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AUTHOR	Bauer, Raymond; And Others
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ABSTRACT

This document reports on Phase II of a major project designed to study how school systems respond to the educational needs of the socially and economically disadvantaged. The report presents the Local Community Control model as the most effective means to change the school board's typical non responsiveness to the needs of the educationally disadvantaged. In so doing, this paper reviews eight schools boards which have incorporated community control into their structure; three in New York City, three in Washington, one in Boston, and one in Chicago. The positions papers that result from this review are guided by the following four questions: 1) How did the community school board come to be? 2) What are its goals? 3) Is the board representative? 4) Is the board's policy making private or public? A striking observation that emerges while considering each board's effectiveness, is that staff personality is an important factor. Accomplishments vary from board to board and are generally modest. For instance, all boards reviewed have increased community participation but have failed to reach the masses of parents, except on specific volatile issues. The most significant accomplishment characteristic of all boards is that they have allowed community members to become politically and socially effective in the face of overwhelming odds and limited power. (Author/AM)

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URBAN EDUCATION:
EIGHT EXPERIMENTS IN COMMUNITY CONTROL

REPORT TO

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

OCTOBER 31, 1969

C-71614

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
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PREFACE

During our first two phases of the study for the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), certain understandings have come to light which are generally applicable to work in this area and which emphasize the social significance of the community control efforts.

First, an inquiry into eight locations often becomes an inquiry of the same people eight times. The community of people involved in these projects is very small and closely knit when compared to the bureaucracies which they confront, confound and frequently cooperate with. The same names appear in several Projects; the prinicpal characters are all professional, if not personal, friends. This leads to widespread dissemination, by word of mouth, from one Project to another, so that each is learning from another's mistakes.

However, this same intensity of involvement, the size of the community, and the immediacy of the issues has led most of the principal characters to feel unable or unwilling to stand back from the Project while he or she writes up the knowledge and understanding gained. Thus, for those outside the community, accurate observations from secondary sources are scant: one must spend a day with each participant to come to an understanding of the Project's workings.

Furthermore, those few secondary sources, written essentially by outsiders or those pausing from the fray momentarily, do not chronicle one vital effect which the Projects have had, namely, the local participants have learned how to be politically and socially effective in the face of overwhelming odds and limited power. Those who have learned have gone on to greater responsibilities and/or to assist in other places beginning with community control, thus continuing to extend the process. This effective participation of its citizens has, of course, always been one of America's most important goals and appears to have immediate practical value in the urban settings of the socially and economically disadvantaged.

Finally, although we have taken "snapshots" of each of the Projects, there are additional items hidden by the subjects on which we have focused for the foreground of our picture and the Projects have continued to operate and function, so that even now some of our information is out of date.

Raymond Bauer
Gary Marple
Ellen Metcalf

Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 27, 1969

REPORT OUTLINE

PART I: THE STUDY, ITS CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

- A. BACKGROUND
- B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
- C. APPROACH
- D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

PART II: POSITION PAPERS ON LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS

- A. THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
- B. THE MORGAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
- C. THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
- D. THE ANACOSTIA DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
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- F. THE OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN NEW YORK CITY
- G. THE IS 201 DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN NEW YORK CITY
- H. THE WOODLAWN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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PART I: THE STUDY, ITS CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. BACKGROUND

One principal hypothesis of how the poverty cycle can be broken is to make school systems responsive to particular educational needs of the socially and economically disadvantaged. While it has been clear that such responses have not been forthcoming it has not been clear as to why the needs have not been recognized or dealt with by school boards. One of OEO's objectives has therefore been to understand how and under what conditions disadvantaged clientele can achieve effective responses to particular educational needs. This has been the focus of our work both for Phase I (reported in January 1969) and the present Phase II, as reported in this document.

In our Phase I study for OEO on representation of disadvantaged clientele, we found that the general pattern of School Board behavior did not readily lend itself to being representative on behalf of the disadvantaged. We isolate four models of change presently being discussed or experimented with in attempting to change this pattern: Local Community Control; Total Community Involvement; setting up a competitive system, as found in American business; and changing present Board behavior. Of the four, we concluded that the model of change which holds the most promise at present is Local Community Control.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

For our Phase II study of the extant Community School Boards we were asked to write up a summary of each, delineating responses to the following four questions:

1. How did the Community School Board come about?

2. What are the goals of the Community School Board?

3. Is the Community School Board representative?

4. Is the Community School Board's policy-making private or public?

The Community School Boards which we have reviewed are:

- In New York City - IS 201, Two Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
- In Washington - Adams, Morgan, and Anacostia.
- In Boston - King-Timilty.
- In Chicago - Woodlawn.

Philadelphia is presently in the process of decentralization and initial experimentation leading toward community control efforts. Therefore, we also briefly reviewed it. However, it is premature as a subject of study and has been excluded from this document.

C. APPROACH

We have undertaken to assemble as much information as possible within the limitations of a contract totaling $7,329. We began by contacting the eight community boards, key participants in each Project, the teachers' unions, central boards and administrators to obtain available printed information such as: studies, minutes of meetings, proposals, requests for grants, position papers and public statements. From this information, plus newspaper and periodical articles, we prepared working memoranda on each project and mailed copies to a few key participants in each Project, asking them to review the document for inaccuracies or omissions.

We then interviewed those participants who had reviewed our drafts, either in personal or by a telephone interview, and made the necessary changes in the papers.

IS 201, King-Timilty, and Morgan are the three papers benefitting most from this approach, in that the persons involved gave extensive consideration to details, and therefore they should be considered as more fully representative of the participants' understandings than the others. This same process gave us considerably more confidence in the overall accuracy of the other five, which received less consideration to detail, because the changes involved, while contributing substantially to the completeness of timing and the perceived impacts of various actions and policies, did not alter the overall understanding or conclusions of the documents.

The position papers for each Project are found as Part II of this report. A preliminary reading of the position papers may give the reader a background of appreciation for the following two sections, which represent a summary and an interpretation of the detailed findings which they contain.

D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Pattern Similarities

In attempting to develop conclusions from eight living experiments in change, one is drawn to the remarkable similarities of pattern and process among them. The eight local boards range widely in terms of board composition, size, and activities, but this only makes the persistence of similarities more remarkable. Also, in the few instances where all Projects have faced a similar problem but only one has been unable to resolve it effectively, the unique difference involved in that one takes on generalizable significance in view of the overall pattern of similarity. It is within this framework of general similarity which highlights apparently significant differences that the findings from the eight position papers have been summarized and conclusions have been developed.

Importance of Personality

The most striking observation is the importance of personality on the Project's functioning. A school like the Morgan School appears to have functioned smoothly and accomplished a great deal under a Ken Haskins, while a Rhody McCoy ran afoul in Ocean Hill, which diverted much of its energies into symbolic issues.

Project Impetus

The source of impetus of the Projects has varied considerably. Although New York's projects were rather hastily formed to prevent reoccurences of street fighting over the IS 201 school, Morgan was rather hastily initiated over a double-sessions issue, and Adams was finally given Project status over corporal punishment and reading scores issues, Anacostia was mandated by a Presidential Committee; Boston began when it learned about USOE funding to the state, and Chicago drew in community people when the University realized it would not receive funding otherwise. The variety of these sources of impetus indicates that the issue of community control has a widespread latent appeal waiting to be activated by any one of many types of events.

Role of the Funding Agency

However, the impetus is not exactly patternless, for here most of all can be seen the tremendous influence of the funding agency. For example, Ford directed Two Bridges (and, to a lesser extent, Ocean Hill and IS 201) toward community control through their funding priorities; USOE influenced the University of Chicago's decision and the Boston School Committee's decision. Merely by being willing to fund certain attempts at innovation and not others, the funding agency influences who will participate, the relationships between participants, their functions, and the types of innovation they attempt (in terms of use of personnel, curricula, training of personnel, etc.).

Role of the University

Apparently in order to give legitimacy and credibility to the Project (and sometimes to satisfy funding requirements - such as in Morgan), a University affiliation is formed early in the history of the Project. King-Timilty/Harvard; Morgan/Antioch; Woodlawn/University of Chicago; IS 201 and, to a lesser extent, Ocean Hill and Two Bridges/Yeshiva, etc. Anacostia does not appear to have strong university ties, although it may have links to Queens College, which is also directly involved in Ocean Hill (and, to a lesser extent, in IS 201 and Two Bridges) through its Institute for Community Studies. (Ocean Hill also appears linked with Brooklyn College, but this appears to be an association by figurehead only.)

However, the University/Project alliance generally disintegrates within a year, due to several factors:

1. The University is generally middle-class in outlook and seeks ways in which the generally Black community can acquire middle-class attitudes and attributes. It emphasizes middle-class curricula and values (placing stress on verbal and written English, for example, as well as order the discipline).

2. The University considers itself a foremost authority in education, better qualified to know what's "right" for the children.

3. The University chooses to work within the system and cannot understand the activists' position on many issues.

4. The University generally, because of its credibility, political astuteness, and (often) control over the funding allocations, is seen as too influential allowing little room for community leadership.

5. The University's need for research and lack of both capability and capacity to deal with the routine, day-to-day functioning of the Project, becomes an alienating force.

6. The Community Board has a need to assert its independence, which multiplies the effect of the above items.

Role of School Personnel

The reactions of the Central Board and the Superintendent show no clear pattern. Strong opposition was experienced in Boston; Ocean Hill had difficulties; but Anacostia has, to date, apparently had full cooperation, as has Chicago. Variations among school boards are apparently so strong that they overshadow the commonality of the issues that arise. Undoubtedly, one of the key variables in this relationship is the divergence of the Project from established regulations and procedures.

Principals have generally played two diverse roles. The white establishment principals have generally confronted the Project; while minority principals (Black, Puerto Rican and Oriental) have generally been supportive and played a vital role in the Projects.

Teachers are more enigmatic in their roles. The unions have all, without fail, given verbal support to the Project, and to its goals. However, in New York the Union became obstructive to the Project. In most areas the Unions have remained generally inactive or unobstructive at best; while moreover individual teachers have not necessarily followed the Union stance. Their reactions appear to be age, not ethnic based. Older teachers, both white and non-white, have resented intrusion into their domain and have resisted the project, causing ill-feelings on both sides. Generally both white and non-white young teachers have supported the project, spurning the union and (in New York) its strikes. Several of the projects are staffed largely with young college graduates (often seeking draft deferrments), ex-Peace Corps and Vista Volunteers.

Role of the Community

The role of the Community follows a fairly stable pattern. Prior to the project, few individuals have been involved in education: PTA (or its equivalent) meetings are characterized by light attendance. Parent groups, if any, have a small core of dedicated individuals, often members of anti-poverty agencies. Generally these same individuals are the core group pressing for community participation and comprise the first council or self-appointed community board. One might say that the poverty programs have played a crucial role by creating nuclei of organizations in an otherwise unorganized community.

Reaching the rest of the community is a long arduous task, which none of the groups have done with any great success. Although generally much improved, attendance and voting behavior still remains woefully light.

Reasons for the difficulty in reaching the community abound. The three most major ones appear to be:

1. Many parents feel powerless to affect their lives. They have become apathetic toward new promises, having watched hopes being dashed before.

2. Other parents are hostile toward the schools. They resent being told their children are inferior (due to their socio-economic background), unteachable, and unmanageable. Furthermore, they have covertly been told that the school is not interested in talking with them or hearing their complaints.

3. The community is not unified simply because it shares the same ethnic, racial, or socio-economic background. Some members, called "activists", no longer support change within the establishment, but prefer more dramatic confrontational change. Middle-class elements (particularly non-white) are very conservative. Afraid they will lose what they have only so recently gained, they oppose issues and actions which appear to change the system. Other elements are moderates, in seeking modifications within the system. These differing philosophies often fragment the community.

The community also lacks the political experience and astute perception of the negotiation process. The weakness leads them into all-or-nothing situations. Unwilling and/or unable to negotiate, this expertise is only slowly mastered (and sometimes spurned); thus opportunities are lost.

Lack of experience with negotiation and other organizational skills has crucial significance in the early phases of these projects because of the plethora of explosive issues involved. Issues which have on occasion provided great difficulty, and which must be assumed to be latent in even those situations in which they have not become active are: job tenure and teacher assignment, the use of paraprofessionals, and control over the schools in confrontation with the unions; control over the running of the schools in confrontation with the central school board; and curriculum, control of the schools, teaching methods, and the role of research in relations with the universities. These points of latent confrontation can be exacerbated by poor press relations, or by internal frictions.

The range of potentially explosive issues is probably greater than those which we have identified. With the variety of such difficult problems so great, any one community school board is certain to have to deal with one or more of them at some early stage of its existence. And, it has been found that mishandling of any one of them can cause difficulties which persist over a long time. They generate scar tissue which disappears only slowly. The lesson is that improved organizational skills and the establishment of greater personal discipline among the participants are among the most important requisites for improving the success of such Projects.

Authority of the Project Board

The question of authority is not clearly answered and has been at the center of most controversies over the eight Project Boards. In terms of formal agreements, all operate under some form of contract or agreement. However, none has local autonomy in a formal sense; all are advisory boards to the central board concerned. Even the advisory status of the Project Board varies, however, Morgan, Adams, and Woodlawn have fairly clearly defined role relationships; the New York Project, King-Timilty and Anacostia do not (the last does not have an elected board yet). King-Timilty and Anacostia have sought to be incorporated, and Woodlaw is examining the possibility so that other relationships can be worked out on a legitimately sub-contracted basis (for example, discretionary use of lump sums by the Project Boards, acceptance of monies from outside funding sources; hiring consultants, etc.).

Informally exercised authority or power runs an even broader gamut, partly depending on the Project Board's relations with both the School Department and the School Board. IS 201 managed to have some control over personnel, for example, at the same time that Ocean Hill was exploding over the same issue. King-Timilty has also managed to have a great deal of informal power, through both confrontation and negotiation, as has Chicago through involving personnel from the Public Schools Department as formally recognized Woodlawn Community Board members. On the other hand, Ocean Hill, which has been the least successful in obtaining a clearly defined role or developing informally exercised power, has nonetheless managed an impressive list of educational accomplishments.

Authority issues generally focus on control over: allocation of funds; hiring and firing of personnel; building construction; maintenance and repair; use of outside funding sources and consultants; and curriculum.

Of the seven Project Boards presently functioning (Anacostia's has yet to be elected) only one appears to have achieved a degree of formally recognized monetary autonomy: King-Timilty, which, due to its incorporation, had authority over a lump sum of $52,000. The other projects have had additional monies provided by outside sources (i.e., Ford and USOE), but the degree of autonomy over its use has been restricted by the Central Boards, who have received the funds, approved their use, and disbursed them. All Project Boards have sought additional fiscal autonomy and continue to do so.

With the exception of the Project Director, none of the Project's have achieved formally recognized autonomous personnel authority, although most have had broad informal powers, some having even circumvented the established certification requirements, with teachers, aides, and (sometimes) principals and assistant principals.

The total subject of physical plant authority has not been tackled by the Project Boards, as far as can be ascertained. Morgan has the right to select the architect for its new school, but three suggested architects have thus far been rejected. Some Central Boards (Boston and Washington, D. C. for example) do not even have authority for new construction.

Adams and Morgan do appear to have curriculum autonomy as set forth in their agreement with the Central Board. The other Projects do not appear to have such autonomy; however, their informal powers here have been considerable. Because student performance in the Project Schools has generally been abyssmal, the Project Boards are generally allowed great latitude in curriculum changes and innovations, even when these changes are outside state regulations (bilingual classes, for example).

Project Goals

Integration is not a goal; given the dynamics of the neighborhoods it cannot be. A quality education is the primary goal, which gets translated into accountability of the school system to its "consumers", the parents. This further translates into community participation (or more boldly, community control). Community participation, as a concept, not only means participation by the community in the schools, but schools serving (participating in) the community. Thus, most Projects envision a community school which is open mornings, afternoons, evenings, weekends, and summers; offers curricula for all members of society (from pre-school to vocational, to remedial, to social education); and it takes an interest in the community providing community resource information, job placement, and so on.

At times symbolic goals,particularly those of authority over personnel become paramount (Ocean Hill's crises were confrontational in nature, seeking to establish such symbolic precedences; and the two Black principals issues in IS 201 and King-Timilty had a similar objective) and risk sapping the Project's finite energies. (King-Timilty started their first school year with little or nothing to show for their efforts educationally.)

The pattern of curriculum goals appears to be stable and similar among Projects Every Project places reading first. This is not surprising: reading scores are sub-normal in the Project areas; improvements here are easily measured; and reading affects all other learning processes. With the exception of Chicago, other priority curriculum efforts aim toward self-awareness, self-esteem; and self-determination (Black culture and awareness courses, for example).

Teacher training and program evaluation are high on the Project list of needs. Projects generally set up training workshops immediately following their funding. Although a great deal is said about program evaluation, there is little evidence that much energy is focused in this direction, with the exception of publishing reading score improvements. (There are several probable reasons for this: many projects are too new; evaluation is difficult and controversial in terms of methods; and, further it requires greater personnel, time, and money resources than the Projects often have.)

The Project Board's Representativeness

The issue of representation is exceedingly difficult to assess. As mentioned above, a very small proportion of the community has become involved in any of the Projects, despite the fact that it is an order of magnitude better than pre-Project involvement.

Moreover, the problem of dealing with the activists and the middle-class elements is universal. Activists have a role, but it is not a sustaining one. They mobilize a large number of people to action over a significant issue and often effect action in this manner. However, they have no patience with the day-to-day activities and negotiations, and soon fade away, until another issue lends itself to confrontation. This in-and-out role of the activists makes it difficult to maintain a coherent, sustained effort. The anxieties of the middle-class, on the other hand, effect a constant drag on the effort. The drag of the middle-class may be intensified by the actions and rhetoric of activists, which may lose middle-class support for the Project out of fears of a "militant take-over". Finite energy resources may thus be expended in a greater proportion over internal resolutions than in Project operation. This energy expenditure, if coupled with external confrontation, leads to virtually no energy available for Project operation (King-Timilty, in its first year of operation, would appear to be a case in point).

So the question becomes, what is the community to be represented? And is representation to be demographically technical or social and cultural? Although most boards are not representative (they cannot be, with such a small percentage of voting), each board has spent a great deal of energy trying to enlist support from the community and each person at least has an opportunity to be involved. The long hours of Project Board members (from most members, some are less committed, as can be seen by their attendance records) testifies to their concern and empathy for the community (although their efforts, at times, might appear misguided).

Another question is - do teachers, principals, and students represent part of the community? Each Project appears to have set up its own definition of community: some boards have set up quotas for each group (Morgan, for example, which finds commitment mixed by group); some have meant to have teachers and principals, but have been unable to maintain them on the Board (e.g., Ocean Hill).

What Have Project Boards Accomplished?

Accomplishments have varied enormously, and have generally been modest, yet all Projects claim a healthier attitude about schools and education.

- All Projects have increased community (specifically parent) participation, but (like their suburban counterparts) have still not reached the mass of parents, except on specific volatile issues.

- All Projects have made use of community people through use of aides (paraprofessionals). Ocean Hill, in particular has made extensive use of Black authority figures and community liaison workers.

- All Projects have set up some training mechanisms, not only for community workers, but teachers. IS 201 and King-Timilty have conducted lecture series for persons wishing to be candidates for the Board.
- All Projects have set up extensive reading programs (although only two - Ocean Hill and Morgan claim measurable results).
- All Projects have experimented with teaching methods - although these experiments run from minor to major attempts (team teaching, ungraded classes, bi-lingual classes, etc.). Ocean Hill in particular has introduced three innovative pre-school teaching methods: Montessori, Bereiter-Engelman, and Leichstershire.
- Several of the Projects have set up different curricula: Black culture courses; African History; Creative Writing, etc.
- Ocean Hill and Morgan have catalogued proof of increased interest in the schools on the part of both teachers and students, in terms of: absentee and tardy figures; vandalism and suspension figures; turnover and teacher waiting list figures.
- The most significant accomplishment of all Projects, however, is the process, whereby local participants have learned to become politically and socially effective in the face of overwhelming odds and limited power.

PART II: POSITION PAPERS ON LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS

A. THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Martin Luther King Middle School and the James P. Timilty Junior High School are located in the Roxbury-North Dorchester areas of Boston.[1] They and their 10 feeder elementary schools serve approximately 4, 500 children,[2] primarily Black (King - 96.7 nonwhite; Timilty - 99.7% nonwhite).[3] The community itself is within the Model City Neighborhood and is characterized by: dilapidated housing (despite a massive Urban Renewal Program, 34% of the Roxbury, North Dorchester dwellings are "deteriorating"; 10% are dilapidated"[4]); high unemployment; "multiple social problems", and a "high welfare caseload". Schools in the area have a high turnover of staff; (King's is 50% a year)[5] students have a poor achievement record; (Reading Tests at King placed students in the fourth to eleventh percentile of all Boston children at the end of the eighth grade; Roxbury children are one and one-half years behind the national norms in the sixth grade)[6] schools are old[7] and maintenance is poor; and there is a lack of communication between home and school.[8] Moreover, the King and Timilty Schools are known as trouble schools, rife with disciplinary problems.[9]

According to Schrag, Roxbury is torn with division and uncertainty. "For every grievance, a new committee is established, each with its own storefront office and its own little board of directors, many of them White intellectuals from the South End or Beacon Hill"[10]. Many parents have withdrawn their children from Roxbury's public schools, either by bussing them (see under Exodus in Section II) or by sending them to privately run schools which have recently sprung up in the area.

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[1] Undated, incomplete draft proposal (Parts II, III, V and Appendices), covering the period July 1-December 31, 1968, Section II, p. 2 (Referenced as Document 1).

[2] Thomas, George B., "Tension: A Tool for Reform", Saturday Review, July 19, 1969, p. 52.

[3] Van Dyne, Larry, "Balance Worsens in Hub Schools", Boston Globe, November 27, 1968, p. 16.

[4] BRA estimates, quoted in Schrag, Peter, Village School Downtown, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967, p. 38.

[5] Queen, Dan, "King Principal Faces Problems", Bay State Banner, November 5, 1968.

[6] Boston Globe, "Black School Students Lag", August 3, 1969; Schrag, Peter, op.cit., p. 162.

[7] Except for the New (September, 1969) Trotter School, Roxbury Schools date from 1937 and earlier. Jackson, Barbara L., The King Timilty Council, The Black Community of Boston, and the Boston Public Schools: An Analysis of Their Relationship, September, 1969, p. 4, an as-yet unpublished manuscript.

[8] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, pp. 2, 3.

[9] Confidential information.

[10] op.cit., p. 41; Jackson, op.cit., p. 6 confirms this statement.

II WHO ARE THE MAJOR GROUPS INVOLVED? HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

Unlike many of the other demonstration areas, Boston parents appear to have formed into several organizations concerning education. However, although parents appear to be involved from the outset, the Council (descibed in succeeding sections) lists parental involvement as a result which was less than expected.[11] A confidential source indicated two problems with parent participation: some parental apathy; a basic split between moderates who wanted the organized, gradual change that comes about through working with the establishment, and the activists, who wanted to confront the establishment and achieve dramatic results overnight.

Home and School Association (HSA)

HSA, a parent-teacher organization has been called a company union. Schrag indicates its administrator is paid by the School Department (it is housed in the same building), has 52,000 'nominal' members (all teachers belong), and represents the most important channel of contact between parents and teachers (there being no PTA in Boston). By charter the presidency alternates between a parent and a teacher. The association does not criticize the administration, the school committee or the conduct of the schools. With few exceptions, neither do the district organizations.[12] The HSA concerned with the King-Timilty project is characterized as a "moribund" with only a handful of members from King and non-existent at Timilty[13] which is represented on the Council and has been highly involved in the project from the outset, representing a moderate voice in decision making.[14]

Parents Education Committee for Better Schools in Roxbury(PEC)

According to a confidential source the PEC began when a group of parents at the Timilty School joined together to work for improvements in the school. A grass-roots organization, it has little outside help which gives it a broader base of parents involved in its actions, but means it lacks a certain expertise in organization and effective action. However, it began a library staffed with volunteers.[15] The PEC merged into the Timilty Council. With official representation on the King-Timilty Council, PEC has provided "active and visible" support as well as developing a Community Education Program.[16] However, Jackson indicated that it had less than 20 active members at the time the Council was formed.[17]

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[11] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 14.

[12] Schrag, op.cit., p. 139.

[13] Jackson, op.cit., p. 4.

[14] Derr, C. Brooklyn, A Resource Exchange Model for Participatory Systems in Education: Five Case Studies, written for the Danforth Foundation School Board Study and the Urban Coalition, an undated, unpublished draft, p. 31.

[15] Jackson, op.cit., p. 7.

[16] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.

[17] Interview with Barbara Jackson, October 22, 1969.

b. Teachers

Although teachers are infrequently mentioned, they appear to be highly supportive of the efforts of the demonstration. More conservative than many parents, they continuously supported using legitimate channels and cooperating with the establishment, not wishing to endanger the project, which they have supported.[18] Teachers are represented on the Council; there appears to be little teacher/parent friction, although Jackson cites Faculty-Council friction as a contributor to student disruptions and inability of the Council to develop major educational programs.[19]

Boston Teachers Union

Through Louis Vangel, their business agent, the union has worked actively with the Council, especially in problems at the King School relating to administration appointments and the selection and training of teachers.[20] Apparently highly supportive of the Council, Vangel indicated union recognition of the Black Principals issue (See later sections) and said the union would be prepared to negotiate with the Council in hopes of achieving "amicable agreement".[21] Nevertheless, "needless to say, the union in Boston, as in other cities, is wary of any efforts that could be seen as threatening to the rights and aspirations of the membership".[22]

c. Students

Among the various decentralized board experiments, this is the only one to mention an organized student group, the Black Students' Union, which appears to have sprung up prior to the council. (There is some question as to its being representative of the majority of students, however.)

Black Students' Union (BSU)

Listed as one of the cooperating agencies, the BSU has been active in both schools, discussing student needs and sending representatives to Council meetings. No students serve on the Council, however, and "... their activities have been met with mixed reactions".[23]

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[18] Derr, op.cit., p. 31.
[19] op.cit., p. 45.
[20] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, pp. 16, 17.
[21] ibid., Appendix C, p. 2.
[22] ibid., Section II, p. 17.
[23] ibid., Section II, p. 16, 19.

d. The School Department

The School Department is seen as collectively resistant to change, inbred, predominantly Irish-Catholic, and bureaucratic in nature.[24] As Thomas stated, "School department officials are willing to accept quite unusual ideas, if the process of negotiation is discreet and quiet. They prefer to handle problems within the bureaucratic structure and across institutional bureaucracies without recourse to the elected school committee." He continues, "the rules of the game are fairly clear. Limited change is allowed, if the would-be changer stays within the private confines of the appointed school department officials. As soon as he steps into public confrontation, he runs the risk of being blocked".[25]

The references made to the School Department seem to place it in a position analagous to the School Committee on issues.[26]

e. The School Committee

The School Committee has legal power over all educational matters within State regulations, although in 1966 authority for new buildings was vested in the Public Facilities Commission (directly controlled by the Mayor).[27]

Chaired by Thomas Eisenstadt during much of the Council's history (and now chaired by his counterpart, John Kerrigan) the five-member elected School Committee appears to be conservative and uncompromising in its attempts to preserve the status quo. Schrag characterizes the School Committee as unable to confront, accept, or solve problems. "Every member of the Committee is an independent operator, playing to his constitutency-internal and external, to the press, perhaps to his own vanity."[28] According to Derr, the School Committee viewed the demonstration "... as another program to be accomodated into the system." He goes on further to state that their objectives as to the Council"s role were conflicting with the Council's objectives.[29] Others have characterized the School Committee as ruthless and shrewd and have pointed out that both Eisenstadt and Kerrigan (who generally follow the same voting pattern) have used the Council as a political backboard for their constituencies: Eisenstadt in his successful bid for Sheriff and Kerrigan for the Chairmanship.[30] Jackson describes the changes of attitude in the School Committee "monumental" from its earlier uncompromising behavior, however.[31]

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[24] Schrag, op.cit., p. 51.
[25] Thomas, op.cit., p. 52.
[26] See Derr, op.cit., p. 30.
[27] Jackson, op.cit., p. 2.
[28] op.cit., p. 66.
[29] Derr, op.cit., p. 30.
[30] Confidential information.
[31] Jackson interview, op.cit.

f. State Department of Education

Although mentioned as one of the cooperating agencies by the Council[32] little mention of the body is made, except by Derr, who indicates it was cited as a third-party mediator in the Black principals issue, and by the Council as attending Council meetings and providing guidelines for programs and financial arrangements.[33]

g. U.S. Office of Education (USOE)

Part of Health, Education, and Welfare, USOE funded the demonstration through ESEA Title III money (which is distributed through the school system). USOE acclaimed the demonstration, calling it the second most exciting community sponsored effort.[34] At the time of the Black principals issue, the Council called for third-party mediators from USOE.[35] Jackson called the Federal role as strong moral support through its funding stipulations.[36]

h. Academia

Harvard University, located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has remained heavily involved from before the outset of the project through its Graduate School of Education and its Pathways to Identity Project. Spencer McDonald, temporary Chairman of the Council through March, 1969, is from Harvard, as is another member of the Council, and several alternate members (Barbara Jackson, for example, having been involved with the minutes, financial reports, and the proposal). Several other graduate students have been actively involved with community activities.[37] Harvard was involved in writing the Title III proposal; Bruce and Rosenthal have been co-directors of the Path-Ways to Identity Project, a study of male adolescents who attend the King School, which was on-going when the project began.[38] According to a confidential source Harvard has maintained a moderate position on the Council. Harvard's position in the project and on the Council has remained a bone of contention among some activists in the community.[39]

The Boston University of Education is also cited as a cooperative agency, having sponsored, in 1968, the NDEA Institute for training community aides. Both Dr. Stanley Wachs and James Howard directed the Institute; Wachs has continued to work with the Council. However, it appears some difficulties have arisen, as the Council states "...better coordination must be achieved in future collaborative enterprises of this kind".[40]

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[32] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.

[33] Derr, op.cit., p. 36; Document I, op.cit., Section II, p. 19.

[34] ibid., p. 29.

[35] ibid., p. 36.

[36] Jackson interview, op.cit.

[37] Document I, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.

[38] ibid., Section II, p. 18.

[39] Jackson interview, op.cit.

[40] Document 1, op. cit., Section II, pp. 16, 17.

Emanual College was notified of a grant under the Education Professional Development Act for a summer institute, in 1969, in linguistics. Although a representative had "officially" indicated willingness to involve King and Timilty teachers,[41] we have no knowledge as to whether or not this institute operated.

i. Education Groups

The Community Education Council (CEC) composed of representatives of 37 different educational organizations, was cited as one of the cooperating agencies. Members of the Council have served on CEC, whose avowed purpose is to take over the public schools in Roxbury by legal means,[42] and who are credited with determining the Target Area for the Project. The Community Council for Educational Development (CCED) has also been listed as cooperating. The group originated in Roxbury (partly funded by the Ford Foundation) and is comprised of both educators and parents. They have managed to skirt the School Department by incorporating and establishing a new school in Roxbury as part of the proposed state network. It is the first school in the country to be run and financed entirely by the State and had a first year $500,000 operating budget.[43]

Operation Exodus has official representation on the Council and is first on the list of cooperating agencies.[44] The Council, in fact, grew out of the efforts of Operation Exodus, a community group in Roxbury, headed by Ellen Jackson and Betty Johnson, that started bussing Black children to underutilized white schools within the city in the fall of 1965. Although organized by Blacks, the group is financed by white suburban money. Schrag calls them middle class, appealing to middle class people with middle class ambitions and attitudes; others condemn them for draining energies away from the local situation. Exodus became very militant and vocal during the Black principals issue, calling the School Department and School Committee "racist",and even calling a Council meeting together.[45] According to a confidential source Exodus often disagreed with the slower, more conservative council and Ellen Jackson the most dynamic leader in Roxbury, could not maintain a heavy commitment to the Council. Exodus has several educational programs, particularly in the summer (including tutoring and African Culture) and is planning a two-building education complex, funded both privately and through the Federal Government.[46]

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[41] ibid., Section II, p. 18.

[42] ibid., Section II, p. 6; confidential information; Jackson, op.cit., p. 6; The School Committee of the City of Boston, An Alliance for Educational Progress, a proposal for Title III funding, May 13, 1968, p. 14.

[43] ibid., Jackson, op.cit., p. 6; Jackson interview, op.cit.

[44] Document I, op.cit., Section II, p. 6.

[45] Derr, op.cit., pp. 31, 34; Thomas, op.cit., pp. 51, 52; Schrag, op.cit., pp. 13, 123, 144; confidential information.

[46] Woods, Dan, "A Portrait of Exodus", (mimeograph publication by Operation Exodus) pp. 8-10: Boston School Committee, Title III Proposal op.cit., p. 14.

j. Community Groups

The New Urban League is second on the list of cooperating agencies.[47] Mrs. Lewis of the New Urban League is credited with suggesting the strategy which was to prove successful in the Black Principals issue, as well as[48] providing activist pressure on specific issues in Council meetings. Accredited as "activist", but dismayed at the inaction of the Council, Mrs. Lewis did not sustain a steady commitment to the Council, according to confidential information.[49] Staff members of New Urban League have attended the Council meetings and participated in deliberations and position developments of the Council.[50]

Listed as supportive of the Council, the Black United Front was also served by Council members.[51] An umbrella organization for community groups, the United Front is privately funded. It has only 2 criteria for membership: that the group's policy-making body be at least 50% Black and that the organization representative to the United Front be black.[52] In April, 1968, this group apparently demanded complete control of police, schools, social services, and businesses.[53]

Roxbury Federation of Neighborhood Centers (Norfolk House) was the subcontractor for the Community Education Program developed by the New Urban League.[54]

The Highland Park Free School (formerly Hawthorne House) offered space for Council meetings and technical assistance prior to the opening of the Council offices.[55]

Other groups also provided facilities space: Charles Street AME Church (for the three-day conference); Roxbury YMCA and Roxbury Boy's Club (for Learning Centers while the King School was closed).[56]

Mrs. Mary Goode, a member of the 18-member Model Cities Board, is an alternate member of the Council; in the Model Cities Proposal the Council was described and suggested as one possible model of parent and community involvement in the schools.[57]

[47] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.
[48] Derr, op.cit., p. 35.
[49] This was confirmed by Jackson, Jackson Interview, op.cit.
[50] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.
[51] Derr, op.cit., p. 34,
[52] Telephone conversation with Mr. Reed of the United Front, October 10, 1969.
[53] Lupe, Alan, "Bureaucracy Shudders at Community Control but Residents are Demanding", Boston Globe, July 6, 1969, p. A3.
[54] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 6.
[55] ibid.
[56] ibid.
[57] ibid., Section II, pp. 16, 19.

k. Business Interests

The Educational Development Center (EDC) resulting from a merger of ESI (Educational Systems Incorporated, with a staff of 400 persons, and a yearly budget of about $11 million) and another organization, is the largest organization in the country devoted to research and development in curriculum.[58] EDC gave the Council technical, clerical and other assistance, as well as meeting space during the time that the Roxbury YMCA and Boy's Club learning centers were in operation; EDC - Council contact has since been renewed in the area of curriculum materials.[59] Behavioral Research Associates provides consultants for teacher training under a contract with Project Read, a reading program developed by them.[60]

l. Predecessors to the King-Timilty Council

In January, 1968, community residents and others, concerned about the state of affairs at the Patrick Campbell Junior High School (now the Martin Luther King Middle School) formed a council, called the Campbell **Coalition**.[61] It was comprised of parents, teachers, and educators but had no funding.

According to an article in the Bay State Banner, an Interim Board of Education was formed in August, 1968, to make policies and programs for schools and to work toward community control.[62]

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[58] Koerner, James D., Who Controls American Education, Boston Beacon Press, 1968, pp. 63, 64.

[59] Document 1, op.cit., Section II, p. 16.

[60] ibid., Section II, p. 12.

[61] ibid., Appendix G., p. 2; Jackson, op.cit., p. 7, cites the presence of Harvards Pathways to Identity team as establishing an early dialogue at the school (1965).

[62] Bay State Banner, "Community Forms own Board of Education", August 21, 1968, p. 1. See Section III of this memorandum for a descrepant viewpoint.

III. HOW DID THE PROJECT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- April 1967 - A teacher was assaulted at the Campbell Junior High School. The School Department suggested armed policemen; local community organizations and parents met and decided to expose the deplorable conditions of the school, as well as the prejudice of teachers and staff which might have lead to such an assault.[63]

- Spring 1967 - A series of meetings was held among: Ellen Jackson (Exodus); Bryant Rollins (militant community leader); Robert Rosenthal, Bernard Bruce, Florence Shelton (Pathways to Identity); and Thomas McAuliffe, Thomas Meacher and William Hennessy (Campbell Principal) of the school system. They discussed the Campbell School's problems and general ideas of solutions. They proposed a coalition of four elements: educators from the Campbell School; parents and community people; students; and researchers.[64]

- September 1967 - The Campbell Coalition (with Exodus as the applicant agency) applied to the Ford Foundation for a grant of $139,500. Mainly written by Spencer MacDonald of Harvard, (who had worked with Exodus on an earlier proposal) the proposal contained the following items: community para-professionals, better and more teachers and administration, greater innovative curricula. The proposal called for a Coalition-School Department partnership, a sharing of decisions. Ford asked the group to get written Boston School Department support of the Coalition.[65]

- Fall 1967 - The Coalition met regularly with school officials over approval of the proposal.[66]

- February 20, 1968 - The Board of Superintendents endorsed the Ford proposal. With only school committee ratification needed before Ford would give the proposal final consideration, the School Department learned of a demonstration grant of $1.5 million available over three years and the Coalition decided to drop Ford for the USOE funds.[67]

- Late February 1968 - The Boston School Committee made rough plans to spread the money thinly over the city, but Federal education authorities wanted the money spent in one school in a ghetto area and with particular emphasis on community involvement. The School Department tentatively decided on the Mackey Elementary School in the South end and the School Department prepared to meet with Federal education officials in March, without communicating the above information to any of the communities involved. However, concerned School Department officials[68] contacted various people in the South end concerned with education and news filtered to Roxbury to Jackson and Melvin King. School officials began to get community and Federal pressure to use the funds in the King-Timilty schools.[69]

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[63] Derr, op. cit., p. 28. A confidential source indicated two teachers were assaulted, one of which was stabbed. Jackson, op. cit., p. 8, cites a series of "alledged" assaults.

[64] Confidential information. Derr, op. cit., p. 29 gives January 1968 as an apparently conflicting date for the formation of the coalition. See also Document 1, op. cit., Appendix G, p. 2. Jackson, op. cit., p. 8 credits Bernard Bruce of the Pathways Project, with helping bring the parties together.

[65] Confidential information. See Derr, op. cit., p. 29; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix G, p. 2, for a conflicting date - March 1968; Jackson, op. cit., p. 8.

[66] Confidential information.

[67] ibid.; Jackson, op. cit., p. 10.

- March 19-20, 1968 - The Washington, D. C., Central Cities Task Force Seminar was attended by representatives of Boston Public Schools.[70]
- March 25, 1968 - A summary of the seminar was distributed to school officials at the Office of Program Development meeting, where it was decided to develop a USOE-type proposal.[71]
- April 1, 1968 - The NDEA Institute was planned in a one-day meeting, after discussions with Lewis, King and Sister Miriam St. John on the proposal planning.[72]
- April 3, 1968 - The first of 6 meetings of the Planning Committee, set up by the School Department, was held to prepare a proposal for Title III funds. Both school department and community representatives were present,[73] including: USOE: the State Department of Education; parents, Model Cities Board members; the Association of Urban Sisters; School Administrators; Operation Exodus personnel, professors from Harvard, Northeastern, Boston University; Urban League representatives; and teachers.[74] A confidential source credits the initiative of the Coalition, plus the already extant Ford proposal, with securing the funds.
- April 11, 1968 - The School Committee, in a special meeting, agreed to act upon HSA's petition and change the name of the Campbell School to the Martin Luther King Jr., School.[75]
- May 13, 1968 - The final proposal, "An Alliance for Education Progress", was approved by the Boston School Committee by 3 to 2 (Eisenstadt and Kerrigan voting against) and submitted to USOE.[76]

[68] We assume Meager and McAuliffe, although not mentioned by name.

[69] Confidential information, Jackson, op. cit., p. 11 places this after the March 19-20 seminar and dates the proposal to Ford, March 1968.

[70] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 1.

[71] Boston School Committee, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. iv.

[72] ibid., p. v.

[73] Jackson, op. cit., p. 11; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 1.

[74] Kundratis, Merelice, "Community-School Plan Seeks Roxbury Accord", The Christian Science Monitor, Second Edition, May 11, 1968, p. 2. Jackson, op. cit., p. 12, indicates other organizations in Roxbury sent letters of endorsement.

[75] Herald Traveler, "Boston School Renames School for King", April 12, 1968. The Boston School Committee Title III Proposal, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 2 gives the date as April 8.

[76] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 1.

- June 6, 1968 - The Interim King-Timilty Advisory Council was constituted on an interim basis and its membership defined.[77] The two councils comprising the King-Timilty Council were self-appointed from the Coalition and PEC and contained only 3 parents of children at the King or Timilty Schools. MacDonald was elected (unanimously) Temporary Chairman. Although this set-up was meant to be temporary, mounting pressures prevented those elections, as will be seen below.[78]

- June 10, 1968 - The Interim Council held a Central Cities Task Force Planning meeting; determined qualifications and job description for the Project Director; and defined recruitment and selection procedures.[79] The position of Project Director was made interim, from summer through January.[80]

- June 11, 1968 - Temporary officers were elected by the Interim Council.[81]

- June 28, 1968 - The Project, after revisions were made, was approved in Washington.[82]

- July 1, 1968 - The Project began.[83]

- July 5, 1968 - The Council heard presentations from community organizations for the Community Education Program.[84]

- July 12, 1968 - The Council chose the Roxbury Federation of Neighborhood Centers (contractors for the PEC) as a subcontractor for the Community Education Program. (A plan to inform the community about Council activities, with $25,000 in funds.)[85]

- July 16, 1968 - The School Department appointed, and the School Committee approved, two white principals (Cornelius Cronin and John Kelly) for the King and Timilty Schools. An announcement was made to the press without consulting the Council, ". . . whose desires for Black principals had been completedly ignored." This action aroused ill feelings both in the Council and in the Community.[86] According to the School Committee, two Black principals were previously contacted but refused (both women felt there was no point in switching schools if their successors were to be white);[87] according to the Council, agreement had been reached prior to this selection that Black Principals would be named to the schools.[88] The Council, according to confidential information, was unwilling to make an all-or-nothing issue of the situation, not wishing to lose funding and uncertain of community support. Activists, according to this same information, took up the issue independently, under the heading 'summer mobilization'. Flyers and canvassing were prevalent; two United Front members wrote the white appointees, asking them to step down, etc. Groups mentioned as active at this point were: Exodus, HSA, Urban League, Citizens for Boston Schools, Association of Urban Sisters, United Front, CEC, Local NAACP Chapter's Association of Afro-American Education, Boston University's NDRA Institute.[89]

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[77] *ibid*. See also Section II, p. 3, and note Section II of this memorandum and the discrepancy as well as the two different terms.

[78] Confidential source; Jackson, *op. cit*., pp. 14, 15. For a list of interim Council Members see Appendix A of this document and also Document 1, *op. cit*., Appendix G, p. 2. Jackson indicates the Timilty people decided to use university people on a Technical Advisory Committee, which disbanded after meeting a few times over the summer.

[79] Document 1, *op. cit*., Appendix B, p. 1.

[80] Jackson, *op. cit*., p. 16. She also states that only 7 applications were received and that local organizations did not put up candidates.

[81] Document 1, *op. cit*., Appendix B, p. 2.

[82] *ibid*., Appendix B, p. 1; Jackson, *op. cit*., p. 13.

[83] *ibid*.

[84] Document 1, *op. cit*., Appendix B, p. 2.

[85] *ibid*., Jackson, *op. cit*., pp. 18, 19.

- July 19, 1968 - At a Council meeting, members expressed their unhappiness with the appointments. More militant members wanted dramatic action in retaliation; more moderate members (teachers, HSA, and some parents) wanted to try legitimate means to change the decision or to accept it and get on with the program. This difference of opinion almost paralyzed the group. According to Jackson, however, the council decided it must take a stand.[90] A committee was formed by Chairman MacDonald to formulate a press release objecting to the appointments.[91]

- July 23, 1968 - The Council met, discussed, and approved the statement and copies were released to the Superintendent of Schools, members of the School Committee, press, and "appropriate" community people. The statement proclaimed a strong council stand, listing sound educational reasons for the Black principals desire, and demanded reconsideration.[92]

- July 29, 1968 - The Boston School Committee met in public meeting. The Council had requested that the issue be placed on the agenda but didn't know it was on the agenda until it was taken up. The Committee's position was that the white principals were at the head of the promotion rating list (which has very few Blacks), were appointed on their merits;

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[86] Derr, *op. cit.*, p. 31. For a discrepant date, see Document 1, *op. cit.*, Appendix G, p. 2, where the date given is July 29, 1968.

[87] McCain, Nina, "Two Blacks Reject Principal Jobs", *Boston Globe*, July 18, 1968.

[88] Confidential source. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 20 differs here, saying the Superintendent did not see the seriousness of the issue and contended there was nothing he could do since no Blacks were on the list.

[89] Confidential information; Cooper, William, "Parents Slam School Board at Hearing on Principals", *Herald Traveler*, July 30, 1968; Cooper, William, "Black Principals Dispute Compromise Offered", *Herald Traveler*, August 14, 1968, p. 6; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[90] *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[91] Derr, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 32. See also Document 1, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, p. 2.

[92] Derr, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Document 1, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, p. 2. The press release is dated July 24.

and the School Committee would not change this. The Council, in a two-hour debate, pleaded for consideration, using educational arguments, and finally threatened violence in the schools in the Fall if some considerations were not given. The Council finally walked out of the meeting.[93]

- July 31, 1968 - The Council met in Executive Session to discuss alternatives. ". . . this open affront had been very effective for militants because it exposed the establishment for what it was. The tremendous gap between militants and more conservatives began to narrow. However, the conservatives still controlled things and voted to continue to go on record, in the press and elsewhere, as not supporting the White principals, but willing to make every attempt to continue on and creatively make the program work."[94] At this meeting Gerald Hill was recommended for Interim Project Director.[95]

- July-August 1968 - According to Derr, community organizations were holding meetings at this time over the issue. They put tremendous pressure on the Council and organized a school outside the system. They ". . . began to see this issue as reason for major confrontation with the establishment. Community control of the schools was at stake and they exerted every pressure to push for it." In fact, Derr stated that even Council meetings became more a forum for community spokesmen than for the Council's business.[96] Apparently, plans were being laid in closed meetings for a takeover of the Timilty School when classes resumed. This information was leaked to the press, which gave it heavy coverage. Thus, although these groups were never highly organized, the threat of violence had its effect on the School Department. At this time, the Council apparently played an important part in persuading Superintendent Ohrenberger, who was concerned about the Title III funds, to make some concessions.[97]

- August 7, 1968 - Four committees were established by the Council (Staff Orientation; Student Morale; Special Education; and Reading).[98] The Council sent the Superintendent their recommendation of Gerald Hill for Project Director.[99]

- August 9, 1968 - Liberal Boston School Committeeman Paul McDevitt issued a press statement calling for a new look by the committee at the community control issue and stating, "I am for 'community control' in all parts of our city . . ."[100]

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[93] Derr, op. cit., pp. 32, 33; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 2; McCain, Nina, "Parents, Board Clash on Black Principals", Boston Globe, July 30, 1968, p. 8.

[94] Derr, op. cit., p. 33.

[95] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 2. However, in Section II, Appendix B, p. 4, mid-August is given as a date.

[96] Derr, op. cit., pp. 33, 34.

[97] Confidential information.

[98] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 3.

[99] Jackson, op. cit., p. 17.

[100] Document 1, op. cit., as quoted in Section II, p. 15.

- August 14, 1968 - Paul Tierney, the other liberal committeeman, called a special School Committee meeting and requested that Black principals be appointed, citing unusual circumstances, and that the principals be recruited from outside the system. This was defeated. The decision was that the power to nominate principals rested with the Superintendent. The contract for the Community Education Program was approved.[101]

- Mid-August 1968 - The Council wrote letters to two white principals, asking them to resign, not for personal reasons, but because of the issues at stake. They refused. Around this time the Council held a series of community strategy meetings which were ". . . most often held in secret".[102] At this time, the Model Cities Agency apparently offered to help find Black principals for King and Timilty.[103]

- August 21, 1968 - The Council met "after a frantic week of daily emergency meetings". At the meeting, described as "crucial", community members spoke about the need for action. Mrs. Lewis, of the New Urban League, hinted at violence (children burning down the school) and other representatives gave the Council until September 4 to get Black principals for the schools. A possible boycott was mentioned. Some council members still held out for making things work, but they gave in and Mrs. Lewis suggested the strategy of the press release which would put the Council on a new plane, as a negotiating partner with the School Department, demanding that negotiations be resumed and a stalemate would necessitate the use of third-party mediators (USOE and the State Department of Education).[104]

- August 29, 1968 - The Council met with the Superintendent of Schools, and prepared a press statement indicating the meeting was inconclusive.[105]

- August 31, 1968 - The Council decided not to release the statement to the press.[106]

- September 3, 1968 - The day before School opened Superintendent Ohrenberger issued a news release calling on the school committee to change the principal appointments for fear of a serious confrontation between the community and the school.[107] The BTU voted 161 to 74 to oppose the Black Principals,[108] but proposed no further action or any threats. The School Committee announced the reassignment of the White principals on their request; acting principals were appointed (Joyce at the King School and Owens at the Timilty School) by the School Committee; and the Committee recommended that the Council be asked to screen and recommend people for permanent principals, but this last item was rejected by the School Committee.[109]

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[101] Derr, op. cit., p. 34; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 6; Cooper, William, "Black Principals Dispute . . .", op. cit., p. 6.

[102] Derr, op. cit., p. 34; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 6. See under July 16, 1968 for a discrepant viewpoint.

[103] McCain, Nina, "Park[s] Vows to Get Black School Aides", Boston Globe, August 16, 1968.

[104] Derr, op. cit., pp. 35, 36; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 3. See Appendix B of this memorandum for the press release.

[105] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 3.

[106] ibid.

[107] ibid., Appendix B, pp. 3, 6. See also Appendix D of Document 1; Herald Traveler "Text of Superintendent Ohrenberger Proposal", September 4, 1968, p. 16. See Appendix C of this memorandum for Kerrigan's press release.

[108] McCain, Nina, "Two Blacks Get Principal Jobs in Roxbury", Boston Globe, September 4, 1968; Jackson, op. cit., p. 24.

- September 1968 - On several occasions the Timilty School had minor disorders. Having achieved its aim the 'summer mobilization' shifted its attention to a King-Timilty feeder school, the Gibson School (which will not be considered in this report). The Council reportedly had spent so much energy on the Black Principals issue that it was unprepared for the school opening; schools were described as follows: "dark and dingy" corridors; unpainted classrooms; poorly lit cafeteria, etc.; there were no curriculum programs; and the ten new aides in each school had uncertain roles and weren't yet approved by the School Committee.[110] A target of militants, the Council lost some prestige and legitimacy in the community as it had not developed significant programs, etc. As it did not receive funds until January 1969, it felt its position to be precarious.[111]

- September 13, 1968 - The Council announced receipt of the first installment ($75,000) of the USOE grant.[112]

- September 19, 1968 - A permanent nine-member Personnel Committee was established (six parents, two teachers, and one community representative); a chairman was appointed; and an information paper on the Council was distributed.[113]

- September 26, 1968 - The School Committee approved the appointment of Gerald Hill as Project Director at a salary of $16,500 and 16 teacher aides were appointed.[114] The Council held a meeting at the Timilty School to explain its program to staff.[115]

- End of September, 1968 - The grant for the Community Education Program was received.[116]

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[109] Jackson, op. cit., p. 23.

[110] ibid., p. 25.

[111] Confidential information.

[112] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 3. This is inconsistent with the confidential information indicating no funds were received until January 1969.

[113] ibid., Appendix B, p. 4.

[114] Keeley, Bob, "Student Voice in Dress, Clubs Okayed by Board", Record American, September 27, 1968; Document 1, op. cit., Section II, p. 4, and Appendix B, p. 4. This same document gives the discrepant date of September 23 on page 6 of Appendix.

[115] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 4.

[116] The School Committee of Boston, "An Alliance for Educational Progress", August 1, 1969, Appendix A, p. 2. (Hereafter referenced as Boston School Committee Title III Proposal [2])

- October 7, 1968 - The Council authorized Hill to act on behalf of the Council in legal, as well as other matters. A discussion was held on the role of the Council vis a vis the Black United Front, Black Student Union, and Gibson Concerned Parents.[117]

- October 16, 1968 - The Timilty Council's Technical Advisory Committee met with the Black Student Union on needs of the students.[118] The Black Student Union held a Liberation Day Program outside the schools for students, "to liberate and educate the minds of black students to think black".[119]

- October 17, 1968 - At the Council meeting: a report was given on the Detroit conference; nine people were chosen to go to Washington to observe Project Read; Lionel Lindsay was approved as an accountant for the Council ($150 plus a monthly fee of $50, starting November 1); Barbara Jackson was retained as a Resource Consultant to assist in preparing a supplementary proposal; the Chairman was empowered to appoint an Election Committee; and authorized payment of program money for each school to purchase materials on Black History at $340 per set.[120]

- October 23, 1968 - A series of false fire alarms, wastebasket fires, and other student disorders resulted in suspended classes at the King School at 12:15.[121] A confidential source indicates that outsiders, students and non-students alike, were partly responsible for these disorders, and that community activists may have been condoning this behavior. At an evening School Committee meeting, the Committee voted 4 to 1 to reopen the school the next day, despite teacher protests.[122]

- October 24, 1968 - John Cunningham was nominated Assistant Project Director for the Timilty School.[123]

- October 29, 1968 - The Council had a special meeting with the faculty of the King School.[124] At this point the King School had become chaotic, with serious vandalism and destruction. Students were uncontrollable. The school was closed early for two days and completely closed for another day.[125]

- October 30, 1968 - King Council met with King Faculty to plan a three-day conference, and decided a procedure for electing student representatives.[126]

[117] ibid.

[118] ibid., Appendix B, p. 7.

[119] As quoted in the Herald Traveler, "'Liberation' Program Cuts Blacks' School Attendance", October 17, 1968.

[120] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 4.

[121] McCarthy, W. J., "King School Reopens Today", Herald Traveler, October 24, 1968, pp. 1, 2.

[122] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 4.

[123] ibid., Appendix B, p. 5. Here again, Section II, p. 4 gives November as the date

[124] ibid., Appendix B, p. 5.

[125] Confidential information.

[126] Confidential information. Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 5.

- November 6-8, 1968 - The King School was closed while the King School Planning Conference was held. Present at the Planning Conference were: teachers, parents, students, community leaders, and school officials. It apparently resulted in a productive exchange if ideas. Cooperation was achieved among the Council, the Urban League, and the School Department in response to the BTU's demand that improvements be made in the schools. Innovations accepted by the groups were: student monitors, in the King School, assemblies at areas of student interest, field trips within the community, Afro-History and Culture, Black community speakers, Deans for both boys and girls as well as many others. Activists, fearing nothing would come of the conference proposed a King Cabinet, composed of 21 members: six parents, five students, five community leaders, and five teachers - to run the King School in cooperation with the Principal, a community liaison principal, and the two deans. The idea passed on a strong vote (although Project Director Hill voted against the measure) and a temporary Cabinet was elected. Community members were: Melvin King (New Urban League); Bryant Rollins; William Owens; concerned parents of the Gibson School; Julia Owens and William Kinsay (both King aides).[127] This Cabinet drew back some of the community's more effective leaders.[128] On November 7, John Joyce, Principal of the King School, resigned, claiming nervous exhaustion.[129] (The Council recommended Alvin Fortune, a teacher in the Newton Public Schools, after having made unsuccessful overtures to Rollins Griffith.)

- November 12, 1968 - The King School reopened, with King Cabinet members directing operations. Some innovations were put into operation and the day proceeded smoothly, although student attendance was low.[130] The School Committee voted to bar all unauthorized persons from the King School and Eisenstadt declared the Cabinet unauthorized.[131]

- November 13, 1968 - Police barred Cabinet members from entering the King School. The Urban League denounced the School Committee for thwarting attempts at solving the King crisis. The Council also was attacked by militants as being in collusion with the School Committee. Once again loathe to put their funds on the line the Council protested the barring of Cabinet members, but did not take action.[132] Mayor White came out against Community Control, favoring greater mayoral powers and an appointed School Committee to serve conterminously with the Mayor.[133]

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[127] Jackson, op. cit., p. 27.

[128] Confidential information; Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 5 gives November 19 as the date.

[129] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 5; McCain, Nina, "King Principal Quits Strife-Torn School", Boston Globe, November 8, 1968; Jackson, op. cit., p. 26.

[130] Confidential information.

[131] Auerbach, Alexander, "King School 'Cabinet' Vetoed by Hub Committee", Boston Globe, November 13, 1968, p. 1. Jackson, op. cit., p. 28 indicates few were actually banned from the school but the action destroyed the Cabinet's authority.

[132] Confidential information.

[133] Herald Traveler, "Total Community School Control in Boston is Opposed by White", November 14, 1968.

- November 14, 1968 - The King School was closed,[134] as school disruptions rose to new heights. At this time the school was suffering high teacher absenteeism, as well as substantial student attrition as parents placed their children in other schools.[135] The BTU threatened a teacher strike city-wide if the School Committee and School Department didn't help solve the crisis without going outside the Boston system; teachers all turned in transfer requests so the new principal could transfer incompetents; and teachers requested that King begin operations with only permanent teachers.[136]

- November 18, 1968 - Interviews began for King principal; Alvin Fortune and David Owens were recommended for Principal Pro Tempore of the King and Timilty Schools, respectively; Thomas Cummings, Emma Reavis and Warren Brown recommended for assistant principals; and a motion was passed not to open the King School until November 21, 1968.[137] At this time the Council was pressing for another Black Principal, but did not have wide community support. Although the School Department did ask for a list of names, it rejected them all as being either unqualified or outside the system.[138]

- November 19, 1968 - Exodus officials called a meeting, at which they talked of taking over King School.[139]

- November 21, 1968 - The King School reopened, under a phasing plan where each day a grade returns.[140] However, the School Department renigged on promises to include the two community groups in the planning and reopening by vesting full responsibility in a Committee of ten teachers. The Council refused to cooperate unless they had a hand in planning.[141]

- December 3, 1968 - The Boston School Committee voted to appoint John Bradley, a White disciplinarian, as King Principal. Eugene Ellis' nomination was approved as Assistant Project Director of the King School. John Bradley's appointment was rejected by the Council, which reaffirmed the need for a Black principal.[142]

- December 5, 1968 - The King School was closed due to disorders. The School Committee accepted the Council's Working Paper, which declared a moratorium on reopening the school until February. The Council lost support of the King Cabinet at this point and student attrition continued. Feeling betrayed, the Council debated pulling out of Title III. The Council and Cabinet set up Learning Centers with the sanction of both the School Committee and the School Department. The Learning Centers proved successful and achieved favorable publicity.

[134] *Herald Traveler*, "King School Closed at Teachers' Request", November 14, 1968.

[135] Confidential information.

[136] Cooper, William, "King School May Reopen", *Herald Traveler*, November 15, 1968; Auerbach, Alexander, "Solution for King School: Moderate Concessions For all", *Boston Globe*, November 16, 1968, p. 9.

[137] Document 1, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, p. 5.

[138] Confidential information.

[139] *ibid*.

[140] *Herald Traveler*, "Officials 'Encouraged' as King School Reopens", November 22, 1

[141] Confidential information.

[142] Document 1, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, p. 6; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 26. (A confidenti source gives the date one day earlier)

The School Committee recognized the Cabinet to the extent of meeting with it and the Council in Executive Session.[143]

- December 11, 1968 - Council incorporation was approved. A report on the Learning Centers was presented. A motion passed not to recognize the committee of ten teachers from the King School.[144]
- December 12, 1968 - The Project Read Proposal was submitted.[145]
- December 18, 1968 - A letter was sent to Eisenstadt from the Cabinet requesting that the King School not reopen until February 15; that the Cabinet be the recognized administrative authority (with the Council coordinating funds); that the Cabinet negotiate local contracts with unions; that elections be held for a more representative Cabinet; and that the Learning Centers be allowed to continue. This was ignored.[146]
- December 23, 1968 - The School Committee approved a subcontract with the Council for expending part of the USOE funds, increased the Director's salary and issued a directive that the Council coordinate plans for reopening the King School.[147]
- December 26, 1968 - Six months after the start of the Project, the Council was given $52,850, deposited in a Roxbury Bank, part of the subcontracted funds for Council member payments and monies for outside consultants, etc.[148]
- December 30, 1968 - Meetings among the Council, the Cabinet, and the Committee of Ten Teachers resulted in a controversial document, not supported by all, espousing community control. This document was never formally "adopted" although it was "endorsed".[149]
- January 1969 - The Timilty School instituted Project Read.[150]
- January 7, 1969 - The Boston School Committee demanded that the first phase of the King School be reopened by January 20.[151]
- January 9, 1969 - Owens was nominated Principal Pro Tempore.[152]

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[143] Confidential information.

[144] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 6.

[145] ibid., Section III, p. 25.

[146] Confidential source.

[147] Document 1, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 6.

[148] Jackson, op. cit., p. 18.

[149] ibid., pp. 29, 30.

[150] Document 1, op. cit., Section II, p. 12.

[151] Auerbach, Alexander, "King School to Open With Only 1 Grade", Boston Globe, January 9, 1969, pp. 1, 20.

[152] Boston School Committee, Title III Proposal (2), op. cit., Appendix D, p. 2.

- January 13, 1969 - The Continuation Grant Application was submitted; the Election Committee met for the first time; the Council was given the right to screen teachers for a reopening of King School and to participate in curriculum planning and organizational changes.[153]

- January 15, 1969 - The proposal for a Continuation Grant for Title III funding was submitted.

- January 20, 1969 - Despite a bomb scare and a teacher assault, the King School opened,[154] with a new cluster curriculum which featured team teaching, student electives, and longer periods, called "time zones".[155]

- January 23, 1969 - BTU presented seven demands, which the School Committee granted, under threat of all teachers transferring from King. The demands were: that teachers be relieved of all security assignments; that King have a full time nurse, adjustment counselor, music teacher, two physical education teachers, and a school secretary; and that eight aides be relieved of part of their security work.[156]

- January 31, 1969 - Application for a $500,000 Continuation Grant was approved by the School Committee.[157]

- February 7, 1969 - The last grade was phased into the King School.[158]

- February 18, 1969 - The School Committee announced Owens' appointment as Principal Pro Tempore and approved Hall (consultant), Selden and Le Beau for satellite center staff.[159]

- February 19, 1969 - The first of 10 lectures for parents wishing to run for election was given. Parents, to be eligible, were to attend 5 of the 10 lectures.[160]

- March 1969 - Washington approved the Continuation Grant. Nonetheless because each planned program had to be considered separately, only Project Read and a Satellite Supplementary Center for King were in operation by June. Almost $200,000 was lost, but others not becoming operational.[161]

- March 24, 1969 - Council elections were held for one-year terms. Snowstorms and poor parent organization had previously hindered attendance at the ten qualifying lectures.[162] Parents elected six

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[153] ibid., Appendix D, p. 2; Appendix C, p. 1.

[154] Auerbach, Alexander, "King School Reopens Despite Bomb Scare", Boston Globe, January 21, 1969, p. 2.

[155] Herald Traveler, "King School Reopens for 157 Pupils", January 20, 1969, p. 14

[156] Herald Traveler, "New King School Crisis Averted", January 24, 1969.

[157] Jackson, op. cit., p. 31.

[158] Boston Globe, "All is Well at King School", February 7, 1969, p. 6.

[159] Boston School Committee Title III Proposal (2), op. cit., Appendix D, p. 8.

[160] Herald Traveler, "New King-Timilty Council Proposed", February 16, 1969, p. 12
Bay State Banner, Editorial, February 20, 1969, p. 4.

[161] Jackson, op. cit., p. 31.

[162] The King-Timilty Advisory Council, A Proposal For Financial Assistance Concern Field Trips for the Martin Luther King and the James P. Timilty Schools, June 4, 1969.

Timilty parent representatives; five King parent representatives; and ten parents from the feeder schools. Since a King parent and a feeder parent were not elected, special elections were to be held in the Fall. Of 2700 parents affected, 800 registered, and 116 voted (another version says 119 voted out of 1,000 eligible). The Council spent $25,000 on community organizations and $4,000 on the election. Only one parent was a member of the Interim Council; all six community members were former Council members. John Selden became Council Chairman.[163]

- April 10, 1969 - Student turned in five successive false alarms.[164]

- April 1969 - USOE approved the Continuation Grant for the completion of the first year of the program.[165]

- May 28, 1969 - A fire damaged a King classroom. The final report of the Community Education Program was submitted.[166]

- June 1, 1969 - A special council meeting was held. Massachusetts Negro Educators' Association was supported in their contention that no recommendations be made until the King principalship was made permanent.[167]

- June 4, 1969 - The Council submitted a funding proposal for field trips.

- Week of June 8, 1969 - The King Timilty School voted to disband unless a Black male principal of their choice was appointed to the King School. Superintendent Ohrenberger announced, however, he would continue to appoint new principals from the rating list.[168]

- Week of July 7, 1969 - Rollins Griffith, president of the Massachusetts Negro Educators Association, was made Principal Pro Tempore of the King School.[169]

- August 1, 1969 - The Second Continuation Grant proposal was submitted.

- August 31, 1969 - Gerald Hill resigned as Project Director and became Assistant Principal at the Timilty School.[170]

- September 9, 1969 - A suit was filed against the School Committee by Benjamin Scott and William Owens who charged the at-large elections with being unconstitutional. They ask that district voting be instigated and that local boards be set up for Roxbury Schools.[171]

[163] Confidential information; Auerbach, Alexander, "Own Problems Hurt Council", Boston Globe, April 13, 1969; Van Dyne, Larry, "King-Timilty Council Elected", Boston Globe, March 25, 1969; Jackson, op. cit., p. 32. See Appendix D for voting behavior.

[164] Auerbach, Alexander, "Alarms Mar King Peace", Boston Globe, April 11, 1969.

[165] Boston School Committee Title III Proposal (2), op. cit., Part II, p. 1.

[166] Boston Globe, "Fire Damages King School Room", May 28, 1969.

[167] Boston School Committee Title III Proposal (2), op. cit., Appendix D, p. 9.

[168] Boston Globe, "King School Fight May Kill New Plan", July 1, 1969; Jackson, op. cit., pp. 30, 31.

[169] McCain, Nina, "He's Part of the Community", Boston Globe, July 27, 1969, p. 2A.

[170] Telephone conversation with a Council Member, October 2, 1969; Jackson, op. cit., p. 59.

[171] McCain, Nina, "Election Roadblock Filed by Hub Blacks", Boston Globe, September 9, 1969.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL HAVE?

Formal

Formal powers are scant and advisory only, being subject to veto and final authorization from the School Committee;[172] however, some are better defined than were found in New York, for example. According to Derr, the Title III proposal sets up a "partnership of sorts" between the Council and the School Department:

- The Council has the power to initiate recommendations for the spending of monies. Without recommendations the School Department can't spend the money.
- However, the money has to come through the School Department.
- The Council also has the power to present a candidate list to the School Department, from which list the School Department will choose the Project Director, two assistant directors, and a consultant.
- The Boston School Committee, as the Chief policy-making body in the city, must approve all action taken by the School Department and the Council.[173]

Informal

Early definitions of powers were lacking, however, and the School Department tended to see the Council as advisory only. "Early in the summer it became obvious that the 'establishment' was not about to relinquish much real power to this Council."[174]

But the Council, by pursuing strategies and issues has managed to secure certain concessions. It fought successfully for a Director's salary increase and for Black principals. It incorporated and thus was able to obtain a subcontract from the School Department for certain of the Title III funds. It became recognized as a legitimate voice when it was heard in a School Committee meeting on the Black Principals issue.[175] It also selected the Project Director (although the normal school channels were used to secure the position). It had power to select the community aides (but the school committee refused to appoint some of these aides).[176]

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[172] Jackson, op. cit., p. 43.

[173] Derr, op. cit., p. 30.

[174] ibid.

[175] According to Document 1, op. cit., Section II, p. 10, this was the first time the School Committee had discussed administrative appointments with any community group. Jackson, op. cit., p. 44, indicates the Council, due to vague wording of the Title III Proposal, could have achieved other concessions had it been more experienced in these areas, particularly in curriculum improvements.

[176] Jackson, op. cit., pp. 15, 46.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL?

According to the Council, "the dominant issue is how to change the schools." Since some groups don't believe change can be achieved if the community has merely an advisory role,[177] the secondary issue becomes community control and broad community participation.

Thus the Central Cities Task Force proposal defined two major objectives:

1. Improvement of community-school relations which will encourage parental participation in school decisions.
2. Evolving programs to meet the needs of the entire community including adult education.[178]

In order to achieve these objectives, the Council views itself as having several functions to perform: (1) planning and implementing innovative educational programs; (2) marshalling and coordinating all available funding and service resources; and (3) designating priorities, as well as continuous planning and implementation of programs to meet critical needs.[179]

Because of the Black principals issue there is much talk of "Black Power" in Boston, yet the Council goals of that issue have been clearly defined: "The issue was clearly one of taking a stand so that this program would have a chnane to have a real say in the schools."[180]

Educational priorities are fairly complementary to other districts: Reading; Black awareness and History; Physical Education and Recreation; Supplementary Reading Centers; Special Education; Field Trips and Community Awareness; and Staff Training.[181]

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[177] Document 1, op. cit., Section II, pp. 9, 10.

[178] ibid., Section II, p. 1.

[179] ibid., Section II, p. 2.

[180] Derr, op. cit., pp. 31, 32. Jackson, op. cit., p. 37, indicates that control over the schools gives legitimacy to and political expression of the Black Community (a non-geographically defined grouping of Blacks). We are uncertain as to whether this is a personal observation or tied into King-Timilty goals.

[181] See Appendix E of this memorandum for programmatic objectives listed in the first Title III Proposal.

VI. IS THE KING-TIMILTY BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

Although the Interim Council (non-elected) was seen by Derr as representative of all parties,[182] a look at Appendix A of this document will show the earlier King and Timilty councils to be over-representative of various groups. All Timilty parent members are from the PEC (6); King parents (4) are half from Exodus; half from the HSA. Only three were parents of children presently in the school. The Interim Council viewed itself as having had some success in the representational process, but is somewhat defensive.[183]

Although the Council has expected to contact every parent in the first section, it asserted it was thwarted by a lack of accurate records. Although it used many approaches to reach parents, none were as successful as had been hoped: "Parents and community people were hired to organize the community and parents meetings were held at the schools. Although parent participation was 'less than expected' in terms of opening avenues of communication between the school, community and home, the Council has had a measure of success."[184] Yet our confidential source kept referring to militant disenchantment and lack of community support for the Council.

Despite the fact that some representation of local viewpoints were afforded by the Council, and this in itself is a significant step forward, the base of representation is limited. The militants do not appear as members of the earlier King and Timilty Councils. Similarly, students do not have representation as in the Washington, D. C. community boards. And, out of an estimated total of 2700 families potentially affected by the Council's fact of representation, only 800 registered to vote and less than 120 actually cast a ballot.

But the new elections did change the power base somewhat. Parents were parents of children in the schools; they chose community representatives who were not heads of organizations; they chose two Harvard members; non-university members became officials of the Council (thus breaking what some Black activists considered to be the Harvard stranglehold).[185]

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[182] op. cit., p. 30.

[183] Jackson, op. cit., pp. 40, 41, notes with some validity that their feelings of representation must not be minimized since they are the ones who have devoted the time and effort to the Project and are thus 'representative' of concerned parents.

[184] Document 1, op. cit., Section II, pp. 6, 8, 13. Jackson, op. cit., p. 19 indicates that the PEC had serious problems in its attempts to inform the community: inexperience, poor organization, lack of direction from the Council, and delay in receiving the grant, incorrect names and addresses, and confusion in strategies and ideology among groups in the community over the Black Principals issue. In an interview she also stated that lack of charismatic Black leadership and the feeling of futility were factors. Jackson interview, op. cit.

[185] Jackson, op. cit., p. 42.

VII. WHAT HAS THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL ACCOMPLISHED?

- Its biggest accomplishment has been to achieve a certain measure of legitimacy in being recognized by the establishment. Derr credits the council with: leadership, money (it pays Council members $7.00 day), good press relations, influential contacts, good organization, popular support, a strong ideologic and symbolic base, and a fair communications network.[186]

- It has set up new curricula, such as Project Read.

- It has trained paraprofessionals to work in classrooms.

- During the King School closing it kept education of the children continuing through Learning Centers.

- It has aroused the interest and participation of certain segments of the community.

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[186] op. cit., p. 44.

VIII. IS THE KING-TIMILTY COUNCIL'S POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

Derr indicated that sensitive issues had been handled by the Council in secret.[187] This has been confirmed by confidential information, and the Council itself indicated it had accomplished "techniques for arriving at consensus."[188]

However, the same document indicates that detailed minutes have been kept as a record of the Council's actions.[189] And similarly, Thomas indicates that it is ". . . seeking change by pressing for control over decisions so far held to be the exclusive province of the elected school committee responding to the recommendations of its appointed officials; . . . it is pressing publicly without being in the conventional private style."[190]

This issue is perhaps resolved by Jackson, who credits the Council with increased political sophistication in knowing when to deal with an issue privately (in executive session) and quiet negotiation and when to mobilize public support.[191]

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[187] ibid.; Jackson, Gerald, and Aldrich, Bob, "Trouble Predicted in Principal Row", Record American, August 3, 1968, mention a 3 1/2 hour secret council session.

[188] Document 1, op. cit., Section II, p. 6.

[189] ibid., Section II, p. 5.

[190] op. cit., p. 52.

[191] Jackson interview, op. cit.

APPENDIX A

MEMBERS OF THE KING-TIMILTY SCHOOL COMMUNITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE KING TIMILTY SCHOOL COMMUNITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

KING COUNCIL

Voting Members

Bernard Bruce, Harvard University
Thomas Cummings, Teacher
Mary Holman, Teacher
Jacqueling LeBeau, Operation Exodus
Spencer MacDonald, Harvard
Armando Martinez, Teacher
Louise Whitehead, Home-School Assn.
Ronald Worthum, Operation Exodus
Alice Yancey, Home-School Assn.
Principal

Alternate Members

Louis Battaglia, Teacher
Barbara Jackson, Harvard
Ellen Jackson, Operation Exodus
Webster Lewis, Teacher
Louis Palena, Teacher
July Rollins, Operation Exodus
Robert Rosenthal, Harvard
John Salden, Home-School Assn.
Judd Watkins, Operation Exodus

TIMILTY COUNCIL

Voting Members

Mildred Atkinson, PEC
Ruth Gordon, Teacher
James Howard, Teacher
Jessie Jones, PEC
John Meara, Teacher
David Owens, Principal
Queen Powell, PEC
Bernard Powell, PEC
Patricia Raynor, PEC
Doris Tillman, PEC

Alternate Members

Mildred Battey, PEC
Mary Goode, PEC

Staff

Gerald Hill, Interim Project Director
John Cunningham, Assistant Project Director Timilty School
Genevieve McNeil, Secretary
Antoinette Hatfield, Secretary

PEC - Parents Education Committee

Source: Document 1, op.cit., Appendix A

APPENDIX B

GLOBE ARTICLE ON REQUEST FOR BLACK PRINCIPALS

SCHOOL ADVISERS WANT BLACK PRINCIPALS

BY

Nina McCain
Globe Education Reporter

A call for "immediate negotiations" to end the controversy over demands for black principals at Roxbury's King and Timilty schools was issued Wednesday by the advisory council for the two schools.

The view that black principals are needed to fill vacancies at the two schools "is so widely held by parents and residents in the black community that the issue must be satisfactorily resolved before school opens", the statement said.

The new note of urgency in the council's statement reflected a growing feeling in Roxbury. In addition to the parent-teacher-community advisory council set up to run the Federally financed schools project, there are a number of Roxbury groups pressing for black principals at the two schools.

While the advisory council is still relying on negotiations to end the impasse, other groups are discussing more direct tactics. One report circulating in Roxbury calls for a community school board to take over the two schools plus the Gibson school.

The advosory council, however, has called on School Supt. William H. Ohrenberger and representatives of Federal and state departments of education to meet with them in an attempt to find a solution.

Since the Boston School Committee has contended that only the superintendent has the power to nominate principals, one member of the advisory council said: "We are tossing the ball to Ohrenberger where it belongs."

The superintendent was not immediately available for comment.

School Committee chairman Thomas S. Eisenstadt said: "As far as I'm concerned this issue is closed. The superintendent has the power to nominate. He has nominated two qualified men and we have approved them."

The controversy flared when the School committee appointed two new white principals without consulting the advisory council which, under terms of the Federal project, is to share in educational planning. The advisory council contends that the schools need black principals to serve as symbols of achievement and authority for the black students.

Source, Boston Globe, August 22, 1968, as quoted in Derr, op.cit., pp. 36, 37

APPENDIX C

JOHN KERRIGAN'S SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

PRESS RELEASE

PRESS RELEASE

JOHN J. KERRIGAN, MEMBER
BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE

OR RELEASE:

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

A CALL FOR RECONSIDERATION

Four months ago the Boston School Committee after extensive debate approved by a vote of 3 - 2 the Central City Project setting up Community Boards to work with the Boston School Committee in an advisory capacity at a cost to the taxpayers of One Million, Five Hundred Thousand Dollars. Even the most ardent backers of this plan must agree that the debate over this proposal produced an agreement on all sides that final determination and control of all policy over the schools involved, was left with the School Committee elected by all the citizens of Boston.

Let us look at the record of these expensive councils. A few days after this plan to purchase community involvement was passed, the Boston School Committee went in good faith to meet in an open public meeting, with the community involved to discuss first hand the problems of the community. There is no need to go into the history of this meeting. It is well known. However, good questions to ask are: Where were these Advisory Councils that night? Where were these individuals who are and will be paid the high salaries under this giveaway of the taxpayers money plan?

The Councils have been of further help since their inception to the Boston School Committee in the so called principal dispute.

The opening of school a time of pride, a time of happiness, a time of high expectations, has been turned into a time of shame. The Councils are sowing the worst kinds of seeds of bigotry into the minds of children in the most formative period of their lives. Now finally in our Country when the tide is changing, when merit is the thing necessary to attain success, when we have elected a Catholic President, when we have elected a black United States Senator, when one's religion, race or the color of his skin, is no longer important, they would set us back.

It appears now that they will win. That due to the threats of bodily harm, not only to the men who have earned by hard work their appointments as principals in the schools involved, but to the students and teachers, as well ; a majority of the Boston School Committee will capitulate again, and black principals will be appointed.

The question we should ask is when will the majority of the Boston School Committee have the courage to say no. Will it come when they are submitted by the Councils, a list of teachers to fire, or when they are told to appropriate the money period and leave the running of the schools to the Councils. However, then I suggest it will be too late.

The time for action is now. A call for reconsideration of this giveaway of the taxpayers money in forming these Advisory

Councils should be made, and before much more serious problems develop. in the Boston Schools, this plan should be destroyed.

END

APPENDIX D

REPORT OF ELECTION COMMITTEE

Nevertheless, between 88 and 1,000 parents did register. Of these, 119 voted - 62 in the Timilty area and 57 in the King area. The largest votes came in the Timilty area for Timilty parents. The Gibson parents also voted in larger numbers than in any other elementary school.

Evaluation

While we were disappointed that so few voted, we recognize the difficulty of involving parents in the Council and the schools - parents who for so long have felt powerless to affect any change. We know that organizing parents will require a year round active program to increase participation.

At the last Lecture, several of the parents from the Gibson School questioned the procedure of including only one representative from each elementary school and expressed their concern that there have been insufficient publicity about the election. It was stated that the new Council can alter the present compostion and hold another election in the fall.

None of the community agencies or organizations attended the Lecture Series. Only two principals (Mr. Owens and Miss McCoy) attended raising a serious question regarding the participation of principals in the joint endeavor of the Central Cities Task Force Program. None of the central office staff of the Boston Schools attended.

We feel that the Lecture Series approach was a good one for informing potential candidates about the Council and judging their interest in becoming a part of the Council.

Election Results

KING SCHOOL AREA:

King:	Francis Miranda	3
	Shirley Randolph	2
	Simpson Lewis	3
	Irma Thibodeaux	2
	Ethel Sanders	4
Gibson:	Caroline Calloway	16
	Solomon Upshaw	1
	E. Whittington	1
Winthrop:	Catherine Martin	
Brooke:	Thelma Dixon	5
	Louise Whitehead	2
Atherton:	Ann Fields (unopposed)	
Quincy-Dickerman:	Martha Claiborne	
Fenwick:	Dorothy Alleyne	
Hawthorne:	Felipe Lopez	

TIMILTY SCHOOL AREA:

Timilty:	M. Cluckholm	13
	William Clark	10
	Elizabeth Corgain	19
	Mildred Funderburg	19
	Ruth Hayes	23
	Mark Higginbottom	19
	Rebecca McElroy	20
	Neil McIntyre	10
(cont'd) Timilty:	Helen Pace	23
	Cora Williams	7
Dudley:	Jessie Jones	12
	Gloria Whittaker	7
Dillaway:	Charlie MaePatterson	14
Bacon:	Mary Griffin	3

Source: Boston School Committee Title III Proposal (2), Appendix C, p. 3.

APPENDIX E

PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES

Programmatic Objectives

The following list of programmatic objectives is stated most broadly and not necessarily in any order of priority. It represents the concerns that recurred most frequently in discussions held by the two community groups and teachers from the two schools separately and then while meeting jointly.

1. The school as an accessible community facility:
   There has been unanimous agreement that the school buildings be available for a broader range of activities at hours more convenient for the community. This suggests new educational, vocational, and recreational programs which in turn would require additional personnel and physical facilities.
2. The inclusion of the creative arts as an integral part of education.
3. The inclusion of superior physical training program throughout the child's career in school consisting of: systematic physical conditioning activity, health needs such as nutrition and health services, general participation in competitive sports related to city-wide recreation programs.
4. Adult Programs
5. Social Services - The schools are seen as a logical center for the provision of social services on a neighborhood basis.

Source, Boston School Committee Title III Proposal, op.cit., pp. 27-9.

6. Core Basic Skills
   1. Reading and mathematics were stressed.
   2. Consistent reference was made to the need to include Afro American studies as a regular, continuing feature of the curriculum.
   3. There is strong general concern about "known standards" and some legitimate systems of "teacher accountability."

7. Counselling
   1. Many expressed view that community residents could serve very well in certain counselling functions.
   2. Reassessment of test scores and examining "special class" assignments was a general strongly-felt concern.

8. The School as a Continuous Training Facility for beginning Teachers, Experienced Teachers, and Auxiliary Educational Personnel.
   1. A need for deliberate "over-staffing" was related to 6,7, and 8.
   2. There was a very strong emphasis on "sensitivity training" as a requirement for all staff members in all schools as a part of the school's function as a training facility.

3. There was a strong consensus that beginning teachers spend some of their time in training working, directly in the community under the aegis of a community based organization.
4. Reducing faculty turnover is a major concern as is the recruitment of more Negro teachers.

9. Special Supportive Efforts at Transition Points

B. THE MORGAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Adams-Morgan neighborhood is located in the Northwest section of Washington, D. C.; it was named for the two elementary schools located here. The total neighborhood is approximately 300 acres, containing about 24,000 people who range from welfare recipients to others earning $25,000 per year. The majority are black and poor. However, this was not always the case; prior to World War II, the area was primarily an exclusive white neighborhood (approximately two-thirds) with a Black poverty pocket. Following the war, about half of the large homes were converted to rooming and tenement houses primarily serving a somewhat transient Black population. About one-third of the population remained White; however, the housing was allowed to deteriorate.[1]

The two schools, Adams and Morgan, were both included in the first proposal drafted by the Adams Morgan Community Councils School Committee.[2] The Superintendent of Schools asked that the proposal project be limited to Morgan for the first year. The proposal was redrafted and submitted to the D. C. Board of Education. As the Adams School did not come under "community control" until July, 1969, (and then as a separately operated Board) this memorandum is only concerned with the Morgan Community School Board (MSB).

As explained by several participants in the Morgan activities, it is important to note the difference between the overall Adams Morgan neighborhood and the parents served by the Morgan School within the neighborhood. While the overall neighborhood has a significant fraction of middle class Blacks and Whites (somewhere in the ranges of 30-40% and 15-20%, respectively), the parents whose children are served by the Morgan School are 97% black and 80% poor.[3]

Regarding the Morgan School, an observer has indicated that much of the building was substandard; that it was overcrowded (four classes met simultaneously in the auditorium, for example; lacking a lunchroon, a corridor in the basement was used; and the children had to eat in 12-minute shifts); that it lacked proper facilities (such as a library and properly functioning bathroom); and that books and materials were in short supply.

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[1] Morgan Community School: Annual Report to the Community, School Term 1967-1968 (mimeo publication by the Morgan Community School Board), p. 2.

[2] ibid., p. 5.

[3] Interviews with Kenneth Haskins, Principal, and Bishop Marie Reed, Chairman MSB, October, 1968.

II. WHAT MAJOR GROUPS ARE INVOLVED? HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

There appear to be two diverse groups of parents in the community: young White liberals, who were concerned about the quality of education that their children would receive in the public schools; and poor Black parents, who were concerned about the inadequate education their children were getting, particularly in the Morgan School. They were also concerned about not being able to see the school without an appointment, which they construed as lack of respect.[4] However, continuously operating parents' groups are conspicuous by their absence in the Adams Morgan neighborhood.

b. Teachers

While the teachers in the D. C. School System have generally supported the concept of "community control", the particular faculty at the Morgan School suffered because of the 1967-1968 project. First, the Antioch proposal, as accepted, required the faculty be cut from 23 regular teachers to 17, but that the total staff be raised from 38 to 54.[5] As many of the replacements were to be white and inexperienced, many teachers were convinced that this was a scheme to replace black teachers with white. When school opened, only 4 or 5 of the original 28 faculty members remained. Second, the faculty that did participate during the year were confronted by parents on the issues of: "Black power" and its feared effects on education; and the use of community people as teaching aides (interns).[6]

Washington Teachers' Union (WTU)

An affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (as is the New York City, United Federation of Teachers), the WTU is the recognized bargaining agent for Washington's 8,000 teachers.[7] The WTU is on record as supporting the community control project in the Morgan School:

> It should be noted that WTU has been very actively involved in both the Morgan Community School and the Anacostia Project. In fact, on February 25, 1968, Mr. William Simons, President of the WTU in a meeting regarding the Morgan Community School declared, "The parents are demanding, and are going to have a greater say in the operation of the schools, whether the teachers are with them or against them, We want to be with the parents and we have no intention of aligning ourselves with the reactionary forces that fear community involvement." (Washington Post) Furthermore, President Simons spoke in favor of a proposal which would have expanded the power of the Morgan Board at a July meeting with the downtown Board and the Morgan Community Board.[8]

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[4] Morgan Community School . . . , **op. cit.**, p. 4.

[5] Memorandum from Carl F. Hansen, Superintendent of Schools, to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967, p. 1.

[6] Lauter, Paul, "The Short, Happy Life of the Adams-Morgan Community School Project", Harvard Educational Review, Spring 1968, p. 256.

[7] Simons, William H., Testimony Before a Senate Committee on Violence in the Schools, Washington, D. C., October 1, 1969, p. 1.

[8] "A Position Paper On Community Control", Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board, September 24, 1968, p. 1.

The District of Columbia Association of Classroom Teachers (DC-ACT)

Formerly the District of Columbia Education Association, DC-ACT is another teachers' organization which has an 80% Black membership in Washington;[9] this association has recently affiliated with the National Educational Association (NEA), a professional organization of teachers, administrators, principals, counselors, and "othersinterested in American education".[10] According to Rosenbaum, it too is "on record as strongly supporting decentralization".[11] Once the bargaining agent for Washington's teachers, it was edged out by WTU in 1967 and was defeated in a 1968 attempt to re-establish this relationship.[12]

c. The Board of Education

According to an observer, the nine-member Board of Education had, until November, 1968, been appointed to three-year terms by the judges of the U. S. District Court. The Board has been weaker than most as appropriation requests followed a red-tape strewn, tortuous path from the Board of Education to the D. C. Budget Office to the Commissioners, who, until phased out with the appointment of a Mayor in Washington, functioned as the Operating Head of the local government. Congress still must approve all appropriations and monies and are then distributed via appropriations bills.

The Board of Education, according to this same observer is thus unique in not having autonomy in areas generally reserved for Boards of Education. Specifically, the Board lacks: fiscal autonomy; personnel authority in the areas of classification and establishment of positions, autonomy in procurement; autonomy in the design, construction, and maintenance of school buildings; and authority to institute changes.

Even with the reported lack of autonomy, the Board managed to authorize the Morgan School proposal as submitted by Antioch, and to expand the latitude of MSB actions in 1968.

d. District of Columbia Government

Prior to September 28, 1967, the government of the District of Columbia was run by the three-man Board of Commissioners. Since that time, a mayoralty system, where the Mayor was appointed by the President of the United States, has been used. Like the previous Board, the Mayor is responsible to Congress which authorizes appropriations for funding the operations of the District of Columbia.

The Board of Education is subordinate to the Mayor, through whom requests for appropriations must go, and budgetary approvals must be authorized. Program requests by the Board of Education are submitted to the Mayor; budgetary requests following the Mayor's approval, are made through the D. C. Budget Office (who forwards them to Congress).[13]

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[9] Rice, William, The Anacostia Community School Project, Brief Description of History, Program and Progress Report (an unpublished document), June 2, 1969, p. 6

[10] Gale Research Company, Encyclopedia of Associations, "Volume I: National Organization of the United States", Detroit, 1968, Section 5, p. 436.

[11] Rosenbaum, David E., "A Capital Success Story", The New York Times, January 9, 1969 p. 68.

[12] Washington Teachers' Union, Toward a Humane School System in the Nation's Capital, a pamphlet (hereafter referenced as WTU pamphlet), p. 1.

[13] Telephone interview with personnel in the Secretariat of the Government of the District of Columbia.

e. Antioch College

Antioch College is a small (roughly 1,800 students), private-funded co-educational college in Yellow Springs, Ohio. Its Antioch-Putney Graduate School of Education, located in Putney, Vermont has a Graduate Center in Washington, D. C.

A cooperative school and work program allows students to earn enough income to meet most of their expenses. Teaching interns work in the District of Columbia School System and were an active element in the 1967-1968 school year staffing for the Morgan School.

Antioch apparently became involved by invitation from the Adams Morgan Community Council. Two persons living in the community were instrumental in this invitation: the Director of the Antioch-Putney Graduate Center, and a Director of the Antioch College Board of Trustees. Both had participated in the Adams Morgan Community Council's meetings with the Superintendent of the D. C. Schools.[14]

Antioch was finally granted authority to assume responsibility for the organization and administration of the Morgan School. This delegation was in effect during the 1967-1968 academic year.[15] The Antioch professor in charge of the Morgan Project was Paul Lauter.[16]

f. Adams Morgan Community Council

The Community Council is an organization formed in 1959 to deal with social problems in the Adams Morgan neighborhood. It has been characterized as being comprised of young White liberals and Black middle class professionals. Its membership comes from the various block organizations and institutions operating in the Adams Morgan neighborhood.[17]

The Council has played an important role in establishing and assuring the political viability of the Morgan Community School Board and the establishment of the Adams Community School Board.

g. The Adams Morgan Federation

This group, which appears sometime in 1967 or 1968, is comprised primarily of older members of the Adams Morgan neighborhood and represents a coalition of groups opposing the Adams Morgan Community Council. Its role in the Morgan Community School Board is limited mainly to opposing certain proposals for the location of the new Morgan School (yet to be built).

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[14] *Morgan Community School* . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[15] Superintendent of Schools, Memorandum to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967, p. 1.

[16] Holsendolph, Ernest, "Community School Challenging, Adams-Morgan Finds", *The Evening Star*, July 22, 1967.

[17] *Morgan Community School* . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 3.

h. Other Organizations

Within the Adams Morgan neighborhood, there are various other organizations: block organizations; civic groups such as the Mid-Way Civic Association; plus business associations such as the Eighteenth and Columbia Road Business Association. (The Adams Morgan Federation draws from many of these local groups.) As organizations, they have not been visibly active regarding the Morgan Community School Board, except in the spring of 1968, when the Adams Morgan Federation, the Mid-Way Civic Association and the Eighteenth and Columbia Road Business Association requested that the Morgan Schools be returned to D. C. Board of Education jurisdiction.[18]

i. Predecessors to the Morgan Community School Board

Technically, there is no predecessor to the Morgan Board, as the only change was one of role, where the Board changed from advisory capacity to a "community control" capacity. With Antioch's assuming administrative responsibility for the Morgan School, in the summer of 1967, an Elected Community School Council was brought into being with the first elections on Monday, September 18, 1967. This group of representatives began as an advisory group to the school administration and the Antioch Project Group, but later in the same school year, upon recommendation of Antioch,[19] appealed to the D. C. Board of Education for delegated responsibilities superseding Antioch.[20] Although the proposal was submitted in April, the decision was not forthcoming until mid-September.[21] As late as early September, there was a danger that the Central Board would fail to formally recognize the Council's request for authorized community boards'status and "deny the 15-member community school board an opportunity to set its own priorities for spending funds and hiring teachers".[22]

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[18] An unsigned,and unaddressed memorandum, apparently from the Superintendent of D. C. Schools (obtained from the D. C. Board of Education), dated July 18, 1968, p. 2.

[19] Keeton, Morris T., Academic Vice President of Antioch, in a letter to Dr. Benjamin J. Henley, Deputy Superintendent of Schools, March 4, 1968.

[20] Morgan Community School Board, Proposal For The Operation of Community Schools In The Adams-Morgan Area of the District of Columbia (Submitted to the D. C. Board of Education), April 4, 1968. See especially "II: Powers and Duties of the Community School Board", pp. 4, 5. (Appendix A of this memorandum.)

[21] "A Position On Decentralization and Local Control", Statement by Dr. William R. Manning, Superintendent of Schools at a Board of Education meeting, September 18, 1968.

[22] Rosenbaum, op. cit., p. 68.

III. HOW DID THE MORGAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD COME ABOUT? WHAT HAVE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES BEEN SINCE THEN?

- 1954 - In the face of visibly deteriorating neighborhood conditions, the Principals of the Adams and Morgan Schools attempted to organize the neighborhood to undertake improvement activities. Their efforts resulted in a racially and economically open group called the Adams-Morgan Better Neighborhood Conference.[23]

- 1956 - The Adams-Morgan Better Neighborhood Conference asked that the Board of Commissioners for the District of Columbia obtain a demonstration grant under the Federal Housing Act of 1954. The purpose of the demonstration would be to test whether progressive physical blight in an area could be stopped by "a volunteer citizen action supported by maximum services from their city government". This grant was subsequently authorized to commence in 1958 under the supervision of American University.[24]

- 1959 - The Adams-Morgan Planning Council and the Adams-Morgan Community Council were formed; the former focused on physical problems in the neighborhood and the latter on social problems.

- 1959-1965 - The Community Council struggled with the problems of bringing an economically and racially mixed neighborhood sufficiently together so programs could be developed to counteract social problems. Progress was reportedly "slow and painful" but some successes were accomplished: development of block organizations, a walk-in science center, a store-front art center, an "alley" library, a community pre-school, a summer program employing 200 people, and a neighborhood house.[25]

- Fall 1965 and early 1966 (approximately) - A dozen mothers and grandmothers, including Bishop Marie Reed, became concerned with overcrowding in the Morgan School and this grew to a total of roughly 60 mothers who met downtown with Dr. Johnson to obtain relief. Dr. Johnson reportedly stated that split sessions (3 1/2 hours, as was being done with grades 1-3) were certainly adequate. The mothers' response was, in so many words, reported to be: "Fine, put everybody in the school district on 3 1/2 hours, please, and we'll feel equal."[26]

- 1966 - The mothers, assisted by the Adams-Morgan Community Council's Schools Committee managed to defeat the split session proposal and win some relief via bussing of students.[27]

[23] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 2.
[24] ibid., p. 3.
[25] ibid., p. 3.
[26] Interview with Bishop Marie Reed, op.cit.
[27] Lauter, op. cit., pp. 237, 238.

- 1966 - The Adams-Morgan Community Council Schools Committee held open public meetings to discuss what was wanted in the Adams and Morgan Schools.[28]

- 1966 (exact date unknown) - The Adams-Morgan Community Council (reportedly dominated by whites and middle class blacks) met with the D. C. Superintendent of Schools to discuss the idea of a community-controlled school. No parents of Morgan children were present.[29] The Superintendent said he would entertain a proposal for community run schools only if a university were involved.[30]

- Fall 1966 - Two persons who had attended the Schools Committee meetings (the director of Antioch-Putney Graduate Center in Washington, D. C., and a director of the board of Antioch College)[31] met with the mothers who then initiated a request that Antioch participate.[32]

- Fall 1966 - Members of the Adams-Morgan Community Council Schools Committee plus Antioch staff personnel drafted a proposal to include Adams and Morgan Schools in an experimental demonstration in urban teaching under the administration of Antioch College. It suggested that younger children attend one school and older children attend the other. The Superintendent asked that the project be limited to Morgan for the first year, and be extended to Adams the next year, if successful.[33]

- Spring 1967 - A new proposal was developed between Antioch and the D. C. School System, " . . . for an experimental demonstration in urban teaching at the Morgan-Morgan Annex Elementary School . . ."[34]

- May 17, 1967 - The D. C. Board approved the Antioch proposal authorizing Antioch to assume the responsibility for both organizing and administering the Morgan School. Antioch was granted the authority and maximum flexibility in using the Morgan School funds, within the limitations of D. C. rules and regulations relative to purchasing and accounting.[35]

- July 1, 1967 - The fiscal terms of the Morgan School were approved by the D. C. Board. The total amount of $305,505 was later raised to $315,630.[36] This money was to be used to provide the Antioch staffing requirements for Morgan, which, although considerably larger, was to be at about the same cost as the then present staffing plan.[37]

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[28] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 4.

[29] Confidential source.

[30] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 5.

[31] ibid., p. 5.

[32] Interview with Bishop Marie Reed.

[33] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., pp. 4, 5; plus interviews with Mr. Kenneth Haskins and Bishop Marie Reed. In view of the subsequent failure of the D. C. Superintendent to recognize the Adams-Morgan Community Council as a party to the proposal we suspect that the members of the Council's Schools Committee that participated in the proposal drafting were, in fact, the two Antioch connected people.

[34] Hansen, Carl F., Superintendent of Schools, in a memorandum to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, May 17, 1967.

[35] Uusigned and unaddressed memorandum, op. cit., p. 1.

[36] ibid., p. 1.

- July 22, 1967 - An article in The Evening Star noted:

  > "The school [Morgan] lost most of what little integration it had last year. With the removal of Americanization classes from Adams Schools, 180 pupils, including most of the white children, were shifted from Morgan to Adams. But students moved to Adams may gain permission to return, Lauter said."[38] [Lauter was Morgan Project Director for Antioch College.]

- Summer 1967 - Some of the Antioch College board members, in seeing the magnitude of the task of being responsible for administering the Morgan School suggested postponing the demonstration project for one year. The Adams-Morgan Community Council rejected the idea to postpone ". . . and, somewhat reluctantly, Antioch agreed to begin the project".[39]

- August 9-30, 1967 - Antioch conducted an institute for training of staff members. During this institute, the teachers were to train in new curriculum, teaching methods and community relations. The parents were, in the evening, to meet the teachers and discuss the curriculum and teaching methods.[40] This nearly proved disastrous as teachers, particularly the older ones, would not attend evening events or socials, and parents were unsure about discipline and the non-graded concept.[41]

- September 18-19-20, 1967 - The Elections for the Elected Community School Council were held. The elections were conducted in three parts: seven Morgan School parents were elected Monday evening; three community representatives on Tuesday evening; and three teenagers and young adults (16 to 23 years of age) on Wednesday evening. Two teachers, who were not elected by the community, were also part of the board bringing it to a total of 15 members.[42]

- Fall 1967 - The Antioch Team teaching combined with permissiveness resulted in parents being concerned with the lack of discipline. It was only through the persistance of Mr. Haskins, the Morgan principal, and one of the staff members that a permissive attitude was maintained in the face of parents who wanted rigid disciplinary controls ala the white middle class definition of appropriate behavior.[43] This led to unfavorable reactions and complaints being reported to the D. C. Board.[44] Flexible programming and the subsequent request for additional experienced teachers (see below) reportedly overcame these problems. According to one observer, the small contingent of white parents discovered that having committed their children to their political ideals, were facing the reality of a difficult situation, such as kids paying protection money to go to and from school safely, teachers fearing some children, and children who would not behave correctly in a permissive atmosphere. These realities were threatening.[45] However, the permissive atmosphere also had its good effects:

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[37] Hansen, Carl F., Superintendent of Schools in a memorandum to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967. See Appendix B for the complete document.

[38] Holsendolph, Ernest, "Community School Challenging, Adams-Morgan Finds", The Evening Star, July 22, 1967.

[39] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 5.

[40] Holsendolph, op. cit.

[41] Lauter, op. cit., p. 291.

[42] "Adams-Morgan Area Sets School Elections", The Washington Post, September 16, 1967; plus interview with Mr. Kenneth Haskins.

[43] Interview with Mr. Kenneth Haskins.

[44] Unsigned and unaddressed memorandum, op. cit., p. 2.

> "I have found that once you stop fighting with children about fighting, the incidence of fighting diminishes because you no longer have teachers and students acting like prison guards and inmates. You don't condone fighting, but you don't stop it simply because someone labels it a problem. You stop it because young people should be taught that there are better ways of handling social relationships."[46]

- November 15, 1967 - Antioch requested and received budgetary authorization for four additional experienced teacher positions at the Morgan School.[47]

- November 1967 - Antioch reported to the D. C. Board that they were spending an estimated $50,000 of their own college funds for staff, they had received additional grants from outside sources amounting to $30,000 and they were requesting additional funds from other agencies.[48]

- Fall and Winter, 1967-68 - Antioch was perceived as using the Morgan School for training its students in teaching and administration. Conflict developed over the resulting high turnover and low experience of Antioch students. Furthermore, they were white, middle class and filled with a do-good spirit which did not assist in the situation. Consequently, Antioch was slowly phased out from its active role to one of an advisory role and the Elected Community School Council took up the active policy setting role.[49] Antioch delegated the management of curriculum and instruction to Mr. Haskins.[50]

- February 24, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union local of the AFL-CIO American Federation of Teachers endorsed the neighborhood control concept for Morgan School. This was interpreted as public evidence of a split within the national AFT as the New York City UFT local was on record as being opposed to the Bundy Report. WTU President Simons was quoted as saying:

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[45] Lauter, op. cit., pp. 256, 257.

[46] Haskins, Kenneth W., "The Case For Local Control", Saturday Review, January 11, 1969, p. 52.

[47] Henley, Benjamin J., Acting Superintendent of Schools, in a memorandum report to the Board of Education, November 15, 1967. Mr. Kenneth Haskins later clarified this as having been requested of Antioch by the Morgan School Board because of the high turnover and low experience problem. The authorization only "traded" Antioch students for more experienced teachers.

[48] Unsigned and unaddressed memorandum, op. cit., p. 2.

[49] Interview with Mr. Kenneth Haskins.

[50] Letter from Morris T. Keeton, Academic Vice President, Antioch College, to Dr. Benjamin J. Henley, Deputy Superintendent of Schools, March 4, 1968.

> "I don't really see too many problems in regard to the interests of the teacher. I can envision us negotiating a master contract with the central board and local issues with the local board, in much the same manner as the United Auto Workers negotiate their contracts. I think the important thing is that the teachers' union stand with, not against, the parents in their demands for change."[51]

- February 27, 1968 - Acting Superintendent of Schools, Benjamin J. Henley requested that Antioch provide a statement as to its future relationship with the Morgan School, and the D. C. Board of Education.[52]

- March 4, 1968 - Morris T. Keeton, Academic Vice President of Antioch replies to Dr. Henley indicating that "if Antioch is to be in the Morgan School after this year, two conditions should be met: (1) the [Elected Community] School Council requests it, and (2) the Board of Education consents".[53] If these were met, Antioch was then willing to play two roles: (1) as consultant to the school, and (2) as collaborator in teacher education.[54] Antioch also provided a strong recommendation for the principle of Morgan community control by stating:

  > "As soon as the Board of Education will permit, we recommend that the delegation of authority to manage curriculum, instruction, the budget for those purposes, and other agreed upon responsibilities be directly from the Board to the School Council. The School Council should have the option of using other universities along with Antioch as consultant and collaborator or of not using Antioch at all.
  >
  > This suggestion does not arise at all out of a desire to end our relationship with the Morgan School. It arises rather because we think that the Board of Education and the Morgan community are ready to carry on a successful decentralization earlier than the Adams-Morgan Community Council and Antioch anticipated a year ago."[55]

- April 4, 1968 - The Elected Community School Council, calling itself the Morgan Community School Board, submitted a proposal to have formally recognized community control.[56]

- May 8, 1968 - The Morgan School Board arrived at a meeting of the D. C. School Board to discuss its proposal of April 4. The meeting ended within a few minutes because of a misunderstanding: The Morgan School Board thought the meeting was to be a closed session, but the D. C. Board had scheduled an open meeting.[57]

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[51] Jacoby, Susan, "Teachers Support Local Board Plan", The Washington Post, February 25, 1968.

[52] Letter from Morris T. Keeton, op. cit., p. 1.

[53] ibid., p. 1.

[54] ibid., p. 1.

[55] ibid., p. 2.

[56] Morgan Community School Board, Proposal . . . , op. cit., April 4, 1968.

[57] Jacoby, Susan, "Morgan School Offers Its Setup As Model", The Washington Post, May 11, 1968.

- May 15, 1968 - Four members of the Adams-Morgan Federation stated that the Morgan Community School experiment was a failure and asked that the school be returned to full control of the D. C. Board of Education.[58]

- June 26, 1968 - Superintendent Manning said at a noon press conference that next year the Morgan School Board could be reduced to an "advisory" status. He said that the Morgan residents' decision to drop Antioch College' assistance, plus the "serious division in the community" were involved in his reasoning. However, when he emerged from a closed personnel meeting later that afternoon, he found about 70 Adams-Morgan residents jamming the meeting room of the D. C. Board to indicate they would not surrender their limited control of the Morgan School.[59]

- July 14, 1968 - The Morgan School Board held its second election of members, with all being elected on the same day (parents, community members and young adults aged 16 to 23).[60]

- July 17, 1968 - The Corporation Counsel tentatively ruled that the Morgan School Board could not have increased independent powers as requested in the Morgan School Board proposal dated April 4. Because the Central Board itself did not have fiscal autonomy or complete control over personnel, it was ruled that it could not delegate such power to the Morgan School Board under existing statutes.[61]

- July 18, 1969 - A crowd, reportedly in excess of 350 crowded a meeting at the Morgan School where only five of the nine D. C. Board members showed up. The five gave no indication as to when the decision about the Morgan School Board status might be made.[62]

- July 18, 1968 - In an unsigned, and unaddressed memorandum report, apparently from the Superintendent of Schools, it was recommended that the "Adams-Morgan School Board" be allowed to operate as a community-controlled board. This included curriculum, teachers and staff selection and redirecting resources. These were clearly subject to the approval of the D. C. Board, but, if carried out in the spirit of delegation, represented community control.[63]

- September 18, 1968 - Superintendent of Schools Manning took a position in support of decentralization of schools.[64] The D. C. Board adopted decentralization in plans authorizing the Morgan School Board and paving the way for the Anacostia Project.[65]

[58] "Morgan School Plan Called A Failure", The Washington Post, May 16, 1968.

[59] Holsendolph, Ernest, "Citizens Fight To Keep School Reins", The Washington Star, June 27, 1968.

[60] "Morgan Area To Elect Second School Board", The Washington Post, July 15, 1968.

[61] "District Bars Added Power For Morgan School Board", The Evening Star (Washington, D. C.) July 18, 1968.

[62] Jacoby, Susan, "Morgan School Plan Pushed", The Washington Post, [illegible] 18, 1968.

[63] Unsigned and unaddressed memorandum . . . , op. cit., p. 4.

[64] Manning, William R., "A Position On Decentralization and Local Control" (statement at D. C. Board meeting, September 18, 1968). (See Appendix D of this memorandum.)

[65] Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board, "A Position Paper On Community Control", September 24, 1968 (released September 30, 1968).

- September 24, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board "enthusiastically" endorsed the D. C. Board decentralization plans for Morgan and Anacostia and went on record as supporting the community control resolution adopted by the American Federation of Teachers. The Washington Teachers' Union noted that "in effect, teacher rights may well be more closely protected in a community-controlled school than by the downtown board".[66]

- September 30, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board "Position Paper On Community Control" was adopted by the membership.[67]

- School Year 1968-69 - The Morgan School Board and the Morgan School continued to function in an apparently satisfactory way. The only issues publicly clouding the scene were those having to do with the problem of selecting a site for the new Morgan School (previously authorized) to be built upon.[68]

- June 12, 1969 - The Morgan School Board held an open public hiring interview for candidates to fill the position of Principal and Assistant Principal. The fifteen Morgan School Board members plus approximately 75 parents questioned each candidate for an hour, after which they were told the Board would meet on June 16 to decide whether the search should be extended. Also, in a novel move, Board officers were elected in open session without prior nominations.[69]

- July 30, 1969 - At a meeting of the D. C. Board, three important actions were taken:

  -Superintendent Manning, who had made the policy recommendation in July 1968 for decentralization was relieved of all administrative duties effective as of August 17.

  -The board ordered the Superintendent to submit a recommendation tying community control to administrative decentralization of the system.

  -The Morgan School Board's recommendation that John H. Anthony be named Principal of Morgan School was approved.[70]

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[66] Position Paper by Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board, op.cit., p. 2.
[67] ibid., p. 1.
[68] See for example, "Yeldell to Seek Three-Sided Meeting On Morgan School", The Washington Star, February 6, 1969.
[69] Modell, Diane, "90 Interview 2 At School", The Evening Star, June 13, 1969.
[70] "Board Okays Adams School Local Control", The Evening Star, July 31, 1969.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE MORGAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD HAVE?

The authorities requested by the Morgan School Board in its proposal were quite broad. The authorities under which it operated in 1968-69 appear to be the following, as recommended by the Superintendent:[71]

> "In light of the Adams-Morgan Proposal and the subsequent recommendations of the Executive Study Group, it is recommended that the Board of Education permit the Adams-Morgan School Board to operate as follows:
>
> -Have responsibility for curriculum formation and instruction with the aid of Antioch College acting in a consultative capacity, subject to the approval of the Board of Education. It is expected that the resultant curriculum will be innovative and responsive to the needs of the Morgan Community and that maximum autonomy be granted for experimentation in teaching techniques.
>
> -Have the responsibility for recommending teachers and staff, subject to the approval of the Board of Education upon recommendation of the Superintendent.
>
> -Have responsibility for suggesting a redirection of resources not to exceed the total amount which would normally be allocated to the Morgan School. Within the limitation of present budget procedures, efforts will be made to grant these requests.
>
> -Have the support of the complete staff and services that are available to all other schools.
>
> -Continue operation of its present extended program contingent upon availability of funds.
>
> -Request through [elementary school office] action on matters of personnel, supplies and equipment, suspensions, retirement, etc."[72]

As of the departure of Superintendent Manning there were no formally set guidelines for administrative decentralization and community control in any way similar to those set forth in New York. However, the D. C. Corporation Counsel set forth an interpretation of authorities for the Adams School Board in August, 1969. This interpretation is both broader and, at the same time, more restrictive than the recommendations of the Superintendent in 1968.[73] The Morgan Board now operates under a similar agreement.[74]

[71] See Appendix A for specific requests.
[72] Unsigned and unaddressed memorandum . . . , op. cit., pp. 4, 5.
[73] "Policy Agreement for the Administration of the Adams Community School" (mimeographed document) August, 1969. (See Appendix C of this memorandum.)
[74] Interview with Kenneth Haskins, October 15, 1969. He added that the agreement did not appear to change the way the board would operate.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE MORGAN BOARD?

The goals have evolved from the fairly simple and straight-forward one of remedying the overcrowded situation of the Morgan School,[75] to the broader one of improving children's education,[76] to the even broader and more complex ones put forth in the Morgan School Board Report to the community:

> "People want the kind of school where their children will learn those things which they need to know in order to susvive in this society . . . where they and their children are treated with respect . . . [and where they are not insulted] by indicating that something is wrong with the way they look, speak, or dress."[77]
>
> "The school should be an educational center for all. It should encourage everyone to remain continually involved in learning and to work continually to improve his life and the life of the community."[78]

They have consciously sought these goals and continue through the more immediate and/or concrete objectives of:[79]

- Finding an acceptable site for the new Morgan School which can and will be the educational, recreational and neighborhood center.
- Continuing to develop new curricula and methods to improve childrens educational achievement.
- Maintaining adult evening sessions and keeping the school open after hours.

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[75] See the entry for Fall 1965 and Early 1966 in Section III.
[76] See Spring 1967 entry in Section III.
[77] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 9.
[78] ibid., p. 10.
[79] Interviews with Mr. Kenneth Haskins and Bishop Marie Reed.

VI. IS THE MORGAN BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

The Morgan Board composition was originally determined when the project was under the administrative and organizational authority of Antioch College. It was at that time called the Elected Community School Council and consisted of fifteen members:

- Seven parents of Morgan school children.
- Three representatives of the community in the Morgan district.
- Three teenage and young adult representatives of the Morgan district (ages 16-23).
- Two Morgan staff members.

All but the teachers were elected by the community. This pattern of representation has held, with one modification, for two subsequent elections. The one modification has been the inclusion of one community intern (para-professional lay teaching assistant from the community) and the dropping of one teacher in the composition of the most recent board (1969-70).[80]

Nominations are by petition of the person wishing to run. The petition is circulated one month prior to the election. As yet the young people do not choose their own, but follow the same procedure, with all persons over 16 being allowed to vote. The recent election saw approximately 400 persons vote.[81]

However, one must, for example, also consider other representational issues. While the neighborhood within the district is overwhelmingly black and poor, the first elected council contained five white members.[82] Similarly, the Adams-Morgan Community Council, which has supported the Morgan School Board, has, by its emphasis on social issues, in effect created an opposition known as the Adams-Morgan Federation. The Federation does not seem to have representation on the Morgan School Board, although in 1968 they did sponsor candidates who failed to obtain enough votes to be elected. They have, at various times charged that they are unable to obtain an appropriate hearing of its viewpoint by the Morgan School Board.[83]

Other than these two examples, the board appears to function smoothly, indicating an effective representation.

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[80] Anthony, John, in an August 8, 1969 meeting with the House Republican Task Force on Education and Training. Congressional Record (91st Congress, First Edition, Volume 115, No. 138) August 13, 1969, p. E6927.

[81] ibid., p. E6928.

[82] Lauter, op. cit., p. 257; he referred to this as an indication of the power equation, plus the alienation of black parents from the school.

[83] Interview with Mr. Kenneth Haskins, October 15, 1969. Also, see entry for May 15, 1968 in Section III.

VII. WHAT HAS THE MORGAN BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

The Morgan Board's major accomplishments have been:

- Developing via political and representational means, an effective working relationship with the D.C. Board. In this they have been assisted by the Adams-Morgan Community Council and Antioch College.
- Implementing and sustaining a new curriculum and new teaching procedures as developed by Antioch, such as team teaching.[84]
- Introducing community interns (non-professionals) in the teaching and educating process.
- Improving the children's scores on the Primary Mental Abilities Test.[85] Morgan was also one of only six in the D.S. System to show an upward trend in the scores of standardized reading tests administered to fourth and sixth graders in 1968.[86] This year reading scores are reportedly at the level of national norms.[87]
- Successfully developing a working relationship between the Morgan staff and the community. Teachers actively participated with parents in seeking additional powers of community control.[88]
- There have been no student suspensions since the project began, and there is a 70% decrease in vandalism.[89]

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[84] Fantini, Mario D., "Participation, Decentralization, Community Control and Quality Education", The Record, Teachers College, Columbia University, September 1969, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 104.

[85] Morgan Community School . . . op.cit., p. 17.

[86] Jacoby, Susan, "Cause of 'Downward Trend' Laid to Ineffective Methods", The Washington Post, August 2, 1968.

[87] Anthony, John, op.cit., p. E6927.

[88] Interview with Kenneth Haskins, op. cit.

[89] Fantini, op. cit., p. 106.

VIII. IS BOARD POLICY-MAKING OPEN OR CLOSED?

The Morgan School Board meets in public session on the second, third, and fourth Mondays of the month. Issues are discussed openly with policy being determined by vote. This openness was extended to the interviewing of candidates for Principal and Assistant Principal.[90] They also have taken the unusual step of open elections in public session without prior nomination.[91]

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[90] See June 12, 1969 entry in Section III.

[91] ibid.

APPENDIX A

EXCERPTS FROM THE
MORGAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD
PROPOSAL OF APRIL 4, 1968

II. Powers and Duties of the Community School Board *

The Community School Board is the governing body of the school or schools which make up the community school system. It must have broad powers over all aspects of the schools' operation; it cannot be merely an advisory or consultative body to an administrator who is basically responsible to a larger system over which the community has no control. The board must control--to the maximum extent--staffing, curriculum, financing, outside resources, and use of the physical plant.

A. Staffing: The Community School Board (CSB) must choose its own staff and determine the number and type of personnel--administrative, professional, and support--that are necessary, varying them to meet changing needs. Qualifications for the various classes of positions will be determined by the CSB and other bodies according to the type of position.

B. Curriculum: The content and style of the educational and other programs are determined by the people the school serves through the CSB. The CSB will have a major role in deciding what is taught in the school and how it is taught. The specific details of programs and their implementation are the responsibility of the staff, with the CSB constantly evaluating results and approaches.

C. Fiscal Responsibilities: The maximum fiscal control of the program should be in the hands of the CSB. The total amount available will be decided by negotiations between the CSB and the DC Board. Once this is determined, however, the CSB should have flexibility in deciding priorities and in changing the allocation of funds from

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* Morgan Community School Board, Proposal For The Operation Of Community Schools In The Adams-Morgan Area Of the District of Columbia, April 4, 1968 (submitted to the D. C. Board of Education).

one item to another during the year. The CSB should receive directly from those funds from the DC Board or from other sources that are best put into its hands, including the funds necessary for the CSB's own operation. Fiscal and administrative matters must be arranged so that needs of community schools can be met quickly and not left unmet by the present cumbersome bureaucratic system The CSB would be able to receive outside funds or assistance from any source for special programs.

D. Outside Resources: The Community School Board should have available outside resources for consultation and advice Some consultants may come from within the larger educational system, some from advisory committees, and some from other institutions. The CSB should have available the funds necessary to pay for outside help One or a group of universities may be useful in providing a wide variety of services on a regular basis.

E. Physical Plant The CSB should decide on the use of the present buildings and should have resources available for necessary improvement and maintenance. They should have a major role in planning the site and design for new buildings.

APPENDIX B

MEMORANDUM ON FINANCIAL INFORMATION

RE: ANTIOCH'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE MORGAN SCHOOL

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS
FRANKLIN ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
THIRTEENTH AND K STREETS NW.
WASHINGTON 5. D. C.

July 1, 1967

To the Board of Education
of the District of Columbia

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Board of Education, at its May meeting, approved a proposal to authorize Antioch College to assume responsibility for the organization and administration of the Morgan School. Financial considerations relative to this proposal were to be presented at a later meeting. The Superintendent wishes to present the financial information at this time.

The agreement with Antioch is that the District Public School System provide as much support to the Morgan School as it would normally receive. Additional costs are to be covered by Antioch. The key budgetary consideration is to obtain a flexible use of the resources authorized the Morgan School. In essence, the Antioch group wish authorization to substitute 54 positions for 38 positions presently authorized the Morgan School under our regular procedures. This shift of positions is shown in the following table:

Present Staffing		Proposed "Antioch" Staffing	
Regular Teachers	28	Regular Teachers	17
Special Teachers	4	Special Teachers	1
Librarian	1	Librarian	1
Counselor	1	Counselor	1
Secretaries	2	Secretaries	2
Teacher Aides	2	Interns (GS-4)	11
		Community Aides (GS-2 for 9 months)	14
		Undergraduate Aides (GS-2 for 9 months)	7
	38		54

Based upon normal salary costs for these positions, it is estimated that the present and proposed staffing pattern would cost about the same, approximately $300,000. Of course, there is no allocation of salary funds to schools. In effect, the substitution of the recommended staffing pattern for the present staffing pattern is a fair exchange based on estimates of typical salary levels. The attached cost sheets compare the normal budget estimates for these two staffing patterns.

The normal allocations of supplies, textbooks, and materials will be provided the Morgan School. Antioch will be granted the maximum possible flexibility in the use of these funds, consistent with D. C. rules and regulations relative to purchasing and accounting. Antioch has requested permission to develop a Title III proposal concerning this program. These proposals must be presented on their merits, but Antioch is encouraged to participate fully in this program. Antioch will be allocated a fair share of the funds for released time for teachers, now pending in the FY 1968, budget and will generally share in all resources normally available to this school.

In effect, this experiment will not require additional budget authorizations. It is recommended that the Board approve this reallocation of positions to allow the flexibility Antioch requires. In view of the fact that Antioch just now is developing its programs, it also is recommended that the administration be authorized to make further staffing and material reallocations within the levels of resources normally allocated the Morgan School, as the need arises.

The Superintendent recommends that this request be approved by the Board of Education and that copies be submitted to the Board of Commissioners, D. C., for approval. The Superintendent further recommends that copies be sent to Mr. D. P. Herman, D. C. Budget Officer, and Mr. John H. Eaton, D. C. Personnel Officer.

Respectfully submitted,

Carl Hansen

Carl F. Hansen
Superintendent of Schools

Attachment

CURRENT MORGAN - MORGAN ANNEX BUDGET

Direct Appropriations: The total increase of $312,057 is distributed as follows:

Position (Grade and Title) or Item	Number Requested	Personnel Compensation	Personnel Benefits	Other	Total
Teachers, Regular	28	$ 215,600	$ 18,340	$6,552 a/	$ 240.492
Teachers, Special	4	30,800	2,620	--	33,420
Librarian	1	6,370	314	--	6,684
Counselor	1	7,700	655	220	8,575
Secretaries (Morgan and Morgan Annex)	2	10,662	936	1,000	12,598
Teacher Aides	2	9,552	736	--	10,288
Total increase from 1969 base	38	280,684	23,601	7,772	312,057

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a/ Substitute and FICA

PROPOSED MORGAN - MORGAN ANNEX BUDGET

Direct Appropriations: The total increase of $305,505 is distributed as follows:

Position (Grade and Title) or Item	Number Requested	Personnel Compensation	Personnel Benefits	Other	Total
Teachers, Regular	17	$ 130,900	$ 11,135	$3,978[a]	$ 146,013
GS-4 Interns	11	52,536	4,048	--	56,584
Special Teachers	1	7,700	655	--	8,355
Librarian	1	6,370	314	--	6,684
Counselor	1	7,700	655	220	8,575
Secretaries	2	10,662	936	1,000	12,598
Community Aides (GS-2 for 9 Months)	14	41,202	3,262	--	44,464
Undergraduate Aides (GS-2 for 9 Months)	7	20,601	1,631	--	22,232
National Teacher Corps	(5)	--	--	--	--
Practice Teachers	(9)	--	--	--	--
Total increase from 1969 base	54	$ 277,671	$ 22,636	$5,198	$ 305,505

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a/ Substitute and FICA

APPENDIX C

POLICY AGREEMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL

POLICY AGREEMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL

The Corporation Counsel's decision concerning maximum feasible autonomy for Community Schools is interpreted to restrict the Adams Community Board from: directly submitting a budget to the Congress, negotiating contracts binding upon the District of Columbia Government, creating its own Board of Examiners, and operating contrary to established policies and rules created by the Board of Education including this policy agreement and subsequent supplementary policy agreements as may be entered into in the future. In keeping with the aforementioned statement, the D. C. Board of Education and the Adams Community School Board agree to the following guidelines:

1. The operational functions and relations with the Adams Community School Board will be handled by the Division of Special Projects (Office of the Superintendent).
2. The Adams Community School Board will determine the number and kind of personnel that will be hired within the funds allocated to the Adams School, and will recommend its staff through the Division of Special Projects. The personnel recommendations by the Adams School Board at TSA 8 or GS 12 and above will be brought to the D. C. School Board through the Superintendent.

3. The Adams Community School Board will be given responsibility for curriculum formation and instruction with the aid of the Division of Special Projects and colleges it may choose to act in a consultative capacity.
4. The Adams Community School Board will determine priorities for the expenditure of funds which are normally allocated to the Adams School.
5. The Adams Community School Board will be designated as the "Local and area group" responsible for the purposes of preparation of budgetary requests for the Adams School.
6. The Adams Community School will receive the complete staff and services support that are available to all other schools, and this support will be provided directly through the Division of Special Projects.
7. The Board of Education will include in its budget request funds for the operation of an evening school by the Adams School Board to provide educational opportunities for children and adults in the community.
8. The operational relationships based on these general guidelines will be developed by the Adams Community School Board, the Division of Special Projects and the Washington Teachers Union.
9. The Adams Community School Board will be able to receive directly educational funds from federal agencies and private foundations to develop educational programs, for operation of the local board and any other community and/or school related activity, provided that

complete financial accountability is established. No monies coming to the Adams Community School under this provision will affect the normal allocation of funds to the Adams Community School through D. C. budgetary processes.

10. Reports and evaluation made by or for the Adams Community Board of their operation and program will be made available as public documents.
11. The Special Projects Division will be allocated funds to develop, in consultation with the Adams Community School Board, an annual report of the Adams project for submission to the Superintendent and the Board of Education.
12. This agreement will be in effect for a three-year period of operation for the Adams Community School -- August 1969 through August 1972. Either party may reopen a discussion of any part of this agreement during that three-year period; but no changes shall be made without mutual consent.

President, D. C. Board of Education

Chairman, Adams Community School Board

Date

APPENDIX D

"A POSITION ON DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL CONTROL"

A POSITION ON DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL CONTROL*

There are two proposals before the Board of Education for action that have inherent in them the concept of decentralization and local control. The first proposal is in the form of a policy statement on the administrative operation of the Morgan Community School during 1968-69, and the second is the Anacostia Community School Project.

Because of the precedent setting nature of this concept, it seems appropriate that I articulate a position on this issue.

Decentralization and control of the schools by community groups is the most potentially explosive issue facing urban education at this time in history. We but have to look at what's occurring in New York City today. An explosion has taken place and 1,100,000 children and youth are being deprived of their birthright to be educated. What is occurring there can also happen in Washington and our other major cities.

As Superintendent of Schools, I take the position, without equivocation, that where desired, community groups should be granted maximum feasible autonomy within the present legal framework. In addition, where legal constraints exist that inhibit local control to the extent that it is unworkable, the appropriate laws should be amended or modified.

I have weighed carefully the arguments for and against decentralization and local control and have concluded that given the failure of public education and the status of race relations in the United States, I am both persuaded and compelled to the belief that the arguments for decentralization and local control are stronger than those against.

Possible I equivocate in using the terms decentralization and local control. They are not synonymous. There exists some administrative decentralization of large school districts but little local control. It is local control to which I am addressing myself, for to have decentralization without local control is a travesty.

Meeting the needs of children and youth is the purpose of the school. As such, the focus should not be limited to sacred subject content alone, for such content was not born in Heaven nor is it a Newtonian Principle. Rather, each school should seek out clinical truths about youngsters. Attitudes, ideals, concerns, continuities of human nature, and strong beliefs about human welfare should be taught in creative ways, not from a quantitative, impersonal central office point of view. A need exists for loosening the rigidity and arteriosclerosis that exist in the typical educational programs; there should be an unshackling of the tight relationships between the central administration and teachers and community members.

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*Statement by Dr. William R. Manning, Superintendent of Schools, Board of Education Meeting, September 18, 1968.

Local control is not new in public education in this country. It is the bulwark of American democracy and largely responsible for the growth and development of this Nation.

We invented and developed our system of local control. With the growth of our urban centers and bigness in present day American culture, we have lost a degree of responsiveness to both the needs of society and children. I am convinced that local control can be helpful for it is the most reliable means of assuring that schools will be responsive. To some measure we have given lip-service to the belief that the purposes of the schools should be largely determined by parents and other citizens nearest to the schools working in a partnership with the professional educators. It is simply because of the unresponsiveness of the schools that a chaotic and crisis situation exists in our large cities. I am not advocating going back to the one-room school of an agrarian America, but rather to recognize the values in both large and small units, select and synthesize these values into a new operational structure. Just as Thomas Jefferson recognized that institutions of a democracy must change as new knowledge is uncovered, so then must our educational institutions change to be more relevant and "to keep pace with the times." (See 4th panel, Thomas Jefferson Memorial)

The arguments against local control are proliferating at a rapid rate because of some unsuccessful experiences and the threat of racial separation, but they ring hollow. I shall not burden you at this time defending this position; the opportunity to do so will be presenting itself shortly, I am sure.

There are presently only four pioneer, truly community, school demonstration units in this Nation: three are in New York City and the other is here in Washington, D.C. -- the Morgan Community School.

In addition,we do have the Model School Division which is a decentralized unit with limited local control. The Anacostia Community Project is ready to go into operation as a sub-system with some local control at such a time as Congress provides the funds. Other decentralized units will be emerging, including Fort Lincoln New Town.

What have we learned from our experiences to date? A great amount of control must be given decentralized units, for decentralization without control is ineffective. A serious and unrealized obstacle is that the present Board of Education has relatively minimus power and consequently has little to delegate to sub-boards. The elected Board will have no more power or control. This will prove frustrating and will require a continuing dialog for understanding.

We do have a plan of decentralization and local control in the D.C. Schools. It is a simple plan on the surface but operationally the most difficult to manage. Rather than superimpose decentralization from the central office as New York City has done, and unsuccessfully I might add, we believe the kind of decentralization most relevant is that which emerges from the community. There is no single model; however, there can be several models depending upon what the unit of local community members want. (Ultimately, these diverse models will be systematized into a regimen: diversitas intra unitatem.)

How will decentralized units be administered? Recently established within the administrative structure of the school system is a mechanism to deal with community-based proposals and decentralized units. Recently organized is the Special Projects Division approved by the Board of Education and presently in operation. It will serve an umbrella function and the link between the central office and the decentralized units. It could conceivably develop into a parallel system, not bound by tradition or the shackles of the bureaucracy, particularly if conjoined with a non-profit organization as is envisioned.

We have been working with the leadership of the Washington Teachers' Union, and it has indicated support to the principles of local control. Consideration is being given to the possibility of a sub-contract with teaching personnel in decentralized units, a concept prevalent in the private sector but not utilized in teacher bargaining agreements. Such a sub-contract would include a guarantee of teacher rights.

Empirical evidence with local community control in the context of the large urban school system today is limited indeed, almost non-existent. Just as any new piece of legislation creates misunderstandings, searches for intent and parameters so it will be with our school system in working with sub-systems. Many problems can, however, be obviated through a continuing dialogue between the central unit and the sub-unit in which operational guidelines are refined bi-laterally.

Through decentralization and greater local control can stem a new system that could well renew and restructure the institution of public education here in Washington and in other large urban school districts. Unless our city schools can be made more responsive, the consequences to be expected are grave.

Greater local control is the course we have set, for it is the only hope of bringing together urban schools and citizens in a new and viable partnership that will better define those positions of responsibility, make the program more relevant and infuse required enthusiasm and trust in the educational enterprise.

C. THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Adams-Morgan neighborhood is located in the Northwest section of Washington, D. C.; it was named for the two elementary schools located there. The total neighborhood is approximately 300 acres, containing about 24,000 people who range from welfare recipients to others earning $25,000 per year. The majority are black and poor. However, this was not always the case; prior to World War II, the area was primarily an exclusive white neighborhood (approximately two-thirds) with a Black poverty pocket. Following the war, about half of the large homes were converted to rooming and tenement houses primarily serving a somewhat transient Black population. About one-third of the population remained White; however, the housing was allowed to deteriorate.[1]

The two schools, although in the same neighborhood, have essentially different histories witnessed by the following news item in 1930:

> "The John Quincy Adams Schools, at the Nineteenth and California Streets, latest of a line of handsome buildings designed to exemplify the best in school house planning and construction, was dedicated formally last night when Major Donald A. Davison, U.S.A., Assistant Engineer Commissioners of the District, presented the structure to the Board of Education and the children who will attend its classes."
>
> [and after noting the musical selections played by the U. S. Navy Band, further noted that]
>
> "The Adams School's student body was made up of pupils from the old Adams School, which has been abandoned; from the Morgan School, which has been transferred to the colored school divisions, and from certain classes in the Force School."[2]

Even today, while the Adams School is predominantly black, the children of the middle-class blacks, whites and Spanish-speaking in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood attend the Adams School.

The school and its administration came under increasing criticism in recent years for poor facilities, unimaginative curricula and teaching methods, and corporal punishment exercised by teachers.[3]

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[1] Morgan Community School: Annual Report to the Community, School Term 1967-1968 (mimeo publication by the Morgan Community School Board), p. 2.

[2] "School Dedication Attended by 800", The Evening Star, May 28, 1930.

[3] See for example, "Irate Parents Complain About Abuse of Pupils", Washington Afro-American, April 22, 1969.

II. WHAT MAJOR GROUPS ARE INVOLVED? HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

There appear to be two diverse groups of parents in the community: young white liberals, who were concerned about the quality of education that their children would receive in the public schools; middle-class blacks who shared the concern; and poor black parents who were concerned about the education their children were getting, particularly in the Morgan School. After the first two years of the Morgan experiment, Adams parents, (which included the middle class whites and blacks in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood) became concerned about the educational quality of Adams and particularly about the reputed corporal punishment used by teachers.[4]

Parent and Teacher Association (PTA)

The PTA is a conservative organization which twice voted "to ask the administration not to include Adams in the Morgan experiment".[5] However, the PTA officers are selected by the Principal of Adams.[6]

Adams Emergency Committee

This committee is composed of members of the Adams PTA who had complained of being unable to initiate constructive changes via proper PTA and Administration channels.[7] This group pressed for the local school administration for reforms and the D. C. Board of Education for local control.[8]

b. Teachers

While the teachers in the D. C. School System have generally supported the concept of "community control", fourteen of the Adams teachers transferred out of Adams after community control was authorized. However, the number of experienced teachers authorized at Adams does not appear to have changed.[9] This makes the transfer of Adams teachers appear to have been a voluntary action as contrasted to the Morgan School where most were requested to transfer so as to implement the Antioch experiment.[10]

Washington Teachers' Union

An affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (as is the New York City, United Federation of Teachers), the WTU is the recognized bargaining agent for Washington's 8,000 teachers.[11] The WTU is on record as supporting community control:

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[4] "Irate Parents Complain About Abuse of Pupils", Washington Afro-American, April 22, 1969.

[5] Stone, Sharon, "Adams: Local Control?" The Washington Daily News, July 24, 1969.

[6] "Irate Parents Complain . . . ", *op. cit.*

[7] *ibid.*

[8] "Board Okays Adams School Local Control", The Evening Star, July 31, 1969.

[9] "Adams School Has Five Openings", The Evening Star, September 9, 1969.

[10] Memorandum from Carl F. Hansen, Superintendent of Schools to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967, p. 1; see also "II.b. Teachers" in the Morgan memorandum.

[11] Simons, William H., Testimony Before a Senate Committee on Violence in the Schools, Washington, D. C., October 1, 1969, p. 1.

> " . . . on February 25, 1968, Mr. William Simons, President of the WTU in a meeting regarding the Morgan Community School declared, "The parents are demanding, and are going to have a greater say in the operation of the schools, whether the teachers are with them or against them, We want to be with the parents and we have no intention of aligning ourselves with the reactionary forces that fear community involvement." (Washington Post) Furthermore, President Simons spoke in favor of a proposal which would have expanded the power of the Morgan Board at a July meeting with the downtown Board and the Morgan Community Board.[12]

The District of Columbia Association of Classroom Teachers (DC-ACT)

Formerly the District of Columbia Education Association, DC-ACT is another teachers' organization which has an 80% Black membership in Washington;[13] this association has recently affiliated with the National Educational Association (NEA), a professional organization of teachers, administrators, principals, counselors, and "others interested in American education".[14] According to Rosenbaum, it too is "on record as strongly supporting decentralization".[15] Once the bargaining agent for Washington's teachers, it was edged out by WTU in 1967 and was defeated in a 1968 attempt to re-establish this relationship.[16]

c. The Board of Education

According to an observer, the nine-member Board of Education had, until November, 1968, been appointed to three year terms by the judges of the U. S. District Court. The Board has been weaker than most as appropriation requests followed a red-tape strewn, tortuous path from the Board of Education to the D. C. Budget Office to the Commissioners, who, until phased out with the appointment of a Mayor in Washington, functioned as the Operating Head of the local government. Congress still must approve all appropriations and monies and are then distributed via appropriations bills.

The Board of Education, according to this same observer is thus unique in not having autonomy in areas generally reserved for Boards of Education. Specifically, the Board lacks: fiscal autonomy; personnel authority in the areas of classification and establishment of positions, autonomy in procurement; autonomy in the design, construction, and maintenance of school buildings; and authority to institute changes.

[12] "A Position Paper On Community Control", Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board, September 24, 1968, p. 1.

[13] Rice, William, The Anacostia Community School Project, Brief Description of History, Program and Progress Report (an unpublished document), June 2, 1969, p. 6.

[14] Gale Research Company, Encyclopedia of Associations, "Volume I: National Organization of the United States", Detroit, 1968, Section 5, p. 436.

[15] Rosenbaum, David E., "A Capital Success Story", The New York Times, January 9, 1969, p. 68.

[16] Washington Teachers' Union, Toward a Humane School System in the Nation's Capital, a pamphlet (hereafter referenced as WTU pamphlet), p. 1.

Even with the reported lack of autonomy, the Board managed to expand the latitude of Morgan School Board actions in 1968, and authorize the Adams Community School Board in 1969.

Special Projects Division

Little is presently known about the Special Projects Division except that it represents the Superintendent of Schools and has worked closely with the Adams Community School Board (which will be described below). Julian West, is also an Assistant Superintendent of Schools and reports to the Superintendent as Head of the Special Projects Division.[17]

d. District of Columbia Government

Prior to September 28, 1967, the government of the District of Columbia was run by the three-man Board of Commissioners. Since that time, a mayoralty system where the Mayor was appointed by the President of the United States, has been used. Like the previous Board, the Mayor is responsible to Congress which authorizes appropriations for funding the operations of the District of Columbia.

The Board of Education is subordinate to the Mayor, through whom requests for appropriations must go, and budgetary approvals must be authorized. Program requests by the Board of Education are submitted to the Mayor; budgetary requests following the Mayor's approval, are made through the D. C. Budget Office (who forwards them to Congress).[18]

e. Adams-Morgan Community Council

The Community Council is an organization formed in 1959 to deal with social problems in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood. It has been characterized as being comprised of young White liberals and Black middle-class professionals. Its membership comes from the various block organizations and institutions operating in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood.[19]

The Council has played an important role in establishing and assuring the political viability of the Morgan Community School Board and the establishment of the Adams Community School Board.

f. Other Organizations

While there are other organizations within the Adams-Morgan neighborhood, such as the block organizations, civic groups, and the like, they do not appear to have been visibly active regarding the Adams Community School Board. However, these other civic organizations appeared to have representation in Adams School Board by Solomon Shepard who was former head of the Adams PTA and has been "associated for years with the more traditional civic associations in the area".[20]

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[17] Pike, David, "Community-Run School Faces Teacher Shortage, The Evening Star, September 4, 1969.

[18] Telephone interview with personnel in the Secretariat of the Government of the District of Columbia.

[19] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 3.

[20] Denton, Herbert H., "Adams School Begins Test", The Washington Post, September 4, 1969.

III. HOW DID THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD COME ABOUT? WHAT HAVE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES BEEN SINCE THEN?

- 1954 - In the face of visibly deteriorating neighborhood conditions, the Principals of the Adams and Morgan Schools attempted to organize the neighborhood to undertake improvement activities. Their efforts resulted in a racially and economically open group called the Adams-Morgan Better Neighborhood Conference.[21]

- 1956 - The Adams-Morgan Better Neighborhood Conference asked that the Board of Commissioners for the District of Columbia obtain a demonstration grant under the Federal Housing Act of 1954. The purpose of the demonstration would be to test whether progressive physical blight in an area could be stopped by "a volunteer citizen action supported by maximum services from their city government". This grant was subsequently authorized to commence in 1958 under the superivsion of American University.[22]

- 1959 - The Adams-Morgan Planning Council and the Adams-Morgan Community Council were formed; the former focused on physical problems in the neighborhood and the latter on social problems.

- 1959-1965 - The Community Council struggled with the problems of bringing an economically and racially mixed neighborhood sufficiently together so programs could be developed to counteract social problems. Progress was reportedly "slow and painful" but some successes were accomplished: development of block organizations, a walk-in science center, a store-front art center, an "alley" library, a community pre-school, a summer program employing 200 people, and a neighborhood house.[23]

- Fall 1965 and early 1966 (approximately) - A dozen mothers and grandmothers including Bishop Marie Reed, became concerned with overcrowding in the Morgan School and this grew to a total of roughly 60 mothers who met downtown with Dr. Johnson to obtain relief. Dr. Johnson reportedly stated that split sessions (3 1/2 hours, as was being done with grades 1-3) were certainly adequate. The mothers' response was, in so many words, reported to be: "Fine, put everybody in the school district on 3 1/2 hours, please, and we'll feel equal."[24]

- 1966 - The mothers, assisted by the Adams-Morgan Community Council's Schools Committee managed to defeat the split session proposal and win some relief via bussing of students.[25]

- 1966 - The Adams-Morgan Community Council Schools Committee held open public meetings to discuss what was wanted in the Adams and Morgan Schools.[26]

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[21] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 2.

[22] ibid., p. 3.

[23] ibid., p. 3.

[24] Interview with Bishop Marie Reed.

[25] Lauter, Paul,"The Short Happy Life of the Adams-Morgan Community School Project", Harvard Educational Review, Spring 1968, pp. 237, 238.

[26] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 4.

- 1966 (exact date unknown) - The Adams-Morgan Community Council (reportedly dominated by whites and middle class blacks) met with the D. C. Superintendent of Schools to discuss the idea of a community-controlled school. No parents of Morgan children were present.[27] The Superintendent said he would entertain a proposal for community run schools only if a university were involved.[28]

- Fall 1966 - Two persons who had attended the Schools Committee meetings (the director of Antioch-Putney Graduate Center in Washington, D. C., and a director of the board of Antioch College)[29] met with the mothers who then initiated a request that Antioch participate.[30]

- Fall 1966 - Members of the Adams-Morgan Community Council Schools Committee plus Antioch staff personnel drafted a proposal to include Adams and Morgan Schools in an experimental demonstration in urban teaching under the administration of Antioch College. It suggested that younger children attend one school and older children attend the other. The Superintendent asked that the project be limited to Morgan for the first year, and be extended to Adams the next year, if successful.[31]

- 1968 - With the completion of Morgan's first year, Adams was not brought in, as had been suggested by the Superintendent, even though the proposal put forth by Morgan explicitly requested that Adams come under community control.[32]

- February 24, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union local of the AFL-CIO American Federation of Teachers endorsed the neighborhood control concept for Morgan School. This was interpreted as public evidence of a split within the national AFT as the New York City UFT local was on record as being opposed to the Bundy Report. WTU President Simons **was** quoted as saying:

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[27] Confidential source.

[28] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., p. 5.

[29] ibid., p. 5.

[30] Interview with Bishop Marie Reed.

[31] Morgan Community School . . . , op. cit., pp. 4, 5; plus interviews with Mr. Kenneth Haskins and Bishop Marie Reed. In view of the subsequent failure of the D. C. Superintendent to recognize the Adams-Morgan Community Council as a party to the proposal we suspect that the members of the Council's Schools Committee that participated in the proposal drafting were, in fact, the two Antioch connected people.

[32] Morgan Community School Board, Proposal For The Operation of Community Schools in the Adams-Morgan Area of the District of Columbia, (mimeographed document submitted to the D. C. Board of Education) April 4, 1968, p. 6.

> "I don't really see too many problems in regard to the interests of the teacher. I can envision us negotiating a master contract with the central board and local issues with the local board, in much the same manner as the United Auto Workers negotiate their contracts. I think the important thing is that the teachers' union stand with, not against, the parents in their demands for change."[33]

- Summer 1968 - No answer was forthcoming as to whether Morgan would be allowed to continue functioning under "community control".[34]
- September 24, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board "enthusiastically" endorsed the D. C. Board decentralization plans for Morgan and Anacostia and went on record as supporting the community control resolution adopted by the American Federation of Teachers. The Washington Teachers' Union noted that "in effect, teacher rights may well be more closely protected in a community-controlled school than by the downtown board".[35]
- September 30, 1968 - The Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board "Position Paper on Community Control" was adopted by the membership.[36]
- November 26, 1968 - Mr. William Leavitt, wrote to Superintendent Henley asserting that a substitute teacher at Adams "has cuffed and twisted the ears of first grade children, among them my own six-year old son".[37]
- December 4, 1968 - Mr. Tatum, Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Schools, having visited the Adams School, replied to Mr. Leavitt that the substitute teacher "categorically denies the use of corporate punishment or any other extreme form of discipline on your child or any other child . . ."[38]
- April 18, 1969 - Deputy Superintendent Henley stated that the school administration would launch an investigation into the situation at the Adams School. The investigation was to be headed by Dr. Dorothy Johnson, Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Schools.[39]

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[33] Jacoby, Susan, "Teachers Support Local Board Plan", The Washington Post, February 25, 1968.

[34] See Morgan Community School Board memorandum, Section III, entries for May 8, 1968 through September 18, 1968.

[35] Washington Teachers' Union Executive Board, "A Position Paper on Community Control", September 24, 1968 (released September 30, 1968), p. 2.

[36] ibid., p. 1.

[37] Stone, Sharon, "Pupil 'Ear Twisting' to be Probed at Adams School", The Washington Daily News, April 19, 1969.

[38] ibid. As quoted in the article.

[39] ibid.

- April 20, 1969 - The Emergency Committee met with the Adams School Principal and teachers at St. Margaret's Episcopal Church. The Emergency Committee defined its charges as:

    - The use of corporal punishment to maintain discipline.
    - Discrimination by some teachers, against children with shabby clothes.
    - The use of the playground as a parking lot for teachers.
    - Unprofessional conduct by several teachers.
    - Children being discouraged from using the library facilities.

  The Principal reportedly asserted that such charges were "too broad", that some corporal discipline was required, and that such charges had not been brought to her attention previously. The Committee countered that individual complaints had been made regularly.[40]

- May 7, 1969 - Reportedly, the Adams Emergency Committee was to air their charges at a School Board Community meeting held in the Lincoln Junior High School.[41] However, no report has been found as to the outcome of this meeting.

- May-June 1969 - Apparently during this time, Superintendent Manning proposed an Adams Advisory Council as an alternative to a community school board. However, Mr. Leavitt, a member of the Emergency Committee termed this as "another form of colonialism. While they shuffle the papers and hope we [the Emergency Committee] will go away, reading scores at Adams continue to decline."[42]

- July 23, 1969 - The D. C. School Board held its final hearing before a vote scheduled for the following week. (We haven't found any reports of the previous hearings.) Twenty people spoke in favor of Adams coming under local community control; the Adams PTA President and one other spoke against community control. Those supporting included the WTU.[43] The meeting room of the D. C. Board was overflowing with more than 100 persons who heard that the Adams School was not responsive to complaints, and that reading scores of children continued to decline.[44]

- July 30, 1969 - The D. C. Board granted community control to Adams, and relieved Superintendent Manning of his administrative duties as of August 17, 1969. The Board also ordered the Superintendent to submit a program tying administrative decentralization to community control.[45]

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[40] "Adams School Parents Charge Caning of Pupils", The Evening Star, April 21, 1969.

[41] "Adams School Group to Air Complaints", The Washington Daily News, April 24, 1969.

[42] Morgan, Jeanne, "Shift for Adams School Asked by Parent Group", The Evening Star, July 25, 1969.

[43] Stone, Sharon, "Adams Local Control", The Washington Daily News, July 24, 1969.

[44] Morgan, Jeanne, "Shift for Adams School Asked by Parent Group", The Evening Star, July 25, 1969.

[45] "Board Okays Adams School Local Control", The Evening Star, July 31, 1969.

- August 1969 - The corporation counsel developed a statement of agreement for the administration of Adams Elementary School setting out powers both broader and more restrictive than those which the Morgan School had been operating.[46]

- August 1969 - The Principal and fourteen of the twenty-two teachers requested transfers out of Adams.[47]

- September 2, 1969 - Adams Community School Board elections were held. Six polling places were open from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. for voters to elect eight parents of Adams school children, three adult community representatives and two youths (ages 16-23).[48] Teachers were to later select two of their members to complete the Board.

- September 4, 1969 - On opening day of the present school year, Adams School faced a teacher shortage which was to be filled by "teaching interns, Antioch College students and other personnel . . ." The position of Principal was being filled by Julian West, head of the D. C. School System's Special Projects Division.[49]

- September 8, 1969 - Five teacher openings still remained and were being filled by substitutes. Also, the two teacher representatives for the Adams School Board had not yet been selected.[50]

- September 17, 1969 - The D. C. Board approved the Corporation Counsel's policy agreement between the Adams School Board and the D. C. Board. The policy agreement indicated that the Adams School Board would also be able to receive funds directly from private foundations and federal agencies.[51]

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[46] "Policy Agreement for the Administration of the Adams Community School", (mimeographed document by the Corporation Counsel) August 1969. (See Appendix A.)

[47] Denton, Herbert H., "Adams School Begins Test", The Washington Post, September 4, 1969.

[48] "Board for Adams School Will Be Elected Tomorrow", The Evening Star, September 1, 1969.

[49] Pike, David, "Community-Run School Faces Teacher Shortage", The Evening Star, September 4, 1969.

[50] "Adams School Has Five Openings", The Evening Star, September 9, 1969.

[51] Denton, Herbert A., "School Board Hits Cutbacks in OEO Funds", The Washington Post, September 18, 1969.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD HAVE?

This is explicitly stated in the policy agreement set forth by the Corporation Counsel, excerpts of which are set forth below:

- The Adams Community School Board will determine the number and kind of personnel that will be hired within the funds allocated to the Adams School, and will recommend its staff through the Division of Special Projects. The personnel recommendations by the Adams School Board at TSA 8 or GS 12 and above will be brought to the D. C. School Board through the Superintendent.
- The Adams Community School Board will be given responsibility for curriculum formation and instruction with the aid of the Division of Special Projects and colleges it may choose to act in a consultative capacity.
- The Adams Community School Board will determine priorities for the expenditure of funds which are normally allocated to the Adams School.
- The Adams Community School Board will be designated as the "Local and area group" responsible for the purposes of preparation of budgetary requests for the Adams School.
- The Adams Community School will receive the complete staff and services support that are available to all other schools, and this support will be provided directly through the Division of Special Projects.[52]

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[52] See Appendix A for complete document.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF ADAMS SCHOOL BOARD?

The goals of Adams School Board have not been explicitly stated as of the time we began drafting this memorandum. However, they are reportedly similar to the Morgan Board's goals in terms of:

- Having a school be responsive to community needs.
- Improving the education of Adams school children.
- Setting a climate of discipline and dignity in the school.[53]

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[53] As reflected in various news articles. See for example, "Principal Denies Punishment Charge", The Washington Daily News, April 24, 1969; "Irate Parents Complain About Abuse of Pupils", Washington Afro-American, April 22, 1969; also, interview with Mr. Kenneth Haskins, October 15, 1969.

VI. IS THE ADAMS SCHOOL BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

The Adams Community School Board consists of fifteen members:

- Eight parents of Adams school children.
- Three representatives of the community in the Adams district.
- Two young adult representatives of the Adams district.
- Two teachers at the Adams School.

All but the two teachers are elected by the community. This format is similar to that of Morgan except that on the Adams Board, there is one additional parent, and one less young adult. Nominations are not clear, but are assumed to be the same as for Morgan where anyone wishing to run may do so by circulating a petition one month prior to the election.

Other representational issues are not yet known due to the newness of the Board. However, the former PTA President, who spoke against community control for Adams at the July 24 D. C. Board meeting and who is a member of the more traditional business and civic associations, successfully petitioned, ran and was elected as a member of the Adams School Board.

VII. WHAT HAS THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

This question is premature in the case of Adams.

VIII. IS THE ADAMS SCHOOL BOARD POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

This question is also premature in the case of Adams.

APPENDIX A

POLICY AGREEMENT FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL

POLICY AGREEMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ADAMS COMMUNITY SCHOOL

The Corporation Counsel's decision concerning maximum feasible autonomy for Community Schools is interpreted to restrict the Adams Community Board from: directly submitting a budget to the Congress, negotiating contracts binding upon the District of Columbia Government, creating its own Board of Examiners, and operating contrary to established policies and rules created by the Board of Education including this policy agreement and subsequent supplementary policy agreements as may be entered into in the future. In keeping with the aforementioned statement, the D. C. Board of Education and the Adams Community School Board agree to the following guidelines:

1. The operational functions and relations with the Adams Community School Board will be handled by the Division of Special Projects (Office of the Superintendent).
2. The Adams Community School Board will determine the number and kind of personnel that will be hired within the funds allocated to the Adams School, and will recommend its staff through the Division of Special Projects. The personnel recommendations by the Adams School Board at TSA 3 or GS 12 and above will be brought to the D. C. School Board through the Superintendent.

3. The Adams Community School Board will be given responsibility for curriculum formation and instruction with the aid of the Division of Special Projects and colleges it may choose to act in a consultative capacity.
4. The Adams Community School Board will determine priorities for the expenditure of funds which are normally allocated to the Adams School.
5. The Adams Community School Board will be designated as the "Local and area group" responsible for the purposes of preparation of budgetary requests for the Adams School.
6. The Adams Community School will receive the complete staff and services support that are available to all other schools, and this support will be provided directly through the Division of Special Projects.
7. The Board of Education will include in its budget request funds for the operation of an evening school by the Adams School Board to provide educational opportunities for children and adults in the community.
8. The operational relationships based on these general guidelines will be developed by the Adams Community School Board, the Division of Special Projects and the Washington Teachers Union.
9. The Adams Community School Board will be able to receive directly educational funds from federal agencies and private foundations to develop educational programs, for operation of the local board and any other community and/or school related activity, provided that

complete financial accountability is established. No monies coming to the Adams Community School under this provision will affect the normal allocation of funds to the Adams Community School through D. C. budgetary processes.

10. Reports and evaluation made by or for the Adams Community Board of their operation and program will be made available as public documents.

11. The Special Projects Division will be allocated funds to develop, in consultation with the Adams Community School Board, an annual report of the Adams project for submission to the Superintendent and the Board of Education.

12. This agreement will be in effect for a three-year period of operation for the Adams Community School -- August 1969 through August 1972. Either party may reopen a discussion of any part of this agreement during that three-year period; but no changes shall be made without mutual consent.

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President, D. C. Board of Education

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Chairman, Adams Community School Board

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Date

D. THE ANACOSTIA DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Anacostia section of Washington, D.C. has been described as a predominantly Black section of Southeast Washington, physically separated from the rest of the District by the Anacostia River and characterized by poverty, unemployment, grossly overcrowded schools (by 75%), low pupil achievements (in the bottom third in the Nation), over-taxed medical and social services (50% of the city's public housing is in Anacostia), inadequate recreational facilities, frustrated hopes, unwanted bussing, low morale with high teacher personnel turnover, shortage of supplies, high school graduates without marketable skills, severe discipline problems and old and inadequate facilities.[1] Furthermore, "efforts to date designed to remedy Anacostia's educational problems have either been ineffective or insufficient"[2].

"Conservatively estimated", the area contains 120,000 residents; 12,000 students are served by its ten schools,[3] of which eight are elementary and two are secondary (Douglass Junior High and Ballou Senior High).[4]

During a summer workshop in July, 1968, residents expressed school-centered needs as follow: an improved, more relevant curriculum; expanded community involvement in the schools; a greater involvement of teachers with the community; expanded psychological and counseling services; job opportunities and placement; and more classroom space.[5]

Anacostia's history as a community-involved school project is very recent. To the best of our knowledge, elections have not been held, although they were slated for "early fall", 1969. Thus, much of the dialogue must be about their early planning stages and contrasted with early stages in other districts' histories.

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[1] The Anacostia Community School Project, Washington, D.C., p. 1; Nickens, et. al., The Anacostia Community School Project: A Proposal and Response to President Lyndon B. Johnson's Request to Congress for $10 Million to Develop a Demonstration of Excellence in Urban Education in Washington, D.C., August, 1968, pp. 1, 4; Rice, William, The Anacostia Community School Project, Brief Description of History, Program and Progress Report (an unpublished document), June 2, 1969, p. 13; See also Appendix A of this report.

[2] Community Organization Component, Anacostia Community School Project (an unsigned, undated, incomplete document), p. 2.

[3] Community Organization Component . . ., op. cit., pp. 1, 2.

[4] Anacostia Community School Project Fact Sheet, June 2, 1969, p. 1.

[5] Rice, op. cit., p. 5.

II. WHO ARE THE MAJOR GROUPS INVOLVED? HOW DO THEY INTERACT?*

a. Parents

Parents do not seem to have organized into any parent organization, other than the standard Parent-Teachers' Association (PTA). The paucity of parent organizations can perhaps be explained by the fact that they appear to have been "selected" by outside forces (as will be shown on succeeding pages) for a demonstration project in community control. It was only after they were selected that they appeared to organize - with a specific purpose in mind of becoming involved in the schools. They have since been highly involved in the community school planning efforts, nonetheless.

Parent-Teachers' Association (PTA) - We know little of this group on behalf of the schools; its support among Anacostia residents, etc. All we know is that for the educational deprivation suffered by the area's children, "the administration-controlled PTA's have made little or no attempts at solution."[6]

b. Teachers

There appears to be relatively little friction between parents and teachers in Anacostia and teachers generally appear to support the demonstration project. Here again part of this support may be due to the fact that parents apparently did not agitate for community control. Another reason may be the fact that the Anacostia Board has not been elected as yet (teachers supported the New York demonstration districts until their actual functioning). Most Washington teachers are Black (80%)[7] and this too might aid cooperation between the two groups. At any rate, to date teachers appear to be highly involved in the Anacostia Community School Project (Anacostia Project), from early meetings through to representation on the committees involved in the planning of the project.[8]

Washington Teachers' Union (WTU)

"Recognized bargaining agent" for Washington's 8,000 teachers[9], WTU has publicly endorsed decentralization and supported the Anacostia Project's bid for community involvement.[10]

An affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, the union is about 80% Black.[11]

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[6] Community Organization Component . . ., op. cit., p. 2.

[7] Rosenbaum, David E., "A Capital Success Story", New York Times, January 9, 1969, p. 68.

[8] The Anacostia Demonstration Project: A Chronology of Progress in Community Planning, an unpublished document, March 13, 1969, p. 1.

[9] Simons, William H. Testimony Before a Senate Committee on Violence in the Schools, Washington, D.C., October 1, 1969, p. 1.

[10] Washington Teachers' Union, Executive Board, A Position Paper on Community Control, September 24, 1968, pp. 1, 2.

[11] Rosenbaum, op. cit., p. 68.

* See Appendix B for a rough breakdown of elements involved in Anacostia.

WTU was involved with the Anacostia Project at the outset, participating in early meetings discussing community involvement,[12] recruiting teachers for the Workshop (See Section III),[13] waived traditional transfer privileges for 3 months,[14] and will be directing the teacher representative elections for the Anacostia Board.[15]

The District of Columbia Association of Classroom Teachers (DC-ACT)

Formerly the District of Columbia Education Association, DC-ACT is another teachers' organization which has an 80% Black membership in Washington;[16] this association has recently affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA), a professional organization of teachers, administrators, principals, counselo and "others interested in American Education".[17] According to Rosenbaum, it too is "on record as strongly supporting decentralization".[18] Once the bargaining agent for Washington's teachers, it was edged out by WTU in 1967 and was defeated in a 1968 attempt to re-establish this relationship.[19]

c. The Board of Education

According to an observer, the nine-member Board of Education had, until November, 1968, been appointed to three year terms by the judges of the U.S. District Court. The Board has been weaker than most, as appropriation requests followed a red-tape-strewn, torturous path from the Board of Education to the D.C. Budget Office to the Commissioners who, until phased out with the appointment of a Mayor in Washington, functioned as the Operating Head of the local government. Congress still must approve all appropriations and monies then are distributed via appropriations bills.

The Board of Education, according to this same observer, is thus, unique in not having autonomy in areas generally reserved for Boards of Education. Specifically, the Board lacks: fiscal autonomy; personnel authority in the areas of classification and establishment of positions; autonomy in procurement; autonomy in the design, construction, and maintenance of school buildings; authority to institute changes.

Apparently, the Board also lacks clear lines of communication within the school system, as well as between the system and the community.

[12] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[13] Washington Teachers' Union, op. cit., p. 1.

[14] Rice, op. cit., p. 6.

[15] Anacostia School Project, Proposal: Project Organization and Community Participation, an unpublished draft, 1969, p. 11.

[16] Rice, op. cit. p. 6.

[17] Gale Research Company, Encyclopedia of Associations, "Vol. I: National Organization of the United States", Detroit, 1968, Section 5, P436.

[18] op. cit., p. 68.

[19] Washington Teachers' Union, Toward a Humane School System in the Nation's Capital, a pamphlet (hereafter referenced as WTU pamphlet), p. 1.

Because of these factors, this same observer accuses the Board of responding to crises, rather than taking the initiative in implementing programs. Nevertheless, the Board does not appear to have played an obstructive role in the Anacostia project.

Special Projects Division

Little is presently known about the Special Projects Division except that it represents the Superintendent of Schools and has worked closely with the Anacostia Community Planning Council (which will be described below). William Rice, associated with the Anacostia Project in various capacities, is also an Assistant Superintendent of Schools and reports to the Superintendent through the Special Projects Division, of which he was director during most of Anacostia's planning stage, on administrative methods.[20]

d. The Federal Government

Various agencies in the Federal Government have played a key role in the Anacostia Project in terms of providing: funds, technical assistance, information dissemination, and documentation and evaluation of the project.[21]

The Executive Office

President Johnson mandated the experimental project and publicly supported the concept (see section III).

U. S. Office of Education of Health Education and Welfare (USOE)

The USOE assembled an Ad Hoc Committee to respond to the Presidential mandate; appears to be the major fund distributor for Anacostia programs; and apparently is one of the approval channels through which Anacostia proposals must go (see section III for specific actions taken by USOE). Dr. Anne Stemmler serves as the USOE contact both for the Interagency Task Force (described below) and the Anacostia Community Planning Council (also described below) as Project Officer.[22]

Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)

OEO's role is actually uncertain at this time. Although they tenatively agreed to fund the Planning Board Phase of the Early Childhood Unit, we have no indication that they in fact did so.[23]

Interagency Task Force

The interagency Task Force was formed in the Spring of 1968 to coordinate Federal resources and programs.[24]

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[20] Rice, op. cit., p. 7. See also the Anacostia Demonstration Project op. cit., p. 4. See Appendix A for an understanding of the inter-relationships between the various educational groups.

[21] ibid.

[22] ibid., p. 4.

[23] ibid., p. 3.

[24] ibid., p. 1.

Congress

As previously mentioned, all appropriation requests must be approved by Congress and monies are distributed through Congressional Appropriation bills.

e. District of Columbia Government

Prior to September 28, 1967, the government of the District of Columbia was run by the three-man Board of Commissioners. Since that time, a mayoralty system, where the Mayor was appointed by the President of the United States, has been used. Like the previous Board, the Mayor is responsible to Congress which authorizes appropriations for funding the operations of the District of Columbia.

The Board of Education is subordinate to the Mayor through whom requests for appropriations must go and budgetary approvals must be authorized. Program requests by the Board of Education are submitted to the Mayor; budgetary requests following the Mayor's approval, are made through the D.C. Budget Officers who forwards them to Congress.[25]

f. The Ford Foundation

The Ford Foundation role in Anacostia is unclear, although Mario D. Fantini (who has been involved in the New York Demonstration Unit and was on the Bundy Panel) was named Chief Consultant to the Anacostia Project in its early phases and appears on its proposal.[26]

g. Academia

Queens College (we assume Institute for Community Studies may have Ford funding, although this is mere speculation on our part) was to assist the Anacostia project with the development of its training program and directed a Retreat at Maryland University for Principals and community workers.[27] Federal City College representatives served on the Ad Hoc Community Committee[28] (which will be discussed below); their role since then is unknown.

h. Anti-Poverty Groups

Little is known about the influence of these groups on the Anacostia project although they are cited as most prominent and active in the Anacostia educational community.[29] However, we do know that their activities have been considered "sporadic and fragmented"; that in terms of personnel, particularly educational workers, there were ". . . far too few for an area so large".[30] However, they did appear to be represented in the planning phases of the Anacostia project.

[25] Telephone interview with personnel in the Secretariat of the Government of the District of Columbia.

[26] Rice, op. cit., p. 2.

[27] ibid., p. 18; Rice, Williams, The Anacostia Community School Project Progress Report on the Updated Reading Project Proposal (including supporting activities), February - August, 1969, p. 26 (hereafter referenced as Rice Update).

[28] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[29] Anacostia Community School Project Fact Sheet, op. cit., p. 1.

[30] Community Organization Component, op. cit., p. 2.

United Planning Organization (UPO)

'The UPO is a non-profit, private organization, established jointly by public and private agencies in Washington D. C., and surrounding metropolitan counties in Maryland and Virginia.' It was organized . . . to find solutions to the paradox of increasing unemployment, low educational attainment, anti-social behavior, and other economic and socially disruptive conditions in a metropolitan area noted for its growing affluence. UPO is designed to be the central long-term community action and planning agency to better develop the human resources of the 'National Capital Area'.[31]

UPO has been a source of funds for many local organizations, among them: CHASE, Inc., TransCentury and Southeast Neighborhood House (see below).[32]

UPO appears to have been represented on the Ad Hoc Community Committee (which will be discussed below).[33]

Congress Heights Association for Service (CHASE, Inc.)

Apparently serving the northern section of Anacostia,[34] its director may have participated in the Anacostia Project Training Program, which was also suggested for community leaders.[35] Supported by both OEO and UPO, CHASE sponsors education, housing, consumer action, and job finding programs; has an employment center; runs an organization for potential delinquents; oversees a combination youth center and pre-school in two connected apartments.[36]

TransCentury Corporation

Supported by the Department of Labor, OEO, and UPO, the organization provides typing and shorthand classes for school drop-outs and others, and places young people in summer and year-round jobs after training.[37]

The Southeast Neighborhood House apparently services the southern section of Anacostia;[38] is funded by the Health Welfare Council and UPO; and is engaged in community development. It offers recreation, informal education (tutorial and pre-school) and group working services; day care; coordination of neighborhood social, educational and recreational programs; community and black organizations; work projects, etc.[39]

National Capital Housing Authority

This agency conducts a pre-school program at the Valley Green Housing Project and employs teenagers on its properties under summer Neighborhood Youth Corps and Youth Opportunity Campaign Programs.[40]

[31] United Planning Organization of the National Capital Area, "Facts", No. 1, January 1965, p. 1.

[32] Nickens, et.al., op. cit., pp. 17, 18.

[33] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[34] Community Organization Component, op. cit., p. 6.

[35] Anacostia School Project, op. cit., p. 26. A telephone interview with CHASE was unproductive, as they were loath to give out information, but did yield an allusion to the fact that they were Federally funded.

[36] Nickens, et.al., op. cit., p. 17.

[37] ibid.

[38] Community Organization Component, op. cit., p. 6.

[39] Nickens, et.al., op. cit., p. 18.

[40] ibid.

i. Business Interests

Westinghouse Learning Corporation conducts a remedial education program for unemployed and underemployed Anacostia residents, ages 16-60. The program runs for 12 weeks and emphasizes mathematics and English skills, as well as job counseling. Job referrals are made to the TransCentury Program. General Learning's Educational Services Division and Resource Management Corporation assisted the Workshop (see Section III) in formulating program ideas, determining program costs, and preparing the overall proposal.[41]

j. Ad Hoc Community Committee

Assembled by the USOE to respond to the Presidential mandate (see Section III), the group included representatives of "pertinent" Federal and local government agencies (such as USOE and the Bureau of the Budget) community people, and "specialists in the area of community-school relations". The Committee decided to use the Anacostia area in Washington D. C., for the experimental project.[42]

k. Predecessors to the Anacostia Community Board

The Ad Hoc Community Planning Council was formed shortly after Anacostia was chosen for the experimental project. Originally consisting of ten members, it expanded to 35 members "broadly representative of the community".[43] The Ad Hoc Council evolved into the Anacostia Community Planning Council (ACPC),[44] a 46-member council chaired by Reverend Coates, Board of Education Chairman who has apparently been working closely with the D. C. Public Schools through its Special Projects Division (directed by Rice, the Anacostia Project Director) and with the various Federal agencies,[45] with remedial reading training and staffing and so forth.[46]

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[41] Nickens, et.al., op.cit., pp. 8-17.

[42] ibid., p. 2. According to the Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1, the group contained representatives from the D. C. schools; the Mayor's Office; the Federal City College; UPO and USOE, and was designated by the Community Council, a group representing about 75 organizations which was established to implement the Passow Report. See also Nickens, et.al., op. cit., p. 4.

[43] Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[44] ibid., p. 7.

[45] Rice, op. cit., pp. 2, 7.

[46] Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

III. HOW DID THE PROJECT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- January 13, 1968 - The D. C. Corporation Counsel rendered an opinion "that public officials or bodies may not, without statutory authority, delegate their government powers". The same opinion stated further "there is nothing in the statutes which would prevent the Board of Education from seeking and acting upon the opinions, views and recommendations of citizen groups of an advisory nature, so long as the ultimate authority over educational matters in the Public School System remains in the Board of Education".[47]

- March 1968 - President Johnson mandated the development of a program of Excellence in Urban Education in Washington D. C., stating that "Washington's 150,000 school children and their parents . . . must also be able to exercise one of their most fundamental rights. They must have a voice which can be heard in the operation of their school children".[48] Johnson asked Congress for $10 million to fund this project.[49]

- April 1968 - The Ad Hoc Community Committee met to suggest criteria for the demonstration site. They recommended that the Douglass Junior High School Area in Anacostia be chosen as the demonstration site.[50] The Board of Education approved the site, chose Norman Nickens (Executive Assistant Superintendent and Director of the Model School Division) as Project Director, and appointed Mario D. Fantini, of the Ford Foundation,[51] as Chief Consultant in development of the project proposal.[52]

- May 1968 - The Interagency Task Force was formed to coordinate Federal resources and programs.[53]

- June 1968 - A series of preliminary meetings with community leaders, principals of selected schools, WTU officials and teachers was held.[54]

- June 15, 1968 - A well-advertised day-long Community Information Conference was held to discuss the educational needs of Anacostia. Ten members were selected by the Conference to form the nucleus of an Ad Hoc Community Planning Council. Apparently, the D. C. Public Schools secured $150,000 from ESEA Title III funds for a month-long planning workshop.[55]

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[47] As quoted in Rice, op. cit., p. 6.

[48] As quoted in Rice, op. cit., p. 2.

[49] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[50] The Anacostia area was later divided into two units: the Douglass Area (Northern), containing the Douglass, Birney, Woten, Savoy and Turner Schools, and the Ballcu area consisting of the Ballou, Congress Heights, Draper, Green, and McGogney Schools. (Anacostia School Project, op. cit., p. 27.)

[51] Rice, op. cit., p. 2.

[52] Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 1.

[53] ibid.

[54] ibid.

[55] ibid., pp. 2, 6. It is not clear to us whether our sources use the terms D. C. Public Schools and Board of Education interchangeably, so we have preserved their terms.

- July 1968 - 280 Anacostia parents, students, teachers and community representatives attended a month long workshop. 16% of the participants were students; 47% were community residents; and 37% were teachers.[56] Assisted by "special resources persons and consultants",[57] the group formed into 4 Task Forces: Early Childhood, Elementary, Secondary, and Adult Education. A youth group was also set up,[58] and ACPC organized itself into a Task Force to insure lasting community participation, which resulted in the life of the project. The results of its work was a Program for Community Participation and Project Organization, which was given top priority among the 25 programs developed.[59] Workshop participants were paid $15 a day, which was "financed by borrowing from the D. C. School System against funds anticipated for operating the Anacostia project" (this was not without its hazards; the welfare department threatened to withhold welfare payments from participants). All task forces included both teachers and community people.[60]

- August 1968 - At the end of the workshop, each task force submitted recommendations for programs and their priorities. Representatives of all workshop interests formed a committee to consider each program suggested and to participate in writing the proposal, which was reviewed and approved by the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council.[61]

- September 1968 - The Anacostia Proposal was submitted to the Board of Education.

- September 18, 1968 - The Board of Education approved the Anacostia Proposal and sent it to USOE for study and funding.[62] In the Board of Education meeting, Dr. William R. Manning, Superintendent of Schools, stated his position on decentralization and local control: " . . . I take the position, without equivocation, that where desired, community groups should be granted maximum feasible autonomy within the present legal framework. In addition, where legal constraints exist that inhibit local control to the extent that it is unworkable, the appropriate laws should be amended or modified."[63] He also indicated that "the Anacostia Community Project is ready to go into operation as a subsystem with some local control at such a time as Congress provides the funds".[64] A *New York Times* article credits a "packed" Board of Education meeting with being a turning point, since "shortly afterwards" the Board of Education paved the way for expanding decentralization into Anacostia.[65]

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[56] *ibid.*, pp. 2, 7.

[57] Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[58] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, *op. cit.*, p. 2. There is mention of a House cut in funds, which only spurred the Workshop participants on; and a Senate recommendation not to further fund the project, which stirred participants to demonstrate support of the workshop, but no other details were given.

[59] Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[60] Nickens, et.al., *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7.

[61] The *Anacostia Demonstration Project*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[62] *ibid.*, p. 3.

[63] Manning, William R., "A Position on Decentralization and Local Control", Board of Education Meeting, September 18, 1968, p. 1. (an unpublished paper)

[64] *ibid.*, p. 2.

[65] Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

- September 24, 1968 - The Washington Teacher's Union Executive Board issued A Position Paper on Community Control, which endorsed decentralization plans adopted by the Board of Education at its September 18 meeting; supported Anacostia's desire for local control and community involvement; stated that the Anacostia Board should have power to hire and fire personnel; and expressed willingness to bargain and negotiate with each local board set up.[66]

- September 30, 1968 - Anacostia sent a single-page memorandum to the Public Schools, Special Projects Division, suggesting that: ACPC hire its own legal advisor and budget analysis; ACPC develop the necessary preliminary staff; and that it create liaison with the WTU, among other things.

- October 10, 1968 - The President signed the Appropriations Bill for the District of Columbia (PL 9473), including $1 million for Anacostia.[67] Copies of the Project Proposal were also sent to the Interagency Group Members with a letter from USOE asking for program commitments and possible funding sources. Copies were also sent to 4 "field reviewers", who gave the Project high recommendations.[68]

- October 17, 1968 - ACPC formed the Reading Task Force, Since " . . . only $1 million of the $15 million requested was approved . . . ", they revised the original reading proposal to reduce the cost to meet available funds and to include components of unfunded programs.[69]

- November 1968 - A preliminary grant of $40,000 (of the $1 million appropriation) was given the Anacostia Project, through the Board of Education, to hire a Project Director and other key personnel. OEO tentatively offered to fund the planning phase of the Early Childhood Unit to the amount of $100,000, providing they approved of the proposal. Investigations were begun as to community interest in OEO's grant and further sources of funding for the project.[70] The first election for the D. C. Board of Education members took place.[71]

- December 1, 1968 - USOE, through D. C. Public Schools, funded the Anacostia Project.[72]

- December 9, 1968 - The Federal Interagency Group met with representatives from ACPC to discuss funding and consultative possibilities. All participants received a copy of the meeting report. Dr. Anne Stemmler was chosen as the USOE contact for both Interagency and ACPC.[73]

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[66] Washington Teacher's Union, op. cit., pp. 1-3. The exact wording on bargaining was: "Furthermore, the union will gladly sit down at the bargaining table to negotiate subcontracts with local school boards." (p. 3.)

[67] The Senate had recommended $5 million; the House, $1 million; the proposal requested $15 million.

[68] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 3.

[69] Rice, op. cit., p. 9.

[70] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 3. No further mention was made of this possible grant.

[71] Rosenbaum, op. cit., p. 68.

[72] Community Organization Component, op. cit., p. 1.

[73] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 4.

- December 1968 - William S. Rice, Director of the Special Projects Division, was designated (by Superintendent Manning) contact person for Public Schools of D. C. for Operations of the Anacostia Project.[74] ACPC met with Public Health Services personnel to discuss the possibility of the latter body's assistance to the former. The job specification for Dr. Stemmler was agreed upon between ACPC and the D. C. Public Schools and then "made available for national distribution". The Reading Task Force completed its proposal, which was approved by ACPC and submitted to USOE for review and funding. ACPC organized an Early Childhood Education Task Force to propose a program using Head Start Guidelines. Work continued to incorporate ACPC "for fiscal purposes".[75]

- January 1969 - USOE reviewed the Reading Proposal and recommended it for funding, subject to three contingencies: (1) appointment of a Reading Project Director; (2) commitment to strengthen substantial reading aspects; and (3) the addition of a strong evaluative component. These changes were incorporated into the Reading Proposal by the Reading Task Force.[76]

- January 15, 1969 - Recruitment for Community Reading Assistants began. 97 persons were selected. Interviews began for Project Director candidates.[77]

- February 1969 - Final agreement on the Reading Proposal was reached. A grant of $726,000 (incorporating $40,000 for overall project administration) of the original $1 million was given.[78]

- February 17, 1969 - ACPC moved into new offices and began recruitment for a program developer, as well as secretaries and clerical personnel. Anne Stemmler was designated as USOE's Project Officer; William Rice as D. C. School's Project Director.[79]

- February 20, 1969 - Recruitment continued for a second group of assistants, who began training.[80]

- February 24, 1969 - Edward J. Edwards, Principal, Turner Elementary School, became Acting Director of the Reading Program. The first group of trained assistants moved into the classrooms, where a question arose as to their functions.[81]

- February 27, 1969 - A meeting was held with all those involved in the program. A group of teachers, " . . . apparently uninformed about the program were unhappy about its initial implementation, indicated their discontent by leaving the meeting". An airing of

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[74] We assume that Nickens was the temporary Project Director, due to his role as Model School Divsion Director, and replaced by this, a second temporary designation, only later to become formal (after he ceased being Special Projects Division Director)

[75] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 4. (This move would allow ACPC to subcontract outside normal channels.)

[76] ibid.

[77] ibid.

[78] ibid.

[79] ibid.

[80] ibid.

[81] ibid., p. 5.

- difficulties and some support were the outcome of the meeting. ACPC "immediately" planned a series of meetings in each school to iron out difficulties. In addition, Rice and Simons (President of the WTU) talked individually with persons involved.[82]

- March 13, 1969 - A presentation on the progress of the Anacostia Project was made to USOE to Bureau Chiefs.[83]

- March 17, 1969 - Anne Stemmler submitted, Revision: Suggestions for an Overall Plan of Evaluation for the Anacostia Community School Project.

- March 1969 - The Community Education Component was submitted to the D. C. Public Schools, approved, and forwarded to USOE, which requested clarification and amplification on certain points. The search continued for a Project Director.[84]

- April 1969 - ACPC revised and resubmitted the Community Education Component. Rice's appointment as Project Director was announced. Juanita Braddock was appointed Program Developer. A weekend retreat was held for community members, principals, assistant principals and teachers.[85]

- April 3, 1969 - A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by Manning and Simons which would waive normal procedures for transferring teachers from Arpil 1, 1969 through July 31, 1969 (see Appendix C).

- May 1969 - The third revision of the Project Organization and Community Participation Proposal was approved by ACPC. Appointments to the Innovation Team were approved by ACPC.[86]

- May 1, 1969 - Additional professional staff members were appointed by the Board of Education. (Prior to that only Edwards was a paid professional) and USOE gave additional "support".[87]

- May 26, 1969 - Birney teachers walked out of a PTA meeting (due to a remark made by Coates that parents only be allowed to ask questions). Training began for Innovation Team members.[88]

- May 27, 1969 - The Project Organization and Community Participation Proposal was submitted for review.

- May 28, 1969 - Superintendent Manning hand-carried 31 letters of warning/reprimand to Birney teachers for their alleged misconduct at the PTA meeting. The teachers formally complained they were reprimanded without a hearing. Nutall was appointed Deputy Director.[89]

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[82] The Anacostia Demonstration Project, op. cit., p. 5.

[83] The Anacostia Demonstration Project: A Chronology of Progress in Community Planning, an unsigned, unpublished, undated update, p. 5, (hereafter referenced the Anacostia Demonstration Project Update).

[84] ibid., p. 6.

[85] ibid.

[86] The Anacostia Demonstration Project Update, op. cit., p. 6.

[87] Rice, op. cit., p. 11.

[88] ibid.

[89] ibid., pp. 6, 7. Other dissatisfactions were: with the school's principal, with the manner in which Reading Assistants had been introduced into classrooms, with the project's non-inducement of teachers; with Coates "conflict of interest".

- June 2, 1969 - Rice, in making a presentation to the Board of Education, submitted the Anacostia Progress Report.[90]

- June 17, 1969 - A two week workshop began for Community Reading Assistants (CRA's).[91]

- June 1969 - Two libraries remained open for 11 summer weeks, using monies obtained from CHASE. A proposal for a DOD-sponsored summer camp at Fort Meade was submitted to USOE and accepted. 36 teachers left the Anacostia Project (an attrition rate of 8%, as opposed to a 14% attrition rate in the other D. C. schools). $273,933 grant for Project Organization and Community Participation was awarded, and the grant period extended to November 30, 1969.[92]

- June 19, 1969 - Step 3 of the D. C. grievance procedures was implemented for all but one of the Birney teachers (the one having transferred) - an informal hearing with Superintendent Manning, who stated that they had only received a warning, since copies were not placed in their personnel files. The teachers asked for a step 4 hearing from the Board of Education's Grievance Committee (dissatisfied teachers are allowed to transfer to other schools with no repercussions).[93]

- June 21, 22, 23, 1969 - Anacostia hosted a conference on community schools, held at Howard University.[94]

- July 1969 - The President's 1970 budgeted $5,250,000 for Anacostia and Fort Lincoln Projects was cut by the House Appropriations Committee to $1 million, which was endorsed by the full House (HR 1311). The community reorganized to fight this cut. The Project Director began to select staff for the Project Schools. The Hayden-Johnson Junior High School was approved by USOE and the Board of Education as a Project School. It will be a middle school with grades 6 (from some of the more overcrowded schools like Turner) 7 and 8. A proposal for a 4-week Planning Workshop for Black Studies was approved by both ACPC and the Board of Education.[95]

- July 7, 1969 - The 3-week Summer Day Camp for 350 children began.[96]

- July 10, 1969 - An open-house was held at the Anacostia Project's Administration Offices.[97]

- July 14, 1969 - The 6-week camping and educational experience for 48 twelve to 14 year-old boys, co-sponsored by the Department of Defense, USOE, and various other agencies, began with about 140 boys.[98]

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[90] The Anacostia Demonstration Project Update, op. cit., p. 7.
[91] ibid.
[92] ibid.
[93] ibid., pp. 7, 8.
[94] ibid., p. 7.
[95] ibid., p. 8.
[96] ibid.
[97] ibid.
[98] ibid.

- August 1969 - The Summer Day Camp for Reading was extended to a 6-week program, ending in mid-August. At its peak it involved over 600 children. Principals and Assistant Principals were appointed to Project Schools by the Project Director.[99] Rice submitted a Progress Report for February through August, 1969.

- August 4, 1969 - The 4-week Black Studies Planning Workshop began. A course to prepare CRA's for the High School Equivalency Exam began (lasting through August 29).[100]

- August 11, 1969 - ACPC met with Peter Muirhead, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Education, and John F. Hughes, Director of the Division of Compensatory Compensation. They were assured USOE would appeal the cut.[101]

- August 22, 1969 - The Contracts Division, Bureau of Research, signed the Grant for Project Organization and Community participation (under which come the monies for the Anacostia Board elections).[102]

- October 1, 1969 - Simons, WTU President, testified before the Senate Committee on Violence in the Schools. He endorsed Anacostia's desire for store-front schools for drop-outs; and he endorsed the union-sponsored More Effective Schools (MES) program, as well as other concepts which Anacostia is attempting to implement.[103]

- December 1, 1969 - By this date, elections for the Anacostia School Board will have taken place.[104]

[99] The Anacostia Demonstration Project Update, op.cit., p. 9.

[100] ibid., p. 8.

[101] ibid.

[102] ibid., p. 9.

[103] Simons, op. cit., pp. 8, 9.

[104] Anacostia School Project, op. cit., p. 10.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE ANACOSTIA BOARD HAVE?

Formal

Although the Board has yet to be elected, its powers will be only advisory. However, a long-range objective is shared powers with the Board of Education, and Anacostia is seeking negotiations on this basis, either to secure a change in statutory regulations or to create a tax-exempt, non-profit corporation (the first order of business for the newly-elected Anacostia Board).[105]

Informal

Through proper channels (with the Public Schools as well as Federal Agencies), the ACPC has apparently had success in screening its own personnel; writing its own job descriptions and creating positions; programming funds; subcontracting with the WTU as regards personnel transfers; and changing curriculum.[106]

[105] Rice, op. cit., p. 6, 7.

[106] ibid., p. 6.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE ANACOSTIA BOARD?[107]

Assuming that the elected Anacostia Board's goals will be parallel to ACPC's, the primary stated goal is the involvement of the community.[108] Although this goal has top priority at present, its unstated purpose is to achieve a broader goal of educational advancement (note the organization into task forces, the emphasis on learning, which appears heavier than the districts in New York).

A second, short term, priority, which will probably have less significance for the Anacostia Board, has been the organization of the Project (which appears well advanced).[109]

The third priority given in the Anacostia Pamphlet is reading,[110] which, as can be seen, has heavy emphasis in terms of planning (the first program to be funded; a task force specifically designed for studying reading; and the first staff recruitments, training, and operation). Once again, this presents a very clear-cut measure of success for the project.[111]

Inherent in the heavily-focused goal of community involvement and its attendant goal of school accountability, is involvement of the school in the community. A broad range of social services, as well as educational services, is seen as appropriate for the school system.

Anacostia also desires shared power with the Board of Education. Although this is not a prime objective at present, we assume its importance will increase with an elected Anacostia Board.[112]

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[107] See Appendix D for Anacostia's evolution of Goals.

[108] See the Anacostia Pamphlet, *op. cit.*,; Rice, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5, 13; the *Anacostia Demonstration Project*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8; and Stemmler, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3.

[109] See the Anacostia Pamphlet, *op. cit.*

[110] *ibid.*

[111] For other highly specific program priorities, please see *The Anacostia Demonstration Project*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8; see also Appendix E.

[112] For specific powers desired see Appendix F.

VI. IS THE ANACOSTIA BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

This will only be answered when the Anacostia Board is elected. However, it is anticipated that the Anacostia Board will be a 20-member board, as follows: 10 parents (one from each elected parent neighborhood board); 3 youths (one Junior and one Senior High School student, and one drop-out, elected by their peers); 3 teachers (elected by their colleagues, under the direction of the WTU); and 4 community residents at large (elected by the community).[113]

The very size of the Anacostia Board's predecessor, ACPC, indicates a serious effort at representation, and appears to have included youth, parents, teachers, and community members amongst its ranks, with no serious falling-out to date.

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[113] Anacostia School Project, op. cit., p. 11.

VII. WHAT HAS THE ANACOSTIA BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

Although obviously nonapplicable to Anacostia to date, accomplishments of ACPC can be enumerated.

Much of the accomplishments so far have been organizational: setting up procedures for the functions and responsibilities of the various organizations.[114]

However, they have trained considerable numbers of reading assistants, who are now working in classrooms (see Section II), and who are community residents (paraprofessionals).

They have initiated curriculum changes, such as remedial reading lessons in grades K-6.[115]

In terms of direct task accomplishments involving teachers and the community, and programs for the benefit of children, ACPC is without an equal (the many workshops and children's activities are shown in III above). It must be remembered however, that the energy and accomplishment came during the time that aspirations for funds were substantially in excess of those finally received (1968: $15 million sought, $1 million authorized; 1969: $5 million sought by President Nixon, $1 million authorized by the House for both Anacostia and Fort Lincoln New Town). Whether the spirit and energy can be maintained at such a low funding level, and whether cooperation can be maintained after the community has an elected rather than a voluntary voice in operations, are the crucial questions facing Anacostia.

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[114] See Rice, op. cit., the earlier draft, Anacostia School Project, op. cit., and Nickens, et.al., op. cit., for detailed policies in this area.

[115] Washington Star, "Anacostia Gets HEW Backing", August 12, 1969, p. 131.

VIII. IS THE ANACOSTIA BOARD'S POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

Again, this question is non-applicable. Furthermore, the fact that ACPC's role has apparently been very open and the fact that the proposal presents vehicles for communication for the Anacostia Board are not indicative of public policy-making when the Board is elected. (See the Ocean Hill-Brownsville memorandum).

APPENDIX A

OVERCROWDING IN ANACOSTIA SCHOOLS

SCHOOL	Capacity [1]	Enrollment [1]	Avg. Class Size [2]	Percentile Band* STEP Reading Scores [3]	Grades Tested
Douglass	756	1267	31.7	19 - 36	Grade 9
Ballou	940	1539	30.8	31 - 49	Grade 11
Birney	693	1138	40.6	30 - 46	Grade 6
Congress Heights	384	692	43.3	39 - 54	"
Draper	703	1371	47.3	39 - 51	"
Green	823	1352	37.5	35 - 51	"
McGogney	803	1331	39.2	30 - 46	"
Moten	696	1388	44.8	27 - 42	"
Nichols Ave	384	743	46.4	21 - 35	"
Turner	514	926	42.1	27 - 42	"
TOTAL:	6,696	11,747	N/A	N/A	N/A

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[1] D. C. Public Schools, April, 1968

[2] D. C. Public Schools, April, 1968

[3] D. C. Public Schools, July, 1968

* NOTE: The Percentile Band Scores above show the range of performance by Ballou area students compared to the performance by students across the nation. The highest possible percentile is 100. Taking Douglass Jr. High School as an example, Douglass students' mean scores in reading ranked from 19 to 36 percent of all the junior high schools in the country. The percentile band expresses a confidence interval for the test scores from the 19th to 36th percentiles. This confidence interval expresses a mean reading performance at the percentile 28.5. In other words, 71.5 percent of the junior high school students in the country read better than the students of Douglass Junior High School.

Source: Nickens, et.al., op. cit., p. 14.

APPENDIX B

DIRECTLY INVOLVED ELEMENTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
AND
SUGGESTED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR ACPC

DIRECTLY INVOLVED ELEMENTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT


D.C. GOVERNMENT
D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS
ANACOSTIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROJECT
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON TEACHERS UNION
Other Federal Agencies

Source: Anacostia Project.


DC Board of EducaTION
Anacostia Community DC
Supt. of Schools Special Proj. DIV
Project Administrator
ADM ASST.
1 sec
4 clerk typist
Deputy Director
Program Developer
Research ASSIT
Personnel Director
Personnel clerk
Business manager
Procurement officer
Stock clerk
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
Director Community org.
Deputy Director
Secretary
Sr organizer
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Jr organizers
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SUGGESTED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR ACSP


D. C. Board of Education
Community School Board
Superintendent of Schools
Personal Staff
Special Projects Division
Neighborhood School Boards
Project Director
Personal Staff
Principals
Deputy Director
Community Education Trainer
Director Community Organization
Teachers
Program Developer
Program Coordinators
Personnel Director
Business Manager
Facilities Admin.
Senior Organizers
Research Asst.
Pers. Clerk
Acctg. Clerk
Junior Organizers
LEGEND
Administrative
Policy-making X X X X X X X X X X
Advisory . . . .

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APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

April 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Recognizing the importance of the Anacostia Project, the purpose of which is to develop and execute innovative educational techniques designed to overcome the effects of cultural deprivation on the youth of the Anacostia area, the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, and the Washington Teachers' Union, Local 6, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO hereby agree to waive, for the period April 1, 1969 to, and including, July 31, 1969, certain provisions of the current Washington Teachers' Union Agreement pertaining to teacher transfer policy. Specifically, Section B.6. and Section C of Article IV titled, Teacher Transfer Policy, is hereby waived for the stipulated period of time.

Further, the parties hereto agree that this waiver applies only to those teachers within the ten (10) schools designated as belonging to the Anacostia Project and that teachers transferred under this Memorandum of Understanding will be transferred to fill existing vacancies. All other provisions of Article IV, Teacher Transfer Policy, not specifically waived in this Memorandum of Understanding will continue in full force and effect.

W. R. Manning

DR. WILLIAM R. MANNING
SUPERINTENDENT
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

William H. Simons

WILLIAM H. SIMONS
PRESIDENT
THE WASHINGTON TEACHERS' UNION
LOCAL NO. 6
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
AFL-CIO

DISTRIBUTION:

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- Mr. Benjamin J. Henley
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- Mr. George Rhodes
- Mr. Harold Clark
- Mr. Gilbert A. Diggs
- Mr. William S. Rice
- Principals - 10 Project Schools
- Mr. William H. Simons - WTU

APPENDIX D

EVOLUTION OF THE ANACOSTIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL CONCEPT



EVOLUTION OF THE ANACOSTIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL CONCEPT

COMMUNITY SCHOOL	COMMUNITY SCHOOL - COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION	DECENTRALIZED SUBSYSTEM	BROAD SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING FOR COMMUNITY
(extended day and week; expanded staff)	New programs and services	Community control Community school Implications for broader involvement than schools per se	Broader involvement than schools per se, e.g., health, employment, leadership training Decentralized subsystem Community control Community school
SPRING, 1968	JUNE, 1968	END OF JULY, 1968	OCTOBER, 1968 - PRESENT

Source: Anacostia Project.

APPENDIX E

PROGRAM PRIORITIES

Program Title	Task Force Developed By	Cost	Priority
Community Participation and Project Organization	Community Participation	$ 367,426	1
Reading	Elementary Secondary Youth Adult	1,005,099	2
Job Training	Adult	420,960	3
Orientation and In-Service Training	Secondary Elementary	686,778	4
Youth:			5
Sex Education	Youth	152, 207	
Student Advisory Board	"	18,256	
Vocational Guidance & Exposure	"	34,528	
Current Business Policies	"	64,229	
Ballou Data Processing Project	"	43,020	
Self-Satisfaction/Basic Education	Adult	612,428	6
Anacostia Early Childhood Education Model Unit	Early Education		7
Teacher Aides	Secondary	568,500	8
Better School-Community Relations	Secondary	1,394,851	9
Parent and Community Involvement	Adult	60,000	9
Anacostia Community Activities Program (ACAP)	Elementary	1,780,159	10
Curriculum Development and Innovation Reflecting the Needs of Urban Life	Secondary	206,252	11
Elementary School Curriculum Programs	Elementary	1,598,723	11
Black History, Negro History, and African Cultural History	Elementary Secondary Youth	599,988	11
Meeting Individual Needs Daily (MIND)	Secondary	607,058	12
Updating Equipment	Secondary	319, 176	13
Additional Typing Classes	Secondary	133,337	14
Community-Family Guidance Clinic	Adult	508,848	15
Speech:	Elementary		16
a. Speech Therapy	Secondary	488,700	
b. Speech Classes		314,445	
Health Clinic	Adult	2,505,000	17
TOTAL		$15,090,768	

Source: Nickens, et.al., op. cit., p. 25.

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES

INFORMATION CONFERENCE - JUNE 15, 1968

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES

INFORMATION CONFERENCE - June 15, 1968

Program Development

1. Need for Special Programs for Problem Children
2. Preschool for All Children
3. Job-oriented Skills
4. More Recreation and Extracurricular Activities
5. School Books Should be Same in Each School
6. More Field Trips Further Away
7. Scheduling Teachers for out-of-school Community Activities
8. Pay for Students as Incentive
9. More Culturally Relevant Curriculum (Black)
10. More Consumer-oriented Curriculum
11. New Books and Supplies
12. New Ability Grouping
13. Negro History Courses
14. Update Curriculum
15. Vocational Training in Junior High Schools
16. Music Programs (money for instruments)
17. More Pay-Care
18. Extend School Day and Year
19. Stay Program for Anacostia
20. Set up Bureau of Apprenticeship for Trades

    Guarantee Students a Job (Placement)

Source: Nickens, et.al., op. cit., pp. 142-146.

Student Skills & Services

1. More Counseling Services
2. More Psychological Testing
3. Job-Oriented Skills
4. More School Lunch Programs
5. New Ability Grouping
6. Need Tutors
7. New (or Different) Student Rules from Students
8. Need Student Advisory Committee
9. Adult Education (Evenings)
10. Vocational Training in Junior High Schools
11. Music Programs
12. More Pupil Personnel Services
13. Psychologist for Every School
14. African Languages Taught
15. Jazz Taught
16. Guarantee Students a Job (Placement)

Staff Development

1. Special Teacher Training for "Problem" Children
2. Teacher's Aid Service
3. Teachers Should Live in the Area in Which They Teach
4. Improve Teacher Attitudes
5. More Male Teachers & Aides
6. More In-Service Training
7. More Classroom Freedom for Teachers
8. More and Better Staff-Community Communication
9. Teacher Training for Discipline
10. Teachers Involved in Community Activities
11. Reduce Teacher Aide Requirements
12. Intensive Teacher Aide Training
13. Special Bonus for Anacostia Teachers
14. Older Teachers Reoriented
15. Psychologist for Every School

Community Participation

1. More PTA Meetings
2. Meeting Hours Parents Can Make
3. More Church Involvement
4. Father-Son Programs
5. Parent-Classroom Aides
6. Need Community School Board
7. Parent Education (Evenings)
8. Need Parent Advisory Committee
9. Parents to be Hired as Counselor Aides
10. Lay Co-Director with Mr. Nickens
11. Meetings to Help Humanize Police Image

Organization & Administration

1. Less Paperwork
2. Reduced Class Sizes
3. More Class Space
4. More Medical Facilities
5. Double and/or Staggered Class Scheduling
6. More Updated Equipment
7. Improve Bussing Plan
8. More Pupil Personnel Services
9. Extend School Day & Year
10. More Flexibility in Ordering Materials
11. Administration of Corporal Punishment (When Necessary)
12. Better Follow-up on Testing
13. Ungraded Primary & Intermediate Classes
14. Help from Congress
15. More Money
16. More A-V Aids
17. Guarantee Students a Job (Placement)
18. More School Lunch Program

E. THE TWO BRIDGES DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN NEW YORK CITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Two Bridges, one of the three New York demonstration units (Ocean Hill Brownsville, IS 201, and Two Bridges), is located in the Lower East Side of Manhattan and is, among the three units, demographically unique. Once a middle-class Jewish, Irish and Italian immigrant neighborhood,[1] only scattered pockets of middle-class Jewish residents remain. Close to 80% of the area's population, in fact, now consists of Chinese and Puerto Ricans; Negroes are a minority. An observer in a 1968 interview described the neighborhood as 40% Chinese, 30% Puerto Rican, 19% Negro and 11% Jewish.[2] Furthermore, the school population is changing rapidly. In 1968, 36% of the pupils were Chinese, many of whom began school speaking little or no English. In 1969, however, 46% of the 5,000 pupils in the district were Chinese; the groups for which the pupil proportions declined were Negro and Jewish. According to Spier,[3] the majority of White children attend Catholic or Jewish parochial classes. Moreover, the five schools in the demonstration unit have a poor feeder pattern. Two of the four elementary schools send most of their graduates to Junior High Schools outside the district; and the Junior High School receives students in from the outside district.[4] Not only is the area mixed in population, but also in income. The area consists of low-income groups living in subsidized housing projects[5] as well as contingents of middle and upper income residents and, therefore, represents an upwardly mobile community,[6] which seems to be "middle class in their social and political views."[7]

However, their educational facilities leave much to be desired.[8] Not only are buildings poorly maintained, but also they have inadequate classroom space. Reading scores of sixth grade children, like those in Ocean Hill-Brownesville and IS 201, range from about 6 months to two years below the city norms.

Yet much is being done to thwart the educational blight in the neighborhood. A Head Start Program has been begun (as have similar programs in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and IS 201); elementary schools are eligible for "supplementary remedial services" (since they have been designated "special service schools"); the pupil-teacher ratio is favorable, ranging in 1968 from 14:1 to 18:1; and, the expenditure per student was increased, ranging from $700 to $800.[9] However, according to a reputable source involved in the situation, no significant improvements in children's reading scores have yet been realized.

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[1] New York Times, March 30, 1969, p. 70:4, "Strife Besets Two Bridges Demonstration District."

[2] However, Adele Spier stated 40% Chinese, 35% Puerto Rican, 18% White; 12% Black. Since these figures add to more than 100%, we choose to use the earlier 1968 figures. See Spier, Adele, "Two Bridges Model School District: A Profile," Community Issues, Institute for Community Studies, Vol. I, No. 3, February, 1969, p. 3.

[3] ibid.

[4] New York Times, op. cit.

[5] Spier, op. cit., p. 3.

[6] ibid.

[7] ibid., p. 4.

[8] Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Decentralization, submitted to the Board of Education of the City of New York, July 1968 (Niemeyer Report), pp. 14-62.

[9] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., pp. 66-67. However, in 1968 average per pupil expenditure for New York City was $1,000 (Fantini, Mario D., "Participation, Decentralization, Community Control, and Quality Education", The Record, Columbia University Teachers College, September 1969, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 94.

II. WHO ARE THE MAJOR GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE DISTRICT; HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

Parents are dissatisfied with the schools and the school system, which they view as an unresponsive bureaucracy.[10] Black power groups have seized the idea of community control as the only viable means of improving education in their schools. According to Gittell[11], local control has meant the dissolution of feelings of both parents and children that the school system is "Alien and Oppressive". According to a survey of 200 parents from each of the three demonstration districts by the Advisory Committee on Decentralization (see below), Two Bridges' parents are both less informed and less critical of decentralization (as compared with Ocean Hill-Brownsville and IS 201).[12] Moreover, when asked to rank the five biggest problems in the neighborhood, education was not among these top five in the Two Bridges District.[13] 40% of the parents felt that the schools were about the same as they had been (32% felt they were better); but 31% felt they would get better (27% felt they would stay the same and 26% were unsure).[14] According to Spier, the Ford Foundation funded Two Bridges because it was seen as middle class and would provide the example for the other two districts to follow in local control.[15]

There are several factions amongst parents within the district, as will be shown below.

Two Bridges Neighborhood Council

Called "anti-establishment",[16] and well organized, the Neighborhood Council has been involved in the demonstration unit since its beginning, having been one of the organizations which applied to the Ford Foundation for funds (see below). "Middle class" in make-up[17] the organization had been in existence for 13 years and had been involved in educational activities.[18] The Two Bridges Neighborhood Council reputedly controls its affiliate, the Parent's Development Program, and has funds from the OEO-funded Lower East Side Neighborhood Association.[19]

Parent's Development Program (PDP)

The Parents Development Program, described as an affiliate of the Two Bridges Neighborhood Council,[20] is said to be a "local antipoverty agency, with $125,000 yearly at its disposal".[21] The group has received funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)[22] and is characterized as a lower class interest group involving leaders among the Chinese, Puerto Rican, and Black communities - helped by a professional social worker.[23] This group has worked closely with the Two Bridges Neighborhood Council which has caused ill feelings amongst the Parents Association.[24] The group is resented by the teachers for its "interference" in school affairs, and in turn resents the Parents Association, which it has accused of being unrepresentative of the majority of Two Bridges parents who can't afford its membership dues, and irrelevant to them in terms of programs.[25]

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[10] David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street, Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City School System, New York, Random House, 1968, p. 28.

[11] Gittell, Marilyn, and Berube, Maurice, eds., Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. 7.

[12] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 11.

[13] ibid., p. 113.

[14] ibid., p. 115.

[15] Spier, op. cit., p. 5.

[16] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.

[17] Spier, op. cit., p. 4.

[18] ibid.

[19] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 90; Kemble, Eugenia, New York's Experiments in Decentralization: A Look at Three Projects, a compilation of United Teacher articles, p. 27.

[20] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.

[21] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 90.

[22] Spier, op. cit., p. 4.

According to Spier the PDP has caused sharp divisions among members within each ethnic group as to who supported PDP and who did not.[26] Not readily accepted by the Puerto Ricans, it has caused its deepest division amongst the Black Community.[27]

The Parent's Associations (PA's)

Termed "middle class" by the New York Times,[28] this association has indicated extreme dissatisfaction with the demonstration unit.[29] In June, 1968, the Presidents of the Parents Associations of the four elementary schools in the area requested that their schools be removed from the district, charging that: four members of the Two Bridges Board were ineligible (because they had a "conflict of interest" in being associated with the PDP);[30] the Two Bridges Board had not the stipulated number of members and had no representation of teachers and supervisors; elections were not held as scheduled, and the participation of the Parents Development Program was "unfair involvement."[31]

Parents and Educators Action Committee on Education (PEACE)

Some community members have even banded together with teachers to organize a group called PEACE. The purpose of this group appears to be to block the local board in the demonstration unit, contending that education provided under the demonstration district has deteriorated; the governing board and project staff are unresponsive to the community; and that "confusion and divisiveness are the main harvest of the last two years".[32]

b. Teachers

The teachers are threatened by lay participation, as they are unaccustomed to reform initiated from outside the establishment, particularly from the Black community.[33] However, they originally cooperated with the communities through their union, the United Federation of Teachers, (UFT), in their bid for local control and through their introduction of More Effective Schools (MES), a program designed to raise standards by increased expenditures per pupil and increasing the teaching staff. Gittell suggests their motivation was to maintain control of the reform process.[34]

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[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] ibid.
[26] ibid.
[27] ibid.
[28] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.
[29] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 90.
[30] Spier, op. cit., p. 5.
[31] Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 90.
[32] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.
[33] Gittell, op. cit., p. 8-9. Kemble, Eugenia, New York's Experiments in School Decentralization: A Look at Three Projects, a compilation of articles from United Teacher, pp. 27, 29 claimed that teachers were not involved in the initial planning stages, yet she claimed they were paid $1,000 a month to serve on the Planning Council.

UFT

According to Rogers, the UFT, exclusive bargaining agent for 50,000 teachers, had ties with all three parent groups (Negro civil rights groups, White liberals, and moderates).[35] The Union had played an important bargaining role for liberalizing the New York City School System and for greater professionalization of the teacher's role.[36] Generally sympathetic to desegregation and ghetto school problems,[37] it nonetheless is attacked by civil rights groups for its stand on problem pupils and on the teacher transfer problems.[38] Also, many individual teachers do not follow the leadership of the UFT and are provincial and ethnocentric in their dealings with ghetto children.[39] However, as yet, the UFT and the Two Bridges Board (or the parents) have had no open confrontation at Two Bridges.[40]

PEACE

As mentioned above, some teachers have alligned themselves with parents into an organization named PEACE to thwart efforts of the Two Bridges Board, which they consider ineffective in improving the children's education.

c. The Board of Education

According to an interview with an observer of the New York demonstration units, the Board of Education viewed the demonstration units as stop-gap measures to appease pressure groups (both from the communities' desires for local control and from Mayor Lindsay's committee, which was planning decentralization) and was unwilling to delegate any real authority to the demonstration boards. The Neimeyer Report indicated that there are "considerable misunderstandings" between the Two Bridges Board and the Board of Education, particularly over the autonomy of the Two Bridges Board.[41] The Board of Education criticized the Bundy Report (see below) and set up the *Advisory Committee on Decentralization* to study the demonstration units, which it did for approximately one year, resulting in a final report entitled The *Niemeyer Report*. The Board also published its own position in *Guidelines To Decentralization* (see below).[42] Nonetheless, the Central Board has shown signs of cooperation with the Two Bridges Board such as in the areas of ethnic language and culture programs and in fighting for the abolishment of civil service regulations for principals[43] (see below).

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[34] *ibid.*
[35] Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193. 50,000 are members but 60,000 or more are affected.
[36] *ibid.*, p. 192.
[37] *ibid.*, p. 193. However, a confidential source indicates this is a verbal stance only
[38] Rogers, *op.cit.*, pp. 192-195.
[39] *ibid.*, p. 194.
[40] *New York Times*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[41] Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*. pp. 99-100. A participant indicated the Board only acted positively when necessitated by Ford or State Commissioners intervention.
[42] Board of Education of the city of New York, *Guidelines to Decentralization*, New York, December, 1968.
[43] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

d. The Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA)

The CSA maintains that education is the province of professionals and that lay intrusion will lower educational standards, and has played a "consistently obstructionist role" in attempts to decentralize or localize control.[44] Rogers labels it, in fact, "the most powerful organization of the professional groups",[45] and indicates that this group has successfully blocked or subverted all attempts made so far.[46]

Composed of Principals and Assistant Principals, CSA, with the UFT, lobbied against the passage of the Bundy Report (see above). The CSA was the body which brought suit against the creation of the Special Category of Demonstration School Principal for Elementary Schools.[47]

e. Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization

The New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate for a plan of decentralization.[48] Accompanying the mandate was the promise of $54 million in additional state aid for New York City.[49]

On April 30, 1967, Lindsay organized the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools,[50] with McGeorge Bundy as its Chairman. Their position on decentralization was published in November, 1967 (see below).[51]

The UFT and the Council of Supervisory Associations subsequently lobbied against passage of the Bundy report, as it came to be known.[52] Gittell suggests that this was partly due to fear of mayoral control in city education.[53]

As previously noted, the Board of Education was also unfavorably disposed toward the Bundy report (which was suggested as a main impetus for the Board's own Advisory Committee).

f. The Ford Foundation

The Ford Foundation has been variously involved with all three demonstration units. As will be seen below, the Foundation was apparently responsible, in granting funds to Two Bridges, for the inclusion of Two Bridges in the demonstration districts. The Foundation worked on and supported the Bundy Report (Bundy being the President of the Ford Foundation) which was mandated by Mayor Lindsay. The Foundation thus appeared to be working "both sides of the street" for the Mayor and, thus, the State Legislature, as well as funding local efforts to obtain community control.

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[44] Rogers, op. cit., p. 195.

[45] ibid., p. 241.

[46] ibid.

[47] Gittell, op. cit., p. 15. Since Two Bridges had no principals, in the category they were unaffected by the suit. Minter, Thomas, The Role of Conflict in the Development and Operation of Two New York City Decentralized School Projects, Qualifying Paper, August 1968, p. 91.

[48] Gittell, op. cit., p. 335.

[49] ibid.

[50] Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, Reconnection for Learning, A Community School System for New York City, 1967, p. 1.

[51] ibid.

[52] Gittell, op. cit., p. 14. A participant feels that CSA and UFT feared loss of t control.

[53] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 4-10.

According to a confidential source the impetus for Bundy's interest in the Projects came from a meeting with concerned IS 201 people.

g. Yeshiva University

The Two Bridges Neighborhood Council and the Parents Development Program apparently contacted Yeshiva during the Spring of 1967 for help in securing Ford Foundation Funds.[54] However, we do not know Yeshiva's role in the Two Bridges Demonstration District, as no other mention, by any source, has been made of their role.

h. Planning Council

The Planning Council was a short term organization voluntarily established by the UFT, the PDP and the PA's to coalesce interest groups to plan the demonstration unit. However, the Council immediately began to factionate.[55] According to its Chairman, Joe Lespro, "because the need for enlisting grassroots support became over-shadowed by a power play between interest groups, the Parent Seminar never achieved its purpose. Parents never understood decentralization as involving them".[56]

Another source of schism arose when the PDP became embroiled over the Planning Council's proposed conflict of interest clause, which would exclude any of their members from being elected to the Two Bridges Board on the basis of their being employed by another agency.[57]

According to Spier, the first teacher's strike (September, 1967, see section III) intensified conflict as PDP didn't support the strike, but counter-picketed, while PA parents joined the teacher picket lines.[58] The UFT then advised teachers against running for the Two Bridges Board. As a result, two of the five schools did not put up a teacher candidate.[59]

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[54] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 75.
[55] Spier, op. cit., p. 5.
[56] ibid.
[57] ibid.
[58] ibid.
[59] ibid.

III. HOW DID THE DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- September, 1966 - Parents and community groups organized a boycott at IS 201. They demanded either integration or community control. They also demanded a Black principal.[60] Sources generally agree that this boycott signalled the start of the community control issue which led to the formation of the three demonstration units.

- October 20, 1966 - Board of Education announced it was studying various plans to decentralize the city school system in order to increase parental involvement in the schools.[61]

- February 17, 1967 - Board of Education again announced it was studying decentralization.[62]

- March 1967 - Two Bridges neighborhood council applied to the Ford Foundation for broad support of its activities, including: a little league, remedial reading projects, a Parent Development Program narcotics prevention, and improved housing. The Foundation refused general aid but offered funds if the organization was interested in becoming a demonstration unit.[63]

- March 1967 - According to the Niemeyer Report action was initiated by the Two Bridges Neighborhood Council in conjunction with the Parents Development Program (both of which were interested in educational efforts), as these were running out of poverty funds.[64] They contacted Yeshiva to ask for help in obtaining funds from Ford; then they contacted Ford. Spier corroborates the low funds but adds that the original committee which approached Ford was also composed of "one of the churches."[65] She also indicated that Ford considered Two Bridges because of its "middle class" outlook (see above).[66]

- March 30, 1967 - After demonstration districts had been organized, the New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate to decentralize the entire New York City School System, promising $54 million in additional state aid.[67]

- April 1967 - The Board of Education announced its decentralization plan and the formation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Two Bridges, and

[60] Gittell, op. cit., p. 335. Minter, Qualifying Paper, op. cit., p. 70 gives the earlier date of Spring, 1965 when parents met to discuss low reading scores, forming the Parent Development Program (PDP) in the summer, 1965.

[61] ibid., p. 18.

[62] ibid.

[63] New York Times, op. cit., March 30, 1969. For a slightly differing view, see footnote 64.

[64] op. cit., p. 75.

[65] op. cit., p. 5.

[66] ibid.

[67] State of New York, An Act...., in Senate and Assembly, #4622, March 30, 1967.

IS 201 as demonstration districts.[68] According to Spier, at the suggestion of Ford the UFT was contacted and the first meeting of the Temporary Planning Committee of Teachers and Parents was held in Two Bridges, in which the PDP reluctantly agreed with the teachers to include PA's and form the planning council.[69]

- July 1967 - A $40,000 Ford Planning Grant was awarded Two Bridges.[70] The Board of Educations' Advisory Committee on decentralization began studying the three demonstration districts.

- Summer 1967 - The Two Bridges proposal, to the Board of Education on Community Control "Quest for a Child-Centered School System" (Quest), was written.[71] Teachers played a dominant role, although parents and community groups were involved.[72]

- August 21, 1967 - James Allen, State Commissioner of Education, announced that the Board of Education could create the position of Demonstration School Principal for elementary schools.[73] This led to antagonisms between the school officials and professionals on the one hand, and community groups on the other. (see below)

- September 1967 - John Bremer, Professor of Education at Long Island University, was appointed Project Administrator by the Board of Education upon unanimous nomination by the Planning Council.[74]

- September 9, 1967 - On the opening day of school, the UFT struck the NYC schools. Its demands were for enlargement of MES and the power to evict disruptive students; it won a clause empowering it to spend $10 million of Board of Education Funds on an education program. Some parents considered this anti-Black and anti-Puerto Rican.[75] As mentioned above, this first strike deepened conflict between members of the Planning Council. PDP counter-picketed. PA parents joined teacher pickets. It led to the UFT recommending that teachers not run for the local board.[76]

- October 1, 1967 - The CSA charged Bremer ineligible because he was not a U. S. citizen.[77]

- November 9, 1967 - Reconnection for Learning, known as the Bundy Report, was published. The Bundy Report proposed decentralization of the city's schools, vesting power in the local board, and authorizing the Mayor to appoint members of the Central Educational Agency (their term for the Central Board of Education) and five members of the 11 member local boards.[78]

[68] Gittell, op.cit., p. 355.

[69] op. cit., p. 5. Apparently, Romig was asked to Chair the Council being the Chairman of the Neighborhood Council. (Kemble, op. cit., p. 28.)

[70] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 75. Around this time Romig resigned and was replaced by Lespro (a teacher). (Kemble, op. cit., p. 28.)

[71] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 76.

[72] ibid.

[73] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.

[74] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 88. Minter Qualifying Paper, op. cit., p. 92 puts the date as August 27.

[75] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.

[76] Spier, op. cit., p. 5. Kemble, op. cit., p. 17 puts this recommendation on November 3, at a UFT Executive Board Meeting with Bundy panel members.

[77] Kihss, Peter, "City School Designee is Challenged on Citizenship", New York Times, October 2, 1967, p. 38.

[78] See Reconnection for Learning - see also Appendix A of this memorandum report for relevant excerpts.

- November 27, 1967 - UFT delegate assembly adopted their Policy Statement against enacting the Bundy Report.[79]

- December, 1967 - Mayor Lindsay submitted his revised Bundy Plan to the Legislature. Two Bridges elected its community board, the procedures of which exacerbated friction between the Parents Association and the Two Bridges Neighborhood Council (along with the Parents Development Program).[80] In the election, 25% of the parents, 60 % of the teachers and 85% of the supervisors voted.[81] The first board consisted of 3 Puerto Ricans, 3 Blacks, 5 Whites, and 2 Chinese. 7 members were of lower class origin.[82]

- February 21, 1968 - Harold Howe II, U. S. Commissioner of Education, in a speech to the committee on the City of New York of the New York Senate stated about decentralization and local control were necessary to improve education.[83]

- March 1968 - A permanent Chairman to the Two Bridges board (Guillarmo (Alonso) was elected. Before this, internal strife among members of the board prevented a choice of Chairman, and the chairmanship was rotated.[84]

- March 1968 - Teacher and supervisor representatives to the Two Bridges Board resigned. (As of March 1969, they had not been replaced.)[85] John Bremer, Project Administrator also resigned through a lack of confidence, due to his alledged aloofness and hostility aggravated by his eliciting support in the community by discrediting the Two Bridges Board.[86]

- March 26, 1968 - The demonstration districts issue draft constitutions demanding a clear delegation of authority from the Board of Education.[87]

[79] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

[80] *New York Times*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[81] Spier, *op. cit.*, p. 6. The Council was elected December 11. (Minter, Qualifying Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[82] *ibid*.

[83] Harold Howe II, U. S. Commissioner of Education; statement before the Committee on City of New York of the New York Senate, Wednesday, February 21, 1968, p. 5. See also, pages 5 through 12.

[84] Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*, p. 80. See footnotes 68 and 70 for discrepant viewpoints.

[85] *ibid*., p. 76.

[86] Spier, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Bremer resigned March 16, blaming the Board of Education. (Buder, Leonard, "School Aide Quits and Scores Board", *New York Times*, March 16, 1968, p. 16.

[87] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 18. See Ocean Hill-Brownsville's - March 12 and 28, 1968 drafts. Appendices B1 and B2.

- May 22, 1968 - New York State Legislature, having discarded the Bundy Plan and the plan proposed by the Board of Regents and supported by both Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller, enacted the Marchi law which in effect postponed acting on decentralization for a year. Under this law, the Board of Education is allowed to delegate authority to local boards and the Central Board of Education will be enlarged from 9 to 13 members.[88]

- June 1968 - The Parents' Association requested that elementary schools be removed from the Two Bridges demonstration unit, with which they were dissatisfied.[89] Dr. Friedman's term as Project Administrator began.

- July 1968 - Board of Education and the three demonstration boards had reached an impasse over delegation of authority.[90]

- July 30, 1968 - The Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Decentralization (Niemeyer Report) was issued.[91]

- September 9, and 13, 1968 - The UFT struck all city schools because Ocean Hill - Brownsville had not reinstated the transferred teachers. Two Bridges remained open and staffed. This strike, because of the various responses, resulted in unifying the Two Bridges Board, according to Spier.[92] Parents sent their children to school across the picket lines so that 30% to 50% of the pupils were in attendance; similarly, 20% of the teaching staff crossed the picket lines. The local board also hired 23 teachers to fill vacancies. Schools were also established outside the picket lines by UFT volunteer teachers who conducted classes in apartments.[93]

- September 1968 - Superintendent Donovan announced he would limit his supervisory and approval functions to the "absolute minimum" in the "spirit of decentralization" and leave to the local superintendent recommendations on: personnel, textbooks and other materials.[94]

- October 14, 1968 - The UFT went out on strike for a third time, Two Bridges still remained opened and staffed.

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[88] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 74, 337. See Appendix C for a comparison of rejected plans. The enacted law is discussed below.

[89] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.

[90] Gittell, op. cit., p. 15.

[91] See Appendix D for Findings and Recommendations.

[92] op. cit., p. 8.

[93] ibid.

[94] Guidelines, op. cit., p. 6.

- December 1968 - Board of Education issued its Guidelines to Decentralization.[95]

- May 1, 1969 - The New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law defining the powers and duties of the school system.[96]

- July 23, 1969 - Luis Fuentes was appointed Unit Administrator by the Two Bridges Board. However, Justice Joseph A. Brust of the State Supreme Court voided this decision and ordered that Two Bridges Board Elections be held on September 18 for the three Board vacancies.[97]

- September 18, 1969 - Elections were held for the Two Bridges Board. The three successful candidates were backed by PEACE. The election was questioned, however, and ballots turned over to the American Arbitration Association, who announced the results on October 11.[98]

- January 1970 - Elections will be held for new community boards in accordance with the May 1, 1969 decentralization law. This will end the special demonstration nature of the three units in question.. (According to a participant these elections are now being held in March instead, to allow sufficient time to prepare for the elections.)

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[95] See Appendix E for recommendations.

[96] New York State Legislature, Senate Act #S.5693, Assembly Act #A7206; "An Act to Amend the Education Law . . .", May 1, 1969.

[97] Buder, "Two Bridges Board Critics Win; Fuentes is Blocked", New York Times, October 12, 1969, p. 42.

[98] ibid.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE TWO BRIDGES BOARD HAVE?

Formal

Like the other two demonstration districts, Two Bridges presently has little power, as noted in previous sections. The Central Board retains the powers of: personnel hiring and firing (the Two Bridges Board hires the Project Administrator, however); choice of curriculum; and financial budgeting (the Central Board pays the Project Administrator's salary, for instance). It is this lack of formal local power which has been the center of conflict in the other two demonstration units.

Informal

Two Bridges has apparently been somewhat successful in obtaining certain informal powers over personnel and curriculum. According to an observer, the Project Administrator is unwilling to deviate from accepted norms; accepts and respects professionals and business people; and is more acceptable to the establishment, which has not pressured the district despite their having followed several policies which are unacceptable to the Central Board (such as Chinese and Puerto Rican language and Chinese, Puerto Rican and Black culture studies; as well as the use of para-professionals and retaining 23 teachers hired during the strike). However, according to the New York Times, Friedman, the Project Administrator, charged that the City Board was inflexible in the use of funds.[99]

Decentralization

On April 30, 1969, the New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law.[100] This law sets up a specific set of relationships and powers among:

The City Board: A seven-member board consisting of two Mayoral Appointees and one elected member from each of the five boroughs. (An interim board will be operative until a City Board can be elected). The board members' terms are for four years. The City Board will devise a plan to divide New York City into 30 - 33 districts of approximately 20,000 pupils each. It will also establish the size of the decentralized boards. The City Board is the policy-maker. It approves all actions to be taken in the areas of: finance, new buildings, curriculum and personnel. It submits its budget to the Mayor and allocates funds to the districts.

The Chancellor of the city districts, whose salary is paid by the City Board and who serves a two through four year term. The Chancellor acts as a middleman between the City Board, which pays his salary, and the decentralized boards. Theoretically acting with equal powers with the superintendents, the Chancellor is the one who submits material to the City Board for approval. The Chancellor operating city-wide, as opposed to the Superintendent who operates district-wide, has advisory and jurisdistional powers over the schools and the decentralized boards, (with approval from the City Board) including: curriculum; establishment of schools; personnel; finance. Moreover, he has certain authorities which he was not allowed to delegate.

[99] "Strife", op. cit., p. 70.

[100] See footnote 99. As mentioned above, however, elections have since been changed to March, 1970, which will affect the time-table.

The Decentralized (community) Superintendent, whose functions are analogous to the former centralized superintendent. The Decentralized Superintendent theoretically has equal powers and duties with the Chancellor; however is subject to the decentralized boards, which the Chancellor is not.

The Decentralized (community) Boards, which will be elected on the fourth Tuesday of January, 1970. The Decentralized Boards appear to have fewer powers than current demonstration boards under this new system. They are still denied absolute powers, and have the further encumbrance of a "Chancellor". They have to apply to the City Board for Federal, State or private funds, which are disbursed through the Chancellor. They have limited powers of transfer and assignment of teachers (subject to City Board approval and contract constraints). The demonstration districts will continue until February, 1970, when new boards will have been elected.

The City College of New York, which will operate five of the most disadvantaged high schools in New York City under the jurisdiction of the City Board.

The diagram on the following page represents our judgment of the actual powers and interactions between all parties.

Figure 1

Powers & Interactions Under the May 1969 Decentralization Legislation


Board of Estimate and City Council
MAYOR
Budget Approval
Budget Approval
2 Members (Mayor Appointed)
5 Members Elected (1 per Borough)
CITY BOARD
Disbursement of funds
Approves all Actions
Paid by Board
Application for Funds 1
Approves all Actions
CHANCELLOR
2
Theoretically 3
(no apparent actuality)
DECENTRALIZED BOARDS
CITY COLLEGE
Subject to Board
SUPERINTENDENT

Notes:

1 If the approval of actions and authorized disbursement are actually channeled via the Chancellor (as the law designates), this channel will operate for ceremonial purposes only.

2 This link is not known, but an effective Chancellor would not allow it to not exist.

3 While the law designates the local Superintendent as equal in power to the Chancellor, it is very evident from this diagram that he cannot be if the Decentralized Board undertakes an active role within its noted limitations in note 1 above.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE TWO BRIDGES BOARD?

The long-range, over-riding goal of the Two Bridges Board is improved education for their children.[101]

To obtain improved education, they feel very strongly the need to have control over the education of their children, specifically in the areas of: personnel; budget; curriculum; building construction, maintenance and repair; and the hiring of outside consulting personnel.[102] (These are presently in direct conflict with what the Central Board is willing to delegate. Thus, local control often becomes an end in itself and many issues are symbolic points of confrontation over delegated authority for local control.)

A short-term measureable goal of reading score improvement has significance in providing documented evidence of the effects of local control over the long-range goal of educational improvement. Presently, this short-term goal has not been achieved.

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[101] See the Two Bridges Draft Proposal to the Ford Foundation of May 4, 1967.

[102] For specific powers and functions, please see B2.

VI. IS THE LOCAL BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

The ten-member board consists entirely of parents of children attending school in the district,[103] theoretically proportionate to the population. However, the board consists of three Negroes, three Chinese, two Puerto Ricans and two Whites (or four middle-class members and six upwardly mobile lower class)[104] and the changing population consists of 19% Negroes and 11% Whites, 30% Puerto Ricans and 40% Chinese which does not even accurately reflect the school population (see above); therefore, technically the board is not representative.

Parents differ widely on means used to implement goals, moreover, and this has led to internal conflicts which, as mentioned above, prevented a permanent Board Chairman from being designated. Various parents and community groups reportedly feel no "loyalty" to the Board, witnessed by the Parents Associations' request, in June, 1968, that elementary schools be removed from the demonstration unit, as they were dissatisfied with results to date[105] and the March 1969 meeting of the governing board where 50 parents (and teachers) "accused the board of bad faith, incompetence and deception",[106] whereupon the meeting degenerated into accusations and recriminations. Parents are split over the issue of whether they should follow the Project Administrator or direct him, for example.[107] According to an interview with a participant in the demonstration unit, various components are pressuring for confrontation. In fact, according to an interview with an observer, internal friction is the strongest of the three districts, centering primarily among the Chinese, Puerto Rican and Negro factions. Black board members, for example, wished to unite with the two other district boards to fight for explicit powers; however, other elements, although feeling it desirable, felt too separate from them to do so.[108] As mentioned above, community groups are in conflict, such as the recent opposition which has organized into a group called PEACE (composed of teachers and community residents), which contends that "confusion and devisiveness" are the harvest of the governing council.

The original Project Administrator did much to involve the community in the planning of the board,[109] and an extensive election campaign was developed to provide community involvement.[110] The elected representatives do participate actively; the Two Bridges Board works very hard for the community. According to an observer in an interview in October, 1968, they spend close to 40 hours a week visiting schools, talking to parents and students, trying to reform curricula, etc. (reason for their fight for funds to reimburse board members). The Project Administrator himself apparently meets with members of various community groups every two weeks to communicate aims and goals; to learn of resources and services which they can offer; and to understand what support they would like from the Two Bridges Board.

So if not technically representative, the board does appear to attempt to understand and supply community needs.

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[103] The early Planning Council, which purported having teacher and principal representation, had difficulty keeping two segments on Board. Minter Qualifying Paper, p. 90.

[104] Spier, op. cit., p. 7. This may have changed with the September elections.

[105] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 90.

[106] New York Times, op. cit., p. 70.

[107] Spier, op. cit., p. 7.

[108] ibid.

[109] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 76.

[110] ibid., p. 78.

VII. WHAT HAS THE BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

It has implemented new social studies programs on a trial basis.[111]

It has obtained Federal funds for multi-lingual instruction.[112]

It has implemented programmed math courses.[113]

It has made plans for the use of para-professionals.[114]

It has organized a community education committee, to act as its advisor.[115]

It has revampled the local headquarters staff.[116]

Yet, according to an interview with a participant in 1968, it had failed at that time to improve the children's education by any demonstratable measure.

According to Spier[117], the major change which the board has instituted is the community and parent interest and involvement in education. The average board meeting is attended by 200 people; parent aides from all major ethnic groups work in the schools with non-English speaking children; even the churches are playing a more active role.[118] Operation Outreach, funded by the Institute for Community Studies, has been introduced to help reach more parents in the community.[119]

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[111] New York Times, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[112] *ibid.*
[113] *ibid.*
[114] *ibid.*
[115] *ibid.*
[116] ibid.
[117] *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[118] *ibid.*
[119] ibid.

VIII. IS THE LOCAL BOARDS' POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

We have no information on this point other than the knowledge that public disagreements on issues have occurred between community groups and between local boards and professionals (teachers and principals).

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to . . .

- increase community awareness and participation in the development of educational policy closely related to the diverse needs and aspirations of the city's population,
- open new channels and incentives to educational innovation and excellence,
- achieve greater flexibility in the administration of the schools,
- afford the children, parents, teachers, other educators, and the city at large a single school system that combines the advantages of big-city education with the opportunities of the finest small-city and suburban educational systems, and
- strengthen the individual school as an urban institution that enhances a sense of community and encourages close coordination and cooperation with other governmental and private efforts to advance the well-being of children and all others,
- all with the central purpose of advancing the educational achievement and opportunities of the children in the public schools of New York City,

the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City schools recommends:*

1. The New York City public schools should be reorganized into a Community School System, consisting of a federation of largely autonomous school districts and a central education agency. (Section 2)

2. From thirty to no more than sixty Community School Districts should be created, ranging in size from about 12,000 to 40,000 pupils – large enough to offer a full range of educational services and yet small enough to promote administrative flexibility and proximity to community needs and diversity. (Section 3)

3. The Community School Districts should have authority for all regular elementary and secondary education within their boundaries and responsibility for adhering to State education standards. (Section 6)

4. A central education agency, together with a Superintendent of Schools and his staff, should have operating responsibility for special educational functions and citywide educational policies. It should also provide certain centralized services to the Community School Districts and others on the districts' request. (Section 8)

5. The State Commissioner of Education and the city's central educational agency shall retain their responsibilities for the maintenance of educational standards in all public schools in the city. (Sections 8 and 19)

6. The Community School Districts should be governed by boards of education selected in part

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* Numbers in parentheses refer to sections of the draft legislation, Part VI, that begins on page 77. Detailed discussion of each recommendation is found in Part II, beginning on page 15.

Source: Reconnection for Learning, op.cit., p. III, p. IV by parents and in part by the Mayor from lists of candidates maintained by the central education agency, and membership on the boards should be open to parents and nonparent residents of a District. (Section 5)

7. The central education agency should consist of one or the other of the following governing bodies:

– A commission of three full-time members appointed by the Mayor, or

– A Board of Education that includes a majority of members nominated by the Community School Districts. The Mayor should select these members from a list submitted by an assembly of chairmen of Community School Boards. The others should be chosen by the Mayor from nominations by a screening panel somewhat broader than the current panel. (Section 7)

8. Community School Districts should receive a total annual allocation of operating funds, determined by an objective and equitable formula, which they should be permitted to use with the widest possible discretion within educational standards and goals and union contract obligations. (Section 15)

9. Community School Districts should have broad personnel powers, including the hiring of a community superintendent on a contract basis. (Sections 6a and 9)

10. All existing tenure rights of teachers and supervisory personnel should be preserved as the reorganized system goes into effect. Thereafter tenure of new personnel employed in a particular District should be awarded by the District. (Section 11)

11. The process of qualification for appointment and promotion in the system should be so revised that Community School Districts will be free to hire teachers and other professional staff from th widest possible sources so long as hiring is comp titive and applicants meet state qualification (Section 11)

12. Community School Boards should establis procedures and channels for the closest possib consultation with parents, community resident teachers, and supervisory personnel at the individ ual-school level and with associations of parent teachers, and supervisors.

13. The central education agency should hav authority and responsibility for advancing racia integration by all practicable means. (Section 8v The State Commissioner of Education should hav authority, himself or through delegation to the cen tral education agency under guidelines, to over rule measures that support segregation or othe practices inimical to an open society. (Section 19

14. The Community School System should g into effect for the school year beginning September, 1969, assuming passage of legislation in the 1968 Legislature. (Section 5)

15. The main responsibility for supervising and monitoring the transition from the existing system to the Community School System should rest with the State Commissioner of Education. The principal planning and operational functions should be assigned to a Temporary Commission on Transition that should work closely with the current Board of Education, the Superintendent of Schools, and his staff. (Section 20)

16. The transition period should include extensive programs of discussion and orientation on operations and responsibilities under the Community School System and on educational goals generally. School Board members should be afforded opportunities for training and provided with technical assistance on budgeting, curriculum, and other school functions.

APPENDIX B-1

DRAFT CONSTITUTION

March 12, 1968

A Draft Constitution for the ______________
Demonstration Decentralization Project

ARTICLE I. DEMONSTRATION DECENTRALIZATION PROJECT.

Section 1. Establishment.

a. There is hereby created a Demonstration Decentralization Project for Ocean Hill-Brownsville hereinafter designated as the Demonstration Project.

Section 2. Area of Operation.

a. The following schools identify the area of the Demonstration Project: 55-73-87-137-144-178-271-155

Section 3. Administration of the Demonstration Project.

a. The Demonstration Project shall be administered by a Governing Board as established under Article II of this Constitution.

ARTICLE II. THE GOVERNING BOARD.

Section 1. Selection and Composition.

a. The parents, residents, and, if deemed desirable by the community, the professional staff, of the Demonstration Project community shall select the members of the Governing Board. Elections of members of the Governing Board shall be conducted under the supervision of an objective neutral party with a published set of election rules and procedures established by by-laws to ensure a fair and honest election. Election procedures shall meet the prior approval of the Board of Education.

b. The Board of Education recognizes the existing Governing Board of the Demonstration Project as having been elected in accordance with subsection a of this section.

c. There shall be not less than five nor more than twenty-five members of the Governing Board.

d. Governing Board members shall serve for a term to be fixed in the by-laws of the Governing Board. Terms of members shall be staggered.

Section 2. Functions of the Governing Board. In General.

a. The Board of Education hereby recognizes the Governing Board as the agency responsible for the conduct within the Demonstration Project of the education of the children of the community in the public school under the jurisdiction of the Governing Board. In the exercise of that function, the Governing Board shall be responsible to the Board of Education.

b. The Governing Board shall adopt such by-laws for the performance of its functions as it deems appropriate.

Section 3. Instructional Functions.

a. The Governing Board shall establish the curriculum and program to be taught in each school within its jurisdiction subject to the requirements imposed by State law or by the Board of Regents or the State Commissioner of Education.

b. The Governing Board shall select and purchase the textbooks to be used in the schools within its jurisdiction provided that they shall not violate the prohibition of Section 704 of the Education Law.

c. The Governing Board shall determine the methods of instruction and shall exercise control over other educational policies in the schools within its jurisdiction.

d. In the exercise of functions vested in the Governing

Board under this Article, the Governing Board shall act only after receiving the advice of the Unit Administrator created by Article III of this Constitution.

Section 4. Personnel.

a. Within budgetary allotments and subject to applicable State law, the Governing Board may create and fill any position within the pedagogical or administrative staff of the schools within the Demonstration Project and of the headquarters of the Demonstration Project.

b. The Governing Board shall appoint, subject to confirmation by the Board of Education, a Unit Administrator who shall be the chief professional supervisory officer of the Demonstration Project. His qualifications and duties shall be as provided by Article III of this Constitution.

c. The Governing Board shall recommend to the Board of Education, upon prior nomination by the Unit Administrator, candidates for the appointment to vacancies for the position of (Acting) Principal in schools in the Demonstration Project, pending the promulgation of new legally established lists of eligibles for Principal, Demonstration Elementary Schools. After the creation of such lists, the Governing Board, subject to confirmation by the Board of Education, shall select principals from the lists.

d. All other instructional personnel shall be appointed by the Governing Board, subject to the requirements of State law and subject to confirmation, where necessary, of the Board of Education.

e. The Governing Board shall appoint up to two consultants to assist them in the performance of their functions, which positions shall be free of the requirements imposed upon regular civil service or pedagogical personnel.

f. The Governing Board shall recommend to the Board of Education, upon the advice of the Unit Administrator, the removal or denial of probation of any teacher or supervisor who fails to meet the standards of performance established by the Governing Board or the Board of Education.

g. The Governing Board shall have the power to transfer teachers and supervisory personnel among the schools within the Demonstration Project, subject to requirements of State law and of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers.

h. The Board of Education shall establish one school within the Demonstration Project as a training school for teachers; the Governing Board shall have the same power over the operation and staffing of that school as would the Board of Education.

i. Prior to the negotiation of any agreement between the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers, the Board of Education shall consult with the Governing Board concerning modifications, additions, or omissions to the agreement as it affects the functioning of the Governing Board.

Section 5. Budgetary Powers.

a The Board of Education shall, for each fiscal year, after consulting with the Governing Board, allocate a sum of money to the Governing Board for the performance of its functions. That allocation shall include all operating funds except salaries of instructional personnel. The allocation shall be in accordance with an appropriate and equitable formula.

b. Subject only to the requirements of State and City law, funds allocated to the Governing Board shall be obligated and expended by the Governing Board as it determines appropriate for the accomplishment of its educational responsibilities.

c. The Governing Board may, within the provisions of applicable Federal and State law, apply for governmental or private funds to supplement the allocation by the Board of Education of budgetary funds.

d. If the Board of Education undertakes to construct a school to serve the Demonstration Project community, the funds for construction of the school shall be allocated to the Governing Board. In carrying out the construction, decisions about location, design and all other matters shall be subject to the approval of the Board of Education.

Section 6. Contractual Powers.

a. The Governing Board shall have the same power to contract for goods and services, including textbooks, supplies, maintenance and construction as has been delegated by State law to the Board of Education, subject to the same restrictions made applicable by State law to the Board of Education.

ARTICLE III. THE UNIT ADMINISTRATOR.

Section 1. Qualifications.

a. The Unit Administrator whose manner of appointment is described in Section 4b of Article II of this Constitution, must possess or be entitled to a New York City license as an elementary or secondary school principal or a New York State certification for the same position.

Section 2. Duties.

a. The Unit Administrator shall attend all meetings of the Governing Board.

b. The Unit Administrator shall have such powers as are delegated to him by the Governing Board.

c. The Unit Administrator shall report to the Governing Board as appropriate, and shall prepare an annual report for submission to and approval of the Governing Board.

d. The Unit Administrator shall develop effective working relationships with the Superintendent of Schools but he shall remain responsible to the policy directives of the Governing Board.

ARTICLE IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE.

Section 1. Additional Powers.

a. Such additional powers as may be granted to the Board of Education by new legislation for the benefit of the Demonstration Project shall be vested in the Demonstration Project by the Board of Education. The Board of Education shall join with the Governing Board in seeking such change in the area of selection of supervisory personnel.

Section 2. Decentralization of the New York City School System.

a. The Board of Education will join with the Governing

Board in seeking to ensure that any legislation designed to decentralize the New York City School System contain provisions which will guarantee the continuation of the Governing Board and Demonstration Project as created by this Constitution. If the legislation contains discretionary powers to retain the Demonstration Projects, the Board of Education shall exercise such discretion in favor of retention of the Project within the terms of Article VI, section 2, of this Constitution.

ARTICLE V. EVALUATION.

Section 1. 1969 Evaluation.

a. During the months of February and March of 1969 the Governing Board, through such means as it deems appropriate, supported by funds allocated for this purpose by the Board of Education, shall conduct a thorough self-evaluation. The results of such evaluation shall be reflected in the annual report for 1968-1969.

Section 2. 1970 Evaluation.

a. During the months of January and February of 1970, the Board of Education shall employ an independent agency to evaluate the Demonstration Project.

ARTICLE VI. DURATION.

Section 1. Effective Date.

a. This Constitution shall become effective when signed by the President of the Board of Education and by the Chairman of the Governing Board. Such signature shall constitute official recognition ofthe Governing Board and of the Demonstration Project by the Board of Education.

Section 2. Termination.

a. Unless earlier terminated by the Board of Education

APPENDIX B-2

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

Draft Guidelines for a Demonstration Project

Preamble: In order to demonstrate the manner in which community control of the school system can improve the schools as basic and essential institutions of our society, the Board of Education and the governing board of the ______ Demonstration Project hereby declare these to be the guidelines for the operation of the ______ Demonstration Project.

Article I: Demonstration Project

Section 1: Creation of Demonstration Project

a. There is hereby created a Demonstration Project for ______, hereinafter designated as the Demonstration Project.

Section 2: Area of Operation

a. The following are the geographic boundaries of and the schools within the Demonstration Project:

Section 3: Administration of the Demonstration Project

a. The Demonstration Project shall be administered by a governing board as established under Article II of these guidelines.

Article II: The Governing Board

Section 1: Selection and Composition

a. The parents, residents, and, if so designated by the bylaws, the professional staff of the Demonstration Project shall select the members of the governing board. Elections of members of the governing board shall be conducted in accordance with a published set of election rules and procedures established by bylaws to ensure a fair and honest election.

b. The Board of Education recognizes the existing governing board of the Demonstration Project as having been elected in accordance with subsection (a) of this section.

SUBMITTED BY the Ocean Hill–Brownsville governing board to the superintendent of schools, March 26, 1968, as part of the negotiations for a clear grant of power to the local board.

Source: Gittell, op.cit., pp. 19-24

c. Governing board members shall serve for a term to be fixed in the bylaws of the governing board. Terms of office of the members shall be staggered.

Section 2: General Functions of the Governing Board

a. The Board of Education hereby recognizes the governing board as the agency responsible for the conduct within the Demonstration Project of the education of the children of the community in the public schools under the jurisdiction of the governing board. In the exercise of those functions, including functions described in sections 3–6 of this Article, the governing board shall be accountable to the parents and residents of the community.

b. The governing board shall adopt such bylaws for the performance of its functions as it deems appropriate.

Section 3: Instructional Functions

a. The governing board shall establish the curriculum and program to be taught in each school within its jurisdiction.

b. The governing board shall select and purchase directly the textbooks to be used in the schools within its jurisdiction.

c. The governing board shall determine the methods of instruction and shall exercise control over other educational policies in the schools within its jurisdiction.

d. In the exercise of functions vested in the governing board under this Article, the governing board shall consult with the unit administrator created by section 4 of this Article.

Section 4: Personnel

a. The governing board shall appoint a unit administrator who shall be the chief professional supervisory officer of the Demonstration Project. His powers and responsibilities shall be as provided by Article III of these guidelines.

b. All power of appointment of other instructional and supervisory personnel presently exercised by the Board of Education and the superintendent of schools is vested in the governing board acting upon the advice of the unit administrator.

c. The governing board may appoint consultants to assist it in the performance of its functions, which positions shall be exempt from regular civil service and Board of Education regulations with respect to appointment.

d. The governing board, upon the advice of the unit administrator, may remove or deny tenure or suspend any teacher or supervisor who fails to meet standards of performance established by the governing board. Removal, suspension, or denial of tenure of a teacher or supervisor under the jurisdiction of the governing board may be effected only upon a recommendation of suspension, removal, or denial of tenure by the governing board.

e. The governing board shall have the power to transfer teachers and supervisory personnel among the schools within the Demonstration Project.

f. The Board of Education shall establish schools within the Demonstration Project as training schools for teachers; the governing board shall have the same power over the operation and staffing of those schools as would the Board of Education.

g. In the process of collective bargaining with representatives of teachers and supervisors, representatives of the governing board shall participate in all matters pertaining to the governing board; in addition, the governing board may enter into supplemental agreements with representatives of teachers and supervisors.

h. The governing board shall function as the "district level" in the processing of grievance proceedings under the existing collective-bargaining agreement between the United Federation of Teachers and the Board of Education.

Section 5: Budgetary Powers

a. The Board of Education shall, for each fiscal year, allocate a sum of money to the governing board for the performance of its functions. That allocation shall be based on a per capita grant per registered student in the schools under the jurisdiction of the governing board and may not be less than the average planned per capita expenditure, including salaries to instructional and supervisory personnel, by the Board of Education on all pupils in the New York City School System.

b. Funds allocated to the governing board shall be obligated and expended by the governing board as it determines appropriate for the accomplishment of its educational responsibilities. The bylaws of the governing board shall specify at least two persons who must sign an obligation of funds or an order for the expenditure of funds.

c. The governing board may apply directly for government and private funds to supplement the allocation by the Board of Education of budgetary funds.

d. The governing board shall undertake construction or major renovation of schools to serve the Demonstration Project. The funds for such construction or renovation shall be allocated to the governing board.

Section 6: Contractual Powers

a. The governing board shall have the same power to contract for goods and services, including textbooks, supplies, maintenance, and construction as has been delegated by state law to the Board of Education.

Article III: The Unit Administrator

Section 1: Powers and Responsibilities

a. The unit administrator shall have such powers as are delegated to him by the governing board.

b. The unit administrator shall be responsible to the policy directives of the governing board.

Article IV: Legislative Change

Section 1: Additional Powers

a. Such additional powers as may be granted to the Board of Education by new legislation for the benefit of the Demonstration Project shall be vested in the Demonstration Project by the Board of Education. The Board of Education agrees to join with the governing board in seeking enactment of the proposed legislation attached hereto.

Section 2: Decentralization of the New York City School System

a. The Board of Education agrees to join with the governing board to bring about necessary changes in any legislation designed to decentralize the New York City School System to ensure that the governing board and the Demonstration Project may be continued as provided in these guidelines.

Article V: Evaluation

Section 1: In General

a. The governing board shall maintain a continuing evaluation of the Demonstration Project, which evaluation shall be reflected in annual reports to the community.

Section 2: Standards of Evaluation

a. The Board of Education and the governing board shall formulate immediately criteria of evaluation on the basis of which all evaluations will take place. The Board of Education shall then employ an independent agency mutually agreed upon by the governing board and the Board of Education to make an initial evaluation, according to such criteria, of the present state of schools in the Demonstration Project. This evaluation shall serve as the base year evaluation for later comparison.

Section 3: 1971 Evaluation

a. During the months of February and March of 1971, the governing board, through such means as it deems appropriate, supported by funds allocated for this purpose by the Board of Education, shall conduct a thorough self-evaluation.

Section 4: 1973 Evaluation

a. During the months of February and March of 1973, the Board of Education shall employ an independent agency mutually agreed upon by the governing board and the Board of Education to evaluate the Demonstration Project.

Article VI: Effective Date and Continuation

Section 1: Effective Date

a. These guidelines shall become effective when signed by the president of the Board of Education on behalf of the Board of Education and by the chairman of the governing board on behalf of the governing board. Such signature shall constitute official recognition of the governing board and of the Demonstration Project by the Board of Education.

Section 2: Fifth Year Review

a. The continuation of the Demonstration Project shall be reviewed in the Spring of 1973.

Article VII: Resolution of Disputes

Section 1: Arbitration

a. If the Board of Education and the governing board cannot agree on the interpretation of any provisions of these guidelines, the matter shall be referred by either party, after prior notice to the other party, to [the state commissioner of education for resolution of the dispute] [an arbitration board consisting of one appointee of each party and a third to be agreed upon by the two appointees].

APPENDIX C

COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS
FOR THE
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF LOCAL COMMUNITY BOARDS

COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF LOCAL COMMUNITY BOARDS

Board of Education	Demonstration Projects	Board of Regents
	Selection and Composition of Boards	
Parents, community, and teachers, with parents and community forming majority.	Parents, community, and, if so designated, professionals.	All eligible voters in residence; 6 elected, 2 appointed by Mayor.
	Functions of Boards	
Instructional Functions		
PBs determine policy for guidance of PA in curriculum, programming innovations, experimentation within larger framework to be set by central board.	PBs establish cirriculum, select and purchase texts directly, determine method of instruction, and control educational policy in schools.	LSBs have authority over selection of texts and other instructional materials and all matters relating to instruction of children.
Personnel		
PBs shall recommend to Bd of Ed candidates for PA and business mgr; PBs shall recommend for appt PAs principals. PBs can create or fill positions within existing budgetary and contractual limitations. Any deviations to be negotiated with Bd of Ed.	PBs shall appoint a PA. PBs shall have power of appointment of all instructional and supervisory personnel now exercised by present PBs	LBs shall appoint local supt. Right to appoint, assign, promote, discharge, and determine duties of all employees within contractual arrangements. State certification minimum qualification for promotion and appointment of all personnel. Central Bd shall draw plans for control of transfer of employees from one district to another. Central Bd shall negotiate with union, keeping communication with local boards open in advisory capacity.

PB - Project Board
PA - Project Administrator
LSB - Local School Board

Source: Niemeyer Report, op.cit., p. 102, p. 103

Board of Education	Demonstration Projects	Board of Regents
	Functions of Boards (continued)	
Budget		
PB to submit requests to Supt of Schools.	Bd of Ed to allocate a sum of money based on per capita grant per registered pupils.	City Bd shall allocate funds to LSBs equitably. Plan should be devised to give LSBs maximum control and encouragement to experiment.
	PBs may apply directly to govt or private agencies for funds.	PBs may apply directly to govt or private agencies for add'l funds.
	PB should have funds for construction and major renovation of schools within the district.	State Ed Dept should provide funds for development and plans.
Project Administrator		
Powers delegated by PB.	Powers delegated by PB.	
Attend all PB meetings. Report to and prepare annual report to PB. Should be a NYC licensed elementary or secondary school principal or have NY State certification for same position. Responsible to PB and the Supt of Schools.	Responsible to PB; carry out their mandates.	
Evaluation		
	PBs shall maintain continuing evaluation and submit annual reports to community.	
	Bd of Ed shall formulate immediately criteria of evaluation. Bd of Ed shall employ an independent, mutually agreed upon party to make initial evaluation of base year.	After 8 yrs from creation of each special district, City Bd shall determine whether district shall continue.
Second yr of operation--Bd of Ed shall provide funds for self-evaluation.	1971--PB should be allocated funds for self-evaluation.	
Third yr of operation--Bd of Ed should have qualified independent agency evaluation.	1973--Bd of Ed should employ a mutually agreed upon independent agency for evaluation.	

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(NIEMEYER REPORT)

SUMMARY OF GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy of Administrative Decentralization: The Board of Education

Findings

The Administrative Decentralization Plan depends to a large extent upon each District Superintendent working out a process of consultation with his local school board and his principals. In the five districts which we studied we found many examples of weakness in the development of effective consultation. However, we also found encouraging proof that some superintendents and their local boards are learning to work together on a highly satisfactory level. The three districts where this high level of cooperation has been attained have one feature in common: the District Superintendent and the chairman of the local school board (LSB) have developed a trustful personal relationship.

There follows our assessment of the way decentralization is working in relation to the most important areas of school operation[1]:

Appointment of Principals. Probably the most successful use of consultation between District Superintendents and local school boards occurred in the appointment of new principals, although there still are instances of LSBs being bypassed in one way or another.

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[1] A detailed account of the findings of the Advisory Committee is contained in Chapter II.

Source: Niemeyer Report, op.cit., pp. 1-6

Personnel: Assignment of Teachers. The assignment of a pool of substitute teachers on the district level allows the District Superintendents somewhat greater flexibility in meeting the staffing needs of their principals.

Personnel: District Office Staff. Of the ten positions allotted to each district under decentralization, only three are mandated. This arrangement has allowed the District Superintendent flexibility in his staffing arrangements. However, each District Superintendent feels that staffing is inadequate for the new responsibilities. The Committee did not ascertain the validity of this opinion.

The Budget: Involvement of the LSBs in budgetary matters has been limited. For the most part, consultation on budget between the District Superintendents and the LSBs has been inadequate. For example, one LSB did not participate at all in the budgetary process, while a second merely approved a *fait accompli* presented by the District Superintendent. In two of the districts studied the joint thinking and decision-making by LSBs and District Superintendents were admirable.

The range of responsibility given to the Business Manager is a basic reflection of the personal demands that were being made on him by the District Superintendent. The duties and responsibilities of this newly created position remain unclear to most LSB members.

Curriculum and Zoning. The Committee did not find evidence of meaningful involvement of the local school boards or universities in planning for curriculum and zoning.

Books and Supplies. No decentralization seems to have occurred in the procedures whereby the schools select and obtain these instructional supplies.

Recommendations

I. Functions and Authority of the Local School Boards

The Advisory Committee believes that the present nature and amount of consultation by the District Superintendent with his local school board is not an adequate basis for achieving a desirable degree of decentralization. Furthermore, the recent legislative mandate empowers the Board of Education to delegate, with the Regents' approval, any and all of its own powers, thus giving the Board of Education an opportunity to take the initiative in maximizing flexibility in the decision-making and operations of the schools. The Committee therefore recommends that the plan of the Board of Education include, and that in the meantime and prior to the adoption of the plan it carry out, the following:

A. Plan for elections to make the LSBs "legitimate" in the communities they represent.

B. Plan continuing learning programs for LSB members and District Superintendents, including training in specific skills where needed.

C. Delegate the following rights, duties, and responsibilities to the LSBs:

1. Hire and fire District Superintendents.
2. Approve all appointments of professional staff upon recommendation of the District Superintendent.

3. Consult with the District Superintendent on every tenure appointment, provided there is appropriate appeal mechanism for the professional staff and that such decisions by the LSB will not bar appointment elsewhere within the entire school system.
4. Responsibility for visiting the schools in the district.
5. Approval of the budget within allocations established by the Board of Education.
6. Approval of the curriculum within minimum standards established by the Board of Education and the State Education Department.

11. Some Guideline Thoughts on Decentralization

The Advisory Committee recommends* that the Board of Education, in deciding upon the proposed plan for decentralization that it will submit to the State Legislature, the Regents, and the Mayor of New York City, consider some Guideline Thoughts on Decentralization devised by the Advisory Committee and discussed with the Superintendent, Mr. Giardino, and a representative of the Commissioner (see Chapter V for details). The plan accepts the reality of New York City as an entity while at the same time admitting that the present size of the school system requires division. In summary, we would retain the present thirty districts. These would be organized, however, into approximately seven divisions, each having a Divisional Superintendent. Each division would be similar to an autonomous school system of some 150,000 pupils, small enough, for example, so that the Divisional Superintendent could know every principal personally, yet large enough to be economically viable and permit flexibility in the assignment of personnel as well as innovation in secondary and special education programs. In addition, it would make possible greater racial and socio-economic integration.

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*This recommendation is concurred in by five of the six members of the Advisory Committee.

Under this proposal the overall Board of Education would be known as a Central Coordinating and Planning Board; its chief executive officer would be the Superintendent of Schools or Director of Services. A School-Management Committee would be the chief means of bringing the professional educators and the community together.

Since a true school-community system depends primarily upon involving parents at the individual school level, our proposal places great emphasis upon individual School Councils. Even in neighborhoods where parents are assumed to be hostile, there is confidence on the part of the parents in the teachers (see Chapter IV). Therefore, these councils would consist of parents and teachers. The format can be adapted through Teacher Associations and Parent Associations where they exist and through their development where they do not exist.

Although the Advisory Committee has not worked out in detail the authority of these School Councils or School-Community Committees, it sees them as having an important functional relationship to the program of each school. The councils should review and make written recommendations concerning budget, community relations, personnel, and curriculum; these recommendations should be furnished the District Superintendents.

Probably there should be some involvement in the review of tenure appointments. Appropriate appeal mechanisms would be required.

III. A Transitional Plan

There is a profound need for a transitional plan of operation to give new emphasis to providing support and leadership for an orderly and effective process of decentralization. We therefore recommend that the Board immediately appoint a top executive who will report directly to the Superintendent of Schools and will reflect his authority and power and who will do everything possible to cause the decentralization program (including the Demonstration Projects) to succeed. This executive must be an outstanding man, preferably one who already is part of the bureaucracy and is knowledgeable about the system, who is known for his independence and action. At the same time he must be in tune with the community and able to work harmoniously with administrative and community leaders. Such an appointment would require effective and widespread publicity. It should symbolize the determination of the central administration to get on with decentralization. It should be seen as an attempt to relate the power of the chief executive officer directly to the needs of the local community and its representatives.

This official should have an appropriate title, such as Special Assistant for Decentralization. However, the position should not be given tenure; rather it should be undertaken on an *ad hoc* basis.

The responsibilities of the Special Assistant in relation to the three Demonstration Projects are discussed in the second section of this summary chapter. In relation to the citywide decentralization effort, the position should have the following aspects:

APPENDIX E

DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS

Delegation of Functions to Local School Boards

The Superintendent of Schools presents the following resolutions for adoption:

Whereas, Section 2564 (3) of the Education Law empowers the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, with the approval of the Regents of the University of the State of New York, (1) to delegate to local school boards any or all of the Board of Education's functions, powers, obligations and duties in connection with the operation of the schools and programs under the Board of Education's jurisdiction, and (2) to modify or rescind any function, power, obligation and duty so delegated with respect to some or all of the local school board districts: be it

Resolved, That, subject to the approval of the Regents, the Board of Education delegates until June 30, 1969, to the local school boards of the local school board districts established by a resolution of the Board of Education, dated September 4, 1968, the functions, powers, obligations and duties set forth in the attached "Delegation of Functions to Local School Boards": and be it further

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Board is authorized and directed to submit the attached "Delegation of Functions" to the Regents for their approval.

DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the power vested in the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York by Section 2564(3) of the Education Law, and as Board of Education, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Sec. 101. *Delegation of Functions*. There are hereby delegated to each of the local school boards of the local school board districts established by a resolution of the Board of Education, dated September 4, 1968, the following functions, powers, obligations and duties:

(a) *Relationship of Local Superintendent of Schools to Local School Board*. Adopting by-laws to which the functions of the local superintendent of schools shall be subject in the same manner that the functions of the Superintendent of Schools are subject to the by-laws of the Board of Education (Education Law §2566).

(b) *Rules and Regulations*. Prescribing such by-laws, rules and regulations as may be necessary (1) to make effectual the functions delegated to it, (2) for the conduct of the proceedings of the local school board and the transaction of its business affairs, and (3) to authorize the local superintendent of schools to exercise with approval of the Superintendent of Schools such of the local school board's administrative and ministerial functions as the local school board may deem necessary to make effectual the functions delegated to it hereby (Education Law §2554(13)).

(c) *Meetings*. Fixing the day and hour for holding regular local school board meetings which shall be public and held at least as often as once each month and prescribing a method for calling special meetings of the local school board (Education Law §2563). The business and affairs of the local school board shall be transacted at public meetings.

(d) *School Property*. Adopting reasonable regulations for use, subject to fee schedules approved by the Board of Education, of schoolhouses, grounds or other property under its jurisdiction, when not in use for school purposes, for such other public purposes as are specified by Chapter 414 of the Education Law. Providing for the safekeeping of schoolhouses ,grounds or other property under its jurisdiction and not specifically placed by law under the control of some other body or officer (Education Law §2554(4)).

(e) *Teaching and Supervisory Personnel.*

(i) *Licenses and Positions*. Recommending for action by the Board of Education in accordance with applicable law and regulations the creation of such new types of licenses and positions in schools and programs under the local school board's jurisdiction as, in its judgment, may be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of its functions (Education Law §§2566(8) and 2554(2)).

(ii) *Recruitment*. Recruiting persons for (A) examination pursuant to Sections 2569 and 2573(10) of the Education Law, (B) recommendation for appointment by the local superintendent of schools with the approval of the Superindent of Schools, (C) appointment by the Board of Education as directors, supervisors, principals, teachers and all other members of the teaching and supervisory staff, and (D) prompt assignment back to the local school board. Persons recruited for such appointments shall be 19 years of age or over and shall meet other qualifications imposed by applicable law, by-laws, rules and regulations (Education Law §§3001 and 3004).

(iii) *Assignment to Local School Boards*. Approving in advance the assignment to the local school board under the direction of the Superintendent of Schools, of members of the teaching and supervisory staff not recruited by the local school board (Education Law §2566(6)).

(iv) *Tenure*. Issuing or denying permanent certificates of appointment as directors, supervisors, principals, teachers and all other members of the teaching and supervisory staff in the City School District of the City of New York to persons in schools and programs under the jurisdiction of the local school board recommended in writing for permanent appointment by the local superintendent of schools with the approval of the Superintendent of Schools at the expiration of their probationary term. Persons issued permanent certificates of appointment shall hold their respective positions during good behavior and satisfactory service, and shall not be removable except for cause (Education Law §2573(6)). Each person who is not to be recommended for appointment on tenure shall be so notified by the local superintendent of schools with the approval of the Superintendent of Schools, in writing not later than 60 days immediately preceding the expiration of his probationary period (Education Law §2573(1)).

(v) *Discontinuance of Probationary Appointment*. Discontinuing at any time during the probationary period the services of any person appointed for such period, on the recommendation of the local superintendent of schools with the approval of the Superintendent of Schools, by a majority vote of the whole number of the local school board (Education Law §2573(1)), provided that the local school board gives a written notice thereof to a teacher being terminated

Source: Guidelines, op.cit., pp. 17-20

during the probationary period at least 30 days prior to the effective date of the termination of such services (Education Law §3019-*a*).

(vi) *Proceedings on Charges Against Personnel With Tenure.* Proceeding on receiving notice of any charges, brought by a local superintendent of school with the approval of the Superintendent of Schools, of incompetence or misconduct, including neglect of duty, incapacity to teach or immoral conduct, against a director, supervisor, principal, teacher or any other member of the teaching and supervisory staff with tenure, to try and determine the case in accordance with Section 2573(7) of the Education Law by a trial examiner assigned to the local school board after appointment by the Board of Education. The appointment of such trial examiner shall be made by the Board of Education, upon selection by the local school board within five days of receipt of the charges, from a panel established by the Board of Education or from a panel of lawyers established by a bar association organized and existing under the Membership Corporations Law of the State of New York whose principal office is located within the City of New York. Only lawyers in good standing admitted to the Bar of the State of New York with a minimum of ten years experience in the practice of law shall be eligible for a panel established by a bar association. The report of the trial examiner holding such trial shall be subject to action by the local school board rejecting, confirming or modifying, at the first public meeting following or not less than ten calendar days after receipt of the report, whichever is sooner, the conclusions of the trial examiner. Each member of the local school board shall, before voting, review the testimony and acquaint himself with the evidence in the case. The local school board shall fix the penalty or punishment, if any, to be imposed for the offense by a vote of the majority of the whole number of the local board. The person charged may file, with the local school board within ten calendar days after receipt of the final action and determination of the local school board, a notice of arbitration. An arbitration shall be conducted by three persons, one of whom shall be selected by the local school board, one by the person charged and one other person by mutual agreement of the other two who shall be the chairman of the panel. If all the members of the panel are not selected within ten days after the filing of the notice of arbitration, the Board of Education will select the remaining member or members from a list of nine persons previously approved by the Board of Education, the employees' collective bargaining representative and the Confederation of Local School Boards, which at least in acting under this sentence shall include representatives of those local school boards which were governing boards of school decentralization demonstration projects in existence on April 1, 1968. In the event there is failure to agree on such list and the need for an arbitration shall have occurred, the remaining member or members of the arbitration panel shall be named by the New York State Mediation Board. The Board of Education will employ the persons selected and assign them as arbitrators. The arbitration panel shall issue a decision within 20 calendar days from the date of the closing of the hearings or, if hearings have been waived, then from the date of transmitting the final statements and proofs. Such decisions shall be in writing and shall set forth the arbitration panel's opinion and conclusions including an appropriate remedy. If the decision of the arbitration panel is made in accordance with this Del
gation, the local school board and the person charge
shall accept such decision as final and abide by it, ex
cept as an aggrieved person may seek review under th
provisions of the Education Law.

(vii) *Transfers.* Considering and acting on the repor
of the local superintendent of schools, as approved b
the Superintendent of Schools, of transfers of teacher
from one school to another within or into a local schoo
board district. Two local school boards may agree i
advance to consider and act on the reports of thei
local superintendents of schools, as approved by th
Superintendent of Schools, recommending, respectively
the transfer of a teacher from a school under the juris
diction of one of the local school boards into a schoo
under the jurisdiction of the other local school boar
(Education Law §2566(6)).

(viii) *Leaves and Absences.* Adopting rules and regu
lations governing excusing of absences and for th
granting of leaves of absence either with or without pa
(Education Law §2573(12)). Permitting any teacher
having had at least five years service in the City Schoo
District of the City of New York, to apply for and re
ceive a leave of absence for teaching elsewhere in th
State of New York, in other states and territories of th
United States, and in foreign countries and for othe
teaching purposes (Education Law §§3005 (both) an
3005-*a*).

(ix) *In-service Training and Conferences.* Providing
within approved budgets, in its discretion, in-servic
training for its teachers (Education Law §1709(32))
Authorizing, within approved budgets, by resolutio
adopted prior to attendance, any director, supervisor
principal, teacher and any other member of the teachin
and supervisory staff in a school in the local schoo
board district to attend an official or unofficial conven
tion or conference, or to attend any school conducte
for the betterment of municipal government if believe
to be of benefit to the local school board district, excep
that the local school board may by resolution or by-la
delegate the power to authorize attendance at such con
ventions, conferences and schools to the local superin
tendent of schools (General Municipal Law §77-*b*).

(f) *Budget.*

(i) *Estimates Preparation.* Preparing in the manne
required by the Mayor of the City of New York an
the Board of Education itemized estimates for city fisca
years 1969-70 and 1970-71, respectively, of such sum
of money as the local school board may deem necessar
for the operation of the schools and programs under it
jurisdiction. After public hearing on such estimates t
be held by the local school board and after any modifi
cation of the estimates, they shall be filed with th
Board of Education, with a copy to the Director of th
Budget of the City of New York, not later than Octobe
1, 1968, and, if this Delegation is still in effect, Octo
ber 1, 1969. The Board of Education, in accordanc
with applicable law and regulations and after publi
hearings to be held by it and consultation with the loca
school board with respect to any proposed modification
shall then submit its estimates to the Mayor of the Cit
of New York (Education Law §2576(5)).

(ii) *Budget Modification.* Subject to applicable la
and regulations, changing schedules, within units o
appropriation, activities or institutions, prior to th
commencement of or during the fiscal year.

September 7, 1969, covering laboratory assistants (laboratory specialists) and laboratory technicians.

(vii) Agreement between the Board of Education and the Child Guidance Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until September 7, 1969, covering psychologists and social workers.

(viii) Agreement between the Board of Education and Local 372, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, effective until susperseded by a subsequent agreement, but no sooner than January 1, 1969, covering school aides.

(ix) Agreement between the Board of Education and School Lunch Local 372, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, effective until superseded by a subsequent agreement but no sooner than January 1, 1969, for those compensated on an hourly basis, covering school lunch employees.

(x) Agreement between the Board of Education and International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Local 891), effective from January 1, 1966, until December 31, 1968.

(xi) Agreement between the Board of Education and District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, approved in summary form by the Board of Education on May 1, 1968, to be deemed effective from January 1, 1968, until December 31, 1970.

(xii) Memorandum of Understanding between the Board of Education and the Association of District and Borough Supervisors of School Custodians, dated June 6, 1967.

(xiii) Memorandum of Agreement between the Board of Education and the Council of Supervisory Associations of the Public Schools of New York City, dated May 5, 1965, as amended June 28, 1967.

(c) *Consultation With Parents, Members of Teaching and Supervisory Staff.* The functions delegated to local school boards shall be carried out in conjunction with frequent prior consultation with parents and parents' organizations, members of the teaching and supervisory staff and their organizations, and other community organizations. The local school board shall insure that each school under its jurisdiction shall have a functioning parent association or parent-teacher association and the relationship between the school and the parent association or parent-teacher association shall accord with the statement entitled "Parent Associations and the Schools" issued by the Superintendent of Schools in January, 1965.

(d) *Limitation on Incurring Liabilities or Expenses.* Local school boards shall incur liabilities or expenses only in accordance with approved budgets and shall not incur liabilities or expenses in excess of the amount appropriated or available therefor or otherwise authorized by law (Education Law §2576(7)).

(e) *"Local Superintendent of Schools."* As used in this Delegation, the words "local superintendent of schools" or "local superintendents of schools" shall mean any district superintendent of a local school board district, and any unit administrator of a local school board district which was a school decentralization demonstration project in existence on April 1, 1968.

(f) *"Function."* As used in this Delegation, the words "function" or "functions" include any function, power, obligation and duty of the Board of Education in connection with the operation of the schools and programs under its jurisdiction.

(g) *References.* References in this Delegation to any law, by-law, regulation, rule or other procedure, contract or agreement shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(h) *Saving Provision.* Except to the extent inconsistent with this Delegation, all the determinations, authorizations, by-laws, regulations, rules, rulings, resolutions, certificates, orders, directives, and other actions made, issued or entered into with respect to any function affected by this Delegation and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this Delegation, shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified or terminated by appropriate authority.

(i) *Effective Date.* The provisions of this Delegation shall become effective on the day following the date of its approval by the Regents.

(j) *Termination Date.* Unless earlier modified or rescinded by the Board of Education, in whole or in part, the provisions of this Delegation shall remain in effect only until and including June 30, 1969.

(k) *Severability.* If any provision of this Delegation or the application of any provision to any circumstance or person shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the provisions of this Delegation and of the applicability of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

(l) *Functions Reserved.* Functions of the Board of Education in connection with the operation of the schools and programs under its jurisdiction not specifically delegated remain in the Board of Education.

(m) *Pending Matters.* Any business or other matter undertaken or commenced by the Board of Education pertaining to or connected with the functions hereby delegated to a local school board, and pending at the effective date hereof, may be conducted and completed by the Board of Education or, in the discretion of the Board, by such local school board in the same manner and under the same terms and conditions and with the same effect as if conducted and completed by the Board of Education.

(g) *Curriculum.*

(i) *Courses of Study.* Authorizing the general courses of study which shall be given in the schools under the jurisdiction of the local school board and approving the content of such courses before they become operative, subject to (1) applicable law and regulations including (a) Sections 2566(3) and 3204 of the Education Law, and Regulations of the Commissioner of Education §100.1 thereunder, and (b) the specific requirements of Sections 801-810 of the Education Law, and (2) the Board of Education's inherent responsibility for the maintenance of educational standards and the adherence to related law and regulations (Education Law §2554 (11)). Making such curriculum adaptations in every area of the curriculum as the local school board determines are necessary to meet local needs and conducting such experimentation as may be approved by the Commissioner of Education (Regulations of the Commissioner of Education §100.2(*b*)).

(ii) *Textbooks.* Authorizing, designating, determining and providing the textbooks and other instructional materials to be used in the schools under its jurisdiction (Education Law §§701 & 2554(7) & (12). Prior designations can be superseded within a period of five years from the time of such designations only by a three-fourths vote of the whole number of the local school board (Education Law §702).

(h) *Federal and Other Sources of Funds.* Submitting projects for federal and state education funds to the Board of Education for review as to form only and prompt transmittal to the New York State Education Department and/or to the U. S. Office of Education, and accepting the provisions of any law of the United States making appropriations for the purpose of defraying the cost of providing public education, the cost of planning or any other education purpose consistent with this Delegation of Functions (Education Law §3713). Local school boards shall have the authority to submit projects for other funds directly to the funding agency.

Sec. 201. *General Provisions.*

(a) *Schools and Programs to Which Delegated Functions Are Applicable.* The functions delegated to local school boards hereunder shall apply to the following schools and programs under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education except to the extent otherwise specified:

(i) Nursery schools.

(ii) Kindergartens.

(iii) Elementary schools.

(iv) Intermediate schools and junior high schools.

(v) Senior high schools, except that the Board of Education reserves its functions with respect to the following:

(A) Specialized academic high schools.

(B) Vocational high schools.

(C) Summer high schools.

(D) Evening academic and trade high schools.

(E) Development of comprehensive high schools.

(F) Provision of college and scholarship information, maintenance of liaison with schools of higher education, and administration of state and nationwide examinations.

(G) Coordination of experimental projects.

(H) Placement of students returning from custodial institutions.

(I) Maintenance of standards for diplomas.

(J) Zoning patterns for integration and utilization.

(K) Consultation in curriculum development.

(L) Maintenance of a central high school information service.

(vi) Community education, except that the Board of Education reserves its functions with respect to the following:

(A) General adult education and fundamental adult education programs.

(B) Board of Education-Youth Board centers and Board of Education-New York City middle income housing centers.

(C) Evening adult elementary schools.

(D) Federally funded basic adult education programs.

(E) In-service training of supervisors of recreational and community activities, principals of youth and adult centers, center directors and teachers-in-charge.

(F) Preparation of manuals and materials.

(G) Development and coordination of multi-district programs.

(H) Provision of consultant services to local school boards.

(b) *Exercise of Delegated Functions.* The functions delegated to local school boards hereunder shall be carried out in accordance with applicable law, by-laws, rules and regulations and contracts and agreements, currently in force or to be entered into prior to June 30, 1969, of the Board of Education and of the City of New York to the extent applicable to employees of the Board of Education. Contracts and agreements currently in force specifically include but are not limited to:

(i) Agreement between the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until September 7, 1969, covering day school classroom teachers and per session teachers.

(ii) Agreement between the Board of Education and the Attendance Teachers Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until September 7, 1969, covering attendance teachers.

(iii) Agreement between the Board of Education and the Auxiliary Teachers Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from January 15, 1968, until September 7, 1969, covering auxiliary teachers (bi-lingual teachers).

(iv) Agreement between the Board of Education and the Guidance Counselors Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until September 7, 1969, covering day school counselors and per session counselors.

(v) Agreement between the Board of Education and the School Secretaries Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until September 7, 1969, covering school secretaries.

(vi) Agreement between the Board of Education and the Laboratory Assistants Chapter, United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, effective from July 1, 1967, until

F. THE OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN NEW YORK CITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Ocean Hill - Brownsville (Ocean Hill) one of the three demonstration districts set up in New York City (the others being Two Bridges and IS 201), "is a border area between the slum districts of Brownsville and Bedford - Stuyvesant, some miles out from downtown Brooklyn."[1]

The population is roughly 70% Black; 25% Puerto Rican; 4% White and 1% Oriental.[2] Less than one-fifth of the adults were born in New York City (51% were born in the South); 29% had an eight grade education or less; over half the households have incomes under $5,000 a year.[3] Thus, the area is lower class and overwhelmingly Black, with a strong Puerto Rican minority. It also is highly transient; 56% of its residents are classed as "short term" by the Niemeyer Report.[4]

Like the other two demonstration districts, moreover, the educational aspects of the area present a dismal picture of deteriorating buildings; inadequate space in schools; high teacher turnover; inexperienced teachers (75% of the districts' teachers had fewer than two years' teaching)[5] and low student achievement.[6] PS 73, a school in the district was described as follows: "exits padlocked, windows boarded; window glass missing, scuttle openings padlocked; plaster broken, loose and missing; metal corroded and partly missing; paint peeling, door not filled to frame; tiles missing."[7]

Attempts have been made to correct this situation. Buildings have been renovated or constructed; the schools are designated as special service schools and, therefore, eligible for supplementary remedial services; pupil/teacher ratio is favorable (13:1 to 20:1); per student expenditures were increased (at $600 to $900, Ocean Hill's are lower than the two other districts, however); and Head Start Programs and new library facilities have been introduced.[8]

However, Rhody McCoy characterizes his view of the community and its educational problems as follows:

> "In Ocean Hill-Brownsville there are people groping in the dark, who for a long time have felt themselves outside the mainstream of public concern. The city takes no notice of them. In the midst of a crowd or wherever groups of people assemble or pass, these people are obscure, unnoticed, as though they do not exist. They are not

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[1] Mayer Martin, The Teachers' Strike, New York 1968, New York, Harper & Row, 1968, p. 18.

[2] Advisory Committee on Decentralization, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Decentralization submitted to the Board of Education of the City of New York , July 1968 (Niemeyer Report), p. 110.

[3] ibid., p. 111-3.

[4] ibid., pp. 42, 112.

[5] Ferretti, "Who's to Blame in the School Strike" as quoted in Gittell, Marilyn, and Berube, Maurice eds., Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. 303.

[6] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., pp. 65-67.

[7] ibid., p. 66.

[8] ibid. New York City's average per pupil expenditure in 1968, however was $1,000: (Fantini, Mario D., "Participation, Decentralization, Community Control and Quality Education", The Record, Teachers College, September, 1969, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 94.

> censured or reproached; they simply are not seen. They are the invisible residents of a demoralized, poverty-ridden, inner city. To be ignored or overlooked is a denial of one's rights to dignity, respect and membership in the human race. These residents have been frustrated at every turn in their attempt to reverse the process . . .
>
> With increasingly poor academic performance of the pupils attending our schools, with all the schools having student reading levels at least two years below city grade norms, there exists the continuous production of imageless children who take no special interest or pride in school achievement. This manifests itself in the increasing dropout rate even at the Junior High School level. The physical plants are for the most part unfit to house the students, let alone to permit teachers to perform in an effective manner. Many have been condemned only to be subsequently reactivated. The alarming turnover in staff, coupled with high pupil mobility and the aforementioned conditions, result in minimal qualitative learning."[9]

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[9] From McCoy, Rhody A., "The Year of the Dragon". (A paper presented at the Conference on Educational sub-systems, Harvard University Gradute School of Education, January 24-26, 1968) p 1, as quoted in Niemeyer Report. op. cit. p. 59.

II. WHO ARE THE MAJOR GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE DISTRICTS: HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

Parents are not satisfied with their schools; in a survey of 200 parents in the district, schools were ranked 3rd when asked the five biggest problems in the district. Unlike the more middle class Two Bridtes district, however, they do not appear to organize into groups dealing with educational problems, but rather to coalesce to solve immediate issues under dynamic leadership of individuals who are either involved with local or national anti-poverty groups or have church affiliations.[10] (Only a small number of parents were involved in day-to-day activities).

In fact, the only actual mention of parent groups in literature concerning the Ocean Hill district is: a group declaring itself an Independent School Board, and a group declaring themselves to be the People's Board of Education.

Independent School Board

We know little about this group except the fact that they were apparently a group of social workers and parents affiliated with Brooklyn CORE and the Council against Poverty,[11] concerned over the lack of representation in district 17 on the local board (see below in section III).[12] According to Father John Powis, a member of the Ocean Hill Board, this Independent School Board was highly active in 1967, discussing the issue of community control over funds, personnel, curriculum, building construction, maintenance and repair.[13] According to Gittell, their grievances were: segregated schools, unsatisfactory principal, and dismal academic results. This group later joined the UFT in forming the Planning Council (as will be seen below.)[14]

People's Board of Education

The extent of Ocean Hill involvement in this group is unknown. However, the group consists of parents and "activists" from Ghetto communities throughout New York City, and is said to represent Negro, Puerto Rican and White leaders. Termed "militant", the group is not free from internal conflict. Its president, Reverend Galamison, is said to favor a unified city approach to educational problems, while others in the group prefer a more localized approach. Set up in 1966 to coordinate various community groups in the area, the group has apparently been ineffective, although it did conduct cogent research into the Board of Education's budget.[15]

[10] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 113. Center forum, Vol. 2, No. 8, January 26, 1968, p.5

[11] Mayer, op. cit., p. 21.

[12] The term "local board" is used to indicate those boards which have been in existence throughout New York City and were revitalized in 1962-1963.

[13] Father John Powis, "The Role of the UFT in the History of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, News From Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Summer, 1969, p. 8. Although most people indicate this was the People's Board of Education, Powis made a clear distinction between the two groups.

[14] Gittell, op. cit., p. 13.

[15] Rogers, David, 110 Livingston Street, Politics and Bureacracy in the New York City School System, New York, Random House, 1968, pp. 30, 101, 121, 131, 341, 342, 368.

b. Teachers

The teachers are threatened by lay participation, being unaccustomed to reform from outside the establishment, particularly from the Black community. However, they originally cooperated with the communities through their union, the United Federation of Teachers, (UFT), in their bid for local control and through their introduction of More Effective Schools (MES), a program designed to raise standards by increased expenditures per pupil and increasing the teaching staff. Gittell suggests their motivation was to maintain control of the reform process.[16] Yet animosity between parents and teachers was strongest of the three demonstration districts. Parents accused the teachers of sabotage and obstruction of their attempts at local control; the Project Administrator accused teachers of trying to prevent community elements from obtaining positions on the Ocean Hill Board.[17]

Strong factions existed even among teachers, apparently precipitated by the strikes which made rifts between union and non-union teachers. Non-union teachers in Ocean Hill were a majority; many crossed picket lines to teach and were called "scabs" for doing so. Non-striking teachers felt that the strikers were neglecting their obligations to the children in the district; unproven accusations of harassment were rampant on both sides.[18] According to Karp, a Black/White antagonism also emerged so that in some schools "in the teacher's cafeteria, the Black teachers sit on one side of the room, the White teachers sit on the other. The wall of fear and hatred between the two groups makes for communication that is at best polite, more often curt, and most of the time non-existent."[19]

United Federation of Teachers (UFT)

According to Rogers, the UFT, exclusive bargaining agent for 50,000 teachers, had ties with all three parent groups (Negro civil rights groups, White liberals. and moderates). The Union had played an important bargaining role for liberalizing the New York City School System and for greater professionalization of the teacher's role. Generally sympathetic to desegregation and ghetto school problems, it nonetheless is attacked by civil rights groups for its stand on problem pupils and on the teacher transfer problems. Also, many individual teachers are provincial and ethnocentric in their dealings with ghetto children, and thus do not follow the leadership of the Union.[20]

In Ocean Hill, the UFT joined local forces with a local parents' group to form the Planning Council to plan a demonstration district. It was the UFT, moreover, which brought Ocean Hill to the attention of the Ford Foundation as a possible demonstration unit.[21] It was also responsible for recommending that Yeshiva University be a part of the planning.[22]

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[16] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[17] McCoy, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 56.

[18] Gittell, op. cit., p. 80.

[19] Karp, Richard, "School Decentralization in New York," as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 70.

[20] Rogers' op. cit., pp. 192-194. The union's membership was 50,000; it affected 60,000 teachers. Moreover a participant indicated the union's stance was only verbal.

[21] Karp as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 66.

[22] McCoy as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 55.

The Union has been bitterly opposed by the Ocean Hill Board, which accused the UFT of sabotage to their demonstration unit. They, on the other hand, accused the Ocean Hill Board of deliberate attempts to exclude teachers from decision-making.[23] The situation climaxed when Rhody McCoy, Project Administrator tried to transfer teachers out of the district. The UFT accused McCoy of denying them "due process", while McCoy asserted the UFT made an issue of an accepted practice to discredit the Ocean Hill Board.

The issue was never, could never be, resolved, but others jumped into the fray. The Niemeyer Committee indicated that "under normal circumstances the Demonstration Project might have been able to accomplish the transfer of "unsatisfactory personnel informally, but a larger struggle was being waged in the New York Legislature over a general proposal to decentralize the entire school system . . . the project became a looking glass, and any likelihood of working out informal arrangements in such a sensitive area as professional performance and transfer became most difficult."[24] Even the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) became involved. In a report on the controversy which had a major impact on public opinion, they accused the UFT of using the due process issue as a smokescreen.[25]

c. The Board of Education

According to an interview with an observer of the New York demonstration units, the Board of Education viewed the demonstration units as stop-gap measures to appease pressure groups (both from the community's desire for local control and from Mayor Lindsay's committee, which was planning decentralization) and was unwilling to delegate any real authority to the demonstration boards. The Niemeyer Report indicated that there are "considerable misunderstandings" between the local board and the Board of Education, particularly over the autonomy of the project board.[26] Although the Board of Education showed signs of cooperation with the Ocean Hill Board in the areas of ethnic language and culture programs; fighting for the abolishment of civil service requirements for principals; in waiving normal standards for the Project Administrator; and in allowing the Ocean Hill Board to retain teachers hired during the strikes,[27] the Ocean Hill Board, as well as others, found it obstructionist and unwilling to "relinquish an iota of its autonomy."[28] McCoy accused the Board of Education of obstructing attempts to gain registration lists for the Ocean Hill elections; of being unwilling to supply information on the district; of verbally seeking to disuade teachers from applying there for jobs; of with-holding immediate tenure for out-of-state applicants, making it difficult to obtain staff. Also, in the same vein, Karp cited tensions created when the Board of Education refused to transfer Jack Bloomfield, an unsuccessful candidate for Project Administrator.[29] The Ocean Hill Board also complained of the Board of Education's unwillingness to let them award their own contracts for building maintenance and repairs, or to allocate a lump-sum budget, as well as the UFT/Board of Education's agreement to allow 20% of the teaching staff to transfer out of the district in one year.[30]

[23] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

[24] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 95.

[25] New York Civil Liberties Union, "The Burden of the Blame", as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 10.

[26] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 10. A confidential source states the Board does not act positively unless influenced by either Ford or the State Commissioner of Education.

[27] Gittell, op. cit., p. 340.

[28] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 73.

[29] ibid., pp. 68, 69; Rogers, op. cit., p. 485.

[30] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 33, 40.

The Board of Education criticized the Bundy Report (see below) and set up the Advisory Committee on Decentralization to study the demonstration units, which it did for approximately one year; the Niemeyer Report was the result of this study. It indicated, as shown above, that the Board of Education's nonclarification of powers was partly responsible for the misunderstandings between the demonstration boards and the Board of Education. The Board of Education also published its own position in Guidelines to Decentralization.[31]

The New York Civil Liberties Union's report on the Ocean Hill controversy also takes the Board of Education to task: "from the beginning, the Board of Education attempted to scuttle the experiment in Ocean Hill-Brownsville by consistently refusing to define the authority of the governing board."[32]

69% of the 200 Ocean Hill residents surveyed were negative toward the Board of Education.[33]

d. The Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA)

Composed of Principals and Assistant Principals, the CSA maintains that education is the province of professionals and that lay intrusion will lower educational standards, thus, it is viewed as having played a "consistently obstructionist role" in attempts to decentralize or localize control. Rogers labels it "the most powerful organization of the professional group", and indicates that this group has successfuly blocked or subverted all attempts at decentralization or local control made so far.[34]

Gittell cites the group as one of the three groups whose major impetus was against reform (the others being the UFT and the Board of Education),[35] and Rhody McCoy treats it scathingly, as follows: "it is noteworthy that this body of educators, representing years of experience and leadership, has not as an association developed a single program to improve education in the city; rather, as an effective political lobby, it has reacted negatively to most programs. It enjoys a reputation of being against minority group education."[36]

The CSA, with the UFT, lobbied against the passage of the Bundy Report, and was the body which brought suit against the creation of the special category of Demonstration School Principal.[37]

e. The Mayor's Office

The Mayor's office has been variously involved with the demonstration units, and with Ocean Hill in particular. For example, there is evidence that the Mayor's office was involved in initial Ocean Hill planning meetings, as well as in the controversy itself. Mayor Lindsay himself came out in favor of the Board of Regent's Bill, after speeches pleading for decentralization had not been able to affect acceptance of his proposed legislation (see below, under section III).

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[31] Board of Education of the City of New York, Guidelines to Decentralization, New York, December, 1968.

[32] New York Civil Liberties Union as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 115.

[33] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 122.

[34] Rogers, op. cit., p. 195.

[35] Gittell, op. cit., p. 330.

[36] McCoy as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 61.

[37] Gittell, op. cit., p. 15.

The Mayor's involvement in education has been severely criticized, either on the basis that he is trying to "run the schools" (by teachers and professionals in the system) or that he was unsuccessful at it (Rogers, Mayer, *et. al.*).

The New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate for a plan of decentralization. Accompanying the mandate was the promise of $54 million in additional state aid for New York City.[38]

1. The Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization

On April 30, 1967, Lindsay organized the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, with McGeorge Bundy as its Chairman. Their position on decentralization was published in November 1967.[39]

The UFT and the Council of Supervisory Associations subsequently lobbied against passage of the Bundy Report, as it came to be known. Gittell suggests that this was partly due to fear of mayoral control on city education.[40]

As previously noted, the Board of Education was also unfavorably disposed toward the Bundy Report (which was suggested as a main impetus for the Board's own Advisory Committee).

2. Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice

Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice was appointed by Mayor Lindsay in November, 1968, in the wake of serious charges of racism and antisemitism in the aftermath of the teachers' strikes. On January 17, 1969, they issued their report, commonly referred to as the Botein Report, which was vague and unspecific, although it did indicate that racial and ethnic hostility had arisen on both sides; subtle and unwritten on the side of the Whites, open and more obvious on the side of the Blacks.[41]

f. The Ford Foundation

The Ford Foundation has been involved with all three demonstration units. At the urging of the UFT it considered Ocean Hill in its demonstration plans, awarding the district a planning grant of $44,000. An additional $15,000 was awarded, plus a promise of $250,000, later announcing that it would be withheld until the Ocean Hill Board was recognized as the official governing agency. The latter stipulation was seen by the community as a "betrayal", and they felt Ford had bowed to establishment pressures.[42] Ferretti, in "Who's to Blame in the School Strike", indicated, however, in November 1968, that Ocean Hill had received "more than $128,000" for the development of its programs.[43]

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[38] Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

[39] Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, *Reconnection for Learning, A Community School System for New York City*, 1967.

[40] Gittell, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-10, 14.

[41] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[42] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 72. This is the most prevalent version. Ford apparently contended that Ocean Hill contacted it; Ocean Hill contended that Ford was the initiator, wishing to use Ocean Hill as a laboratory experiment (see Karp).

[43] Quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

The Foundation worked on and supported the Bundy Report (Bundy being President of the Ford Foundation). The Foundation thus, by working for the Mayor, as well as funding local efforts to obtain community control, appeared to be working "both sides of the street". Ford has been sharply criticized for these undertakings, in particular by Mayer who feels that outside non-participative consultants and agencies, by not having to be accountable for their errors, are not responsbile in their actions.[44]

g. Yeshiva University

At the same time that the IS 201 Negotiating Committee was working with Harry Gottesfeld and Sol Gordon from Yeshiva in drawing up a decentralization plan for their district, Ocean Hill apparently contacted them, hoping to obtain similar assistance (apparently at the suggestion of the UFT).[45]

Yeshiva was apparently responsible for the introduction of several reading programs at Ocean Hill.

However, there was a falling out between the University which felt that it had to work closely with the Union to make their program effective,[46] and the Ocean Hill Board. McCoy accuses Yeshiva of being "ivory tower" and "insensitive to the pride and new status and responsibility the community had developed."[47]

h. Other Groups Involved.

1. Institute for Community Studies of Queens College

Under a grant from Ford, the Institute provided assistance to the three demonstration units, primarily Ocean Hill and IS 201.[48]

2. CORE

CORE was not involved per se, but its leadership appeared to be particularly active in the Planning Council days. Characterized by Rogers as "often militant", especially in the Bronx, Harlem and Brooklyn, the organization was limited in power because it had few members, limited funds, divided leadership, poorly organized plans, and lacked pull with the City Board or City Officials. Local groups were suspicious of its national officers whom they accused of pressure to please White liberal benefactors. The structure was decentralized which led to conflict between local groups and the national organization, among local groups, and even within one local group. Therefore, there was no consistent program or guidelines and the organization was apt to act unpredictably, although it did tend to encourage public protest and was fairly strong in the ghetto.[49]

[44] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

[45] Kemble, Eugenia, "Ocean Hill-Brownsville", as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 34

[46] According to an interview with a professor in 1968.

[47] McCoy, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 55.

[48] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 82; also from a 1968 interview with a professor.

[49] Rogers, op. cit., pp. 105, 111-112.

i. Ocean Hill Planning Council

In early 1967, the Independent School Board and the UFT joined forces forming the Planning Council, to plan the demonstration unit. According to Mayer, they had common roots in the civil rights movement and in a dislike for the Board of Education, but differing objectives immediately caused dissension. While the UFT wanted MES expanded, the Independent School Board wanted "community control". The Planning Council began picketing and other demonstrations and forced the removal of an unsatisfactory Principal and "won some special services" for schools within the district. Mayer indicates they were led by Mrs. Sandra Feldman, a young teacher, union field representatives and civil rights workers, who had been among the organizers of the East River CORE. Throughout the month of July, this group met with: the Ford Foundation, Brooklyn College, Yeshiva University, the Mayor's Office, and the Board of Education.[50]

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[50] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 21-23.

III. HOW DID THE DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- Spring 1965 - The Board of Education created a new school district (District 17), comprised of Ocean Hill, Brownsville and Flatbush (this last, a white middle-class area). Ocean Hill had previously been part of the Bedford Stuyvesant School District and, as such, had had a representative on the local board. The new district left Ocean Hill without a representative. Later on Rhody McCoy, Project Administrator of the Ocean Hill district, indicated that this maneuver precipitated the desire of the community for more control.[51]

- September 1966 - Parents and community groups organized a boycott at IS 201. They demanded either integration or community control. They also demanded a black principal.[52] Sources generally agree that this boycott signalled the start of the community control issue which led to the formation of the three demonstration units.

- October 20, 1966 - The Board of Education announced it was studying various plans to decentralize the city school system in order to increase parental involvement in the schools.[53]

- November, 1966 - All groups with whom the Board of Education normally deals -- including the parents' associations -- cut off all relations with the District 17 local board and the Board of Education. This move was supported by the UFT. The group issued a plan, stating 3 aims: an independent Ocean Hill school district; a governing school board of teachers and parents; public meetings in the community to discuss school problems and future action.[54]

- December 19 - 21, 1966 - The "People's Board of Education" occupied the Board of Education headquarters.[55]

- February 17, 1967 - The Board of Education again announced it was studying decentralization.[56]

- February 1967 - Partly in response to the IS 201 controversy and partly due to parent attempts to be represented on the lay board, Ocean Hill community members began to plan for some means of participating directly in school affairs. Key participants were: poverty workers, parents, neighborhood association leaders, and religious leaders. They were in contact with the Mayor's office and the Board of Education in these meetings, which continued on through July.[57]

[51] McCoy, quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 52-53.
[52] Gittell, op. cit., p. 335.
[53] ibid., p. 18.
[54] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 65.
[55] Rogers, op. cit., p. 30.
[56] Gittell, op. cit., p. 18.
[57] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 72.

- March 30, 1967 - After the demonstration districts had been organized, the New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate to decentralize the entire New York City school system promising $54 million in additional state aid.[58]

- April 1967 - The Board of Education announced its decentralization plan and the formation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Two Bridges, and IS 201 as demonstration districts.[59]

- April 1967 - The Ford Foundation arranged a meeting between Ocean Hill groups and Superintendent Donovan ostensibly to discuss the IS 55 princip but actually Ocean Hill brought up its plan for an independent board.[60]

- July 6, 1967 - Ocean Hill received a $44,000 planning grant from the Ford Foundation. Stipulations of the grant were that it he administered through Father John Powis', Our Lady of Presentation Church[61] and that a proposal for community control be submitted within 26 days.[62] Rhody McCoy was selected as Temporary Project Administrator.

- July 1967 - During July, the Planning Council formulated its proposal, meeting with the Board of Education and Superintendent Donovan. It was felt that there was general agreement as to specific powers to be granted the Ocean Hill Board; moreover, the local community interpreted the appointment of the temporary Project Administrator as formal recognition of the demonstration unit, although the Board of Education never explicit granted full recognition.[63]

- July 29, 1967 - The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Planning Council completed its proposal in which parents, community leaders, and teachers were involved (some parents were paid on a weekly basis to participate).[64] The proposa "A Plan for an Experimental School District: Ocean Hill-Brownsville" dropped its original request for MES (after Superintendent had indicated that not every school could be a MES school) and changed the method of selecting the project administrator and principal when vacancies occurred Teachers, as proponents of MES, opposed the former change.[66]

- August 3, 1967 - The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board was elected. This election became a center of controversy and was declared "unorthodox" because votes were still being solicited two days after the election.[67] Nonetheless, 25% of the parents voted, electing 7 parent representatives, who in turn chose 5 community representatives. Two supervisors and 4 teachers were elected as board members in voting by their colleagues.[68]

- August 21, 1967 - James Allen, State Commissioner of Education, announced that the Board of Education could create the position of Demonstration School Principal for elementary schools (as Ocean Hill requested).[69] Thi decision led to antagonisms between the CSA and UFT, and community groups

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[58] State of New York, An Act, In Senate and Assembly, #4622, March 30, 1967.
[59] Gittell, op. cit., p. 335.
[60] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 72.
[61] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 67.
[62] Gittell, op. cit., p. 35.
[63] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 91.
[64] ibid.
[65] ibid., p. 74.
[66] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.
[67] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 77.
[68] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.
[69] ibid.

- August 27, 1967 - Rhody McCoy is elected by the Ocean Hill Board to serve as Project Administrator. The other candidate was Jack Bloomfield, who was apparently the Board of Education's choice. The Board of Education recognized McCoy and agreed to pay him a salary.[70]

- August 29, 1967 - The Ocean Hill-Brownsville proposal was submitted to the Board of Education, stating specific powers and duties of the Ocean Hill Board and stipulating that it was to be responsible directly to the Superintendent of Schools and District Superintendent.[71]

- August 31, 1967 - McCoy nominates 5 principals to fill school vacancies. One of those is Herman Ferguson, a man who was then indicted (and later convicted), for conspiracy to murder Roy Wilkins (NAACP) and Whitney Young (Urban League). The teachers, upset particularly with the nomination of Ferguson, abstained from voting.[72]

- September 9, 1967 - On the opening day of school, the UFT struck the New York City schools and lodged complaints against the Ocean Hill Board. The UFT demands an enlargement of MES and the power to evict disruptive students; it won a clause empowering it to spend $10 million of Board of Education funds for an education program.[73] Some parents considered the disruptive child clause anti-Black and anti-Puerto Rican,[74] and some outsiders considered the strike a move to "force Mayor Lindsay to bargain with the union".[75] The strike lasted 12 days and created great tensions. At the same time, 17 assistants to the principals resigned.[76] The Ocean Hill Board made a great effort to keep the schools open,[77] and school attendance was about 60%.[78] Around this time, Shanker and Feldman called a meeting of the UFT to urge teachers to return to Ocean Hill and "give the project a chance".[79]

- September 27, 1967 - At a Board of Education meeting, Rhody McCoy and three new principals were appointed. The meeting reportedly was tension filled, with disruptive influences and hostility prevalent, assertedly due to a series of rumors circulated before the meeting.[80] Teachers, in a statement, accused the Ocean Hill Board of hostility toward them. "They were extremely hostile and negative, there was a constant stream of remarks to teachers which stated that teachers were bigoted, incompetent, disinterested, obstructive, and were attempting to sabotage the plan . . . the atmosphere became so hostile that teachers hesitated to even ask a question or express an opinion. Any attempt at teacher comment was met with insult and charged with obstruction."[81] At the same time, teachers supportive of the Ocean Hill Board made a statement that the Ocean Hill Board had had full participation by parents, teachers, and community; harmonious and unbiased relations; concensus on all issues; accountability to each group; and the goals of education had been paramount to all at the meetings.[82]

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[70] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

[71] As quoted from "A Plan for an Experimental School District" in the Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[72] Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 28-29; Levine, Naomi, "Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Schools in Crisis, New York Popular Library, 1969 indicates the Ocean Hill Board appointed 4 on September 2.

[73] Niemeyer Report, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

[74] Gittell, *op.cit.*, p. 336.

[75] Mayer, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

[76] Niemeyer Report, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

[77] *ibid.*, p. 85. They had voted August 24 to keep the schools open (Weilk, Carol A, "The Ocean Hill-Brownsville School Project: A Profile", Issue, Vol. I, No. 2, February, 1969, p. 7.

[78] Ferretti, as quoted in Gittell, *op.cit.*, p. 306.

[79] Mayer, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

[80] Kemble, as quoted in Gittell, *op.cit.*, p. 45. See under August 27, 1967 for an apparently conflicting statement.

- Fall 1967 - Ford granted an additional $15,000 to Ocean Hill.[83]

- October 1967 - The CSA filed suit against the creation of a special category of Demonstration School Principals. This category would be under state regulations rather than city regulations.[84]

- November 1967 - All 18 assistant principals left Ocean Hill.[85]

- November 9, 1967 - *Reconnection for Learning*, known as the Bundy Report, was published. The Bundy Report proposed decentralization of the city's schools, resting power in the local board, and authorizing the Mayor to appoint members of the Central Educational Agency (their term for the Central Board of Education) and five members of the 11 member local boards.[86]

- November 27, 1967 - A policy statement on decentralization was adopted by the UFT executive board (by the delegate assembly on December 20, 1967).[87]

- November 1967 - The Ocean Hill Board and the UFT met to resolve teacher representation problems on the Board. The UFT had never recognized the means by which teacher representatives were chosen. No resolution was reached.[88]

- December 1967 - Mayor Lindsay submitted his revised Bundy Plan to the Legislature.

- January 1968 - The Ocean Hill Board was given a copy of the suggested guidelines prepared by the Niemeyer Committee, concerning powers and functions of the Ocean Hill Board. The Ocean Hill Board discussed the guidelines with the Board of Education in terms of Ocean Hill's own demands, such as better Demonstration Unit evaluation procedures and a Project Administrator solely responsible to the local board.[89]

[81] As quoted in the Niemeyer Report, *op. cit*., pp. 74-75.

[82] *ibid*., p. 73.

[83] Mayer, *op. cit*., p. 25.

[84] Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 337.

[85] New York Civil Liberties Union, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 112.

[86] See *Reconnection for Learning*. See also Appendix A of the Two Bridges Memorandum Report.

[87] Gittell, *op. cit*., pp. 219, 337. See also Appendix A of this Memorandum Report.

[88] Mayer, *op. cit*., pp. 20-23.

[89] *op. cit*., p. 8.

- February 1968 - The Ocean Hill Board issued strong guidelines for decentralization. Jack Bloomfield, the unsuccessful candidate for Project Administrator, left, along with all assistant principals, 30 teachers, and 5 secretaries.[90]

- February 14, 1968 - Mayor Lindsay made a policy speech on education at a Civic Assembly meeting, condemning the school system and strongly urging support for decentralization (this was his first speech on decentralization).[91]

- February 19, 1968 - Norman Brubaker, Special Assistant to the Superintendent of Schools, wrote a letter to the Reverend C. Herbert Oliver (The Ocean Hill Board Chairman) with four recommendations: that provision be made for fixed terms for Ocean Hill Board Members; that the Ocean Hill Board recognize the Board of Education's responsibility; that funding requests be submitted according to regulations; and that the Ocean Hill Board make a statement accepting the Board of Education Guidelines.[92]

- February 21, 1968 - Harold Howe II, U. S. Commissioner of Education in a speech to the committee on the City of New York of the New York Senate stated that the decentralization and local control were necessary to improve education.[93]

- March 4, 1968 - Judge Rinaldi rules against the CSA's suit, indicating that the Board of Education had the right to create the position of Demonstration School Principal. However, he also ruled that the category was not clearly delineated and voided the appointments made under the category.[94]

- March 1968 - The State Board of Regents announced a far-reaching plan for decentralization of New York's schools.[95]

- March 26, 1968 - The demonstration districts issue draft constitutions demanding a clear delegation of authority from the Board of Education.[96]

- Spring 1968 - During this time, an effective three-way lobby (Board of Education, UFT, and CSA) is organized against the Bundy Report.

- April 10 & 11, 1968 - Ocean Hill parents boycotted the schools to demonstrate support for meaningful community control and to protest the Ocean Hill Boards' unofficial status.[97]

- End of April, 1968 - The Board of Regents went to the New York State Legislature and asked it to pass through their March proposal into law. At this time, both Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller announced support of the Regent Plan and urged the legislature to take swift action.[98]

[90] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 70.
[91] Rogers, op. cit., p. 204.
[92] As quoted in the Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 92.
[93] Howe, Harold, II, U. S. Commissioner of Education, Statement before the Committee on City of New York of the New York Senate, Wednesday, February 21, 1968, p. 5. See also pp. 5-12.
[94] Gittell, op. cit., p. 337.
[95] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 74.
[96] See the Two Bridges Memorandum Report, Appendices B1 and B2.
[97] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 96.
[98] Karp as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 75.

- May 8, 1968 - The Ocean Hill Board sent termination notices to 19 professionals (13 teachers, 5 assistant principals, and 1 principal) and referred them to the Board of Education for reassignment.[99] "This move was interpreted by the professional staff, the community at large, and the press as a dismissal."[100] The transfer raised a storm of controversy, as the question became one of authority. Proponents of the Ocean Hill Board indicate McCoy tried to transfer the teachers within the district first (which is within his authority) and had tried to get Superintendent Donovan to transfer them, but Donovan refused.[101] Others felt McCoy was usurping powers of others and complained of "due process" for the teachers (see Section II, above).

- May 14, 1968 - The Superintendent of Schools demanded that the Ocean Hill Board supply written charges and appointed Judge Rivers examiner.[102] On the same day, the New York Legislature agreed to work on a strong decentralization bill.[103]

- May 18, 1968 - The Board of Regents announced that a strong decentralization bill would be passed by the Legislature. The bill would create a 3 member commission that would have one year to decentralize New York's school system and create nearly autonomous local school boards.[104]

- May 20, 1968 - The UFT lobbied 500 strong against passage of the Board of Regent's bill.[105]

- May 21, 1968 - Governor Rockefeller publicly predicted a strong bill would be passed by the Legislature.[106]

- May 22, 1968 - New York State Legislature, discarding both the Bundy and the Board of Regents Plans, passed the Marchi law, and in effect, postponed acting on decentralization for a year. Under this law, the Board of Education is allowed to delegate authority to local boards and the Central Board of Education would be enlarged from 9 to 13 members.[107]

- May, 1968 - According to Mayer, the Ford Foundation awarded Ocean Hill yet another grant at this time. Mayer did not specify the amount.[108]

- July, 1968 - Board of Education and the 3 demonstration boards had reached an impasse over delegation of authority.[109]

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[99] See Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 33 for a copy of the notice.

[100] Niemeyer Report, *op. cit*., p. 94.

[101] New York Civil Liberties Union, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 115. See also the Niemeyer Report, *op. cit*., pp. 94, 96.

[102] Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 337. According to the Niemeyer Report, *op. cit*., p. 94, the UFT made the demand for written charges, "thus placing the request for transfers (for which no charges are required) into the realm of dismissal."

[103] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 75.

[104] *ibid*.

[105] *ibid*.

[106] *ibid*.

[107] Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 337. See Appendix C of Two Bridges to compare rejected pla

[108] *op. cit*., p. 104.

[109] Gittell, *op. cit*., p. 15.

- Last week of July, 1968 - Ocean Hill Board Member Wright submitted a petition to the Board of Education to have a new election in Ocean Hill.[110]

- July 30, 1968 - The Final Report on the Advisory Committee on Decentralization (Niemeyer Report) was issued.[111]

- July 31, 1968 - The Board of Education appointed Galamison, Vasquez and Lotz (3 of its members) to a committee to look into Wright's petition. Wright claimed 3,000 signatures on his petition; McCoy showed a petition with 5,000 signatures supporting the local board. Wright's petition was in question, moreover, due to irregularities in signatures. The UFT was also said to have been involved in gathering the signatures.[112]

- August 14, 1968 - The Board of Education voted to reject Wright's petition and not to have new elections until 1969.[113]

- August 26, 1968 - Judge Rivers ruled that the Ocean Hill Board had not proved its case and would have to reinstate the professionals which it had "reassigned".[114]

- September 4, 1968 - Superintendent Donovan announced he would limit his supervisory and approval functions to the "absolute minimum" in the "spirit of decentralization" and leave to the local superintendent, recommendations on: personnel, textbooks, and other materials.[115]

- September 9, 1968 - The UFT struck all city schools over Ocean Hill's not having reinstated the "reassigned" professionals. The Ocean Hill Board kept schools open and operating with a "full complement of staff, nearly all non-union . . . "[116]

- September 11, 1968 - Ocean Hill residents barred returning teachers from the schools.[117]

- September 12, 1968 - The Board of Education asked State Commissioner of Education Allen to intercede.[118]

- September 13, 1968 - The teachers went out on strike again over the reinstatement issue.[119] Attendance at Ocean Hill was "light", but all classrooms were manned. Legal proceedings began against UFT.[120]

- September 14, 1968 - The Allen compromise, proposing a suspension of the Ocean Hill Board and the temporary transfer of the ten teachers out of the distrist was refused by the UFT. Allen ordered the Board of Education to suspend the Ocean Hill Board anyway.[121]

[110] Mayer, op. cit., p. 61.

[111] See Appendix D of Two Bridges for Findings and Recommendations.

[112] Mayer, op. cit., p. 61.

[113] ibid.

[114] "The Rivers Report", as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., pp. 83-100.

[115] Guidelines, op. cit., p. 6.

[116] Mayer, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 67.

[117] Mayer, op. cit., p. 70. UFT/Board of Education agreement came 10/7. (Levine, 1968).

[118] Gittell, op. cit., p. 338.

[119] ibid.; Levine, op. cit., p. 68.

[120] Mayer, op. cit., p. 76.

[121] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 338, 339, Levine op. cit., p. 68, gives September 15.

- September 20, 1968 - The suspension of the Ocean Hill Board was lifted and the Board was granted permission by the Board of Education to retain teachers hired during the strike. The disputed teachers were ordered back to the district by the Board of Education.[122]

- October 1, 1968 - The UFT threatened a new strike, due to teacher harassment at Ocean Hill.[123]

- October 6, 1968 - The Board of Education suspended the Ocean Hill Board for 30 days for improper assignment of duties for the disputed teachers.[124]

- October 8, 1968 - McCoy, the Project Administrator, and seven of the 8 principals were relieved of their duties and reassigned to Central Headquarters. McCoy refused to be reassigned, and remained at Ocean Hill.[125]

- October 9, 1968 - Disorders forced the closing of JHS 271.[126] The New York Civil Liberties Union issued "The Burden of the Blame: A Report on the Ocean Hill-Brownsville School Controversy" which placed the majority of the blame on both the UFT and the Board of Education (see Section II, above).[127]

- October 13, 1968 - The UFT voted to strike and issued a series of demands to be met, among them a demand to have the Ocean Hill demonstration termed a failure.[128]

- October 14, 1968 - The UFT went out on strike for a third time.[129] This time, however, "fewer than 8,000 teachers" voted for the strike.[130]

- October 16, 1968 - Mayor Lindsay appointed a fact-finding panel headed by Kheel. McCoy refused Kheel's Mediation Plan which called for paying back pay to the 10 controversial teachers. Four days later, the panel quit.[131]

- October 30, 1968 - The Ocean Hill Board sent a letter to Allen stating they would take back the teachers in question.

- November 15, 1968 - The Apellate Division in a 3:2 decision upheld the Rinaldi decision which voided the principals named under the category of Demonstration School Principal and held that the appointments were illegal. The Board of Education appealed the decision.[132]

[122] *ibid.*, p. 339. For a more complete listing of day-by-day activities during the strike see Levine, *op. cit.*, pp. 68, 69. The schools were reopened September 3 after mayoral intervention.

[123] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 339. For all the day's activities, including a teacher walk-out, please see Levine, op. cit., p. 69.

[124] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[125] *ibid.*

[126] *ibid.*

[127] *ibid.*

[128] *ibid.*, p. 340. The Board of Education had reopened the schools and reinstated the teachers on the 11th. (Levine, *op. cit.*, p. 69.)

[129] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[130] Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[131] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 340. See also the Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 97.

[132] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

- November 17, 1968 - The UFT and the Board of Education reached an agreement which ended the strike. The Ocean Hill Board was not a party to this agreement. The demonstration district, under the terms of the agreement, was placed under state trusteeship and both McCoy and the Ocean Hill Board were suspended until State Commissioner Allen removed the ban. The State Trustee was to oversee the district, while a three-member panel was set up to investigate complaints of harassment.[133]

- November 1968 - The Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice was appointed by Mayor Lindsay.[134]

- November 29, 1968 - I.S. 201 and Ocean Hill schools were closed in support of a boycott over the cancellation of holidays to make up for strike time. Judge Travia ruled that the Ocean Hill Board was "no more than an unofficial body of citizen advisors without power to transfer or suspend".[135]

- December 1968 - The Board of Education issued its Guidelines to Decentralization.[136]

- December 2, 1968 - Disruptions occurred in 12 schools; JHS 271 was closed by Allen. State Trustee Johnson resigned and was replaced by Dr. William D. Firman. The UFT threatened yet another strike.[137]

- December 13, 1968 - After a series of disruptions, the suspending of Rhody McCoy (on the eleventh), etc., Firman took over McCoy's offices while McCoy's followers boycotted JHS 271 and two other schools were closed.[138]

- December 16, 1968 - Dr. Wilbur R. Nordos replaced Firman as State Trustee.[139]

- January 15, 1969 - The Court of Appeals voided the Apellate Division decision. The Court of Appeals ruled the special category of Demonstration School Principal correct on all counts and allowed the principals to be reinstated.[140]

- January 17, 1969 - The Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice, chaired by Judge Botein, issued its report, which admitted to prejudice on both sides of the controversy, but which was vague in its language.[141]

[133] ibid. For all the detailed happenings about this time please see Levine, op. cit., pp. 112-120.

[134] Gittell, op. cit., p. 174.

[135] Levine, op. cit., pp. 113, 114; interview with Steve Arons of the Harvard Education Center of Harvard University, October 9, 1969.

[136] See Appendix E of the Two Bridges Report for recommendations.

[137] Levine, op. cit., pp. 115-117.

[138] ibid., pp. 118, 119.

[139] ibid., p. 119. The next day JHS 271 was reopened (p. 120).

[140] Gittell, op. cit., p. 340.

[141] ibid., p. 174.

- January 29, 1969 - The Board of Education issued a "Plan for the Development of a Community School District System for the City of New York" (as per its mandate under the Marchi Law).
- March 7, 1969 - The Ocean Hill Board was reinstated.[142]
- May 1, 1969 - The New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law defining the powers and duties of the school system.[143]
- Fall 1969 - Ocean Hill instituted a suit requesting that the three demonstration districts be allowed to continue under their present status.
- January 1970 - Elections will be held for new community boards in accordance with the May 1, 1969 decentralization law (a participant indicates this may be March 1970).

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[142] Levine, op. cit., p. 120.

[143] New York State Legislature, Senate Act 5693, Assembly Act 7206, "An Act to Amend the Education Law . . .", May 1, 1969.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE OCEAN-HILL BOARD HAVE?

Formal

Like the other two demonstration districts, Ocean Hill presently has little power, as noted in previous sections. The Central Board retains the powers of: personnel hiring and firing (the Ocean-Hill board hired the Project Administrator, and eight principals, however); choice of curriculum; and financial budgeting (the Central Board pays the Project Administrator's salary, for example). In fact, the Board of Education never formally recognized the Ocean-Hill board. It is this lack of formal power which has been the center of conflict in the demonstration unit.

Informal

Ocean-Hill secured fewer informal powers from the Central Board than Two Bridges. They instituted curriculum additions and corrections; hired paraprofessionals, and were able to retain teachers hired during the strike (like Two Bridges), for example, but created a storm of controversy over professional transfers (IS 201 achieved peaceful transfers at the same time), possibly due to the method employed, as has been suggested by some. As mentioned in Section II, moreover, the Central Board allowed no flexibility in the use of funds.

Decentralization

On April 30, 1969, the New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law.[144] This law sets up a specific set of relationships and powers among:[145]

> The City Board: A seven-member board consisting of two Mayoral Appointees and one elected member from each of the five boroughs. (An interim board will be operative until a city board can be elected.) The board members' terms are for four years. The City Board will devise a plan to divide New York City into 30 - 33 districts of approximately 20,000 pupils each. It will also establish the size of the decentralized boards. The City Board is the policy-maker. It approves all actions to be taken in the areas of: finance, new buildings, curriculum and personnel. It submits its budget to the mayor and allocates funds to the districts.
>
> The Chancellor of the city districts, whose salary is paid by the city board and who serves a 2-4 year term. The Chancellor acts as a middleman between the City Board, which pays his salary, and the decentralized boards. Theoretically acting with equal powers with the superintendents, the Chancellor is the one who submits material to the City Board for approval. The chancellor (operating city-wide as compared to superintendents operating district-wide) has advisory and jurisdictional powers over the schools and the decentralized boards, (with approval from the City Board) including: curriculum, establishment of schools; personnel; finance.

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[144] See footnote 143. As mentioned above, the timetable may be changed.

[145] This account is an exact duplicate of the account in the Two Bridges memorandum.

The Decentralized (community) Superintendent, whose functions are analogous to the former centralized superintendent, theoretically has equal powers and duties with the Chancellor; however, he is subject to the decentralized boards, which the Chancellor is not.

The Decentralized (Community) Boards, which will be elected on the 4th Tuesday of January, 1970, appear to have fewer powers than current demonstration boards under this new system. They are still denied absolute powers, and have the further encumbrance of a "Chancellor". They have to apply to the City Board for Federal, State, or private funds, which are dispersed through the Chancellor. They have limited powers of transfer and assignment of teachers (subject to City Board approval and contract constraints). The demonstration districts will continue until February of 1970, when new boards will be elected.

The City College of New York, will operate five of the most disadvantaged high schools in New York City under the jurisdiction of the city board.

The diagram on the following page represents our judgment of the actual powers and interactions between all parties.

Figure 1

Powers & Interactions Under the May 1969
Decentralization Legislation


Board of Estimate and City Council
MAYOR
Budget Approval
2 Members (Mayor Appointed)
5 Members Elected (1 per Borough)
CITY BOARD
Approves all Actions
Paid by Board
Disbursement of funds
CHANCELLOR
Application for Funds 1
Approves all Actions
(no apparent actuality)
Theoretically 3
2
DECENTRALIZED BOARDS
CITY COLLEGE
Subject to Board
SUPERINTENDENT

Notes:

1 If the approval of actions and authorized disbursement are actually channeled via the Chancellor (as the law designates), this channel will operate for ceremonial purposes only.

2 This link is not known, but an effective Chancellor would not allow it to not exist.

3 While the law designates the local Superintendent as equal in power to the Chancellor, it is very evident from this diagram that he cannot be if the Decentralized Board undertakes an active role within its noted limitations in note 1 above.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE OCEAN HILL BOARD?

Like the other two demonstration units, the long-range goal of Ocean Hill is improved education for their children.[146]

However, unlike the other two districts, community control in terms of hiring and firing of personnel, administration of their budget, building construction, maintenance and repair, use of outside sources for both consultation purposes and as a source of funds, seemed to become the paramount issues to the exclusion of the education of the children. Thus, the Ocean Hill Board appeared unwilling to perform any politically astute compromises which would endanger their power confrontation with the Union, despite the fact that this situation triggered strikes and disrupted education. In this case, local control became an end in itself, overpowering the larger goal of improved education.

A short-term measurable goal of reading score improvement has significance in providing documented evidence of the effects of local control over the long-range goal of educational improvement. This goal apparently has been realized through Project Read, which is credited with improvement of one grade level within six weeks, and often more.[147]

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[146] See the Ocean Hill Draft Constitution as well as AppendiX B 1 and B 2 of the Two Bridges Report.

[147] According to a brochure entitled "Project Read", issued by Ocean Hill. Even though we must suspect The Hawthorne Effect of operating here, nonetheless as one observer put it "what difference does it make as long as the children learn?"

VI. IS THE OCEAN HILL BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

The Ocean Hill Board is larger than the Two Bridges Board, which consists of ten members. The Ocean Hill Board is comprised of eighteen members representing parents (7 members), Community (5 members), teachers (4 members) and supervisors (2 members). Each group is elected by its colleagues (except only the parents choose the community representatives). Accusations were levelled at the original Ocean Hill Board that it was unrepresentative, since all but two of the seven parents' representatives were PTA Presidents.[148]

Some feeling of misrepresentation is also apparent in the survey of 200 parents 47% of them were negative toward the Ocean Hill Board.[149] Yet McCoy claimed 5,000 signatures in support of the Ocean Hill Board at the time of Wright's petition (See Section III above); and a New York Times article contrasted Two Bridges with Ocean Hill and IS 201 which were united against outside forces.[150]

But arguments not withstanding, the Ocean Hill Planning Council and the Ocean Hill Board appear to have made great efforts to obtain community participation. They held training workshops for prospective Board members as well as for prospective paraprofessionals. McCoy contended a large part of his time in the early months was spent in open community meetings and communication.[151]

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[148] Kemble, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 42

[149] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 122

[150] New York Times, March 30, 1969, p. 70:4, "Strife Besets Two Bridges Demonstration District".

[151] McCoy as quoted in Gittell, op.cit., pp. 59-60

VII. WHAT HAS THE OCEAN HILL BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

- It has managed to stir the interest of both students and teachers, as witnessed by: fewer student suspensions (less than 30 as opposed to 628 in a similar length of time before the project began); less vandalism (2 cases in one year, as opposed to an average of two per week previously); high pupil attendance (90%, as opposed to pre-project 70-75%); low teacher absenteeism (2%, compared to 15%); low teacher turnover (3%, compared to 20-25% previously); a 130-name teacher waiting list (previously there were around 60 vacancies).[152]

- It has established the use of 240 paraprofessionals, 16 Community Liaison workers, and professionals from other fields (lawyers, engineers, etc.) as well as recruiting teachers from outside the city.[153]

- It has established public relations and information centers for communication with the community, including a newspaper, *News from Ocean Hill-Brownsville*, published monthly, which contains articles dealing with educational issues.[154]

- It has established several reading projects, one of which claims success in improving reading scores dramatically (see above) and one of which teaches children to read in Spanish.[155]

- It has established courses in Black culture, African history, creative writing, and a program in conjunction with an art workshop.[156]

- It has established innovative methods of teaching, such as a Montessori class; the Bereiter-Engelman Method of teaching; a Leicestershire-Modeled School; and Project Learn (with programmed reading curricula).[157]

The most common achievement by all three demonstration units, however, is increased community participation. In all three areas, there has been greater voter turnout, greater attendance at school meetings, and more direct participation of the lower class groups in school affairs.[158]

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[152] Fantini, *op. cit.,* pp. 106, 107.

[153] McCoy, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.,* p. 60. Fantini, *op. cit.,* p. 103. Moreover, greater responsibility is given to the aides and liaison workers. McClintick, Dave, and Sears, Art, Educational Hot Spot, *Wall Street Journal*, April 10, 1969, p. 28.

[154] McCoy as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.,* p. 60.

[155] Ferretti, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.,* p. 295; see also p. 145.

[156] *ibid.*; The Center Forum, *op. cit.,* p. 5; Weilk, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

[157] Ferretti, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.,* p. 295; Weilk, *op. cit.,* p. 14; Fantini, *op. cit.,* p. 103.

[158] Gittell, *op. cit.,* p. 332.

VIII. IS THE OCEAN HILL BOARD'S POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC

Mayer provides ample evidence to the effect that McCoy acted independently of the board without the board's knowledge of such acts (in meetings with Shanker, Donovan, Board of Education, and the Mayor, for example, and committments as a result of these meetings)[159] and even paid parent representatives without either Ford's knowledge or announcing it to the public.[160]

Mayer also furnishes other incidents where the board was publicly swayed by its chairman, the Reverend C. Herbert Oliver to reverse their vote (the vote on the teacher transfer issue was turned when "15-20 militants" entered the room; and Oliver announced rejection of the Kheel proposal after an affirmative vote had been taken, calling a special meeting and pleading with them to change the vote, which they did).[161]

According to an interview with an observer in 1968, the Ocean Hill Board depends heavily on McCoy, who is a competent professional, but they don't like having to do so. McCoy, on the other hand, gives every indication that he responds to mandates from the board.[162]

Teachers, as has been mentioned previously, accused the Ocean Hill Board of intentionally leaving them out of the decision-making process.

Thus, the Ocean Hill Board appears to function very publicly in its decision-making; however, its Project Administrator, Rhody McCoy, on whom the board relies, apparently does not.

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[159] op. cit., pp. 23, 62, 65, 69-70, 113.

[160] ibid., pp. 24-25.

[161] ibid., pp. 49, 50, 56.

[162] See "The Year of the Dragon", Gittell, op. cit., pp. 52-63.

APPENDIX A

UFT DECENTRALIZATION POLICY STATEMENT EXCERPTS

Excerpts from the UFT Policy Statement on Decentralization

The United Federation of Teachers believes that the adoption of the Bundy proposals would irreparably harm the educational system. The Bundy model is based upon a glorification of the old-time rural school structure and is unfit for the greatest urban center in the world. The Bundy model is not decentralization; it is Balkanization. It runs counter to the current trend of enlarging school districts in order to provide both for greater efficiency and integration by narrowing school boundaries to increase administrative costs and reinforce segregation. Finally, the Bundy report ignores the new power and integrity of the professional teacher who will not continue to teach in any school or district where professional decisions are made by laymen.

UFT Proposals

Central Board of Education. The present Board of Education should be removed immediately by the legislature and a caretaker board appointed. This is not an attack on the present board or its individual members. They have tried hard. It may be that they have done as well as anyone could during these trying years. But we must recognize that they have lost public confidence and their continuation in office merely provokes increasing community hostility.

Source: Quoted in Gittell, op. cit., pp. 219-221

Decentralization. The New York City School System should be decentralized. The number of local school districts formed should be under fifteen in order to insure the possibility of integration within each district and to reduce administrative costs.

Local School Boards. Each local school district should have a local school board of eleven members. All should be elected by parents in the community and should serve without pay. Limitations should be placed upon expenses and reimbursement for lost salary. At least six members of the local school board shall be parents of children in the school.

District Superintendent. District superintendents who meet state qualifications shall be employed by local school boards on contract for a specified term of office.

Funding. The central Board of Education shall continue to control those parts of the budget that represent its legal and contractual obligations. Since salaries, pension costs, social security taxes, and other costs are central obligations, no service is performed by requiring local districts to act as a mere transmission belt. Funds distributed to local boards should be for their own use—administrative and educational. Local boards should be *guaranteed* funds instead of merely getting whatever remains of central funds. Thus, a fixed percentage of all new funds must be earmarked for local distribution. This proposal would make teachers and community allies rather than competitors. Under the Bundy proposal, the more money teachers receive, the less for localities. Under this proposal the greater the budget increase, the greater the sum for districts and for teachers. Whereas the Bundy Report mandates a budget based on the funds likely to be available, the Board of Education shall develop its budget request on the basis of educational needs, not the availability of funds.

New Central Board. The new central board shall be appointed by the mayor. For each vacancy, the mayor shall select from three names, these to be elected by all members of the local school boards. The board shall be unsalaried.

Teacher Licensing and Appointment. New York City should engage in a vigorous nationwide recruiting campaign. A national teacher examination and an interview by the Bureau of Personnel should be used, with a minimum exam mark established. Appointments should be made to districts from a ranked list by the central board, on the basis of vacancies. Final tenure of a teacher should depend upon successful completion of an on-the-job internship. Thus, although the Board of Examiners would be eliminated, the merit system would be maintained.

Promotion. We oppose the continuation of the hierarchical military model of supervision. We urge a two-track system: administrators employed from nonteacher ranks on the basis of administrative competence and supervisors elected for a term of office by tenured members of their faculties.

Collective Bargaining. All collective bargaining shall be city-wide. Present tenure provisions shall continue.

Professionalism. Any new law must clearly recognize the right of the teacher to make educational decisions within his area of competence.

Teacher Transfer. A permanent staff is an essential ingredient for effective schools, and the transfer plan established in the contract advances this goal. Thus, the transfer policy shall remain a contractual matter.

The UFT endorses the following innovations:

1. a two-track system for administration and education
2. increased assignments of paraprofessionals in the schools with a procedure to aid their training so that they would be encouraged to become teachers
3. the coordination of community efforts for the education of children—thus museums, hospitals, recreation centers, etc. would be utilized
4. the liaison arrangements between the community board and the UFT district chairman
5. the arrangements that might be made to educate some children for a portion of their school day in the homes of parents in the community.

G. THE IS 201 DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT IN NEW YORK CITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The IS 201 Demonstration Unit, one of three in New York City (Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Two Bridges and IS 201), consists of Intermediate School 201 and its four feeder elementary schools. Located in East Harlem, the population of the area is predominantly Black (81%), with some Puerto Rican (17%) and almost no White residents (1%).[1] According to the New York Times, 85% of the pupils are Black (and 60% of the teachers).[2]

Demographically, the area consists of the socio-economically disadvantaged; 30% of the adult population has an educational completion level of eight years or less; 62% were born in the South (only 14% were born in New York City); 66% had total family incomes of less than $5,000; and one-half to two-thirds lived in unsound housing.[3]

The situation and circumstances of schools in the IS 201 District are similar to those in the other two demonstration districts. In a survey of 200 residents of the IS 201 district, parents placed schools fourth in a ranking of the five biggest problems in their neighborhood. Schools are characterized as dilapidated, often substandard, either crowded and inadequate or underutilized, and staffed with large numbers of substitute teachers.[4] Moreover, the children's rate of learning appears to diminish every year causing them to fall further behind; in February, 1964, 50% of the children in the district were reading two to five years below grade level; when tested in 1966, 85% of the elementary school children in the district were two to five years below grade level.[5]

Attempts have been made to alleviate the situation, similar to those in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Two Bridges. A Head Start Program has been inaugurated; the schools have been designated "special service schools", eligible for supplementary remedial services; new library facilities were established in 1966-1967; the pupil-teacher ratio is favorable, ranging from 13:1 to 16:1 in 1968; and IS 201 has the highest annual expenditures per student of the 3 demonstration units, ranging from $900 to $1,000.[6]

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[1] Advisory Committee on Decentralization, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Decentralization, submitted to the Board of Education of the City of New York, July, 1968, (known as Niemeyer Report) p. 111. Rogers (see footnote 9) indicates that IS 201 is 40% Puerto Rican (p. 225).

[2] Stern, Michael, New York Times, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to a Good Start", September 21, 1968, p. 20.

[3] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., pp. 64, 110-112.

[4] ibid., pp. 66, 113.

[5] Jones, Dorothy S., "The Issues at IS 201: a View from the Parent's Committee", Integrated Education, October - November, 1966, p. 18. (A printing of two memoranda, which had been written on September 19, 1966 and October 4, 1966)

[6] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., pp. 66, 67. But New York City's 1968 average per pupil expenditure was $1,000 (Fantini, Mario D., "Participation, Decentralization, Community Control, and Quality Education", The Record-Teacher's College, September, 1969, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 94.)

II. WHO ARE THE MAJOR GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE DISTRICTS: HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

Like the Ocean Hill District, parents do not appear to organize into groups dealing with educational problems to a great extent, but rather to coalesce under dynamic leadership of individuals involved with either religious institutions or anti-poverty groups.

Only two parents' groups are mentioned with any frequency in the literature: the Parents' Associations and the Harlem Parents Committee (both of which will be discussed below). Yet parents give ample evidence of dissatisfaction with their schools (42% of 200 surveyed felt that their schools were not as good as they used to be)[7] and with the school system which spawns the conditions of the schools.

One explanation of the paucity of parents' groups involved in the demonstration unit is the fact that the Puerto Rican minority "see problems of adjustment as more linguistic and cultural than ethnic"[8] and thus tend to set themselves apart from the Blacks. Rogers also offered the explanation that Puerto Ricans are disinclined to engage in social protest. He quotes a Puerto Rican leader as saying,

> "It is difficult to convince Puerto Rican parents that they have any basis or right to challenge the school system . . . from all their experience they hold great confidence in the public schools and a general attitude of respecting authority . . . Negroes are more militant about rights they feel they have not been able to get, while Puerto Ricans withdraw instead of getting angry. They have a hope the Negroes don't have. Their reaction to a poor school is when I earn a little more money we'll move to a better area or go back to Puerto Rico. They have a dream that the Negroes don't have - a little education, a better job, and you are equal."[9]

This explanation is doubly meaningful in light of the fact that of 40 parent-requested pupil transfers, as of February, 1968, 30 were Puerto Rican.[10]

United Parents Association

The United Parents Association is termed the most powerful moderate organization in New York City, with a large political base; substantial financial backing; considerable numbers of parent volunteers to perform research and reporting activities; and a technically and politically sophisticated staff. The UPA is reportedly able to exert maximum influence on the Board of Education.[11]

[7] ibid., p. 115.

[8] Goldbloom, Maurice J., "The New York School Crisis", as quoted in Gittell, Marilyn, and Berube, Maurice, eds., Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. 254.

[9] Rogers, David, 110 Livingston Street, Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City School System, Random House, New York, 1968, p. 225.

[10] Buder, Leonard, "IS 201's Violence Spurs Transfers", New York Times, February 8, 1968.

[11] Rogers, op. cit., p. 170.

The UPA represents mainly middle class parents and is strongly Jewish, although Rogers notes an increase of Black and Puerto Rican members. Nonetheless "most minority group members of UPA are middle class and disassociate themselves from the demands and tactics of lower class Ghetto populations". Its stand for the status quo and against decentralization is perhaps due to the fears about Black and Puerto Rican groups taking over power locally.[12]

Thus a top UPA official, in 1967, stated that the protests over IS 201 were consistently led by a small group which had not only a limited following, but also limited interest in educational improvement; and UPA publicly denounced IS 201's insistence on a black principal(the issue will be described in succeeding sections).[13]

Although generally having a single position, with a high degree of consensus among its local chapter some local organizations were not in consensus.[14] The UPA did not require local chapters to be members of its organization; IS 201 was one which was not. Dave Spencer, Project Administrator for the demonstration unit, was a vice-president of the Parents Association (PA) when be became involved with the district in March 1967, and became president when the preceding president left a meeting, claiming no community representative had been invited.[15] An earlier example is the 1966 boycott protesting Lisser's appointment as principal (see succeeding sections for this incident) which was organized by Isiah Robinson, head of one of the Parents' Associations. (Significantly, Robinson was also Chairman of the Harlem Parents Committee.)[16] At the time Dave Spencer became President, the organization also changed to accept community members who were not parents and renamed itself the Parent-Community Organization.

Harlem Parents Committee

According to Rogers, the Harlem Parents Committee came out of the New York branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and included middle class black militants, lawyers, artists and community workers who formed together in the summer of 1968 to protest against Harlem schools and the intensely segregated school system. Isiah Robinson, who had been President of the PA for JHS 139, and Mrs. Thelma Johnson, a community organization specialist who later became a top education official in the Lindsay organization, led the committee. The HPC was generally a strong supporter of Galamison although their focuses were different: HPC was concerned with improving Harlem's schools, of which JHS 139 was symbolic of all that was wrong, while Galamison's Parents Workshop of the NAACP was concerned with improving schools on a city-wide basis and had previously led a series of successful demonstrations against the city's schools. Galamison later became a member of the New York City School Board.

[12] ibid., pp. 170-175.

[13] ibid., pp. 179, 180, 369.

[14] ibid., p. 369.

[15] Kemble, Eugenia, New York's Experiments in School Decentralization: A Look At Three Projects, a compilation of reprints from United Teacher, p. 8.

[16] Gustaitis, Rasa, "The Angry Parents of IS 201", Reporter, Vol. 35, November 17, 1966, p. 30.

The HPC group apparently was unable to mobilize a large following, although its monthly newspaper, the Harlem Black Paper was reportedly "widely circulated".[17]

b. Teachers

While teachers are threatened by lay participation, being unaccustomed to reform from outside the establishment, particularly from the Black community, it should be remembered that 60% of the IS 201 faculty was Black. Teachers in all demonstration districts originally cooperated with the communities, through their union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), in their bid for local control and through the UFT's introduction of More Effective Schools (MES) a program designed to raise standards by increased expenditures per pupil and increasing the teaching staff. Gittell suggests their motivation was to maintain control of the reform process.[18] Nonetheless sources generally agree that teachers were highly involved in the planning of the demonstration units. It appears as if they were more involved in IS 201, in fact, than in any other demonstration unit. The IS 201 Board also appears to be the only one which has consistently been able to maintain teacher representatives as members.

Later animosities between teachers and the community led to charges of non-representation of teacher wishes. This must be discounted somewhat in light of the evidence, although 30-40 teachers requested transfers in 1967.[19]

United Federation of Teachers (UFT)

According to Rogers, the UFT, exclusive bargaining agent for 50,000 teachers, had ties with all three parent groups (Negro civil rights groups, White liberals, and moderates). The Union had played an important bargaining role for liberalizing the New York City School System and for greater professionalization of the teacher's role. Generally sympathetic to desegregation and ghetto school problems, it nonetheless is attacked by civil rights groups for its stand on problem pupils and on the teacher transfer problems. Also, many individual teachers do not follow the leadership of the Union and are provincial and ethnocentric in their dealings with ghetto children.[20] A confidential source views the Union as inactive in implementing its publicly-expressed support.

Moreover, the UFT, according to Sayre and Kaufman, has a "desire to be self-directing, self-sufficient and autonomous", particularly in the area of personnel.[21] Goldberg calls it "an organization of civil service bureaucrats rather than of teachers, per se".[22]

[17] Rogers, op.cit., p. 104. The point regarding NAACP is unclear, as an observer claimed. That any ties, among those forming the HPC with NAACP had been terminated years before and that the NY branch had no role in initiating HPC.

[18] Gittell, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

[19] See Kemble, op.cit., See also Minter, Thomas K., A Study of the New York City Board of Education Demonstration Projects: IS 201, Two Bridges, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, a draft, October 10, 1967, p. 23 (referenced as the Minter Draft).

[20] Rogers, op.cit., pp. 192-4. The Union, according to a confidential source, had 50,000 members but affected 60,000 teachers.

[21] As quoted in Goldberg, Gertrude S., "IS 201: An Educational Landmark", IRCQ, Bulletin Eric Information Retrieval System for the Disadvantaged, New York, Vol II, No. 5 and Vol III, No. 1, winter 1966-1967.

[22] op.cit., p. 4.

A participant in the early planning days of IS 201 contended (as in 1968 interview) that the IS 201 planning council attempted to negotiate locally with the union, which insisted on going through Union channels, with resultant red tape and ill feelings between the union and the community. Another participant disagrees, stating that only the teachers demonstrating against the Demonstration were contacted: the council later negotiated city-wide with the UFT. The local governing board of the union was apparently against uniting with the community because, our source indicated, the union felt that it needed to take the initiative of having a plan with some power. The union did not want education under the control of the community; this became their key arguing point. According to our source, the community finally gave up trying to work with the union.

The union appears to be less powerful in IS 201, however, than in Ocean Hill-Brownsville for only 10% of teachers were out during the September 9, 1968 strike, despite the fact that IS 201 was 80-85% union.[23]

Two specific issues led to hostilities between the union and the community (other than the Teacher"s Strike, which wasn't well supported by the teachers in the district): teachers refused to teach in a temporary location (an old school) while the community tried to reach an agreement with the Board of Education, and they pressured for the retention of the Board of Education's appointed principal, Lisser (rather than a Black principal, which was demanded by the community). These issues will be discussed more fully in later sections.

c. The Board of Education

According to an interview with an observer of the New York demonstration units, the Board of Education viewed the demonstration units as stop-gap measures to stop the rioting and appease pressure groups (both from the community's desire for local control and from Mayor Lindsay's committee, which was planning decentralization). Furthermore, other observers imply the Central Board was unwilling to delegate any real authority for change (i.e., control) to the demonstration boards. The Niemeyer Report indicated that there were "considerable misunderstandings" between the local board and the Board of Education, particularly over the autonomy of the project board.[24] The Board of Education was reluctant, despite repeated requests, to spell out to any Demonstration Board the dimensions of its authority, according to a confidential source.

The Central Board played a unique role in the IS 201 situation by reviewing plans to build a school on a site which was objectionable to local parents and community representatives. The Central Board designated the school as an "Intermediate School" (grades 5-8) and projected two benefits:

(1) "it would hasten the exit of minority group children from their neighborhood schools into larger, racially mixed schools, and

(2) it would make possible a four-year sequence of language and mathematics in senior high school." (underscoring added)[25]

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[23] Stern, Michael, "Once Torn IS 201 Off To A Good Start", op.cit.

[24] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., p. 95.

[25] Minter, Thomas K., Intermediate School 201, Manhattan, Center of Controversy. A Case Study, Cambridge, June 2, 1967, p. 4.

The latter objective or benefit was, of course, not relevant to an intermediate school (grades 5-8), the former was important to Harlem parents and community agencies, who hastened to point out that the location could not (without redistricting and/or bussing the students) meet the integration goals of the local community. The Central Board, however, promised that the school would be integrated. When it later became apparent that integration could not be achieved (both because of practicality as well as the Central Board's inflexibility of policy) the movement for local control was pressed by poverty agency representatives and civil rights groups. However, controls to reach the dual goals of integration and improved educational achievement were not to be delegated to the resulting Demonstration Unit Board.[26] Indeed, from the viewpoint of Demonstration Board members, the goal of integration had become irrelevant as well as impossible to achieve on a practical basis.

The Board of Education showed signs of cooperation with the IS 201 Board in: appointing both a principal and a Project Administrator as "consultants"[27] when they lacked the traditionally proper credentials for certification, fighting a legal battle with the Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA) over the creation of a new category outside the city regulations (Demonstration School Principal);[28] and exempting teachers already in Harlem schools (but not those outside Harlem) from regulations controlling transfers if they wished to volunteer for assignment to IS 201 (this was a two-way street; those wishing to transfer from IS 201 to other Harlem schools were also exempted).[29] However, it has also been accused of sabotaging the IS 201 Board's efforts by: not funding them or providing programs;[30] not attempting to provide integration for the schools;[31] not clarifying the powers which the IS 201 Board could exercise;[32] de-emphasizing the programmatic aspects of their proposals (like suggesting the dropping of MES);[33] and by reversing themselves on the Black principal issue (apparently due to pressures from the UFT, CSA and others). An IS 201 community member commented that the Board acted positively only when it was absolutely necessary. This only increased local community members' determination to press for assistance via the local community, the State Commissioner of Education, and the Ford Foundation.

The local community became disillusioned with the Board of Education; this disillusionment crystallized in an October 20, 1966 closed meeting with the Board of Education. The IS 201 School and the Board of Education could not agree as to the negotiating committee's role and refused cooperation with them on a Task Force to study the decentralization issue. Since Bundy agreed to chair the Task Force on the condition that the community be represented (and the community, supporting the Negotiating Committee, refused to participate), the Task Force was quietly dropped. The community, at this point, ceased communication with the Board of Education until April, 1967.[34] The Niemeyer Report documented the lack

[26] _ibid._, pp. 3-4.

[27] Niemeyer Report, _op.cit._, p. 86.

[28] Gittell, _op.cit._, pp. 336-340.

[29] Minter, _op.cit._, p. 5.

[30] In a 1968 interview with a participant in the early planning stages. See also the Niemeyer Report, _op.cit._, p. 87.

[31] New York Civil Liberties Union, "The Burden of the Blame", as quoted in Gittell, _op.cit._, p. 106.

[32] Rogers, _op.cit._, p. 485. See also the Niemeyer Report, _op.cit._, p. 95.

[33] Kemble, _op.cit._, p. 3.

[34] Jones, _op.cit._, p. 14, plus confidential information.

of communication between the two groups at the time of IS 201's proposal for community control.[35] 63% of 200 parents surveyed in the IS 201 demonstration unit were negative toward the Board of Education.[36]

The Board of Education criticized the Bundy Report (see below) and set up the Advisory Committee on Decentralization to study the demonstration units, which it did for approximately one year. The Niemeyer Report was the result of this study. The Board of Education also published its own position in Guidelines to Decentralization.[37]

d. Local Boards[38]

The local board is chosen by the Board of Education from a list recommended by a panel of representatives of parent associations and community organizations. (According to a community member only establishment supporters make the list.) The District Superintendent belongs to the Board, although not a voting member, yet is more responsive to the school system, particularly the Superintendent of Schools, than to the community. The local board communicates with the Board of Education through the Office of Coordination for Local School Boards. Three members of the Parent Board serve as an ad hoc committee for local school boards overseeing 30 local school boards. The constituency of the local board changed several times during the IS 201 controversy.[39]

According to Rogers, a 1965 survey of local board members found 50% of those surveyed referring to their contacts with the Board of Education as "bad". They felt powerless and frustrated in their attempts to advise the Board of Education, which they felt did not take them seriously. In IS 201 the local board took an active role against the Board of Education, resigning, en masse, during the controversy over the IS 201 school. According to Rogers, Reverend Vincent Pasa, spokesman for the local board, declared publicly, in November 1966, "The Central Board has utterly refused to discuss the issues seriously with us or with the parents. The board's proposal for us to set up a parents' committee to advise the school administration would make it nothing more than a glorified PTA."[40]

e. State Education Commissioner

Commissioner James Allen has been involved in the demonstration units, although Rogers indicates his efforts in the realm of education have been ineffectual due to pressures from the Governor's Staff, and others. Nevertheless, as an individual, Allen is "one of the most reform and innovation-minded State Education Commissioners in the nation."[41] Allen himself called a meeting to attempt to settle the IS 201 controversy (although, significantly, he miffed both the UFT and the community by excluding them and the IS 201 community would later complain that he would not see them because he was unable to intervene in New York City without a request from the Board of Education).[42] He also set up a committee to investigate charges and counter-charges from various groups involved in all three demonstracion units.[43] (A confidential source disagrees with the above viewpoint, stressing Allen's immense interest in IS 201 and stating he became unofficially involved in its early controversies, although legally unable to effect action.)

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[35] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., pp. 97-98.

[36] ibid., p. 122.

[37] Board of Education of the City of New York, Guidelines to Decentraliztion, New York, December 1968.

[38] This term will be used to refer to those lay boards appointed by the Board of Education which were revitalized in 1962 to operate in an advisory capacity to the Board of Education.

[39] Minter, op.cit., p. 20.

[40] Rogers, op.cit., pp. 370-374.

[41] ibid., pp. 373-374.

f. The Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA)

Composed of Principals and Assistant Principals, the CSA maintains that education is the province of professionals and that lay intrusion will lower educational standards, and consequently has been viewed as playing a "consistently obstructionist role" in attempts to decentralize or localize control. Rogers labels it, "the most powerful organization of the professional groups", and indicates that this group has successfully blocked or subverted all attempts at either decentralization or local control made so far.[44] Another source indicates the CSA has a tradition of opposing any change in the system.

Gittell cites the group as one of the three groups whose major impetus was against reform (the others being the UFT and the Board of Education),[45] and Rhody McCoy, the Ocean Hill Project Administrator, treats it scathingly, as follows: "It is noteworthy that this body of educators, representing years of experience and leadership, has not as an association developed a single program to improve education in the city; rather, as an effective political lobby, it has reacted negatively to most programs. It enjoys a reputation of being against minority group education."[46]

The CSA, with the UFT, lobbied against the passage of the Bundy Report, and was the body which brought suit against the creation of the special category of Demonstration School Principal;[47] it was also involved in pressuring the Board of Education in the Black Principal issue.[48]

g. The Mayor's Office

The Mayor's office has been variously involved with the demonstration units, and with IS 201 in particular. The Niemeyer Report states the Mayor"s office was involved in the IS 201 school controversy.[49] Even after the school was open, Rogers indicates the Mayor's office was still involved in discussions amongst parties in the dispute.[50] Accordint to Minter, it was the Mayor's office which suggested that the Board of Education appoint a Task Force in 1966 to "maintain a dialogue"[51] with the IS 201 district. (Although the Task Force was never very effective).

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[42] Minter, op.cit., p. 12.

[43] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., p. 78.

[44] Rogers, op.cit., p. 195.

[45] Gittell, op.cit., p. 330.

[46] McCoy, Rhody, "The Year of the Dragon", as quoted in Gittell, op.cit., p.61.

[47] Gittell, op.cit., p. 15.

[48] Minter, op.cit., p. 18.

[49] op.cit., p. 68. See also Rogers, op.cit., p. 364.

[50] Rogers, op.cit., p. 367.

The Mayor's office accused the Board of Education of bad handling of the IS 201 dispute in September 1966,[52] but was in turn accused by the IS 201 community because they presented the situation to the Mayor and "received no hint of support".[53]

Mayor Lindsay himself came out in favor of the Board of Regent's Bill, after speeches pleading for decentralization had not been able to affect acceptance of his proposed legislation (see below, under Section III). The Mayor's involvement in education has been severely criticized, either on the basis that he is trying to "run the schools" (by teachers and professionals in the system) or that he was unsuccessful at it (Rogers, Mayer, *et.al.*).

The New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate for a plan for decentralization. Accompanying the mandate was the promise of $54 million in additional state aid for New York City.[54]

The Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization

On April 30, 1967, Lindsay organized the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, with McGeorge Bundy as its Chairman. Their position on decentralization was published in November, 1967.[55]

The UFT and the Council of Supervisory Associations subsequently lobbied against passage of the Bundy Report, as it came to be known. Gittell suggests that this was partly due to fear of Mayoral control of city education.[56] A confidential source elaborated on this indicating self-interest in maintaining the status quo was the reason; fear of Mayoral control was an excuse.

As previously noted, the Board of Education was also unfavorably disposed toward the Bundy Report (which was suggested as a main impetus for the Board's own Advisory Committee).

The Human Resources Administration (HRA)

Rogers referred to this agency as a "super-agency administering poverty, manpower, education and welfare programs". The agency if presently trying to coordinate data from other agencies to spotlight educational service needs. Its Office of Educational Liaison, has been the Mayor's main agency working to get legislative acceptance of decentralization; its Education Action Division, under Commissioner Thelma Johnson (influential in the Harlem Parents Committee, before leaving it for HRA as mentioned above) has played a key role in pressing for school reforms.[57] (She has since returned to HPC, leaving HRA).

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[51] *op.cit.*, p. 8.

[52] *ibid.*, p. 463. Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 26 indicates that Mayor Lindsay supported the principals and staff on this issue.

[53] Gittell, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

[54] *ibid.*

[55] Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, *Reconnection for Learning, A Community School System for New York City*, 1967.

[56] Gittell, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-10, 14.

In fact, the Education Action Division is the staff unit for the Council Against Poverty's education committee, both of which have been involved in ghetto areas with Headstart programs and training and organizing poverty area groups.[58]

IS 201 and the HRA issued a joint proposal, "IS 201 and its Feeder Schools: An Autonomous Community Center Combining Services, Training, and Research Functions. A Proposal for Cooperation between HRA and the Parent-Teacher Planning Board of IS 201 and its Feeder Schools", which proposed a community-centered facility. Apparently, this proposal was never made available to the public nor its contents publicized.[59] (According to a community participant it was never agreed on.)

h. The Board of Regents

The Board of Regents was involved in New York's demonstration units in both the broader and the narrower (IS 201) sense. In the broader sense, they were involved in the decentralization issue (see Section III, below), in drafting, proposing and lobbying for a decentralization plan.

In the narrower sense, the entire Board of Regents was involved in IS 201, including its legal counsel and professional staff. They were involved through their committee, Committee on Integration, and through Kenneth B. Clark, a Board of Regents member, and member of the Committee on Integration. When the Board of Education rejected IS 201's proposal, they turned to Clark, who helped write a second proposal, which apparently had the support of the Committee on Integration, as well as other influential parties. However, this second proposal was not accepted by the Board of Education. Moreover, Clark maintained close contact with Allen.[60]

i The Ford Foundation

In June 1967, the Ford Foundation awarded IS 201 a $51,000 planning grant.[61] According to Karp, moreover, Ford worked with IS 201 after the September 1967 confrontation between the IS 201 community and the Board of Education.[62] The Board of Education had included Ford in its Task Force for decentralization and had, in fact, asked Bundy to head the Task Force (which he would have been willing to do, had the community groups joined the Task Force).[63]

[57] Rogers, op.cit., pp. 121, 334, 335, 467.

[58] ibid., p. 467.

[59] Kemble, op.cit., p. 11.

[60] Jones, op.cit., p. 27; Confidential information.

[61] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., p. 69. Levine, Naomi, Ocean Hill Brownsville: Schools In Crisis, New York, Popular Library, 1969, p. 15, indicates that all 3 grants were given to the Board of Education in May to disburse.

[62] Karp, Richard, "School Decentralization in New York", as quoted in Gittell, op.cit., p. 66. Rogers (op.cit., p. 364) also indicates that Ford was involved in a "coalition" in support of local control at this time.

[63] Rogers, op.cit., p. 367.

The Foundation worked on and supported the Bundy Report (Bundy being President of the Ford Foundation) which was mandated by Mayor Lindsay. In fact, an observer indicated Marjo Fantini was Bundy's assistant and the key writer of the report. The Foundation thus, by working for the Mayor, as well as funding local efforts to obtain community control, appeared to be working "both sides of the street". Ford has been sharply criticized for these undertakings, in particular by: Mayor who feels that outside non-participative consultants and agencies, by not having to be accountable for their errors, are not responsible in their actions;[64] Kemble, who accuses Ford of using children as pawns;[65] and the Board of Education, who accuse Ford of power-grabbing.[66]

j. Yeshiva University

According to a 1968 interview with a professor, Professors Gottesfeld (who was formerly with OEO's MEND in Harlem) and Gordon developed a research plan to tackle the question of how the New York City Board should operate; approached the Board of Education with their plan; and were turned down on the basis of lack of funding. They then went to IS 201 with it. They encouraged the community and teachers to work together, being primarily responsible for UFT inclusion.[67] A confidential sourse feels Yeshiva was seeking funds and was not actually interested in cooperating with the community.

The IS 201 proposal, "Academic Excellence: Community and Teachers Assume Responsibility for the Education of the Ghetto Child" was written by these two professors, mainly along MES lines (the professors felt strongly that since teachers must do the teaching, they must be happy with the manner in which they are teaching), although expanded to include reading projects developed by Yeshiva and Project Beacon, a Yeshiva University inter-departmental project that conducts research and training in educating ghetto students. (Project Beacon has an "information retrieval center on the disadvantaged" funded by OEO) Although Yeshiva was written into the proposal as a consultant to the district, and, as such, would have a member on the IS 201 Board, the community dropped Yeshiva (and Project Beacon) from the final version.[68]

An observer indicates that Yeshiva was subsequently phased out of the project. The implication is that Yeshiva by closely tying itself to the UFT, suffered when the IS 201 community became frustrated with the UFT local; another implication is found in Yeshiva's reading and writing studying center which has close ties to the Central Board; and a respondent indicated the community was loathe to accept authority in the hands of Yeshiva rather than the community.

[64] Mayer, op.cit., pp. 116-117.

[65] Kemble, op.cit., p. 12.

[66] Rogers, op.cit., p. 367.

[67] Goldberg, op.cit., p. 4.

[68] Kemble, op.cit., p. 10; confidential information.

k. Anti-Poverty Groups

Although IS 201 appears to have a great number of these groups involved most groups are not officially represented (by officers, for example) but happen to share some of the same personnel, who were deeply interested in education long before involvement in anti-poverty agencies, according to a participant. They are as follows:

Massive Economic Neighborhood Development (MEND)

There appears to be consensus among sources that OEO-financed MEND was heavily represented in the IS 201 community. The Niemeyer Report states that "community activists appeared to be most influential in the planning phase ... primarily poverty workers or ex-poverty workers associated with MEND".[69] Goldbloom felt that"MEND endeavored to channel discontent over the choice of a site into the demand for a Black principal", and was responsible for the school boycott.[70] Some teachers, in fact, accused MEND of "control", and "takeover", and being "over represented" on the IS 201 Board.[71] Other individuals deny this accusation.

Community Association of East Harlem Triangle(Triangle)

In September 1966, the community organizations and parents elected a Negotiating Committee to meet with the Board of Education over the IS 201 issue. A representative from Triangle was chosen as a member.[72] Minter mentions Triangle as one of the three largest agencies involved in the planning phase (the other two being MEND and UBA).[73] Ford's Planning Grant was administered through Triangle.[74]

United Block Association (UBA)

We know nothing about this association other than the fact that both Wilcox and Minter cite is as influential in the development of the IS 201 demonstration unit,[75] and that it, too, was represented on the Negotiating Committee.[76] Kemble quotes a teacher as saying, however, that UBA wasn't represented on the IS 201 Board.[77] A confidential source indicates the organization was not influential, but individuals were. For example, Helen Testamark was an early leader of the negotiating committee who had been actively involved in UBA, as well as being Chairman of the PA Council.

[69] op.cit., p. 69.

[70] Goldbloom, as quoted in Gittell, op.cit., p. 255.

[71] Kemble, op.cit., p. 9.

[72] Jones, op.cit., p. 20.

[73] Minter, op.cit., p. 4.

[74] Kemble, op.cit., p. 5.

[75] Wilcox, Preston, "The Controversy Over IS 201", Urban Review, July 1966, p. 12. See also Minter, op.cit., p. 4.

[76] Jones, op.cit., p. 20.

[77] op.cit., p. 9.

CORE

Characterized by Rogers as "often militant", especially in the Bronx, Harlem and Brooklyn, the organization was limited in power because it had few members, limited funds, divided leadership, poorly organized plans, and lacked pull with the City Board or City Officials. Local groups were suspicious of its national officers whom they accused of pressure to please white liberal benefactors. The structure was decentralized which led to conflict between local groups and the national organization, among local groups, and even within one local group. Therefore, there was no consistent program or guidelines and the organization was apt to act unpredictably, although it did tend to encourage public protest and was fairly strong in the ghetto.[78]

A HEW article cites Harlem CORE as active in picketing IS 201 during the school controversy in September 1966,[79] and Jones mentions the same group as having representation on the Negotiating Committee.[80]

EQUAL

Formed in early 1964, EQUAL is a militant white group which lends assistance to ghetto organizations. The leader of this group is Mrs. Ellen Lurie, an activist and former social worker who previously participated in East Harlem housing activities. The group is small but "intensely committed". Its white parents are middle class but send their children to ghetto and integrated shcools. A member of the community maintains only a few do this. With a small following in white middle class communities, EQUAL publishes numerous newsletters and reports on conditions in schools. Mrs. Lurie is "one of the best informed people" in the city on school matters.[81]

According to Goldberg, EQUAL, "an organization of parents seeking quality, integrated education", was one of only two city-wide organizations which originally supported the IS 201 group.[82]

One would expect that IS 201's later demands for community control and a Black principal would have alienated this group from further support, but this did not, in fact occur.

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

Although not officially represented on the committee, a confidential source indicates an individual from the organization was present full-time in the planning phase and conducted a training program for candidates for board membership; SNCC was also present during the picketing.

[78] Rogers, op.cit., pp. 105, 111-112.

[79] HEW Statement, IRCD, Bulletin, op.cit., p. 1. This is confirmed by a confidentia source.

[80] op.cit., p. 20.

[81] Rogers, op.cit., pp. 205-206.

[82] op.cit., p. 4.

Other Anti-Poverty Agencies

The East Harlem Tenants' Council, another anti-poverty agency, composed of Puerto Ricans, attended the first few meetings of the IS 201 parents group in the person of Ted Velez, its director, but was aked to leave. "This reflected the deep conflict between Velez' group and MEND."[83]

HARYOU Community Corporation was also involved, according to Wilcox, who names it among the five groups involved in the IS 201 protest.[84] But a teacher was cited by Kemble as upset that HARYOU wasn't represented on the IS 201 Board, and a parent was quoted as saying that HARYOU had not supported IS 201.[85] A participant indicates, however, that much of IS 201 was not within the HARYOU area; that HARYOU did not take a position on IS 201; but that some individuals also involved with HARYOU were active on the committee.

l. Other Groups Involved

Institute for Community Studies of Queens College

Under a grant from Ford, the Institute provided assistance to the three demonstration units, primarily Ocean Hill and IS 201.[86]

Protestant Council of the City of New York

According to Goldberg, this was the second of two city-wide organizations which originally supported the IS 201 group.[87] Dorothy Jones, an active participant in IS 201, was the director of the Office of Church and Race of the Protestant Council.

Rogers characterizes the Protestant Council as the single most active Protestant agency, which supports decentralization, but has limited power. He indicated, however, that it has become more powerful in recent years, particularly under Mrs. Jones, "a middle-class Negro professional", and "one of the most experienced and informed people in the city on school matters", having served on a local board in Harlem on the Staff of the Mayor's Commission on Human Rights, and the Harlem Parents Committee.[88]

m. Predecessors to the IS 201 Board

In September 1965, at a meeting of the local school board, an AD Hoc Parents Committee was formed. Its membership included representatives from the Parents' Associations, parents paid for working for community anti-poverty agencies (such as MEND, UBA, and Triangle), PA members and members of the civil rights organizations. Led by Helen Testamark, this group began independent communication with the Board of Education officials .[89] It pressured for information on the school to be opened; demonstrated against the new school; and appealed to outside groups for support[90] (Mayor Lindsay, Commissioner Allen, and U.S. Commissioner, Harold Howe).

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[83] Rogers, op.cit., p. 125. A community member denies this statement by Rogers, indicating Velez did not appear for the initial meetings. Therefore, when he arrived for the first negotiating session, he was asked to leave and did so unwillingly. He did later become involved, however.

[84] Wilcox, op.cit., p. 12.

[85] Kemble, op.cit., p. 9.

[86] Niemeyer Report, op.cit., p. 82; also from an interview with a professor in 1968.

[87] op.cit., p. 4.

[88] op.cit., pp. 154-155.

[89] Minter, op.cit., p. 4.

In September 1966, parents and community organizations elected 10 negotiators, 2 advisors, and 13 observers to sit with the Board of Education in negotiations. They formed the Negotiating Committee, chaired by Mrs. Helen Testamark (the president of the Parents Council). Individuals on the Negotiating Committee were also members of the following community organizations: Harlem CORE, UBA, Triangle, HARYOU, and the Protestant Council. Each evening a community-wide reporting session was held to inform people of the day's negotiations. Agreement was reached in mid-September but reversed the next day; thus the group continued to meet, and was involved in the subsequent controversy over the Black principal issue and the picketing resulting. During the activist phase, they were joined by members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panthers, but these two groups were only involved in demonstrating, not negotiating. The Negotiating Committee appealed for support outside - to Mayor Lindsay and to a church organization.[91]

Upon receiving the Ford planning grant an IS 201 Demonstration Unit Planning Board was set up, consisting of 5 parents (one from each school), 10 teachers (2 from each school in the Demonstration Unit), and five community representatives. Apparently, the Demonstration Unit school administrators were also asked to send a representative, but failed to do so. Parents were elected by the PA's; teachers elected their representatives; and the community representatives were held over from the Negotiating Committee. Teacher representatives attended faithfully; one even functioned as co-chairman of the Education Subcommittee, but they were always conscious, according to Minter, that the constitutncy they represented was not favorably disposed.[92] A confidential source indicated that the intended composition of the Planning Board was the reverse of the above; with 10 parents, and 5 teachers. This may be a transpositional error. However, the same confidential source indicated the Planning Board was never entirely filled, since summer commitments made reaching members difficult.

The Planning Board, according to this same participant, did not hold election for the Governing Board until December, 1967, allowing time to generate greater community involvement.

[90] Jones, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

[91] ibid., p. 20, 26. Kemble, op.cit., cites teachers who claim otherwise, but these claims appear to be unsubstantiated by any other source.

[92] Minter Draft, op.cit., pp. 5, 9.

III. HOW DID THE DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- 1958 - Board of Education announced a plan to erect a new school between Madison and Park Avenues on 127th Street. Parents on the local board's advisory committee indicated that the site was unsuitable because it precluded integration in the school. Furthermore, the site was unpleasant; it was surrounded by broken down tenements and railroad tracks.[93]

- 1959 - Superintendent of Schools Theobold agreed not to use the proposed site, but instead, to bus children from an overcrowded JHS in East Harlem to under-utilized suburban schools in Yorkville.[94]

- 1962 - The Board of Education, local districts, and local boards were reorganized. Afrer reorganization plans for the site were revived, Parents and community representatives again restated their objections to the site; the Board of Education responded with plans for a "creative" design for the building and a progressive curriculum, which would include Negro history and African culture studies. The school was designated an "Intermediate School" - that is encompassing grades 5-8 - which was part of the 4-4-4 system that was to promote integration by having large intermediate and high schools.[95]

- February 1964 - Reading scores of the schools were released; 50% of the children were reading 2-5 years below grade level. A boycott of schools was a result of this finding.[96]

- Fall 1965 - The Board of Education announced that IS 201 would open in the spring of 1966.[97] The school, when built, lacked both playground and parking space.

- September 1965 - At a meeting of the local school board, the Ad Hoc Parents' Council was formed. Meeting separately with the Board of Education, they pressed for details concerning IS 201's program and desegregation plans.[98] At this meeting, the school name came up. Conflicting stories about this abound, but Minter finds support for a committee which was established to suggest names and report back.[99]

- November 1965 - A community meeting was held; it was announced that Brandes, a principal, would be named principal to IS 201. Minter claims there was little public opposition to this announcement.[100]

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[93] Minter, op. cit., p. 3. Minter, however, is the only source not indicating 1962 as the site selection year. See Jones, op. cit., p. 19; Goldberg, op. cit., p. 1; Gustaitis, op. cit., p. 31.
[94] Minter, op. cit., p. 3; confidential source.
[95] ibid., see also Goldberg, op. cit., p. 2.
[96] Jones, op. cit., p. 18.
[97] ibid., p. 19.
[98] ibid.
[99] Minter, op. cit., p. 4.
[100] ibid., p. 5.

- November 1965 - At a second community meeting, parents learned that the school had been named before the committee could present its suggestions. Brandes then withdrew his name from consideration for the post of principal of IS 201. (A participant indicates Brandes understood the depth of the community's desire for a black principal.) Stanley Lisser, a man with "an impressive record of interest and achievement in teaching Negro history"[101] requested the post, and began staffing with a Black and Puerto Rican assistant principal.[102] A participant indicated that its community began pressing for a black principal, not having been informed that Lisser had been selected.

- Early 1966 - The Board of Education, in response to demands by the parent group, indicated that the "integration" in IS 201 would be 50% Negro and 50% Puerto Rican, and that programs being set up were: typing, art, and modern shop.[103]

- April 1, 1966 - IS 201 was to be opened. There was a demonstration of parents and community leaders outside the building. The opening was postponed until May 1.[104]

- April 26, 1966 - District Superintendent Schrieber gerrymandered the districts around IS 201 to allow more Puerto Rican students to enter so that "integration" could be achieved.[105] Both Negro and Puerto Rican parents complained about this and the attempt at redistricting was ended.[106] (According to a confidential source, the parents also boycotted one of the feeder schools for one day.)

- Late April 1966 - The local board for District 4 had an open meeting. Present were: Parent Association representatives, Mayor Lindsay, Superintendent Donovan, District Superintendent Schrieber.[107] Parents presented a proposal for integrating the district based on a paper by Preston Wilcox that developed a system of "accountability" of the educational system to the community.[108] Wilcox indicates the meeting was hostile. At a second meeting, the parents accused the Board of Education of "bad faith" and demanded educational equality of their segregated school.[109]

- May 1, 1966 - The Board of Education postponed the IS 201 opening until June 1.[110]

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[101] Goldberg, op. cit., p. 4.

[102] Minter, op. cit., p. 5.

[103] Jones, op. cit., p. 19.

[104] ibid., see also Rogers, op. cit., p. 365.

[105] Gustaitis, op. cit., p. 31.

[106] Minter, op. cit., p. 6.

[107] Wilcox, op. cit., p. 12.

[108] Gustaitis, op. cit., p. 31. See p. 13 of Wilcox, op. cit., for a copy of that paper.

[109] Wilcox, op. cit., p. 12.

[110] HEW, op. cit., p. 1.

- June 1, 1966 - The Board again postponed the opening. A summer program was to be inaugurated in the school; it was dropped, and September 12 was set as the opening.[111]

- Late Spring 1966 - The Board of Education sent a four-page, 6" X 9" leaflet to White schools in surrounding districts urging them to voluntarily enroll students in IS 201.[112] The Board evidently thought the parents belonging to EQUAL would send their children to IS 201. However, the response according to an observer, was that if the residents were opposing the school why should others voluntarily send their children from outside the district? Around this time, a series of proposals based on the MES concept were being developed by IS 201.[113]

- June 1966 - The Parent's Council met with the Board of Education and pressed for a voice in IS 201.[114]

- July 1966 - The Parents' Council met with Mayor Lindsay; this meeting was ineffective. They were refused a meeting with Commissioner Allen on the grounds he couldn't interfere without a mandate from the Board of Education.[115]

- August 5, 1966 - The Parent's Council sent a delegation to Washington to meet with U. S. Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe II. Despite the fact that Howe indicated his sympathy for the group, he also noted that he was unable to exercise authority over the New York City Schools.[116] However, according to a participant, Howe was sympathetic and offered to exercise what influence he could through Federal funding requirements.

- August 18, 1966 - A meeting of Donovan, Board of Education President Garrison, and other school officials was held with the newly-formed Negotiating Committee, which began demands for a Black principal and community control. Nothing was accomplished. Superintendent Donovan then took over the negotiations, meeting regularly with the Negotiating Committee.[117]

[111] *ibid.*

[112] Minter, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[113] Goldberg, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[114] Gustaitis, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[115] *ibid.*, pp. 32, 33,

[116] *ibid.*, p. 33. See also Minter, *op. cit.*, p. 9, who regards this as the turning point in the conflict. Goldberg, *op. cit.*, p. 4, concurs, indicating it was at this time that parents adopted the policy of a power-oriented pressure group,
[117] began to talk of a quality segregated school, and demanded a Black principal. Sources are very confused over the timing of these events. See Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 366; also Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 18, and Minter, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Jones gives March 1966, as the beginning of the Black principal movement; indicates the Negotiating Committee was formed on September 12.

- August 1966 - A poor response of only 10 to 20 White parents had shown an interest in sending their children to IS 201. None had enrolled their children (reportedly, they were impressed by the facilities, but hesitant over community antagonisms). A Board of Education official reportedly made the decision to halt further recruitment of White students until the school proved itself.[118] (Community members resented the implication contending that it ought to be proved to them also.)

- September 9, 1966 - The local UFT chapter for the IS 201 area was formed.

- September 12, 1966 - On opening day of the New York City Schools a parent boycott closed the IS 201 school.[119] Meetings continued between Donovan and the Negotiating Committee.[120]

- September 17, 1966 - Agreement was reached between Donovan and the Negotiating Committee. The parties agreed that the Board of Education and the community would jointly operate the schools and the principal would be "mutually agreed upon", i.e., a Black or Puerto Rican.[121]

- September 19, 1966 - Lisser announced his decision to withdraw his principalship.[122] Teachers refused to teach in an old school which had been agreed upon by the Superintendent and the Negotiating Committee. (Although the school was manned with teachers from other schools.) They later claimed they were not informed of the agreement and had taken this stance in support of the Negotiating Committee.[123] In an afternoon meeting between the Negotiating Committee and Donovan, the Black Assistant Principal was appointed acting principal; she refused the post citing her opinion that the selection was made on a racial basis, a misunderstanding on her part since this is normal procedure and the post was temporary.[124]

- September 20, 1966 - Teachers picketed the Board of Education, urging the Board not to accept Lisser's withdrawal.[125] A meeting with 30 Harlem principals was held. Although no press release followed, it was reported that they condemned the Board of Education and threatened to resign en masse if the Board accepted Lisser's withdrawal.[126] The Board announced that Lisser had withdrawn his request to transfer and they would honor this second statement.[127]

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[118] Minter, op. cit., p. 16.

[119] ibid., p. 9. See also Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 68.

[120] Jones, op. cit., p. 21.

[121] ibid., p. 22.

[122] ibid., p. 24. See also Minter, op. cit., p. 10.

[123] Jones, op. cit., pp. 22, 23. See also Minter, op. cit., p. 10.

[124] Minter, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.

[125] HEW, op. cit., p. 1. Minter (op. cit., p. 19), cites the teachers as supporting Lisser since (a) he had hired them, and (b) they worked for him. Gustaiti op. cit., suggests the parents fought this issue because of a "need for victor

- September 21, 1966 - IS 201 opened. 85% of the students were Black; 15% were Puerto Rican. The school was picketed by a group led by the Negotiating Committee and joined by representatives from SNCC, Black Panthers, CORE, Harlem Labor Council, EQUAL, NAACP, etc.[128]
- September 22, 1966 - Lindsay criticized the Board of Education for inept handling of the situation.[129]
- September 26, 1966 - Governor Rockefeller made a statement urging that New York City consider electing the Board of Education, rather than appointing it. Allen opposed this suggestion.[130]
- September 29, 1966 - Allen called a meeting of school officials, representatives of UPA and PEA, and the Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions (of which Clark is a member), but excluded the UFT and the Negotiating Committee.[131]
- In the weeks following the controversy, Clark as well as two others, met with the Negotiating Committee. Clark helped to draw up a proposal which he indicated had the support of Allen, Lindsay, the Board of Regents' Committee, and the New York Times. The proposal was similar to Wilcox's proposal, having a nine-member council composed of university, parents, and community representatives.[132]
- October 5, 1966 - The Board of Education met in closed session to discuss Clark's proposal.[133]
- October 20, 1966 - The Board of Education met with the Negotiating Committee, offering a counter-proposal to the Committee's demand for community control. The counter-proposal offered the community an advisory role in IS 201 and proposed to appoint a high level Task Force which would make an interim report within 30 days and specific action within 90 days. The Negotiating Committee left the meeting.[134]

[126] Minter, op. cit., p. 11.

[127] HEW, op. cit., p. 2.

[128] Goldberg, op. cit., p. 2.

[129] ibid.

[130] Minter, op. cit., p. 13.

[131] ibid., p. 12.

[132] ibid., p. 13. See also Jones, op. cit., p. 27.

[133] Jones, op. cit., p. 27.

[134] The dates mentioned are conflicting. Minter (op. cit., p. 13) and HEW (op. cit., p. 2) give October 20; Gustaitis (op. cit., p. 31) and Jones (op. cit., p. 27) give October 19.

The Board of Education publicly announced it was studying various plans to decentralize the city school system in order to increase parental involvement in the schools.[135] However, according to a participant, the Board of Education had called a closed meeting at which agreement could not be reached regarding the role of the Negotiating Committee in the local school system. The Negotiating Committee viewed the task force as another delaying tactic and refused to participate asserting that the task force had nothing to do with community control. The Board of Education members left the meeting. Bundy, who was present, became interested in the issues involved. Some claim this led to the Ford Foundation later providing money for planning grants.

- October 29, 1966 - The Board of Education local school board resigned en masse, some felt in support of the Negotiating Committee.[136]
- December 19-21, 1966 - The "People's Board of Education" occupied the Board of Education headquarters.[137] According to Goldberg, IS 201 leaders played an important role in this three-day sit in.[138]
- February 16, 1967 - The Board of Education again announced it was studying decentralization.[139]
- Spring 1967 - The draft proposal for IS 201 "Academic Excellence: Community and Teachers Assumed Responsibility for the Education of the Ghetto Child", was written by Sol Gordon and Harry Gottesfeld of Yeshiva University.[140] According to a participant, this proposal was never formally submitted by the Negotiating Committee.
- March 30, 1967 - The New York State Legislature presented Mayor Lindsay with a mandate to decentralize the entire New York City school system promising $54 million in additional state aid.[141]
- April 19, 1967 - The Board of Education announced its decentralization plan and the formation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Two Bridges, and IS 201 as demonstration districts.[142]

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[135] Gittell, op. cit., p. 18.

[136] Gustaitis, op. cit., p. 34. NB: Minter, op. cit., p. 14 indicates the local board resigned on November 1, 1966, whereas HEW (op. cit.) p. 2, indicates the date as November 2, 1966.

[137] Rogers, op. cit., p. 30. See also memorandum report on Ocean Hill-Brownsville

[138] op. cit., p. 5.

[139] Gittell, op. cit., p. 18.

[140] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 69.

[141] State of New York, An Act . . . , Senate and Assembly, No. 4622, March 30, 196

[142] Gittell, op. cit., p. 335.

- Early June 1967 - The Board of Education announced the appointment of a committee, "The Committee to Prepare Guidelines for Individual Schools", headed by Abraham P. Taucher, Assistant Superintendent for District 16.[143]

- June 29, 1967 - "The Committee to Prepare . . ." presented its report to the Board of Education. (This report was not released until three months later.)[144]

- July 6, 1967 - Ford Foundation awarded IS 201 a $51,000 four month planning grant, awarded through Triangle and stipulating that funds would not be disbursed until an Administrative Committee was organized.[145] Levine stated that in May the Ford Foundation gave the Board of Education a lump sum to disburse to all three demonstrations.[146]

- Summer 1967 - The Niemeyer Report indicates that the IS 201 Planning Council and the Board of Education had little communication during this time.[147] Communication was maintained with the Department of Schools however.

- August 21, 1967 - James Allen, State Commissioner of Education announced that the Board of Education could create the position of Demonstration School Principal for elementary schools (as Ocean Hill requested). This led to antagonisms between the school officials and professionals on one hand, the community groups on the other.[148]

- September 9, 1967 - On the opening day of school, the UFT struck the NYC schools. It demanded enlargement of MES and the power to evict disruptive students; it won a clause empowering it to spend $10 million of Board of Education funds for an education program.[149] Some parents considered this anti-Black and anti-Puerto Rican,[150] and some outsiders considered it a move to "force Mayor Lindsay to bargain with the union."[151] The strike lasted 12 days, and the Niemeyer Report credits the strike with creating a situation where Ferguson and Spencer of the Planning Council could mobilize a more militant approach.[152] IS 201 parents solidly opposed the strike, as did most of the teachers. Although some principals turned away volunteer teachers and students, and hastily closed the schools, IS 201 remained open and adequately staffed. The Planning Council attempted to screen returning teachers after the strike, but was prevented from doing so by the Board of Education.[153] Reports conflict as to the number of teachers out during the strike, from 9 to 17[154], but the figure was low, as was the pupil absentee figure.

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[143] Kemble, op. cit., p. 4.

[144] ibid.

[145] ibid., p. 8. Gittell, op. cit., p. 255 concurs with the July date, although the Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 69, gives the month of June. This report also refers to a Project Administrator who was hired immediately but left within a few weeks. No other source mentions this.

[146] op. cit., p. 15.

[147] op. cit., p. 71.

[148] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.

[149] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 85.

[150] Gittell, op. cit., p. 336.

[151] Mayer, op. cit., p. 30.

[152] op. cit., pp. 69, 72. The terminology is unclear as the report states "Parent's Planning Council" but Spencer was with the IS 201 Demonstration Unit Planning Board. We assume the terms are interchangeable.

- October 1967 - IS 201 submits its proposal, essentially a duplicate of Ocean Hill's, to the Board of Education. The CSA filed suit against the creation of a special category of Demonstration School Principal. This category would be under state regulations rather than city regulations.[155]

- November 9, 1967 - Reconnection for Learning, known as the Bundy Report, was published. The Bundy Report proposed decentralization of the city's schools, vesting power in the local board, and authorizing the Mayor to appoint members of the Central Educational Agency (their term for the Central Board of Education) and five memebrs of the eleven member local boards.[156]

- November 1967 - IS 201 held its elections, which were a center of controversy (although the Honest Ballot Association certified that there was no evidence of wrong doing). Some parents, complaining they had not been properly informed, boycotted one school. Charges and counter-charges were made between the UFT and the Planning Council. 23% of the parents, 54% of the teachers, and 67% of the supervisors voted. Despite the elections, the Niemeyer Report complained, "It is not clear who has been in charge of the five public schools in the cluster since the formal election in November . . ."[157]

- November 27, 1967 - A policy statement on decentralization was adopted by the UFT Executive Board (by the delegate assembly December 20, 1967).[158]

- December 1967 - Mayor Lindsay submitted his revised Bundy Plan to the legislature.

- February 2, 1968 - IS 201 formally submitted its proposal to the Board of Education.[159]

[153] Minter draft, op. cit., pp. 23, 25. He also states this was "an exercise in rhetoric".

[154] See New York Times, Stern, Michael, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to Good Start", op. cit., and the Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 112.

[155] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 71; Gittell, op. cit., p. 337.

[156] See Reconnection for Learning. See also Appendix A of the Two Bridges Memorandum Report.

[157] op. cit., pp. 78, 86.

[158] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 219, 337. See also Appendix A of the Ocean Hill Memorandum Report.

[159] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 97.

- February 1968 - At the beginning of the second semester, District Superintendent Martin W. Frey took over personal supervision of IS 201, whose entire supervisory staff had left as they had indicated they would. An observer reported the school as "near bedlam". The IS 201 Board had heard of the situation, although only indirectly; they responded by appointing Ronald Evans as principal of IS 201, although a week later the names of seven person's eligible for the position were reportedly referred to the IS 201 Board by District Superintendent Frey.[160]

- February 14, 1968 - Mayor Lindsay made a policy speech on education at a Civic Assembly meeting condemning the school system and strongly urging support for decentralization (this was his first formal speech on decentralization).[161] He had however discussed some of the issues involved on previous television interviews.

- February 16, 1968 - Charles Wilson was formally proposed for Project Administrator.[162]

- February 21, 1968 - Harold Howe II, U. S. Commissioner of Education in a speech to the committee on the City of New York of the New York Senate stated that the decentralization and local control were necessary to improve education.[163] IS 201 held a Memorial Day program for Malcolm X. The program apparently exacerbated racial tensions within the community; riots and subsequent destruction of property resulted.[164]

- March 1, 1968 - The IS 201 Board met with the Board of Education to discuss the proposal and issues which the Board of Education had raised.[165]

- March 4, 1968 - Judge Rinaldi ruled against the CSA's suit, indicating that the Board of Education had the right to create the position of Demonstration School Principal. However, he also ruled that the category was not clearly delineated and voided the appointments made under the category.[166]

- March 1968 - The State Board of Regents announced a far-reaching proposal for decentralization of New York's schools.[167]

- March 8, 1968 - The consultants to the IS 201 Board (Kelly and Ferguson) were released. According to the Niemeyer Report, this stemmed from the controversy created by both the Malcolm X Memorial Day Program and hesitancy over Ferguson who had been indicted for

[160] Buder, op. cit., p. 1; Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 86.

[161] Rogers, op. cit., p. 204.

[162] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 69.

[163] Howe, Harold, II, U. S. Commissioner of Eudcation, Statement before the Committee on City of New York of the New York Senate, Wednesday, February 21, 1968.

[164] Stern, Michael, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to a Good Start", op. cit.

[165] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 98.

[166] Gittell, op. cit., p. 337.

[167] Karp, Richard, "School Decentralization in New York", as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 74.

conspiracy to murder Ray Wilkins (NAACP) and Whitney Young (Urban League).[168] Members of the community disagree, citing that Ferguson's contract had expired and Kelly resigned to rejoin MEND.

- March 20, 1968 - Despite the lack of traditionally proper credentials, Evans was appointed Acting Principal of IS 201 by the Superintendent of Schools.[169]

- March 26, 1968 - The demonstration districts issue draft constitutions demanding a clear delegation of authority from the Board of Education.[17

- March 27, 1968 - Despite the fact that Charles Wilson lacked the traditionally proper credentials, the Board of Education approved Wilson's appointment as Project Administrator, "overcoming legal obstacles by naming him consultant to the IS 201 Complex . . . prior to this appointment, no professional staff other than consultants had assumed formal responsibility for this project."[171] Up until this time, the Board of Education had not funded the operation of the Demonstration Unit's central office; IS 201 Demonstration Unit had been functioning due to the Ford grant and "two supplementary grants" from Ford.[172] With the approval of Evans and Wilson, the Board of Education relinquished some authority over the school.[173]

- March 28, 1968 - Frey told the Principals of the five schools in the Demonstration Unit in his District, they would now report to the Project Administrator. Wilson objected to this maneuver, since he had no staff; asked for a smoother transition of power.[174]

- End of April 1968 - The Board of Regents went to the New York State Legislature and asked it to pass their March proposal into law. At this time, both Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller announced support of the Regent Plan and urged the legislature to take swift action.[175]

- May - Summer 1968 - The IS 201 Board transferred more personnel than Ocean Hill's controversial "transfers","through informal administrative procedures".[176] As a participant noted, Wilson's political negotiating skills were superior to McCoy's and the UFT concentrated on Ocean Hill because the IS 201 community was judged more cohesive.

[168] op. cit., p. 86, Mayer suggests that Ford flexed its muscles over Ferguson in terms of funding. (op. cit., p. 118.)

[169] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 69.

[170] See Ocean Hill-Brownsville's March 12 and 28, 1968 drafts, Appendices B1 and B2 of the Two Bridges Memorandum Report; and Appendix A of this report for excerpt from the original IS 201 proposal.

[171] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 69.

[172] ibid., p. 87; confidential information.

[173] ibid.

[174] ibid., p. 88.

[175] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, op. cit., p. 75.

[176] Mayer, Martin, "The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The Teachers' Union and the Teachers' Strikes of 1968", The New York Times Magazine, Section 6, p. 23.

- May 14, 1968 - Although Karp said that the New York Legislature agreed to work on a strong decentralization bill,[177] an observer noted that the battle had already been lost.

- May 18, 1968 - The Board of Regents announced that a strong decentralization bill would be passed by the legislature. The bill would create a three-member commission that would have one year to decentralize New York's school system and create nearly autonomous local school boards.[178]

- May 20, 1968 - The UFT lobbied 500 strong against passage of the Board of Regent's bill.[179]

- May 21, 1968 - Governor Rockefeller publicly predicted a strong bill would be passed by the Legislature.[180]

- May 22, 1968 - New York State Legislature, discarding both the Bundy and the Board of Regent's Plan, passed the Marchi Law and, in effect, postponed acting on decentralization for a year. Under this law, the Board of Education is allowing but not required to delegate authority to local boards and the Central Board of Education would be enlarged from 9 to 13 members.[181] The Board was required to submit a decentralization plan for the 1969 legislature.

- Spring 1968 - The Board of Education provided technical assistance to the IS 201 Board on: program planning and the budgetary process; school organization; anticipated budgetary allocations.[182] Community members viewed the assistance as being as much a hindrance as a help. At this time, according to Mayer, the president of IS 201 Parents' Association complained that it was harder to get answers from the IS 201 Board than it had been from the Board of Education.[183]

- July 1968 - Board of Education and the three demonstration boards had reached an impasse over delegation of authority.[184]

- July 30, 1968 - The Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Decentralization (Niemeyer Report) was issued.[185]

- September 4, 1968 - Superintendent Donovan announced he would limit his supervisory and approval functions to the "absolute minimum" in the "spirit of decentralization" and leave to the local superintendent recommendations on personnel, textbooks and other materials.[186]

- September 9 and 13, 1968 - The UFT struck all city schools over the Ocean Hill-Brownsville reinstatement of teachers.

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[177] Karp, as quoted in Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[178] *ibid.*

[179] *ibid.*; a confidential source puts the figure at 900.

[180] *ibid.*

[181] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

[182] Niemeyer Report, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[183] *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[184] Gittell, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[185] See Appendix D of the Two Bridges report for findings and recommendations.

[186] *Guidelines for Decentralization for the Period Ending June 30, 1969*, December, 1968, p. 6.

- October 14, 1968 - The UFT went out on strike for a third time.[187] This time, however, "fewer than 8,000 teachers" voted for the strike.[188]

- November 15, 1968 - The Appellate Division in a 3 to 2 decision upheld the Rinaldi decision which voided the principals named under the category of Demonstration School Principal and held that the appointments were illegal. The Board of Education appealed the decision.[189]

- December 1968 - The Board of Education issued its Guidelines to Decentralization.[190]

- January 1969 - The State Supervisory Committee, which had been established as part of the November 1968 UFT strike settlement, recommended in a hearing ". . . that the Board of Education bring charges against IS 201 Unit Administrator, Charles Wilson, and suspend the Chairman of the local governing board, David Spencer, for harassing the nine teachers." [Who, as members of the UFT, had been barred from PS 39 in late November and early December, following the strike settlement.][191]

- January 15, 1969 - The Court of Appeals voided the Appellate Division decision. The Court of Appeals ruled the special category of Demonstration School Principal correct on all counts and allowed the principals to be reinstated.[192]

- January 29, 1969 - The Board of Education issued a "Plan for the Development of a Community School District System for the City of New York" (as per its mandate under the Marchi Law).

- March 1969 - ". . . the Board of Education voted to administer a 'strong reprimand' to Mr. Spencer . . ." ". . . [it] did not affect Mr. Spencer's status as governing board chairman . . ." "No decision was made on the recommendation that charges be filed against Mr. Wilson."[193]

- April 1969 - The IS 201 board still had not restored the nine UFT teachers to their class assignments.[194]

- May 1, 1969 - The New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law defining the powers and duties of the school system.[195]

- January 1970 - Elections will be held for new community boards in accordance with the May 1, 1969 decentralization law. These may be postponed until March 1970.

[187] Gittell, op. cit., p. 340.

[188] Mayer, op. cit., p. 69.

[189] Gittell, op. cit., p. 340.

[190] See Appendix E of the Two Bridges report for recommendations.

[191] See Levine, op. cit., pp. 117-120, for a detailed account.

[192] Gittell, op. cit., p. 340.

[193] Levine, op. cit., p. 121.

[194] ibid.

[195] New York State Legislature, Senate Act 5693, Assembly Act 7206, "An Act to Amend the Education Law . . .", May 1, 1969.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE IS 201 BOARD HAVE?

Formal

Like the other two demonstration districts, IS 201 presently has little power, as noted in previous sections. The Central Board retains the powers of: personnel hiring and firing (the IS 201 Board hired its temporary Project Administrator, however); choice of curriculum; and financial budgeting (the Central Board pays the Project Administrator's salary, for example). It is this lack of formal power which has been the center of conflict in the demonstration unit.

Informal

IS 201 has had the greatest success in obtaining informal powers of the three demonstration units. They apparently had no difficulty in transferring personnel and they hired non-certified officials (Project Administrator and Principal). We have no information on special curriculum privileges, however, such as are operative in Two Bridges and Ocean Hill.

Decentralization

On April 30, 1969, the New York State Legislature enacted a new decentralization law.[196] This law sets up a specific set of relationships and powers among:[197]

> The City Board: A seven member board consisting of two Mayoral appointees and one elected member from each of the five boroughs. (An interim board will be operative until a city board can be elected.) The board members' terms are for four years. The City Board will devise a plan to divide New York City into 30-33 districts of approximately 20,000 pupils each. It will also establish the size of the decentralized boards. The City Board is the policy-maker. It approves all actions to be taken in the areas of: finance, new buildings, curriculum and personnel. It submits its budget to the mayor and allocates funds to the districts.
>
> The Chancellor of the city districts, whose salary is paid by the City Board and who serves a 2-4 year term. The Chancellor acts as a middleman between the City Board, which pays his salary, and the decentralized boards. Theoretically acting with equal powers with the superintendents, the Chancellor (operating city-wide) is the one who submits material to the City Board for approval. The Chancellor has advisory and jurisdictional powers over the schools and the decentralized boards (with approval from the City Board) including: curriculum; establishment of schools; personnel; finance, and has certain powers which cannot be delegated.
>
> The Decentralized (community) Superintendent, whose functions are analogous to the former centralized superintendent, theoretically has equal powers and duties with the Chancellor; however, he is subject to the decentralized boards, which the Chancellor is not.

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[196] See footnote 192.

[197] This account is an exact duplicate of the account in the Two Bridges memorandum report.

The Decentralized (community) Boards, which will be elected on the 4th Tuesday of January, 1970, appear to have fewer powers than current demonstration boards under this new system. They are still denied absolute powers, and have the further encumberment of a "Chancellor". They have to apply to the City Board for Federal, State, or private funds, which are dispersed through the Chancellor. They have limited powers of transfer and assignment of teachers (subject to City Board approval and contract constraints). The demonstration districts will continue until February of 1970, when new boards will be elected.

The City College of New York, will operate five of the most disadvantaged high schools in New York City under the jurisdiction of the City Board. The diagram on the following page represents our judgement of the actual powers and interactions between all parties.

Figure 1

Powers & Interactions Under the May 1969 Decentralization Legislation


Budget Approval
Board of Estimate & City Council
MAYOR
2 Members (Mayor Appointed)
Members Elected (1 per Borough)
CITY BOARD
Disbursement of funds
Approves all Actions
Paid by Board
Application for Funds 1
CHANCELLOR
Approves all Actions
Theoretically 3
(no apparent actuality)
2
ECENTRALIZED BOARDS
CITY COLLEGE
Subject to Board
SUPERINTENDENT

tes:

If the approval of actions and authorized disbursement are actually channeled via the Chancellor (as the law designates), this channel will operate for ceremonial purposes only.

This link is not known, but an effective Chancellor would not allow it to not exist.

While the law designates the local Superintendent as equal in power to the Chancellor, it is very evident from this diagram that he cannot be if the Decentralized Board undertakes an active role within its noted limitations in note 1 above.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE IS 201 BOARD?

The primary goal of IS 201 is improved education in their schools.

Since over the short term, they realize they will not have an integrated environment (due to Board of Education laxness in this area, as well as inner city housing patterns), they feel they must have control over their children's education and, to have this control, they must be "accountable", have full powers over budget allocation, curriculum, outside funds and consultants and school professionals.

Since, in the short term, control over their children's destiny is a goal with more obvious solutions than improved education, the friction and conflict are centered here, and thus, local control, and its secondary objective, local administration to improve the self-image of children, become symbolic goals. Thus Evans can say "we're not just concerned with the educational process, but also with the larger image we're projecting into the community. We are proving that we can accumulate enough Black talent to run the school well."[198]

Preston Wilcox stated it as follows: "Residents of the Ghetto must seize the opportunity to assume a leadership role in the education of their own children, just as they must become involved in the direction of all programs set up to serve their needs . . . 'A community presence'[must] be established at a high level of educational administration, and . . . an instrumentality [must] be developed which would assure minority group parents of direct access to the channels of informed opinion and power."[199]

But, apparently unique to IS 201 of the three demonstration units, the IS 201 Board also looks to a broader range of community service than education. It wants the school to be open long hours each day, providing evening and weekend programs for adults as well as children; it desires commitment to other areas of concern such as welfare, public safety, housing, and so on; and it wants children to engage in "meaningful and effective" community projects outside the school. Likewise, it seeks to have other organizations involved in the schools.[200]

We have no specific evidence that reading score improvement is their short-term goal, as we do in the other two demonstration units, for Yeshiva's programs appear to have been dropped, for the most part, in subsequent proposals, and none of our sources have discussed curriculum goals. Yet the schools are attempting to introduce reading instruction into all subjects taught; remedial reading courses have been instituted; and one of the ideas contained in their proposals has been the publishing of student reading and mathematical scores. So, presumably, IS 201 follows the Two Bridges and Ocean Hill pattern of a short-term goal in this respect.

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[198] Stern, Michael, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to Good Start", op. cit.,, Minter (op. cit., p. 18) suggests that for some, a goal of Black supremacy and separatism also exists.

[199] Wilcox, op. cit., p. 13.

[200] ibid., p. 14.

VI. IS THE IS 201 BOARD REPRESENTATIVE?

The 21 member IS 201 Board, chaired by David Spencer, represents parents, (two from each school or 10), teachers (one from each school, or five), five community representatives and one supervisor,[201] and thus is the most broadly representative of the three demonstration units (the other two of which could not maintain teacher representatives).

The number of individuals that commited themselves to the IS 201 effort in its planning stage also bespeaks a broad representation, particularly when a participant stated that the Board refused to allow them lists of parents and teachers (the superintendent finally sent a clerk to address envelopes and send out the information, so that the public would be informed without giving over the lists); then they were forced to hire parents to go from door to door to explain the project concept and collect names and addresses; and resorted to posters, sound trucks and local meetings. Planning board meetings were advertised. Communication with teachers was delayed until school began. However, IS 201 is still accused by some as being nonrepresentative. Some appeared disturbed that of the original 40-50 parents in the planning stages, only one was on the IS 201 Board (in other demonstration units the complaint has been that "the same people" are always involved in the planning and operating stages); two schools (who never accepted the proposal) complained of nomination and election procedures; others complained that they were uninformed about the election; still others complained that parents were unhappy about the IS 201 Board activities but were reluctant to speack out because of fears about the "small militant group" which had taken over.[202]

There is certain evidence to this effect. 45% of 200 IS 201 parents surveyed were gegative toward the IS 201 Board.[203]

Yet, response by teachers during the strike was the best of the three demonstration units, despite problems in teacher-community relations over both the Black principal issues and using a temporary school.

[201] New York Times, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to Good Start", op. cit.; see also Minter draft, op.cit., p. 5

[202] See Kemble, op. cit.

[203] Niemeyer Report, op. cit., p. 122.

VII. WHAT HAS THE IS 201 BOARD ACCOMPLISHED?

Our information is scanty here. This may be due to limited accomplishments, or it may be due to the fact that research attention has been focused on the early conflicts of the Board.

Evans himself indicated that while the 1967 - 1968 school year was a time of dissension, disruption, and discipline problems, community efforts stabilized the school, relaxed the children, and communicated to parents that something was happening in their schools.[204]

They have set up a program to meet the special needs of Black and Puerto Rican children who have grown up in a neighborhood characterized by poverty, transiency, slum housing, broken families, poor health, and epidemic drug addiction.

The teachers of all subjects are being trained to incorporate reading instruction in their classes.

Attempts have been made to eliminate obvious class rankings to prevent children from viewing their capabilities negatively (but these attempts have been relatively unsuccessful so far).

Like the other two demonstration units, Gittell claims the greatest accomplishment is parent participation in terms of greater voter turnout, greater attendance at school meetings, and more direct participation of the lower class groups in school affairs.[205]

Finally, as with the other New York Demonstrations, IS 201 has employed non-educators as professionals in the district. For example, the Chief Education Officer in IS 201 is a public administrator.[206]

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[204] Stern, Michael, "Once Torn IS 201 Off to Good Start", op. cit.

[205] op. cit., p. 332.

[206] Fantini, op. cit., p. 104.

VIII. IS THE IS 201 BOARD'S POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

There is evidence in the readings that early planning meetings were open to the public, that great efforts were made, by paying canvassers, to arouse public particpation, and that the community was informed as to events taking place (open meetings each evening by the Negotiating Committee, while they met with Donovan, for example), despite some protests to the contrary.

Yet, we have little information as to how the IS 201 Board operated when it became a formal entity. The president of the IS 201 PA complained it was more difficult to get answers from the IS 201 Board than it was from the Board of Education;[207] other than that, public sources have no information. Observers have claimed and participants have indicated that a small inner group of members are the only ones consistently attending the meetings, thus acting with greater influence than their proportionate number on the twenty-one member board would indicate. Furthermore, many of the sessions were closed to the public for fear of "forewarning" the central board or the UFT with regard to internal divisions among members about, or basic strategy to be employed in, an important issue on which the IS 201 Board expected to receive serious opposition. As one person noted: "You never knew who was a Shanker or Donovan man." It must be remembered that the preceding took place in the midst of frequent confrontations. Now that the confrontations have subsided, the meetings may again be masked by the openness for which they were noted.

[207] Mayer, op. cit., p. 112.

APPENDIX A

EXCERPTS FROM THE ORIGINAL IS 201 PROPOSAL

The civil rights movement and the nation's anti-poverty efforts have focused attention upon the ghetto school. The children who attend these schools are several years behind middle class children in academic achievement. These children will tend not to obtain the education and skills necessary to advance themselves economically. They will be forced to take whatever semi-skilled and unskilled work is available. Many will be on welfare rolls. Barring some major changes in the educational system, their children will attend similar schools, be behind in academic achievement, and eventually obtain the less desirable types of jobs and live in impoverished areas of the city where social pathology indices such as crime, infant mortality, and deteriorated housing are the highest.

Teachers are at one with the parents of the city's school children in their concern with lack of achievement and reading retardation in the schools. ✓ As long as those who are closest to the needs of the children---their parents and their teachers---are left out of the decision-making in the educational process, the schools cannot succeed.

Given present problems, the school system cannot continue as an autonomous bureaucracy. Parents and community leaders must fulfill their right to exercise influence in educational policy. This alone, however, will not suffice to cure the system's ills. The role of the teacher must also change. At present he has no freedom in his work. He is restrained by a hierarchy, rising above him in increasing influence and decreasing understanding of classroom problems. In order to work to the full capacity of his training and ability, the teacher must be permitted to exercise the rights which his professionalism entails: He must be allowed to take responsibility for exercising independent action and making expert judgement while performing his work.

Teachers, like parents and the community, play an essential and irreplaceable role in the learning life of each child. The schools should be the mutual responsibility of these groups---a responsibility to be shared equally. Without this equal sharing of responsibility there can be no true accountability for learning progress.

I Therefore, we believe that teachers and community people should compose the proposed governing board for an intermediate school and its three feeder schools. The board would consist of eight parents (two from each school), four community leaders, four teachers (one from each school), one school supervisor or administrator. Any decision reached by the governing board would require approval of both a majority of the parents and community leaders and a majority of the school professionals on the governing board.

Such a governing board, once established, would undergo a training period to enable its members to carry out their duties to optimum capacity. Local people serving on the board would be remunerated; teachers serving on the board would have their teaching load reduced. The board would employ a university and/or other experts to provide consultation and services, but would maintain for itself the following responsibilities:

Source: Gottesfeld and Gordon, "Academic Excellence . . .", op. cit., pp. 2-9.

A. Selection of the administrator of the program. This should be a full-time paid position, filled by a person with appropriate experience and ability. Guidelines for selection can be worked out by the governing board.

B. The setting of educational goals and standards within the schools. This would be done with university or other established expert consultation and aid.

C. Recruitment and selection of staff for the schools involved would be carried out by the governing board with the following provisions holding:

1. All teachers are licensed through an approved, objective method which does not lower standards.

2. There will be no involuntary assignments to these schools.

3. Teachers presently with the schools may remain if they wish to.

4. Further recruitment takes the form of soliciting applications from experienced teachers who are volunteering with the understanding that they may leave after one year of service if they so desire. This procedure has worked successfully in M. E. S. Schools. Brand new teachers, if they accept assignment here, also have that option.

5. The rights of teachers to security and permanance in their jobs must also be insured if the quality of the teaching staff is to be maintained. The governing board, however, must establish for itself a procedure through which unfit and/or unsatisfactory professional personnel may be removed. For this function, the board should employ or appoint an independent, expert group or committee whose job it is to provide on-going evaluation of the total school program, including personnel performance. Should this committee, after exploring all possible reasons for a given failure or lapse in the learning process and after assuring that all steps in regard to on-the-job training and supervisory support have been taken, find it necessary to terminate the services of a professional, it shall have the right to seek such termination. Reasons for termination must be sound and serious, objective, substantiated, and subject to impartial review with provision for teacher defense. A procedure insuring the juridical rights of employees can be worked out between the union and the governing board, with the understanding that the union will maintain its role as defense counsel.

6. Applications solicited from teachers should be worked out on the basis of objective criteria such as, but not limited to:

   a. License held
   b. Previous service rating
   c. Years of experience
   d. Special training; courses or degrees
   e. Successful participation in any special educational program, etc
   f. Other experience which may have bearing, such as participation or activity in civil rights groups, anti-poverty groups, Peace Corps or releted similar experience indicating the applicant is aware or predisposed to developing an awareness of the problems and aspirations of the community.

7. The governing board shall have the right to review the anonymous applications in order to insure that those teachers who most clearly meet the criteria be assigned first and that no teacher with an objectionable record be retained. Prospective candidates will have an opportunity to meet with community people. The administrator shall have the right to interview prospective cnadidates.

8. The principal in each school shall be selected by the teachers, parents and administrators. Nominees for the position must meet certain objective standards, such as; 6 course credits in supervision, a minimum number of years of teaching, etc., to be worked out by the governing board in consultation with experts. Final selection will be subject to approval of the governing board.

D. The board shall have the right to determine curricula changes with regard to content and direction of the curriculum. The implementation and detailed substance of the curriculum shall be determined by a committee of teachers and the principal in each school. Such a committee should have adequate time to meet.

E. The board shall contract for the services of an accredited, independent evaluative agency.

F. The board shall review the university's services and terminate any or all that are found to be unsatisfactory.

G. The board shall determine policy toward public and private agencies.

H. Maintenance of fiscal control shall mean the governing board's employment of accountants, auditors and other experts for the carrying out of monetary duties and the right of the governing board to determine the allocation of funds in consultation with educational experts and the Teacher Curriculum Committees on each grade.

II Implementation of an expanded More Effective Schools program in the feeder elementary school.* We believe that the main features of the MES program such as smaller classes, better equipment, team teaching are sound and are attractive to students, parents and teachers. Despite deficiencies, MES schools are emerging as generally more successful than other ghetto schools. We further propose that the addition of the following programs would greatly strengthen the MES program.**

A. Learning Center

1. Elementary Schools.
Almost one third of ghetto children fail to read adequately. Different children fail to read for different reasons. Although many educators give lip service to this point, they fail to offer a differential remedial approach which recognizes these differences in etiology. The ghetto schools document our failure to bridge the gap between learning theory and educational practice.

Visual and auditory skills seem not as well developed among ghetto children as among middle-class children, some 90% of whom learn to read, regardless of the method employed to teach them. Our view is that ghetto children need remediation at the very beginning of their schooling. We should devise methods of categorizing children according to their specific needs---some will need visual motor training, some phonics instruction, etc.

For children who do not respond to the special training in class, and for those who are in the upper grades and have still not acquired functional reading skills, a Learning Center will be established. This will be staffed by a remedial educator who is skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of reading problems. He will have available several methods of instruction, including programmed learning, and such equipment as the O. K. Moore computerized typewriter.

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* cf. "Report of the Joint Planning Committee for More Effective Schools," New York City Public Schools (May15, 1964).

** We are detailing only the programs which should receive top priority. Other changes are now being discussed by MES planning committees. Additional innovation have been proposed by us, such as New Models for School Psychology and Guidance Services, as well as Physical Education Programs, Pre-Service Training of Teachers and Curriculum Development. These are detailed in our report entitled, "Academic Excellence in a Ghetto Elementary School: An Approach to Prevention of Learning Disabilities."

The Learning Center would be affiliated with a Learning Laboratory now being developed at Yeshiva University. The Laboratory is being developed with the following goals in mind:

a. to discover why children with normal intelligence have learning problems.

b. to identify methods and/or teaching "styles" which can be most beneficial for children with reading difficulties.

c. to improve the diagnostic and evaluative skills of professionals with particular reference to selecting the most appropriate method or methods, and/or teaching styles for a specific learning problem.

d. to contribute in a similar way as described above to the understanding and correction of learning disabilities of exceptional children.

e. to develop a related program with special emphasis on math skills.

f. central to all our programs will be our efforts to bridge the ever-widening gap between learning theory and educational practice. We will, therefore, be concerned with the problem of articulation between the Learning Laboratory at Yeshiva University, the Learning Center at the school, and the Classroom Teacher.

School children are routinely examined in New York City schools, often superficially and by general acknowledgement with less than minimal adequacy in areas such as dental health and vision. We are becoming increasingly aware of the role of vision in relation to reading. We know that low achievers will usually show 20/20 visual acuity. This, however, only tells us that the child can see clearly. It gives no indication of how he processes information for meaning. There are numerous perceptual factors that are clearly related to learning.

We will make available in our Demonstration School complete (health, medical, dental, and vision, etc.) examinations. This will be carefully supervised and coordinated by established services, including the Optometric Center of New York (which specializes in the relationship of perception to learning problems).

In offering complete health services, as well as remediation, we are able to study the health needs of children who live in a poor urban ghetto and begin to make some judgements about the relationship of learning to health problems.

Intermediate School Literacy Program.
A shockingly high percentage of students who reach ghetto intermediate schools are illiterate. If millions of adults in developing countries can be taught to read and write, there is no reason why this cannot be done for American adolescents. A remedial educator using diagnostic skills and modern teaching methods such as programmed instruction, teaching machines, including the computerized typewriter, should be able to teach reading in an intensive two to three-month course. Some children who have not learned to read are so angry that they equate learning from a teacher with the destruction of their own personalities. They often can learn through teaching machines where they are in control of the learning

apparatus.

Eventually the intermediate school literacy program would be eliminated. A successful Learning Center in the elementary grades would make all children literate before they reach the intermediate school.

All learning activities at both the Elementary Schools and the Intermedi School would take place during the school day.

B. School-Community Involvement

Although it is said that there is a need for cooperation of parents and peo of the community with teachers, in many ghetto areas these groups know litt of each other. Prejudices of one toward the other stand uncorrected. It i proposed that in the intermediate school and its feeder schools, vigorous efforts will be made to remedy this situation. Specifically:

1. The governing board involves parents and teachers in decision making fo the schools. This involves parents and teachers learning each other's views and working together.

2. A group of Community-School Workers, selected by parents, will be hired These workers will be local people from the community; a ratio of one community-school worker for each grade is suggested. These workers will first be trained at Yeshiva University through a course in which there will be workshops and lectures led by faculty and community leade in community organization, community resources, group dynamics, school administration, child development and learning, and the More Effective Schools program. After receiving this training, the work of the commun school worker would be to interpret the policies, procedures and progra of the school to parents and other community members and to interpret the views of parents and the community to teachers and school administr Community-school workers will be responsible to the governing board. Specifically, the community-school workers will:

    a. make class visitations, home visitations, speak to teachers;

    b. help to organize or strengthen education committees of community organizations;

    c. keep parents informed of school events and programs, arrange vis to the school and lead parent discussions on school programs;

    d. serve as consultants to the governing board, school administrato and teachers, educational specialists and research personnel; an

    e. follow up complaints.

3. Teachers would make regular visits to parents' homes and local communit organizations. This would serve to give teachers first-hand informatio about the child's environment and resources of the community and help parents learn about the teachers. The MES program with its provisions for more teachers and other personnel would make possible the time for teachers to make such visits.

4. The school would be used as a center for holding community events.

5. Regular open invitations would be extended to parents to visit the school. Parents would speak to their child's teacher, see the various school programs in operation, have the opportunity to meet other parents, and later, under the leadership of the Community-School Worker, to discuss their visit to the school and make known their opinion of what is happening at the school.

C. Enhancement of the Student's Self-Image.

If the plan is successful---if ghetto school children are able to achieve at grade expectancy and the school is perceived positively by parents, teachers, and the community---the child will have pride in his school accomplishments and in his school. This will contribute toward improving the child's self-picture. However, important additional measures aimed at helping to repair the damage of discrimination and impoverishment are proposed:

1. Pride in one's ethnic background.
   Courses and school events relating to African and Latin culture and history would be organized. An after-school program developed in cooperation with parents and community would reflect the culture of local ethnic groups. Programs might include such things as "A Festival of Latin American Films," or "An Afro-American Festival of Music and Literature." The schools would attempt to build ties to new African countries by the study of African languages and overseas correspondence with African students. Schools which have significant percentages of Black and White children (as well as Puerto Rican children) would include Spanish instruction as a second language, beginning in kindergarten.

2. Student government.
   At every grade level, students would hold regular meetings, elect officers and representatives, make decisions regarding themselves, and present to the governing board criticisms of school procedures and suggestions for improvement. The governing board would listen to the arguments of student representatives and then rule on them. The entire proceedings and the implementation of favorable rulings would be reported in the school newspaper with accompanying editorials by students. By actively contributing to decisions made about the school the student is not in the powerless role of his schooling entirely in the control of his parents and other local people, teachers, and school administrators.

3. Programs for the talented.
   By "talented," we are referring to a wide range of assets and strengths which include science, art, drama, music, sports, as well as leadership ability, sensitivity to feelings of others, inventive impulses, etc. We are currently developing an approach to seeking out the assets and strengths of school children which does not depend on apparent or obvious talent.

D. Teacher Training Program.

Teacher training has not been implemented in the More Effective Schools. Proposed are the following:

1. In-service training for all teachers.

2. Orientation of teachers and school administrators by local community leaders.

3. A course for all administrators, teachers, and parents oriented to problem-solving in the ghetto school. Each of these groups from their different vantage points will have unique contributions to make in recognizing and solving the problems of the ghetto school.

4. The Board of Education pays for one course for teachers. This course should not be hit-or-miss among any of the assorted courses offered in education, but rather a specific one geared to the problems in the ghetto schools. For example, Yeshiva University's Graduate School offers a course involving lectures and discussions about ghetto children, the significance of discrimination and poverty and the implications for guidance, curriculum, etc.

5. A Teacher Trainer, one to each school, would be available full time in the school to guide new teachers and conduct on-the-job training for them. New teachers would not be plunged into full time teaching assignments but would spend most of the first year in assisting and learning from more experienced teachers and in further formalized service training.

6. Training for sub-professionals by the university and community people.

7. The Information Retrieval Center on the Disadvantaged, at Yeshiva University, would make available to all local people and teachers of the schools its extensive resources.

We believe that the above programs will result in superior education in the ghetto school.

Many educators, officials and citizens believe that quality education means only integrated education. While quality integrated education is certainly the most desirable state of affairs (and efforts to achieve it would be pursued vigorously) the reality is that integration in New York City in recent years has proceeded at a snails pace.

We cannot abdicate our role as educators in ghetto schools and wait patiently for integration before improving the quality of the schools. In fact, improving the schools may make the possibility of integration appear more attractive, and when integration of Whites, Blacks, and Puerto Ricans does come to the schools the social integration will be facilitated by the fact that Black, White, and Puerto Rican students have comparable educational achievements.

Teachers and community groups must unite to set forth the conditions necessary for a good school and the administrators of the school must be accountable to them to insure quality education.

H. THE WOODLAWN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

I. INTRODUCTION

District 14 of the Chicago public schools encompasses the University of Chicago campus and the neighborhoods of South Kenwood, Hyde Park, and East Woodlawn. Although the entire district is involved in various forms of experimentation, the East Woodlawn section is the neighborhood of the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project, including the Woodlawn Community Board (WCB),[1] which is the subject of this memorandum.

Located in a Model Cities Target Area,[2] East Woodlawn is a 473-acre area of high density population which is rapidly changing from white to non-white. According to the 1960 census 26.7% of the housing units contain over 1.01 persons per room; its 60,000 residents live in 22,447 housing units. The population under age 19 doubled between 1950 and 1960, and the non-white proportion of the total population increased from 13.4% to 86.2% in the same ten year span. The area is further defined as transitional, serving many ethnic groups on their way to middle class status. It is said to be among the 10 worst (of 76) communities in Chicago in terms of income, housing conditions, unemployment, and incidence of disease.[3]

The drastic change in population, including the startling numbers of youth, have meant problems of near-crisis proportions for East Woodlawn: student gangs are a threat; schools have a high drop-out rate; and facilities such as the Boys Club and the YMCA do not attract youth in large numbers. Moreover, the neighborhood faces problems in the areas of employment, education, and law enforcement. Despite efforts of the well-organized Woodlawn Organization (see Section II below), resources in the community are inadequate to deal effectively with these problems.[4]

The East Woodlawn schools have certain drawbacks as well. Books are irrelevant to the needs of an inner-city child or are outdated; supplies are scanty; libraries are either non-existent or combined with lunchrooms as all-purpose rooms; gyms and playgrounds are either missing, cramped, or ill-equipped; and space is generally lacking for programs in art, music, science, shop, and guidance.[5]

The specific schools chosen under the guidance of WCB are: Wadsworth K-6; Wadsworth Upper Grade Center, and the Hyde Park High School.[6] There are, however, 10 schools in the district: 1 primary; 6 kindergarten through six, 2 seven through eight; and 1 high school.[7]

[1] Campbell, Roald F., Institutional Collaboration to Improve Urban Public Education with Special Reference to the City of Chicago, proposal to USOE, October 12, 1966, p. 1.

[2] Redmond, James F., Operation Grant, Woodlawn Experimental Elementary Schools Project, proposal to USOE for Title III funding, January, 1968, frontice piece. (Hereafter referenced as Redmond, Title III Proposal.)

[3] Redmond, Title III Proposal, p. 6; Campbell, op. cit., Appendix D, p. 1.

[4] Campbell, op. cit., p. 7; Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 9.

[5] Congreve, Willard F., Institutional Collaboration to Improve Urban Public Education with Special Reference to the City of Chicago, Final Report to USOE, March 15, 1968, p. 20.

[6] Woodlawn Community Board Study, an undated, (Fall 1968) unpublished draft document provided by Thomas Williams (hereafter referenced as WCB Study)

[7] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 22.

II. WHAT MAJOR GROUPS ARE INVOLVED? HOW DO THEY INTERACT?

a. Parents

Perhaps due to the strength of the officers and Steering Committee of the Woodlawn Organization (see below), parents do not appear to be a strong force in and of themselves. Some are said to be apathetic; others are said to be hostile.[8] There is some evidence that parents are now beginning to take an interest in the project and demand a greater role.

b. Teachers

Teachers originally were not highly involved in the project. The School Department contingent of the Troika (as will be seen in succeeding sections) has been dominated by the principals; only fairly recently (within the last 18 months) have teachers become more vocal and begun to demand a role in the process. According to the document supplied by Williams, "Teachers in the Wadsworth schools have been unhappy and concerned about the project. They have complained that they have been left out of meaningful planning and that they have been hearing promises for five months but do not yet know what is going to happen."[9] Sometime in 1968, provision was made for teacher representatives to attend WCB meetings as *observers* and to participate in planning sessions but problems apparently still remain with the Hyde Park personnel.[10] The Teachers Union does not appear to have been particularly involved in a manner similar to its counterparts in New York or Washington.[11]

c. Students

Although the students in the area do not appear to have been active during the initiation or early operations of WCB, a *Black Coalition of College and High School Students*, a subcommittee of UC/BSA-SPLIBS, has apparently been making itself heard in 1969 in its fight to remove the University of Chicago from the WCB.[12]

d. The Chicago Public Schools

One of the three contingents represented on the WCB and heavily supportive of the project, the Chicago Public Schools collaboration efforts have been among the strongest, if not the strongest (Anacostia's Public Schools in Washington, D.C., have also been cooperative), of the experimental efforts.

Nonetheless, these are holdovers from past defenses against both community pressures and University of Chicago research. Dr. Melnick, the contingent's Chairman, is said to have the least influence over his contingent (which is the most discontented). School personnel have been characterized as defensive and suspicious of the project, fearing the University was selling them out, and having charged the project staff with "moving too fast in the planning."[13]

According to the Memorandum of Agreement between the three contingents, the Chicago Public Schools are primarily interested in upgrading programs by applying continual inputs from research and experience, by improving the training of personnel, and by involving the community "directly" in planning improvements.[14]

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[8] Congreve, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

[9] *op.cit.*, p. 15.

[10] *ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

[11] *ibid.*, p. 33.

[12] See Appendix A of this document for a memorandum written by this group.

[13] WCB Study, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 18, 21, 23.

[14] See Appendix B of this document for the Memorandum of Agreement.

e. The Chicago Board of Education

Little mention is made of the Board of Education, except its role in the Memorandum of Agreement, when its legal counsel stipulated that the Board's hands must not be tied. The Board appears to have played a cooperative role to date, wit minor interference in the functioning of the WCB.

f. The Mayor's Office

The Mayor has apparently shown antagonism toward the project and was said to have put pressure on Federal officials to thwart Title III funding. Apparently ill feelings had earlier been aroused by The Woodlawn Organization which had secured funding without going through the "proper" channels. The Mayor is credited with putting pressures on the General Superintendent to include the Urban Progress Cente (UPC), "...the poverty agency controlled by the city machine to a great extent." Accordingly, two members from UPC were to have been put on the WCB (although we have no indication that they were).[15]

g. The Federal Government

The influence of the Federal Government has been substantial. Chicago appear to be the most heavily funded of the various experimental projects, relying heavily on USOE, in particular, but also OEO, for financial support. Therefore, the projec has largely been shaped by what these agencies will and won't support.[16]

h. The University of Chicago

The University apparently was the originator of the Woodlawn Project and apparently had been involved in the area's schools prior to that time. The University continues to be highly involved in a variety of ways: As one of the three contingents on the WCB; through the Woodlawn Community Education Center, and their funding of an Upward Bound Project; and through their training center for personnel.

The University contingent of the WCB, under the chairmanship of Dean Campbell, has been very active in the Woodlawn Project. Several of the Project Staff had University origins. The University, in the Memorandum of Agreement, indicated it was primarily interested in research and training; it sees its role, apparently, as mediatory.[17]

The President's Committee on Urban Education was formed at the University in 1965. The University contingent of the WCB is apparently a derivative of that group

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[15] WCB Study, op.cit., pp. 15, 30.

[16] ibid., p. 30.

[17] WCB Study, op.cit., pp. 20, 21; Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 1.

[18] WCB Study, op.cit., pp. 7, 8.

Beginning September, 1969, the University was financed for a 5-year cooperative training program for pre-service, in service, and doctoral personnel, primarily from the Chicago Public Schools.[19]

i. The Woodlawn Organization (TWO)

"... an indigenous federation of community churches, associations, block clubs, etc....", TWO was formed in 1960 to resist the University of Chicago's Urban Renewal and campus extension plans.[20] Credited with being "... one of the strongest community organizations in the nation," apparently it was founded primarily through the efforts of Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation,[21] a strong, militant community organization. "Early in its history" it appointed a Schools Committee to seek to influence change in the public schools. It has also sponsored a preschool educational program.[22]

One of the three contingents on the WCB, TWO indicated, in the Memorandum of Agreement, that its primary interest was in building leadership for the redevelopment of the community, as well as in changing educational programs and resource allocations to serve the community needs.[23] The chairman of TWO's contingent on the WCB, Reverend Brazier, has been characterized as a charismatic leader, well respected on the WCB, who helps resolve problems while remaining a watchdog over TWO's interests.[24]

j. Other Organizations

The Woodlawn Mental Health Center, a "service facility and field laboratory in social and community psychiatry", is located on the South Side of Chicago. The Center works with the community to assess mental health needs and resources, and to come up with priorities. It has collaborated with a Community Advisory Board of 20-25 people from the neighborhood. The Center has conducted several studies of the Woodlawn neighborhood and school children.[25]

The First Presbyterian Church has been cited as a significant community resource. It apparently has made some pioneering efforts in working with youth gangs and young children excluded from public schools. It also sponsors a pre-school educational program.[26]

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[19] Redmond, James F., Memorandum # 68-744-2 to the Board of Education, September 25, 1968, p. 1.

[20] WCB Study, op.cit., p. 3.

[21] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op.cit., p. 9. Congreve, op.cit., p. vi.

[22] Congreve, op.cit., p. iv; Redmond, Title III Proposal, op.cit., p. 11.

[23] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op.cit., Appendix B, p. 1.

[24] WCB Study, op.cit., pp. 18, 19.

[25] Campbell, op.cit., Appendix D, pp. 1-4.

[26] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op.cit., pp. 9, 11.

Mention was made of an attempt to link up the WCB with the Chicago State College, a 5,000 student college which feeds many of the public schools, to develop experimental teacher education programs, where students would be involved in the classrooms during all four of their undergraduate years.[27] However, no further mention was been made of an actual program in operation.

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[27] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op.cit., p. 48.

III. HOW DID THE PROJECT COME ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THEN?

- Spring 1965 - The President's Committee on Urban Education was formed at the University of Chicago.[28]

- Summer 1965 - The University of Chicago and the Chicago Public Schools developed a Special Summer School for secondary school boys, under the sponsorship of the Stern Family Fund.[29]

- Summer and Autumn 1965 - A proposal was developed by the Committee on Urban Education for the creation of a Research and Development Center in Urban Education (USOE #6-1478).[30]

- April and May, 1966 - University of Chicago President Beadle and Dean Campbell, of the Graduate School of Education, met with Chicago Superintendent Willis to discuss the proposal. Later, Dean Campbell discussed the proposal with Frank Whiston, President, Board of Education, as well as others in the Chicago Public Schools.[31]

- May 4, 1966 - USOE made a site visit to the University of Chicago campus. Mrs. Louis A. Malis, a member of the Board of Education, participated in this site visit.[32]

- May 16, 1966 - Reverend Brazier, head of TWO, heard of the impending proposal, and wrote to Campbell, with a copy to USOE, indicating his distress that there was no involvement of the community in the project.[33]

- May 25, 1966 - Discussions were held among TWO, the University of Chicago, and the Chicago Public Schools; they continued on the twenty-seventh.[34]

- June 3, 1966 - USOE submitted its site visit report conditionally approving the proposal, but holding off funding until fiscal 1967 criticizing the lack of community and Chicago public schools involvement and the lack of rationale for the experimental school being part of the Research and Development Center in Urban Education.[35]

- June 7, 1966 - The beginning of a series of meetings among the three groups (called the Planning Committee); the University of Chicago, TWO, and the Chicago Public Schools (also the 9th, 10th, 26th, and 27th), which resulted in a proposal for a Woodlawn Community Board. (WCB)[36]

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[28] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 7.
[29] Congreve, op. cit., p. iv.
[30] Campbell, op. cit., p. 2.
[31] ibid., pp. 2, 3; plus a later telephone interview with Dean Campbell.
[32] ibid.; Congreve, op. cit., p. 3.
[33] Congreve, op. cit., p. 3; WCB Study, op. cit., pp. 7, 8.
[34] Campbell, op. cit., p. 3.
[35] ibid., p. 2; Congreve, op. cit., p. 4.
[36] Campbell, op. cit., p. 3.

- June 26, 1966 - Dr. Curtis Melnick, then Superintendent of District 14, joined the Planning Committee; it was he who suggested the name of WCB.
- June 30, 1966 - Campbell met with Superintendent-Elect James F. Redmond to discuss plans emerging from the Planning Committee.[38]
- July 21-22, 1966 - The University of Chicago held a Conference on Problems of Urban Education.[39]
- August 1, 1966 - A proposal for the development of an Early Education Research Center on the University of Chicago Campus was submitted to USOE.[40]
- August 9, 1966 - USOE and OEO conducted a site visit to the University of Chicago Campus about the Early Education Research Center.[41]
- August 24, 1966 - The first WCB meeting was held. Seven representativ each from TWO and the University of Chicago were appointed (Chicago Public Schools representatives were not named due to vacations.)[42]
- September 13, 1966 - A meeting between the University of Chicago and USOE took place. USOE suggested that the WCB initiate a developmental project to analyze possible relations among the three groups.[43]
- September 28, 1966 - The second WCB meeting took place; each member received a copy of the proposal draft for a USOE Development Grant. The Chicago Public Schools contingent had appointed its seven representatives to the WCB.[44]
- October 2, 1966 - At a WCB meeting a Project Staff was commissioned to work out the details of the Program Statement.[45]
- October 12, 1966 - The USOE Development Grant proposal entitled "Institutional Collaboration to Improve Urban Public Education with Special Reference to the City of Chicago" was submitted, requesting $96,440 in funds for the period November 1, 1966 through October 31, 1967.[46]

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[37] Congreve, _op. cit._, p. 6; WCB Study, _op. cit._, p. 8.

[38] Campbell, _op. cit._, p. 3.

[39] _ibid._, p. 4.

[40] _ibid._

[41] _ibid._

[42] _ibid._, p. 3; Memorandum from Bruce McPherson to WCB members, August 17, 1966,

[43] Memorandum from Bruce McPherson to WCB members, September 21, 1966, p. 1; WCB Study, _op. cit._, p. 9.

[44] Memorandum by Bruce McPherson to WCB members, October 20, 1966, p. 1; Campbell _op. cit._, p. 3; WCB Study, _op. cit._, p. 8.

[45] WCB Study, _op. cit._, p. 11.

[46] Congreve, _op. cit._, p. 8; McPherson's memorandum of October 20, _op. cit._, p. 1 gives October 13 as the date.

- November 22, 1966 - USOE rejected the Development Grant proposal, despite its attempts to overcome previous USOE criticisms. Apparently the proposal had previously been submitted to Redmond, General Superintendent of Chicago Public Schools, who had indicated support but stated he could not finance the project. Campbell wrote letters to HEW Secretary Gardner and Commissioner of Education Howe asking for a review of the proposal.[47]

- January 1967 - USOE awarded a $70,000 Title IV Grant running from February 1967 through December 31, 1967.[48]

- February 17, 1967 - The USOE contract began. A core Project Staff of director and associate directors was formed.[49]

- March 1, 1967 - Congreve was appointed Project Director. Some personnel were opposed to this move, feeling he was neither Black nor Black oriented.[50]

- Late Spring 1967 - A Grant was received from the Wiebolt Foundation to examine the feasibility in producing a cinema verite film; subsequently, a proposal was prepared and distributed in an attempt to secure funds to produce such a film.[51]

- April 15, 1967 - The Project Staff began an assessment of the needs of the Woodlawn Community. The two-month study, completed June 15, 1967, uncovered feelings of inadequate interpersonal relations involving teachers, administrators, children, and parents. Parents and teachers felt by-passed in the decision-making process; children were not achieving what school personnel expected of them either in terms of speed or quantity. Specific needs were in terms of space, materials, etc. (as listed in the Introduction above). Discipline and youth gangs were also seen as a threat.[52]

- May 3, 1967 - The final version of WCB's General Statement of Purposes and Procedures was adopted.[53]

- June 7, 1967 - A preliminary report of an assessment of findings was presented to WCB.[54]

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[47] Congreve, op. cit., p. 8; WCB Study, op. cit., p. 9.

[48] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., pp. 11, 45; WCB Study, op. cit., p. 9.

[49] Congreve, op. cit., p. 11; Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 47.

[50] Memorandum from McPherson to WCB members, February 22, 1967, p. 1; WCB Study, op. cit., p. 22.

[51] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., pp. 73, 74.

[52] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 11; Congreve, op. cit., pp. 23, 24.

[53] Congreve, op. cit., p. 15. However, see Appendix C of this memorandum report, dated December 27, 1967.

[54] Congreve, op. cit.

- October 1967 - Redmond became Superintendent of Schools.[55]

- October 3, 1967 - The Memorandum of Agreement was drawn up among the three groups.[56]

- November 1, 1967 - Some teacher aide positions were created.[57]

- November 3, 1967 - The Memorandum of Agreement was reviewed and a proposal was submitted, entitled, "Experimental Schools in East Woodlawn: A Proposal".[58]

- November 14, 1967 - Central Staff was given the Memorandum of Agreement, which it reviewed until November 28.[59]

- November, 1967 - Contact was reportedly re-established with Redmond; Redmond espressed a strong wish to be kept informed.[60]

- December 13, 1967 - The Memorandum of Agreement was presented to the Board of Education, whose legal counsel deferred it, citing Illinois Code incompatibilities. Because of urgency occasioned by the USOE early January deadline, a week of negotiations with the School Board began. The Board lawyers objected to the Board of Education sharing or abdicating decision-making prerogatives.[61]

- Mid-December 1967 - A number of instances of crime, including shootings, took place prior to the December 27 meeting of the Chicago Board. As the instances were ascribed to gangs, and TWO had established affiliations with gangs through their own youth program, members of the Chicago Board questioned the appropriateness of entering into an agreement with TWO. However, the appropriateness of TWO was supported by both Campbell and Redmond on this issue.[62]

- December 27, 1967 - At a Board of Education meeting the Memorandum of Agreement was approved, 8 to 3.[63]

[55] Telephone conversation with Pat Muth (in Mr. Hefferman's office) of the Chicago Public Schools, October 17, 1969.
[56] Congreve, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
[57] *ibid.*, p. 20.
[58] Memorandum from McPherson to WCB, November 9, 1967, p. 1; Congreve, *op. cit.*, p. 42. The proposal was reviewed in WCB meetings November 8 and 14.
[59] WCB Study, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[60] *ibid.*
[61] *ibid.*; Congreve, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[62] Congreve, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 49.
[63] WCB Study, *op. cit.*, p. 13; Congreve, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

- December 1967 - The Board of Education recognized the WCB, which previously operated on an ad hoc basis.[64]

- January 1968 - A Title III Proposal was submitted to USOE entitled, "Operation Grant, Woodlawn Experimental Elementary Schools Project".[65]

- Late February 1968 - A meeting was held with USOE in Washington, where USOE indicated it would like a saturation effort, perhaps funded by HEW rather than USOE, and a supplement should be written concerning plans for the High School.[66]

- March 15, 1968 - Congreve submitted his final report on "Institutional Collaboration to Improve Urban Education with Special Reference to the City of Chicago".

- June 24, 1968 - The Chicago Comprehensive Project, consisting of the four proposals under Title III-ESEA submitted to State and Federal Title III officials, was funded by a contract from USOE to the Board of Education. The project was to begin as of June 24, 1968, and end June 23, 1969, with a total cost not to exceed $2,035,976.[67]

- July 24, 1968 - The Board of Education leased space for Project Staff members and appointed Mrs. Clara Holton Associate Director and Dr. Willard J. Congreve Director of the Project.[68]

- September 25, 1968 - Allen Paige Collard was appointed coordinator of Community Education Services, effective September 20, 1968.[69]

- March 31, 1969 - A proposal for a continuation grant was approved by the Woodlawn Community Board and submitted to the Board of Education.[70]

- April 7, 1969 - The Chicago Teachers' Union (CTU) held a meeting with the Chicago Board to air grievances of Wadsworth teachers, who claimed to have been threatened in Summer 1968, planning sessions. The CTU subsequently petitioned for representation on the WCB.[71]

- April 9, 1969 - The Continuation Grant Proposal was approved by the Chicago Board of Education.[72]

[64] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 4.

[65] See Appendix D of this document for a program plan.

[66] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 13.

[67] Memorandum #68-551 from Redmond to the Board of Education, July 10, 1968, p. 1.

[68] Memoranda #68-576, #68-586-7, and #68-586-8 from Redmond to the Board of Education, July 24, 1968.

[69] Memorandum #68-738-5 from Redmond to the Board of Education, September 25, 1968, p. 1.

[70] McPherson, WCB minutes, April 10, 1969, Appendix A (Congreve's announcement to the WCB).

[71] WCB minutes, June 12, 1969.

[72] McPherson, WCB minutes, April 10, 1969, Appendix A.

- April 10, 1969 - Prior to the scheduled WCB meeting, an open hearing related to reorganizing the Board was held. The essential points of the statements were:

    - Community parents must be heard in the Board.

    - Citizens should have the right to elect those persons who represent them.

  As one speaker said it: "The schools have been controlled by an educational system that has not served us well. We have come here to be sure we will be heard."

  The University of Chicago representative indicated that three of the seven University seats on the board were at the disposal of the community. He concluded with the statement that if TWO thought the University should get out, "we will leave and leave at once".

  During the regular meeting:

    - The Project Director, Dr. Willard Congreve, resigned to allow some local leadership to be found and appointed. (He indicated this was his decision and not in response to any pressure.)

    - The law department of the University of Chicago was to be asked to assist the Project Director in investigating the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of developing the Woodlawn Community Board into a not-for-profit corporation in Illinois.[73]

- May 14, 1969 - The Chicago Board approved the WCB reconstitution allowing more local community persons, plus teacher and student representation.[74]

- May 15, 1969 - At the WCB meeting:

    - The Black Coalition of College and High School Students submitted a position paper calling for the removal of the University of Chicago from the Project.[75] However, when Dean Campbell offered to adjourn the meeting from its agenda so the issue might be discussed. The parents and community people attending the meeting refused to do so indicating the issue was less important than the regular agenda items. (Indeed, the University of Chicago had reportedly offered, prior to this meeting and again at later dates, to relinquish all its seats on the WCB.)[76]

    - The WCB learned that the new budget would be $1,356,961 rather than the $1,656,256 originally requested. This was reportedly due to federal action regarding Title III funds plus state actions.

[73] McPherson, WCB minutes, April 10, 1969, pp. 1-5, 8.

[74] Redmond, James F., Memorandum Progress Report on Title III-ESEA, to the Board of Education, August 13, 1969.

[75] WCB minutes, May 15, 1969. See also Appendix A of this memorandum report.

[76] Clarification obtained in a telephone interview with Dean Campbell and Dr. Barbara Sizemore.

  - An open hearing on line items in the budget was held and 42 recommendations for revision were made. It was agreed that the budget would be sent back to the WCB committee level and revised.[77]

- May 20, 1969 - At a meeting of the University Contingent of the WCB, it was decided that:
  - No specific answer to the Black students would be made.
  - It would be recommended to WCB that the University membership be reduced to four people.
  - Reverend Brazier be urged to become chairman of WCB and that Dr. Melnick and Dean Campbell be seen as vice-chairmen.[78]

- May 22, 1969 - At a meeting of the WCB, the revised budget for the continuation grant was approved, after which objections were raised that further hearings and discussion were not conducted.[79]

- June 12, 1969 - The WCB voted to establish ad hoc committees of community persons to deal with matters of incoming personnel at the Wadsworth and Hyde Park Schools.[80]

- June 24, 1969 - A WCB meeting was held for the sole purpose of receiving nominations for a Project Director. While the formal process of widespread publication for applicants for the position had been fulfilled and seven applications were received, the WCB unanimously voted that Mrs. Barbara Sizemore be appointed. (Mrs. Sizemore had been proposed before the widespread process had been conducted.)[81]

- June 26, 1969 - Willard Congreve, retiring as Project Director, filed his report of activities for the period of February 1 to June 30, 1969, noting that considerable strides had been made toward the objective of creating a new social system in which the school ". . . would become an institution of the community".[82]

[77] WCB minutes, May 15, 1969.

[78] Minutes of the Meeting of the University Contingent of the Woodlawn Community Board, May 20, 1969.

[79] WCB minutes, May 22, 1969.

[80] WCB minutes, June 12, 1969.

[81] WCB minutes, June 24, 1969.

[82] Congreve, Willard J., Memorandum Report of Activities of the WESP for the period February 1 to June 3, 1969, p. 1. Also see Section VII of this memorandum report.

- July 24, 1969 - Sizemore, in her first report to the WCB, recommended that:

  > ". . . some process for development of criteria for teacher evaluation commence immediately with principals, teachers, parents, community residents, pupils and WESP staff included in the construction of such criteria."[83]
  >
  > "The Model Cities Educational Program for Woodlawn (which apparently duplicated much of WESP) be channeled through the Woodlawn Community Board."[84]

- August 13, 1969 - Superintendent Redmond submitted Congreve's report to the Board of Education.85

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[83] Sizemore, Barbara A., Memorandum Report to WCB, July 24, 1969, p. 2.

[84] ibid., p. 4.

[85] Redmond, James F., Memorandum Progress Report, Title III-ESEA . . . , op. cit., pp. 1-3.

IV. WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE WCB HAVE?

Formal

WCB has no formal powers, being subject in all cases to Central Board Veto. The Memorandum of Understanding makes clear that, ". . . nothing in this agreement will be construed to limit the authority of the Board of Education to control and manage the schools . . . in accordance with the administrative and decision-making powers of the Board of Education contained in the laws of the State of Illinois."[86]

However, WCB does have some formal advisory powers: the Board of Education, in the agreement, agreed to *consult* the WCB before changing or designating the experimental schools; the WCB will be *consulted* by the Superintendent before he recommends the Project Director to the Board of Education; the WCB will be *consulted* by the Board of Education on personnel, organization, programs, and administration; and the Director must obtain *counsel* from WCB before making recommendations and must state any differences of opinion clearly.[87]

Informal

The Board of Education is still not bound to act on community wishes; however, to date the wishes of WCB have seemed sufficiently compatible that they virtually have had powers in these areas - the Board of Education does not appear to have vetoed their plans.

The WCB, in setting out its *functions*, stated they were, ". . . (a) to review, discuss (and in some cases initiate) and prepare recommendations for policies and projects in urban education which will directly affect the children, adults, community or community organizations of Woodlawn and (b) to provide a channel of communication between the projects and the larger institutions represented on the Woodlawn Community Board. It is recognized that under the provisions of the Illinois School Code, final decisions regarding said policies and projects must be made by the Board of Education, City of Chicago."[88]

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[86] Redmond, Title III Proposal, *op. cit.*, Appendix C, p. 2. See also Appendix B of this memorandum report.

[87] *ibid.*

[88] Redmond, Title III Proposal, *op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 1.

V. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE WCB?

The over-riding goal of the WCB would seem to be to make the schools responsive to the whole community through community participation. Redmond, for example, indicates that WCB's highest priority is to "restructure the school as a social system in terms of its community through mutuality of effort, and improve the quality of teaching and learning in the school through mutuality of effort".[89]

Improved education, of course, is bound up in the primary goal, but is directed toward three specific sub-goals. (1) raising student achievement; (2) improving the student self-concept; and (3) increasing the students sense of power over himself and his community.[90]

Specific curriculum priorities are as follows: (1) reading comprehension; (2) voluntary reading to serve individual interests; (3) writing competency; (4) speaking competency; (5) competence in quantitative thinking; (6) learning how to learn; (7) communication; (8) I.Q.; and (9) sense of control over surroundings.[91] These curriculum priorities appear to be unusual among the local boards, because, while it is true that others generally place reading skills first, they also place among curriculum priorities topics such as: Black awareness and culture, and do not stress the more traditional educators' items such as speaking competency and I.Q.

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[89] Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 15. See also Campbell, op. cit., p. 7; WCB Study, op. cit., p. 3.

[90] Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., p. 5.

[91] ibid., p. 17.

VI. IS THE WCB REPRESENTATIVE?

The 21-member board was originally comprised of three contingents of seven each: (including a chairman); the University of Chicago; the Chicago Public Schools, and TWO. The representatives were not elected by the community but appointed, which led to a situation where all the Chicago Public Schools' representatives were principals, and no teachers were represented. Each of the three contingents could, when requested cast only one vote, and voting was designed so that no two contingents could outvote the third: this meant that any one contingent had absolute veto power assuring that consensus had to be reached. As a practical matter, most votes are simple majority votes without a request for the single contingent vote.[92] The chairmanship rotates and regular meetings are held monthly.[93]

The representativeness of the WCB would thus seem to be questionable. Indeed, various groups have questioned this very point: the Board of Education, University of Chicago undergraduates, the Hyde Park High School PTA, and the Urban Progress Committee.[94]

The basis of membership on the board has been reconstituted (see May 14 and 15 entries on Section III above). The total membership remains at twenty-one, with TWO having a contingent of ten, the Chicago Public Schools having seven, and the University four. The Public Schools group contains two teachers and two students among its seven. Voting procedures remain the same.[95] It is therefore unlikely that the issue of representativeness will escape further questioning by interested parties.

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[92] Telephone interview with Dean Campbell.

[93] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 4; Redmond, Title III Proposal, op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 1, 2.

[94] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 31. See also Appendix A, where representation in the WCB is seriously called into question by the Black Coalition of college and high school students.

[95] Telephone interview with Dean Campbell.

VII. WHAT HAS THE WCB ACCOMPLISHED?

- Increased parent participation in Parent Council meetings and as observers in WCB meetings.[96]
- Better interpersonal relationships among parents, teachers, and students.[97]
- Improved reading skills at the third and sixth grade levels in the Wadsworth Schools.[98]
- Improved I.Q. scores of primary students.[99]
- A Community Education Center operating at Wadsworth, Monday through Thursday evenings, offering courses from basketabll to computer instruction (in cooperation with Operation Breadbasket).[100]

[96] Congreve, Willard J., Report of Activities of the Woodlawn Experimental Schools District Project for the Period February 1 to June 30, 1969, June 26, 1969, p. 1. See Appendix E of this memorandum report.

[97] Congreve, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

[98] *ibid.*, p. 2.

[99] *ibid.*

[100] *ibid.*

VIII. IS THE WCB POLICY-MAKING PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

Detailed minutes are kept of the WCB meetings, lending them highly public, and apparently up to 150 "observers" have attended meetings, thus there is evidence to support the contention that much policy-making is carried out in a public manner.

However, some issues were pre-vetoed by either Melnick or Campbell, for example, and never reached the WCB (for example: a first draft of the Agreement, written by Brazier and using terminology such as "autonomy", "local control", and so forth, was pre-vetoed; choice of schools for the Project - this was announced to the WCB; and political negotiations). This by-passing of the WCB has been attributed to needs for "haste", "efficiency", and "political efficacy".[101]

Some WCB procedures are also designed to allow for private decision-making, such as the insistence on consensus; the frequent use of informal approval rather than a formal vote; and the use of a caucus to resolve inter-contingent differences.[102] However, Dean Campbell reported that the caucus has been resorted to only three or four times and that they were held in public view, although without public participation.

Public attempts by the WCB to obtain consensus are the use of "rituals, conventions, and collective representations", such as: seating which doesn't separate the three groups; use of first names to show rapport and titles to show esteem; the use of various connotative words such as "collaboration", "mutual effort", "meaningful participation", etc.[103]

There are also ways of preventing extended WCB observer dialogues: "Difficult issues that cannot be handled by discussions are often channeled away from the public forum; persons are asked to write a letter, or get together with the project director to discuss the issue, or to wait until the next meeting."[104]

[101] WCB Study, op. cit., p. 22. Congreve deals with the Agreement draft in saying that Campbell and Melnick, in vetoing it, showed that many of the ideas were already in existence as options; some weren't necessary; and the tone of the document might raise hackles of the School Department. Congreve, op. cit., pp. 41, 42.

[102] WCB Study, op. cit., pp. 22, 24,

[103] ibid., pp. 25, 26.

[104] ibid., p. 25.

APPENDIX A

A CRITIQUE BY
THE BLACK COALITION OF COLLEGE AND
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

The "Black Critique" is the center of considerable controversy. It was read aloud by Miss Muriel Balla at the WCB meeting, May 15, 1969. The document was accepted and filed along with other statements made in the April 10 hearing by the WCB which the students had claimed they were unable to attend. From the May 15 minutes:

> "Mr. Campbell asked if the Board wished to continue with the agenda for the meeting or adjourn so that the component groups could consider the statement which had been read by Miss Balla. Mrs. Cain said, 'The University of Chicago has been called racist before and you have been attacked before as a white man. It takes a great deal of effort for parents to make arrangements to get out to a meeting like this. I believe we want to go on with the meeting and I ask TWO members on the Board to support that.'"

As the issue was finally discussed in a telephone interview with Dr. Sizemore and Dean Campbell, the community felt the critique was not in fact a "Black Critique", as a group of white students, connected with SDS, had been involved in the initiation and writing of the document. It was for this reason that the WCB did not interrupt its agenda and the university contingent later agreed to make no reply to its charges. The complete text follows.

A Black Critique of The University of Chicago in the Woodlawn Experimental School Project *

This critique comes from the necessity to evaluate the University of Chicago position in the Woodlawn Experimental School Project (WESP). This need forced the Black Coalition of College and High School Students (a subcommittee of UC/BSA-SPLIBS) to make public their evaluation. By examining the public policies and general policy direction of the University of Chicago on the Woodlawn Community Board, the need for this criticism became self-evident.

Discrediting a local school board or refuting 'experimental' decentralization of school authority is not our purpose. However, due to the University of Chicago position and operation on the Woodlawn Community Board, WESP is a poor manifestation and implementation of these potentially beneficial structual arrangements. And the Woodlawn Community Board (WCB) cannot act in the interest of the Black Community.

The basic argument of this critique is that The University of Chicago presence on WCB hinders the local board and decentralization and helps engineer Black pacification. Consequently the University should withdraw immediately from WCB. The public record of the University as a social and political institution, with political ideas and concrete social programs, is sufficient reason for its removal. And its public record on the Woodlawn Community Board doubly indicts it to withdraw immediately.

The seven basic arguments that lead to this conclusion contend at present:

1. that the University of Chicago is not a 'junior partner' in Black education and WCB;
2. that the University is crucially represented in WESP staff;
3. that the University,through its external power, legitimizes and neutralizes WESP, that is, it keeps it in 'line';
4. that the University's basic role is inhibiting meaningful Black development;
5. that the University, through its legal sophistication, engineers its policies on the local board;
6. that the University gains external prestige from this project by researching and implementing a successful, early Black pacification of Black, Woodlawn children;
7. that the University of Chicago, historically, has been socially and politically conservative and has therefore been consistently anti-Black.

* Source: WCB minutes, May 15, 1969, Appendix A, pp. 1-6.

A brief discussion of each of these points should show why the University of Chicago should withdraw immediately from the Woodlawn Experimental School Project.

Current University rhetoric says the University is, and should be, a 'junior partner' in Black community affairs. However, close examination of the University of Chicago involvement in WESP immediately shows that the University of Chicago is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a 'junior partner'. According to the formal constitution of the Woodlawn Community Board -- the so-called 'Memorandum of Agreement' between the University of Chicago, the Chicago Board of Education and TWC -- the University has one third of the board membership and a unit vote of one. Further, no programs and policies can be passed or acted on by the board unless the University of Chicago, through its unit vote, approves. The University has veto power over anything WCB might do since all three components must unanimously agree on programs and policies. This makes the University of Chicago a crucial and essential partner in Black education and development: its possession of a unit vote may curtail or cancel any program or policy designed by Black community planners.

The University of Chicago, in addition to being an integral and powerful part of the Woodlawn Community Board, is crucially represented in the administrative of the project. Both the project director and the project research are University of Chicago professors; neither had significant experience in meeting Black people's educational needs. Educational programs are, to a significant extent, covertly devised by these University staff members in collaboration with members of the University (some of whom also happen to be on WCB. For example, the technical input for the summer program at Wadsworth due mostly to the University. Also, recently, the project director took it upon himself to write up a 'drop-out prevention' program and submitted it in 'preliminary' form to the Federal Government in the name of WESP without even consulting community representatives.

Beyond its representation on the staff and on the board of WESP, The University has another, more 'external' involvement -- it furnishes the determining financial and political pull of the project. To potential conservative finacial contributors, the white society at large and status quo forces, the heavy involvement of the University of Chicago insures that the project is under 'responsible' leadership (that is University of Chicago leadership) and without community control. This 'external' power makes the University the major spokesman and negotiator for finances and programs for the project.

For instance, Julian Levi was the principal negotiator with his flunkey, the project director, for the orginal structuring of the project, the establishment of the so-called 'Memorandum of Agreement' and the securing of Federal funds for the project. (Julian Levi happens to be the University big shot who deals with the surrounding Black communities who masterminded the Hyde Park Urban Removal of Blacks. More recently, the same Julian Levi, acting in the name of the University, played a major role in negotiating an agreement with James Redmond, Supt. of Chicago Public Schools, to alter the program of Hyde Park High School reconstruction. Despite three years of protest from parents, students and teachers from the school, the Board of Education did not move on the issue until the prestigious University of Chicago took an active position.

Since the University has 'legitimized' WESP and has neutralized the effectiveness of WESP for the conservative and reactionary forces in American society, The University's role is simple: inhabit the institution of substantial and relevant changes in black people's education and developmnet. That the University does so is, again, clear from the public record of the Woodlawn Community Board meetings.

Generally, when pressure and Black community discontent seek changes in WCB programs and policies, the representatives of the University (particularly Mr. Levi) have talked in highly legalistic terms about what can and cannot be done and have pointed out restrictions in the 'Memorandum of Agreement', previous policies, etc. On the other hand, the University has consistently discovered convenient loopholes in the 'law', if these loopholes bring about what the University suggests.

For example, when the Board faced the question of dismissing, transferring or suspending a Hyde Park High School teacher who was branded as dictatorial by a petition of some 500 students and by his principal, the University's position was strictly for 'due process'. Due process meant no action in the forseeable future and putting the whole matter through the Board of Education and Union channels. As this particular meeting progressed, the conflict between community spectators (especially students) and the Board members became increasingly open and hostile. Finally, in an apparent reversal of position, Mr. Levi rushed a motion for dismissal of the teacher through the Woodlawn Community Board, thus for the moment accommodating the justifiably upset community persons. However, it discovered the next day that the motion Mr. Levi had made was invalid through a legal technicality. Mr. Levi recinded the motion at the next WCB meeting, and no action was directly taken on the matter by WCB. But in lieu of direct action Mr. Levi then moved (and won approval) for a motion requesting the District Superintendent to give an administrative transfer, less this teacher impair the whole project. This was equivalent to suggesting that if the board adopted Mr. Levi's motion and publicly coerced the District Superintendent, either the teacher must leave or the project would fail. The District Superintendent, politely and legally, was coerced to remove this teacher from a volatile project and a volatile situation.

It is clear, then, that the University,far from being a 'junior partner' in WESP, is in fact an extremely powerful force in the project. It has veto power on the board, it is significantly represented on the staff and it plays the role of political intermediary between powerful conservative elements of American society and the project -- it keeps WESP in line. Further, the University, through its legal sophistication and its public prestige, may engineer its policies on the Board and virtually stiffles corresponding leadership, sophistication and political development from and within the black community.

Another aspect of more recent University propaganda about its community involvement has been the claim that its involvement stems from community invitation because it has 'something of value' to share. A careful consideration of the public statements, policies and action of the University reveals that this claim is nonsense.

The president of the University of Chicago, Edward Levi (Julian's brother), has said that the University is one of the greatest research institutions in the country and he wants it to stay that way. Right now, research in education means experiments in education, especially experiments by white institutions in the education of Black children. This is one of the main reasons for the University of Chicago participation in WESP. The principal goal of 'Black ghetto education' as envisioned by the University of Chicago and implied in the WESP project director's secret drop-out proposal is to create educational programs that will equip the 'socially maladjusted' (read 'Black') child to cope with reality (read 'status quo'). Presently WESP is hovering on the edge of the national spotlight. It would be a large feather in the cap of this 'great research institution' if it could be the first to discover the best means towards such early-age Black pacification (that is, early Black brainwashing).

The University of Chicago is essentially anti-Black and consequently pro-white. Its nature manifests itself in its long record of conservative, social policies, which generally coincided with political, economic and social consensus. Restricted covenants in housing, which discriminated and systematically excluded Blacks from decent housing, has been its policy; indifference to the 1965 Hyde Park-Woodlawn educational park issue centering around a model educational park issue, centering around a model educational park for stabilizing Woodlawn and keeping high academic achievement at Hyde Park High School, has been its policy; that indifference which conceded a racist victory to Hyde Park-Kenwood residents and fostered class and race separation in Woodlawn schools has been its policy; land expansionist tendencies in Woodlawn, prompting the creation of the Temporary Woodlawn Organization and a temporary job descrimination, low wages and minimum promotion at Billings--all of which affected Blacks the most--has been its policy; refusing to admit Blacks wounded by guns in Woodlawn for treatment at Billings has been its policy; almost total exclusion of Black enrollment from its Graduate Schools and College, until recently and only on a token level, has been its policy; political suppression of dissent within its student body and faculty has been its policy.

Given these policies displaying its real unbending and authoritarian nature, given these status quo precedents, given their pro-white, consistent racist intent, given its black indifference, black exclusion and black suppression, what legitimate reason can it have for being on the Woodlawn Community Board? Because it has none, it should withdraw immediately.

Appendix

Since the Committee completed its analysis, some suggested changes and a tentative resignation have been submitted to the Board. The change consists of reorganizing the board by adding five more community personnel, if the University of Chicago loses three of its members and the Board of Education loses two of its members. Currently the Board consists of seven representatives from each component. Under the proposed change, TWO would have twelve (12 members: Seven from its current component; three from the University of Chicago component; and two from the Board of Education component. The University of Chicago would retain four of its original seven members. And each component would still retain its unit-vote, which means that a no-vote from any component could block any program.

Basically, this proposed change does not alter the so-called "Memorandum of Agreement", the official document establishing WCB. All it does is color each component with some community representatives. It leaves the University of Chicago and the Board of Education with a majority on their respective components. Further, if a simple majority vote determines the final unit-vote, each component still has an autonomous unit vote working for its interest.

What is even more fundamental about this move is the overt conciliatory approach of the University of Chicago, an approach which has no real consession but which serves as a propaganda gesture for its public relations image. Moreover, this move intends to further solidify the University's presence in Woodlawn. In attempting to further legitimize its illegitimate presence in Woodlawn, the University seeks community cooperation by giving the illusion it allows community participation in its component but by maintaining its simple majority to control and overrule any community proposal.

An immediate denial of this monolithic view of the University majority will be forthcoming. However, by looking at the behavioral aspects of WCB and by comparing the comments of Mr. Levi, Dean Campbell and Dean Johnson -- all of whom sit on WCB -- it is immediately apparent that an extremely homogeneous perspective comes from all three. Further, neither these men or their other four colleagues -- none of whom are Black -- ever publicly disagree on what course of action to take. And since Mr. Levi generally does most of the talking for the University -- if the public hearings where Mr. Levi publicly stated University present policy and current rationale for being in WESP is any indication of who speaks for the University of Chicago -- there is good behavioral reason to suspect a monolithic or premeditated consensus from the University and its component.

The tentative resignation submitted to the Board is that of the project director. The project director, who is white and a University Associate Professor in the Department of Education -- his name is unimportant, his social fact is more meaningful -- publicly announced his resignation at the public hearings concerning the re-organization of the Board. At that hearing, the Chairman of the meeting mentioned that all three Board Co-chairmen had known about the intent of the project director for some time. And they thought it was about time that he made it public.

What is critical about his announcement is its timing. The director used an occasion of conflict and tension, which could be predicted from the previous three Board meetings where community personnel and Board members had various clashes, including one walk-out by all Black people present. That occasion of conflict and tension needed something to 'cool off the heat'. The 'heat' was there: various organization and personnel working in the Black community and Woodlawn schools asked for wider participation and involvement in the project; one public witness called for the removal of the majority white membership of the Board; and the District Superintendent of this District A, who sits on the Board, was publicly questioned about his published remarks against community participation and control of schools. "To cool off the heat" someone made the decision to include the project director's resignation on the agenda. That inclusion brought a noticeable approval from observers in the room. Such a noticeable approval could be predicted since the initial appointment of the

Director caused much tension and conflict concerning his potential and ability to relate to Black needs. Because such approval was predictable, it was used to quiet dissent in and outside the project and to remove a director after his essential work was completed.

His essential work was to see that all initial planning occured under watchful management. That careful management has already passed. Most of the Tentative insignificant changes in the 'experimental' school have already been proposed. And the only foundation for change has occured under a white, University of Chicago professor. The removal of a director, at this time, does not alter his work already completed. Nor does it change the nature and programs tentatively considered for the next two years. What it does is remove the architect of early Black pacification and leave a vacancy for the engineers and builders of this early, meticulous pacification through intensive in-school socialization. (Such work has already begun with the Woodlawn Mental Health Clinic Project in which the University of Chicago has undertaken programs and studies of adjustment to school by first graders in twelve primary public and certain parochial schools in Woodlawn.)

Both proposed changes in WCB and the resignation of the project director are basically insignificant moves. Neither changes the fundamental nature of WESP. Both covertly serve to entrench and strengthen University of Chicago presence in Woodlawn schools. Both leave an essentially racist research institution to further its kinds and degrees of involvement in Woodlawn. Neither alters its crucial powerful position in community decision-making. Neither produces more autonomous community self-determination, Both play on a cynical Machiavellian framework by emphasizing the range of the possible (reform) but ignoring inherent contradictions and consequences in the range of the possible (perfecting a bankrupt educational system). Both moves serve to further the already too powerful privitization of public powers of the University of Chicago which is usurping prerogatives of social planning under the covert pretext of 'institutional collaboration.'

In effect, the continued presence of the University of Chicago allows a rationalized, racist system of educational and social planning to determine future Black development and to determine, irreversibly, what priorities and programs determine Black development. Only the removal of the University of Chicago could alter this almost imminent and ominous development.

Black Coalition of College and High School
Students, a Subcommittee of UC/BSA-SPLIBS

May 15, 1969

APPENDIX B

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
AMONG THE CHICAGO BOARD,
THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BOARD OF EDUCATION REPORT #67-1214 (AMENDED)*

(12/27/67)

Approve Memorandum of Agreement For Experimental Urban Education Developmental Project in District 14; Approve Request for Title III Grant

To the Board of Education of the City of Chicago:

The General Superintendent of Schools

Reports that Board Report 67-267-4 adopted March 8, 1967, outlined briefly an experimental developmental study project carried on by the University of Chicago in cooperation with the Chicago Public Schools and The Woodlawn Organization. This report outlined the major objectives of the planners during the developmental period of March 15, 1967, through November 15, 1967, as "(a) the determination of how the participating institutions and organizations can most appropriately and effectively work together for the improvement of public education in the central city; and (b) the development of recommendations for an operational plan for such collaborative effort." The focus of the initial inquiry was in the East Woodlawn section of District 14 of the Chicago Public Schools.

That Board Report 67-267-4 further stipulated that "planners affiliated with the project will design new mechanisms and programs for educational research, development, demonstration, dissemination, and training, all viewed in the context of practice in regular public schools in Chicago. Certain basic design suggestions already advanced will be tested for feasibility during the developmental period. Particular emphasis will be placed on the study of the potentiality (a) of designating District 14 as an experimental district; (b) of creating a Title III (Public Law 89-10) educational center for the experimental district; (c) of designating specific mainstream schools in the experimental district as demonstration schools; and (d) of developing an experimental elementary-secondary center for the experimental district."

That Board Report 67-267-4 further stipulated that "it is anticipated that the activity of the developmental period itself (to include the cooperative effort of a major urban public school system, a growing and nationally respected community organization, and a major urban university) and the operational plan recommended will provide a model for similar

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* Source: Congreve, *op. cit.*, Appendix N, pp. 1-6.

and subsequent action in large and small urban centers of the United States."

And Further

Reports that a tri-partite organization called the Woodlawn Community Board consisting of representatives from the University of Chicago, District 14 of the Chicago Public Schools, and The Woodlawn Organization was organized to formulate policy in line with the objectives noted above.

That a small staff representing the University of Chicago, the Chicago Public Schools, and The Woodlawn Organization has been at work during the period noted above gathering data and preparing a preliminary proposal entitled "Urban Education Developmental Project" for the schools in East Woodlawn District 14.

And Further

Reports that it has been determined that there should be modification of the basic design suggestions listed above to the effect that (a) only the East Woodlawn schools in District 14, to be known as the Woodlawn Experimental District, will be designated as experimental schools in the project; these consist of Carnegie, Dumas, Fermi, Fermi Upper Grade Center, Fiske, Scott, 61st and University, Tesla, Wadsworth, Wadsworth Upper Grade Center, and Hyde Park High School; (b) it does not appear feasible at this time to create an educational center for experimental purposes but that experimentation be carried out within the existing school settings; (c) intense experimentation will, at first, be carried out in one or two K-6 schools listed above, one UGC, and Hyde Park High School; (d) it does not appear feasible at this time to develop an experimental elementary-secondary center.

And Further

Reports that a Memorandum of Agreement (attached hereto) has been developed by the Project staff and agreed to by members of the Woodlawn Community Board.

And Further

Reports that staff has reviewed this Memorandum of Agreement and recommends its approval.

The General Superintendent of Schools Therefore

Recommends that the Memorandum of Agreement be approved by the Board of Education and that the President and Secretary be authorized to execute same on behalf of the Board of Education.

And Further

Recommends that the Board of Education approve the proposal presented in another Board Report for a PL 89-10 Title III Grant which will provide funds to initiate this experimental district.

Financial: No expense to the Board.

Prepared by: Curtis C. Melnick Area Associate Superintendent	Respectfully submitted, James F. Redmond General Superintendent of Schools

Approved by:
Evelyn F. Carlson
Eileen C. Stack
Associate Superintendents

Noted:
Robert Stickles
Controller

December 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION, AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

(Final Draft-12/27/67)

This agreement, made this 27th day of December, A. D., 1967, by and among the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, the University of Chicago, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and The Woodlawn Organization, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation.

Witnesseth, that:

Whereas the creation by the Board of Education of an experimental school district in the Woodlawn area of the City of Chicago offers to the Board of Education, The Woodlawn Organization, and the University of Chicago an opportunity to test an imaginative plan in urban education; and the commitment of the three collaborating institutions to finding a way to provide education of high quality in an inner-city community represents a readiness and willingness on the part of each institution to commit time, energy and resources to the fulfillment of this hope.

Now, therefore, in order that this opportunity can be realized, The Woodlawn Organization agrees to participate in the experiment and to commit time and resources in attempting to involve parent and other grass roots community persons in the programs of the experiment; the University of Chicago agrees to participate in the planning, study and evaluation of the experiment and to assist in the recruitment and training of personnel who are to be involved in the experimental district; and the Board of Education agrees to establish the experimental district and to provide schools in which ideas may be tested and new procedures developed.

The parties further agree as follows:

1. Each party hereto will assign seven persons, representing a cross-section of its institution, who will form the Woodlawn Community Board. The purposes of the Woodlawn Community Board are, among other things, to [(a) review, discuss, initiate and recommond policies and projects in urban education that will directly affect the children, adults, community and community organizations of the Woodlawn area, and (b) provide a channel of communication with the institutions represented on the Woodlawn Community Board.] The Woodlawn Community Board may make such rules for its administration and operation as it deems desirable that are consistent with the purposes of the experiment and of this agreement.

2. The Board of Education will designate the particular schools that are to be included in the experimental district. The schools forming the experimental district may be changed from time to time by the Board of Education. The Board of Education agrees that it will seek the advice and consultation of the Woodlawn Community Board before designating or changing the schools in the experimental district.

3. The Board of Education will appoint the director of the experimental district upon the recommendation of the General Superintendent of Schools. The General Superintendent of Schools will make this recommendation after consultation with the Woodlawn Community Board. The director of the experimental district will be responsible to the General Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education but he will bring proposals for experimentation to the Woodlawn Community Board to receive its reactions, recommendations and approval.

4. The Board of Education recognizes the Woodlawn Community Board as the body that insures the involvement and participation of The Woodlawn Organization and the people and agencies it represents, and the University of Chicago, in this experiment. The Board of Education solicits the participation of the Woodlawn Community Board in all matters related to the personnel, organization, program and administration of the experimental district. The Board of Education agrees that the director of the experimental district is required to obtain the advice, counsel, recommendations and concurrence of the Woodlawn Community Board prior to making any recommendations related to the personnel, organization, programming, administration, finance or any other matters concerning the experiment, to the General Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education. The action taken by the Woodlawn Community Board on these matters will be indicated in any recommendations that the director of the experimental district submits to the General Superintendent of Schools. If the director's proposed recommendation is not in agreement with the Woodlawn Community Board's recommendation, the director of the experi-

mental district will make a report and will so indicate. The concurrence, or lack of it, of the Woodlawn Community Board will not bind the General Superintendent of Schools in directing the performance of this experiment or of making any recommendations to the Board of Education; nor does it in any way affect the right of the Board of Education to grant or deny approval to any recommendations of the General Superintendent of Schools in this regard or to initiate, change or terminate any part of the performance of this experiment. The Board of Education will give full consideration to the decisions and recommendations of the director of the experimental district and the Woodlawn Community Board, but nothing in this agreement will be construed to limit the authority of the Board of Education to control and manage the schools in the experimental district in accordance with the administrative and decision-making powers of the Board of Education contained in the laws of the State of Illinois.

5. The initial two or three months of the project in each school will be devoted, among other things, to meetings by the director of the experimental district with school personnel to share with them the purposes of the experiment and to enable them to participate in determining specific programmatic dimensions designed to achieve these purposes. When the purposes and program dimensions have been determined through this involvement and the personnel needs have been established, faculty members in the school will be invited to express an interest in continuing as members of the faculty. To the extent possible, other persons expressing an interest in the experiment will be invited into the program.

6. The Woodlawn Community Board will have the opportunity to recommend the general location of the offices for the experimental district.

7. As the experiment becomes operational this agreement may require revision. In order that this can be accomplished, it is understood that any one of the three collaborating institutions has the right to ask for a review.

8. This agreement is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois.

In witness whereof, the University of Chicago, The Woodlawn Organization, and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago have caused these presents to be executed by their respective presidents and secretaries and have impressed their seals hereon, this 27th day of December, A. D., 1967.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

By ______________________________
George W. Beadle, President

SEAL

Attest: __________________________
Walter V. Leen, Secretary of the
Board of Trustees

THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION

SEAL

By ______________________________
Arthur M. Brazier, President

Attest: ______________________________
Eula Mae Anderson, Secretary

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO

SEAL

By ______________________________
James M. Whiston, President

Attest: ______________________________
M. Q. Collins, Secretary

BOARD: 67-1214 (12/27/67)

Approved as to Legal Form:

____
James W. Coffey, Attorney
for the Board of Education
of the City of Chicago

Noted:

____
Robert Stickles, Controller

7322

APPENDIX C

WOODLAWN COMMUNITY BOARD

WOODLAWN COMMUNITY BOARD FOR URBAN EDUCATION PROJECTS*

(12/27/67)

1. Preamble and Purposes

1.1 Whereas the Chicago Public Schools, The Woodlawn Organization, and the University of Chicago are concerned with education in urban settings; and

1.2 Whereas the mutual goal of these three institutions is to establish urban education projects which may include (a) experimental and demonstration schools as well as (b) a variety of research, training, development, demonstration, and dissemination projects; and

1.3 Whereas the initial and intensive efforts of the urban education projects will be focussed in the East Woodlawn community which is located in District 14 of the Chicago Public Schools; and

1.4 Whereas in projects in urban education which directly affect the children, adults, community or community organization of Woodlawn, the three institutions essential to planning and implementation are (a) the Chicago Public Schools, (b) The Woodlawn Organization, and (c) the University of Chicago; and

1.5 Whereas these three institutions and the members thereof are broadly representative of the cultural and educational resources of the area designated as the experimental district in East Woodlawn;

1.6 Therefore, a Woodlawn Community Board for Urban Education Projects has been established. Its primary functions are (a) to review, discuss (and in some cases initiate) and prepare recommendations for policies and projects in urban education which will directly affect the children, adults, community or community organization of Woodlawn and (b) to provide a channel of communication between the projects and the larger institutions represented on the Woodlawn Community Board. It is recognized that under the provisions of the Illinois School Code, final decisions regarding said policies and projects must be made by the Board of Education, City of Chicago.

2. Organization

2.1 The Board consists of seven representatives each from the Chicago Public Schools, The Woodlawn Organization, and the University of

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* Source: Congreve, op. cit., Appendix O, pp. 1-3.

Chicago. Members are selected by each participating institution in a manner designated by the institution. The delegation from each institution should be selected to represent a cross-section of that institution. For example, the Chicago Public Schools delegation might include representatives from the central administration, the district office, principals, teachers, and other staff members; the University of Chicago delegation should be cross-disciplinary; The Woodlawn Organization delegation should be broadly representative of the organization and the community.

2.2 Each delegation elects a chairman. Each chairman presides for four consecutive regular meetings prior to turning over the gavel to the next chairman.

3. Meetings

3.1 Regular meetings of the Board are held monthly, with the option of special meetings. The directors of the urban education projects in Woodlawn will, in consultation with the three chairmen, prepare the agenda for each meeting of the Board.

3.2 The regular meetings of the Woodlawn Community Board may be open to observers who desire to come for information. In order to provide opportunities for members of the Woodlawn community to participate, a sub-committee of the Woodlawn Community Board may hold open meetings to receive criticisms, complaints, and suggestions. The entire Woodlawn Community Board may occasionally hold open hearings on important matters prior to reaching a decision.

4. Procedures

4.1 Decisions on recommendations which the Woodlawn Community Board will make to the Board of Education must have concurrent approval of the delegations of the institutions represented. Ordinarily, decisions are reached through open voting by the assembled Board members. When a Board member requests, institutional delegations may caucus to determine their positions before voting. When the caucus is called, the chairman of each delegation presides over his respective delegation during the caucus session and casts a single vote.

4.2 Whenever feasible, the Woodlawn Community Board will recommend that specific programs in urban education be conducted under the auspices of and through the structure of existing institutions in the community.

5. Jurisdiction

5.1 Recommendations for programs and projects in urban education may emanate from any source within the community and the component institutions. In each case a proposed program which would directly affect the Woodlawn community will be reviewed by the Woodlawn Community Board prior to submission to the Board of Education.

5.2 The activities of the Early Education Research Center, which has been funded as part of a National Laboratory in Early Childhood Education, fall under the jurisdiction of the Woodlawn Community Board whenever policies and programs of the Center directly affect the Woodlawn community.

5.3 The Woodlawn Community Board has been established to facilitate occasional but necessary direct communication from any community group or citizen, or university researcher, or public school teacher (as examples) to the Board itself. The Woodlawn Community Board is responsible for designing methods for such direct access.

APPENDIX D

EXCERPT OF PROGRAM PLAN
FROM TITLE III PROPOSAL



1. Pre-summer planning period, equivalent of one week; time spread over a one-or two-month period.

2. Intensive summer workshop of six weeks to include one week sensitivity experience; two weeks problem identification; three weeks invention and trying out of new techniques with children coming for half-day sessions. Three-week intensive training program for school-community agents followed by field work to initiate parent organizing activities.

3. Full-school year program: continued analyses of problems; study of curriculum; invention and test of techniques; addition of human and material resources; and major effort to establish parent-school relationships and create parent advisory groups.

4. Four-week intensive summer workshop followed by a four-week special summer school supported out of Chicago Public Schools funds. This summer school will provide teachers, parents, and children the opportunity to try out inventions which they are still skeptical about using during the school year. These inventions should stretch decisively conceptions about grouping, organization, content, and materials. Parents, other adults, and high school students will be used in the instructional program.

5. Full-year program of continued inquiry and invention in problem areas. Some effective techniques and programs will become established practice. Autonomous parent advisory groups will become active in the development of school policy.

Source: Redmond Title III Proposal, op.cit., pp. 40, 41.

6. Two-week workshop followed by a six-week experimental summer school. The summer school will be supported by the Chicago Public Schools budget.

7. Demonstration year with a stabilized number of human resources to determine what resources are needed to maintain the effective programs and to sustain the inquiry and invention into unresolved problems.

APPENDIX E

REPORT OF WESP DIRECTOR

JUNE 26, 1969

WOODLAWN EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJ
6253 SOUTH WOODLAWN AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637

MEMORANDUM

JUNE 26, 1969

TO: DR. CURTIS C. MELNICK

FROM: WILLARD J. CONGREVE

IN RE: REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE WOODLAWN EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS DISTRICT PROJECT FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 1, TO JUNE 30, 1969

The following report of Activities of the Woodlawn Experimental Schools District Project for the period February 1 to June 30, 1969 is submitted as requested.

The second half of the first year of the Woodlawn Experimental Schools District Project preved to be a most important period. By February, 1969 project positions were, for the most part filled and programs described in the project proposal were underway.

It is important to restate at the outset of this report the major objective of the project during its first year: to creat a new social system in which the school would no longer be viewed as an institution located in the community, but would become an institution of the community. This new institution would be shaped by a mutuality of effort involving teachers, parents, students, administrators and community residents. The basic hypothesis undergirding the project is that this new social system will facilitate the development of an educational program involving both the school and the community which, through relevance and expertise will meet the needs of the children, of Woodlawn and significantly increase their educational attainments, their self images, and their abilities to achieve success upon graduation from high school.

Considerable strides have been made toward achieving this objective. The best evidence available are anecdotal reports of incidents which reflect the new involvement of teachers, parents, students, and administrators. A number of these reports follow.

1. Some twenty-seven School Community Agents, recruited through The Woodlawn Organization and trained under its auspices using resources from the community, the University of Chicago, and Title I of the Higher Education Act, organized 30 parent councils on a geographical basis. These councils meet regularly in the homes of Woodlawn parents. Each council sends one of its members to an executive parent council. This executive council meets weekly with the educational staff to discuss mutual concerns. When the project began 25 - 50 parents infrequently attended PTA meetings. Now over 300 parents are actively involved in considering educational problems in the Woodlawn community. Many of these parents regularly attend the meetings of the Woodlawn Community Board where attendance of observers often exceeds 150 persons.

2. The rising strength of parents, students and teachers in the newly developing social system resulted in the questioning of the constituency of the Woodlawn Community Board. After careful extensive deliberation, the Board voted to reconstitute itself so that more local community persons would sit on the Board and that teachers and students affected by the project would have representation on the Board. The Chicago Board of Education recognized this developing social system by approving this new arrangement.

3. A means has been devised for developing stronger working relationships among teachers, parents, administrators and students. These laboratory work sessions conducted on an intensive basis over weekends have helped persons involved in the project develop ways of working together to define and to solve problems. Considerable progress has been made in involving the new social system as a result of these programs.

4. A group of Hyde Park High School teachers, parents and students rejected a drop-out prevention proposal which was prepared by project staff because it did not reflect the mutual thinking of staff, teachers, students and parents. Following this rejection a strong planning organization of teachers, parents and students was created. This group developed an imaginative, innovative and comprehensive plan for new and relevant programs to be implemented in Hyde Park High School during the 1969-70 school year.

5. Parents, teachers, and students of Hyde Park High School, and the Woodlawn Community Board raised a number of serious questions about the procedures being used to carry out the modernization of the Hyde Park High School facility. This action led to a number of meetings with Chicago Public Schools Central Office personnel which resulted in major changes in planning procedures and the employment of a school design consultant who now coordinates the work of the central office staff with the interests of local school and community persons. It is anticipated that this example of mutuality of effort will demonstrate how local involvement can produce a fine educational plant constructed by work teams made up primarily of members of the local community.

6. Many promising innovative programs have been implemented this year in the Wadsworth Schools. These have been reported previously. Of importance to note at this time is that reading achievements at both the third and sixth grade levels this year were above that of last year. In addition, the I.Q. scores of primary students were higher. Total credit for these gains probably should not go to the project. Nevertheless, these data refute the contentions of a few disgruntled teachers that "nothing good happened at Wadsworth this year."

7. The Community Education Center operating at Wadsworth Monday through Thursday evenings has been quite successful in attracting hard to reach students. Operating on the philosophy that "we will try to teach anything to anyone," no one has been turned away. Programs in "adult talk," boxing and basketball, have attracted students into the building who have later become involved in more academic pursuits. In cooperation with Operation Breadbasket, a program in computer instruction has been underway in the center since April. The success of this center has demonstrated the urgent need for a community educational program which aggressively includes community people in determining its goals and in designing its programs.

8. The project successfully withstood a severe attack on its purpose and integrity by four teachers who were encouraged and used by the President of the Chicago Teachers Union to further union goals. Refusing to use regularly established and accepted channels for grievances, these teachers and union personnel brought charges directly to the labor relations committee of the Chicago Board of Education. This action received no support from other teachers and community persons involved in or affected by the project. In fact, it resulted in embarrassment to the four teachers and a reduction of union pressure for a seat on the Woodlawn Community Board. If the charges had been true, the action of these teachers and the union might have sounded the death bell for the project. However, no further action was taken following the

hearing. Furthermore the Woodlawn Community Board was reconstituted subsequent to it. These actions attest to the strength and integrity of the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project.

9. Full involvement of teachers, parents, administrators, and students characterized the determination of the budget for the Title III E.S.E.A. Continuation Grant. All groups were represented in the preparation of the budget. Several hearings were conducted by the Woodlawn Community Board. Revisions were made by similar representative groups. No one can suggest that the new budget does not reflect the concern and will of the local people.

10. The dissemination conference on June 10 attracted persons from throughout the United States and reflected the excellent progress of the project thus far. The speeches and panel discussions will become part of a report to be published at a later date.

This report would not be complete if it did not highlight some of the major problems still confronting the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project. These problems I regretfully bequeath to the new project director:

1. The line-staff administrative arrangements relating this project to the existing structure of the Public schools are not satisfactory. It is virtually impossible for the project director to mold the many, diverse interests represented by various groups into a smooth functioning program characterized by some unity of purpose under the present administrative arrangements. The director must be officially in charge of the experimental schools, the principals, and the teachers. The tentative arrangement worked out among the present director, the superintendent of District 14 and the Area A Associate Superintendent, did not prove satisfactory. Furthermore, this line authority must extend fully over project staff who have been identified by other components. On occasion the project director felt powerless to deal with staff selected through The Woodlawn Organization. As a result, he occasionally found himself in the role of a puppet leader, rather than a director. At times he was used as a scapegoat. Part of the problem may have been the director's view of his own role. Nevertheless it is recommended that major changes in these arrangements should be effected upon the appointment of the new director.

2. Middle management in the central offices of the Chicago Public Schools should be instructed by someone in authority that this project is to be given their full support and attention. Great time lags between requests and action have been destructive especially in the areas of payroll and civil service personnel.

The payroll fiasco in January may never be lived down. To those working in the project it appears that few people in the central office sense any urgency about the problems of Woodlawn, or any sensitivity to the promise of this project in dealing with them.

3. Project staff need straight answers to questions relating to how the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project fits into local, state and federal plans. The double dealings and half truths experienced this spring involving federal, state and local personnel were demoralizing, to say the least. We can understand that many people are concerned if not frightened about the implication of this new social system. Nevertheless, if the official stance is anything less than full support, the project staff and the Woodlawn Community Board should know this. For example:

In March, 1969 federal and state officials denied a desperately needed major budget revision which was submitted upon the urging of one federal official. This denial meant a loss of about $200,000 to the Woodlawn community. Yet not one loud voice in the central office was raised in protest. Rather, the project director was directed to reduce the 1969-70 expenditure by $353,000. The directive was withdrawn when the director vigorously objected to it.

A final personal note. I leave the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project with a sense of pride, but also with misgivings. Much has been accomplished. I know I have played some role in helping to realize these attainments. Yet I fully acknowledge and do not wish to diminish the exceptional work and determination of the project staff, the three co-chairmen of the Woodlawn Community Board, the Woodlawn Community Board, the dedicated teachers, students, administrators, parents and community members. In many ways I regret leaving the project. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that my decision to leave was appropriate.

In leaving, I wish to express my sincere thanks to all who worked with me and to those who cheered me on from the sidelines. I am also grateful to those who raised difficult questions which forced me to reconsider until I had established sound reasons for my actions. To everyone who will participate in the Woodlawn Experimental Schools District Project from this time forward I extend every good wish for success however "success" may be eventually defined.

Respectfully submitted,

Willard J. Congreve

Willard J. Congreve
Director

WJC/db

cc: Members of the Woodlawn Community Board

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